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1. INTRODUCTION 
This document contains the results of a series 
of analyses made as part of the Joint DOT-NASA 
Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy 
Study. 
The sections in this document cover a variety 
of subjects, some technical - which relate 
d i r e c t l y  t o  c ivi l  aviation research and 
development - and some nontechnical - which 
affect the climate for technical innovation in the 
civil aviation industry and therefore determine 
whether the results of research and development 
will find application in the future. Figure 1.1 
shows the interrelation between the sections. The 
sections on the left-hand portion of the fiiure 
(Missions and System Elements) form the tech- 
nical foundation of the report, that is, the  specific 
missions performed by civil aviation and the  four 
system elements of each of these missions. In the 
analysis of a mission (such as commercial passen- 
ger service), each system element must be con- 
sidered, and conversely, in the analysis of a sys- 
tem element (such as air traffic control), each 
mission must be considered. 
Each technical section is based on analyses of 
the characteristics and growth to  date, current 
problems, future requirements (demand for ser- 
vice). potential solutions, implications for R&D, 
and recommendations. 
The first section of  the report, “Systems Sta- 
tus and Potential,” combines the missions and ele- 
ments, so that they may be examined in the con- 
text of a total air transportation system. The 
structure, characteristics, and cost of  an air trans- 
portation system that could efficiently satisfy the 
potential demand for air services in 1985 are 
presented. 
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Early in the Study, it became evident that 
one of the most serious problems facing civil avia- 
tion related to its impact on the environment. 
The degree to which civil aviation can solve its 
environmental problems (the most important 
ones being noise and pollution) will determine the 
degree to  which it can grow to serve the Nation. 
A separate section is devoted to  this subject. 
Other nontechnical considerations affect (and 
in turn are affected by) civil aviation to  such an 
extent that separate analyses were indicated. Two 
of these “nontechnical” sections address industry 
financial considerations and foreign competition 
to  show the relationships between these factors 
and the health of  civil aviation (and vice versa). 
The Senate Committee on Aeronautical and 
Space Sciences raised the specific question of 
“the divergence of military and civilian aeronauti- 
cal requirements.” Because of this and the impor- 
tance of military R&D to civil aviation, a separate 
section on  the military contribution to  civil avia- 
tion is included. 
The “Policy” section addresses certain policy 
issues that transcend technology alone and are 
heavily involved with the nontechnical, or  institu- 
tional, factors that affect the climate for technol- 
ogical innovation. 
Aeronautical R&D - which resulted in signif- 
icant advances in the various elements of 
aviation - together with other, nontechnological 
factors and policies have brought significant bene- 
fits t o  the Nation. The last section of this volume 
addresses these benefits and their relationship to  
research and development. 
Although the sections are all interrelated and 
interdependent as shown in Figure 1.1, each sec- 
tion was intended to be a reasonably complete 
discussion of its subject. There is thus some 
redundancy among the papers. Many of the sec- 
tions contain conclusions and recommendations 
based on detailed analysis of the specific subject 
area. The analyses and specific recommendations 
of this document formed the basis for the report 
of the Joint DOT-NASA Civil Aviation Research 
and Development Policy Study, published as DOT 
Report TST-10-4 and as NASA Report SP-265. 
CIVIL 
AVIATION 
R&D 
POLICY ISSUES 
DAl IPV 
GENERAL SURFACE ONTRIBUTION T 
AVIATION TRANSPORTATION CIVIL AVIATION 
Figure 1 . l .  Civil Aviation Research and Development Policy Study structure. 
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Systems Status
INTRODUCTION
For the purposes of this Study, air
transportation has been characterized in terms of
missions (long-haul, short-haul, cargo, general
aviation) and in terms of system elements
(vehicles, air traffic control system, airports,
complementary ground transportation).
Subsequent sections of this report will discuss
each of the missions and elements individually.
To permit an examination of some of the
interactions between missions and to identify the
major impacts from these interactions, this
section will consider all missions and elements
together in the context of a national civil aviation
system.
Another objective is to indicate the potential
and characteristics of a 1985 civil aviation system
that would meet the air transportation needs of
the public. To assist in the identification of pos-
sible changes required for the 1985 system, it has
been necessary to examine the current system and
its status (and problems). This has helped to iden-
tify those areas that require technical advances.
There is another reason for examining all the
missions and elements together. In the past, the
major components of civil aviation have in many
cases tended to develop independently and some-
what out of phase. The normal pattern has been
for air vehicles to lead, with the remaining parts
of the system responding to the demand placed
on them by new vehicles. The remarkable success
and efficiency of modern aircraft have placed
other parts of the civil aviation system under con-
siderable stress and often in a position of having
to catch up. This is reflected in the current limita-
tion on airport capacity at most major terminals.
There is thus a well-recognized need to give
increased advance attention to the complete
system - especially to the impact on the system
of the introduction of new air transport services.
A demand-center concept was used for
aggregating the requirements and characteristics
of the future air transport system. The demand
centers, patterned after hub definitions used by
and Potential
FAA, were used for integration, since the demand
centers (which contain the airport(s)) are the
points at which all four system elements (air vehi-
cles, air traffic control system, airports, and com-
plementary ground transportation) and the
missions come together. In evaluating the demand
centers, it was necessary to consider urban centers
of varying size, to project future traffic in the
various parts of civil aviation serving those cen-
ters, to postulate various airports or combinations
of airports necessary to accommodate that traffic,
and to examine the requirements placed on all
components of the civil aviation system.
SUMMARY
Air transport has become the dominant mode
of intercity common-carrier passenger travel. This
has come about in large part as a result of contin-
ual application of technological advances, which
have made possible better service to the users at
lower prices.
The application of these technical advances
and the economies accompanying the use of
more, bigger, and better air vehicles in an expand-
ing market have provided a reasonable formula
for growth. However, they have also led to con-
gestion, imbalance in the economics of the differ-
ent air transport sectors, and unfavorable environ-
mental impact. If not resolved, these problems
will place serious constraints on the ability of the
air transport system to satisfy the potential
demand for passenger and cargo services in the
future.
The potential demand for air transportation
in 1985 is shown in Figure 2.1. The total number
of passengers enplaned by U.S. scheduled airlines
is expected to grow from 154.4 million in 1969
(ref. 1) to a potential 800 million in 1985. This
represents a growth in passenger-miles from 120
billion in 1969 to approximately 700 billion in
1985. In addition, the number of passengers
carried by general aviation aircraft is expected to
increase to 390 million annually from about 215
million in 1969 (ref. 2). Air cargo traffic is
forecast to grow even faster than passenger
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service. By 1985, the U.S. airlines are expected to 
move over 34 million tons annually, nearly 12  
times the amount carried in 1969. 
This potential level of demand cannot be 
handled with the existing air system. Larger 
aircraft and incremental improvements in airports 
and the air traffic system can service only a 
portion of the new requirements. Additional 
facilities will be needed. One possible solution 
would be to  add a large number of conventional 
takeoff and landing (CTOL) airports throughout 
the United States. Such airports, however, require 
extensive amounts of land. I t  is doubtful that the 
required number of new CTOL facilities could be 
established to provide the capacity (and service) 
to satisfy the potential demand. An alternative 
solution is to attempt to serve a portion of the 
total demand (e.g., the short-haul market) in a 
different fashion - for example, through new 
short takeoff and landinglvertical takeoff and 
landing (STOL/VTOL) systems. 
Such systems would unload CTOL facilities 
by providing smaller, less expensive facilities 
closer to  the origins and  destinations of short-haul 
customers. They would also provide short-haul 
travelers and shippers with better service, while 
relieving congestion a t  major CTOL facilities. 
An alternative solution for serving the 
B 200- 
short-haul market is the use of high-speed ground 
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  such as rail on  existing 
rights-of-way or  high-speed rail o r  tracked 
air-cushion vehicles on new rights-of-way. As 
pointed out  in the “Commercial Passenger Ser- 
vice” section of this report, an efficient 
high-speed ground system is attractive in a region 
such as the Northeast Corridor where heavy 
demand centers are located along a “spine.” This 
region has an existing rail right-of-way. Even in 
the Northeast Corridor, however, it would be 
impractical to provide fixed right-of-way ground 
links to all of the areas desiring short-haul service. 
Other regions of the country, where demand for 
short-haul travel will be increasing, do not all have 
the fixed rights-of-way that would allow eco- 
nomic implementation of high-speed ground 
systems. 
On the other hand, air transport systems have 
an inherent flexibility of route, and can be used 
throughout the country wherever demand is suffi- 
cient to  warrant air service. Additionally, analyses 
discussed in the “Commercial Passenger Service” 
section show that in regions such as the Northeast 
Corridor, the future level of  demand for 
short-haul travel will be so great that use of both 
advanced high-speed rail and STOL/VTOL sys- 
tems may provide the best solution to meeting 
the demand. 
Figure 2.1. 1969 actual and 1985 potential demand, enplaned passengers, originating cargo. Source: Based on refs. 1, 2, 3. 
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1969 NORMALIZED 
1985 1969 RATIO 
GApnAL ANNUA 
aCon t i p o u s  48 states only. ‘Total for air vehicles, airports, and airways. 
Figure 2.2. Potential 1985 air carrier system. Source: Based on  refs. 1 ,  3-6. 
In the interest of a balanced total transport 
system, it is felt that  high-speed ground systems 
should be developed and should be used where 
economically feasible. In the future, demand 
levels and desired origins and destinations will be 
such that short-haul air service will continue to  be 
required. As shown in the subsequent analyses, 
STOL/VTOL systems have the potential for pro- 
viding the best service for the high-density 
short-haul portion of the air transport system. 
The air transport system for 1985 is 
envisioned as an integration of multiple systems, 
tailored to  satisfy specific requirements for air 
service. Based on such a philosophy and the 
potential demand, the scope and characteristics of 
the air carrier portion of  air transportation for 
1985  could be as shown in Figure 2.2. (General 
aviation is covered separately a t  the end of this 
section. ) 
The potential future air transport system of 
Figure 2.2 is possible only if significant advances 
are achieved through R&D aimed at :  
0 r e d u c i n g  environmental effects to  
acceptable levels: 
0 improving system capacity and service. to 
reduce the door-to-door time for passen- 
gers and cargo: 
improving the economics of civil air 
t r a n s p o r t ,  especially for short-haul 
systems; and 
continuing to improve the safety of air 
transport. 
GROWTH OF THE AIR TRANSPORT 
SYSTEM 
In the 30 years from 1939 to 1969. U. S. 
domestic air transport passenger plus cargo traffic 
1939 TO 1969 18 1 
Figure 2.3. Comparative growth rates, 1939-1969. 
Source: Ref 7. 
(overall common-carrier plus private ton-miles) 
expanded four times faster than all U. S. domestic 
transport modes combined, four times faster than 
the U. S. general economy as a whole, and 1 2  
times faster than the U. S. population (Fig. 2.3). 
Air Transport in the Total Domestic Intercity 
Travel Market 
The automobile has dominated the total 
domestic intercity travel market for many years. 
It reached a peak in 1961, with 90.2% of the total 
market. Since then, the auto share of the market 
declined slowly but steadily, until in 1969 its 
share (86.5%) had fallen to  slightly below its level 
30 years earlier (88.6%). During the same 30 
years, total air domestic passenger-miles (includ- 
ing both common-carrier and private) climbed 
from a 0.3% share of the total market in 1939 to  
9.8% in 1969. By 1969, bus accounted for only 
2.3%, rail 1.1%, and water 0.4% of the total 
passenger-miles; in 1939, rail constituted 7.6%, 
bus 3.1%, and water 0.5% of the total 
passenger-miles. Air transport, then, is the only 
mode that has captured an increased share of the 
total domestic travel market in the last 30 years 
(ref. 7 ) .  
Figure 2.4. Modal split (in percent) of common-carricr 
domestic intercity passenger-miles, 1949, 1959, and 
1969. Source: Based on reJ 7. 
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Air Transport in the CommonCarrier Intercity 
Travel Market 
In the common-carrier intercity travel mar- 
ket, air transportation has been the dominant and 
fastest growing mode during the last decade or  
two. In the domestic area, air has been the leader 
since 1958. The domestic trend is illustrated in 
Figure 2.4. In the international area, air has been 
the leader since 1950. Air transport in 1969 
accounted for 70.8% of the total domestic inter- 
city common-carrier passenger-miles. In 1969, 
more than 98% of the U. S. flag-carried passengers 
between the United States and the rest of the 
world traveled by air; less than 2% by sea. 
Air Cargo 
In contrast t o  its achievements in the passen- 
ger sector, air transport still accounts for just a 
small fraction of the total U. S. domestic intercity 
cargo traffic (the term “cargo” includes freight, 
express, and mail). Even today, air transportation 
provides only 0.17% of the total domestic inter- 
city cargo ton-miles carried by all modes, and 
only about 1.3% of the total domestic intercity 
cargo revenues. Air cargo is relatively more impor- 
tant internationally, accounting for about 13% of 
the U. S.-flag air-plus-sea cargo revenues but prob- 
ably only about 1% of the total U. S.-flag cargo 
ton-miles (ref. 7).  Air cargo, however, is now 
experiencing the rapid growth that was enjoyed 
by the railroads and motor carriers in earlier 
years. This has come about even though very little 
emphasis has been placed on  cargo systems devel- 
opment. Increased emphasis on  this sector of air 
transport along with recognition of the advan- 
tages of cargo movement by air will result in 
continued significant growth. 
General Aviation 
The growth of the general aviation sector of 
civil aviation is reflected in the increase in the 
number of aircraft and airports of record for a 
11-year period, as shown in Table 2.1. Thus, the 
private use of aircraft has grown along with com- 
mercial acceptance and utilization. 
TABLE 2.1. GENERAL AVIATION GROWTH
YEAR a
1959
196Z
1967
1969
1970
aAs of Jan. 31
Source: Ref. 6
TOTALAIRCRAFT
67,839
84,121
104,706
124,237
130,806
I Ill i l
STATUS OF THE AIR TRANSPORT
SYSTEM
AIRPORTS
OF RECORD
6,018
8,084
9,673
10,470
i
The growth of the total system and its public
acceptance would not have come about unless air
transportation was providing significant benefits
to the public - to the user, the manufacturer, the
operator, and the national economy. Coupled
with the growth of air transportation have come
problems- some that are already affecting the
ability of civil aviation to satisfy the potential
demand for air transport in the future.
Change has usually come from the air
vehicles, with the rest of the system responding to
demands imposed by the new aircraft. For
example, as the number, size, and productivity of
air vehicles increased, airports generally
responded with "catch-up" expansions rather
than make the large capital outlays needed for
new airports. There were also major institutional
problems associated with developing new airports.
Congestion and delay were the results. Passengers
and cargo were affected during surface movement
to, from, and within the airports while aircraft
were affected at the airport and in the airspace
around the airports.
Such congestion and delays detract from the
basic advantage of air transport- speed. While
the average flight time of aircraft over a given
distance has remained about constant since 1960,
the average door-to-door elapsed time between
some major cities has actually increased.
In addition, even though roughly half of all
domestic air passenger movements are for trips of
less than 500 miles, very few operators have been
able to operate profitably at reasonable rates with
existing types of equipment over these short-haul
distances. Short-haul operations face the same
congestion and delays encountered by long-haul
operations so that utilization of aircraft is poor,
and thus uneconomical.
One of the most serious problems in all air
transportation is the increasingly popular idea
that an airport is a poor neighbor. Noise and pol-
lution in the vicinity of airports have caused pub-
lic alarm, objections to current operations, and
resistance to expansion of the system.
Considering the problems already confronting
air transport with today's level of demand, it is
obvious that vigorous efforts will be required to
relieve these problems if the potential of air trans-
port to meet future demand is to be realized.
FUTURE DEMAND FOR CIVIL AIR
TRANSPORTATION
By 1985, a dramatic increase in demand is
expected in all segments of civil aviation. It is not
likely that the market for future air travel will
include the entire U. S. population, since available
data indicate that as recently as 1967, almost half
(45%) the total population had not made even
one intercity trip by any mode in the preceding
12 months. On the other hand, the 55% (108
million persons) of the total U. S. population that
took one or more domestic or international trips
in 1967 (a total of 361 million round trips) con-
stitutes a substantial potential market for air
travel. However, 88% of the trips made were by
auto, and auto must be expected to continue to
be the most popular form of travel - particularly
since three out of four auto trips involve two or
more passengers, resulting in significantly lover
per-person costs.
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ACTUAL FORECAST
ATA--AIR TRANSPORTASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
ATCAC--AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLADVISORY COMMITTEE
FAA_FEDERAL AVIATIONADMINISTRATION
ATCAC 300 BILLION
ATA--485.6 BILLION
PASSENGER-MI
z,ooo_LUON
PASSENGERS-
MILES
ATCAC
/ ATA--3OL2 BILLION FORECASTS
/ PASSENGER-MIFAA--295 BILLION FAA POINTS 0
PASSENGER.MI INDUSTRY --
JOINT STUDY _--
Figure 2.5. U.S. domestic passenger-mile past and forecast growth. Source: FAA data, ref. 8; ATCAC data, ref. 9.
Passenger Miles
To put the forecast passenger demand levels
in perspective, a review was made of the latest
industry and Government forecasts. A compari-
son of these forecasts for domestic passenger ser-
vice is shown in Figure 2.5. The passenger
demand [orecast of the Joint Study was based on
FAA data for fiscal years 1970 through 1981
(ref. 8). This forecast shows an average annual
growth rate in passenger-miles of 12% per year.
The Joint Study assumed that this growth would
continue through 1995. This relatively uncon-
strained growth can be achieved only by provid-
ing increased capacity and service, improved oper-
ating economics, minimal impact on the
environment, and a high degree of safety.
Table 2.2 presents summaries of various fore-
casts of international traffic through 1985. Due
to variations in the definition of base-year traffic
(1969), the forecasts are not directly comparable
but give some indication of the magnitude of
future demand. A note of clarification is appro-
priate for the Joint Study demand level shown.
The values reflect only passenger-miles generated
by U. S. common-carrier flights leaving from and
TABLE 2.2. INTERNATIONAL REVENUE PASSENGER-
MILES, BILLIONS (U.S. SCHEDULED SERVICE ONLY)
JOINT
FISCAL FAA ATCA( DOUGLAS BOEING I Kl-UOYb _
YEAR
1969 27.9 - 30.6 29.5 I 9.1 _i
1975 59.5 - 67.1 70.6 I - !f_.....
1980 107.5 150.0 115.7 115.3 I -
1985 - 420.0 186.6 - 130.0I
aA TCAC forecast includes nonscheduled operations.
bThe Joint Study forecast is only for flights departing
from or returning to the United States.
returning to the United States and do not con-
sider flights by U.S. carriers between foreign
countries. (This approach was taken to determine
the impact of these activities on facilities within
the United States.)
Enplaned Passengers
Another measure of demand is the "enplaned
passenger." Figure 2.1 showed the distribution of
enplaned passengers by type of operation for
both air carriers and general aviation. It is esti-
mated that there will be 733 million domestic
passengers enplaned by airlines in the United
States in 1985, a five-fold increase over the 149
2-8
million passengers in 1969. The greatest percent-
age growth in passenger enplanements will be at
the extremes of the distance spectrum. An esti-
mated 39 million passengers will be enplaned on
trips of less than 50 miles in 1985, compared with
approximately 1.7 million enplanements in 1969.
This growth can be expected to occur if more
efficient air service can be introduced in the intra-
urban environment, primarily providing connect-
ing service for long-haul air flights but providing
some normal, daily transportation as well.
The growth in international enplanements
from 5.6 million in 1969 to approximately 65
million in 1985 will result from many of the same
factors that affect the other segments of the air
transport business. Among these factors are con-
tinued vehicle improvement in the form of speed,
TABLE 2.3. POTENTIAL 1985
comfort, reliability, and unit operating costs; a
shift in the population mix to a younger, more
educated population; increased per capita dis-
posable income; longer vacations; and expanded
international trade.
AIR TRANSPORT CONCEPTS AND
POTENTIAL FOR 1985
Demand Center Concept
The impact of the predicted demand is diffi-
cult to envision at the aggregate national level. It
is more illuminating to examine typical metropol-
itan areas utilizing aviation services (demand cen-
ters). Potential air system requirements and char-
acteristics were arrived at by considering different
DEMAND BY DEMAND CENTERa
1969b 1985
SUPER LARGE MEDIUM SMALL NON TOTAL SUPER LARGE MEDIUM SMALL NON TOTAL
NUMBER OF DEMAND
AREAS 7 14 37 231 9 292
PERCENT OF NATIONAL
DEMAND c 6 1.7 0.5 5.3 0.0
AIR CARRIER d
ENPLANED PASSEN-
GERS, MILLIONS 9.5 2.6 0.8 154.4 45.1 ( 798
PASSENGER-MILES,
BILLIONS 8.55 2.13 0.66 ( 120.0 43.2 ( 685
CARGO d
ORIGINATING TONS,
THOUSANDS 223 59.5 12.7 3,140 2,800 34,700
TONMILES,
MILLIONS 431.2 120.5 21.4 5,880 5,470 1 62,400
GENERAL AVIATION f
BASED AIRCRAFT 1,534 1,416 388 124,237 4,450 1 5 _4 287,000
.... o)rl(4cEalmmm_ _ _ _ __.t_F_ _ _ _ ._ _
aAll values in matrix except totals are per-hub averages.
bDistribution of data by demand area is based on statistical data in refs. 7 and 12.
CBased on carrier enplaned passengers.
dDomestic and international; contiguous 48 states only.
eThese figures are the total for the remainder of the U.S. which does not fall into the hub classifications of super, large,
medium, and small. This is required for general aviation examination since a large portion of general aviation aircraft
activities occur outside the hubs (unlike air carrier, where almost all operations occur within the hubs).
f As of January 1.
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types of demand centers and the numbers of each
that will be required throughout the United
States. The demand centers, also referred to as
hubs (ref. 10), were used for integrating and eval-
uating the air system because these centers are the
only places where all four systems elements (air
vehicles, air traffic control system, airports, and
complementary ground transportation) and mis-
sions (short-haul, long-haul, etc.) come together.
Each center is classified by its percentage of the
total air carrier enplaned passengers. In this study,
the classifications in terms of enplanements were:
super- 3% and over; large-1.00% to 2.99%;
TABLE 2.4. POTENTIAL 1985 SUPER DEMAND
CENTER ACTIVITIES
[II li IIIIIIIIII1| i
AIR CARRIER 1969 1985
PASSENGER
ENPLANED PASSENGERS, MILLIONS
DOMESTIC SHORT-HAUL (0-50 MI.) 0.15 2.7
DOMESTIC SHORT-HAUL (50.500 MI.) 3.5 15.5
DOMESTIC CHARTER (a) 0.7
TAXI 0.12 (b)
DOMESTIC LONG-HAUL 5.1 19.7
TOTAL DOMESTIC 8.9 38.6
INTERNATIONAL 0.6 6.5
TOTAL DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 9.5 45.1
PASSENGER-MILES, BILLIONS
DOMESTIC SHORT-HAUL 1.03 5.0
DOMESTIC LONG-HAUL 6.35 23.8
DOMESTIC CHARTER 1.4
TOTAL DOMESTIC 7.38 30.2
INTERNATIONAL 1.17 13.0
TOTAL DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 8.55 43.2
CARGO
ORIGINATING TONS, THOUSANDS
DOMESTIC FREIGHT 96 1,860
DOMESTIC MAIL 67 100
DOMESTIC EXPRESS 9 40
TOTAL DOMESTIC 172 2,000
INTERNATIONAL 51 800
TOTAL DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 223 2,800
TON-MILES, MILLIONS
DOMESTIC SHORT-HAUL 21.7 450
DOMESTIC LONG-HAUL 286.0 2,100
TOTAL DOMESTIC 307.7 2,550
INTERNATIONAL 123.5 2,920
TOTAL DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 431.2 5,470
1,534
0.51
0.45
0.96
GENERAL AVIATION
FIXED-BASED AIRCRAFT
ITINERANT OPERATIONS, MILLIONS
LOCAL OPERATIONS, MILLIONS
TOTAL OPERATIONS, MILLIONS
4,450
2.64
2.13
4.77
alncluded in domestic short- and long-haul figures.
blncluded in GeneraI Aviation. Source: Refs. 1, 3, 4, 6, 11-13.
2-10
medium- 0.25% to 0.99%; small- 0.05% to
0.24%; nonhub - less than 0.05%.
Table 2.3 is a summary of the demand by
demand center classification for 1969 and the
potential demand for 1985. The levels shown
were arrived at by analysis of past trends in the
distribution of demand by hub category. It can be
seen that a growth in the total number of demand
centers from 231 to a potential 292 is projected
to occur between 1969 and 1985. The data in
Table 2.3 are for typical demand centers. Actual
demand centers will vary in terms of levels of
demand, distribution between missions, etc., but
the "average" demand centers should have the
potential demand shown.
Demand was further divided by mission:
short-haul intraurban (0-50 miles, primarily air
taxi and feeder service); short-haul interurban
(50-500 miles); long-haul domestic (greater than
500 miles within the continental United States);
long-haul international (all travel to and from the
continental United States); and cargo (all domes-
tic and international goods). Table 2.4 shows a
detailed breakout for a typical super demand cen-
ter. Comparable data were developed for each of
the other classes of demand center.
Air Transport System Concepts, 1985
Figure 2.6 shows the potential number of
enplaned passengers for average super and large
demand centers in 1985. For comparison, this
same measure of demand (for 1969)is shown for
three current super hubs and three large hubs (the
21 large hubs defmed in ref. 14 include the super
and large demand centers as defined for the Joint
Study). It is projected that by 1985 at least 9
demand centers will be categorized as "super,"
and 12 as "large." The average 1985 large demand
center will exceed a current super hub, and the 9
super demand centers will far outstrip any current
demand area. Although not shown in the figure,
the average medium demand center (of which
there will be 40) will have a greater passenger
demand than the current large hubs (Table 2.3).
One way to increase the capacity of the air
system to serve such a potential demand is to
continue the current trend of introducing larger
capacity aircraft. Figure 2.7 shows the alleviation
of problems with certain elements of the air sys-
tem, especially airports (airside) and the air traffic
system, which will occur if this trend is con-
tinued. Shown in this figure are the number of air
alncludes Newark.
Figure 2.6. Enplaned passengers. Source: Based on refs. 3, 14.
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Figure 2.7, Air carrier aircraft operations. Source: Based on ref. 3.
carrier operations at the average 1985 super and
large demand centers for two different situations:
(1) the average passenger aircraft size for all air
travel beyond 50 miles is the same as in 1970
(approximately 107 seats per aircraft); and
(2) the average size is approximately 240 seats per
aircraft (based on a detailed analysis of 1985
potential demand by demand center and the mix
of vehicles best suited to satisfy this demand).
Comparable increases in all-cargo aircraft sizes in
1985 are also included in calculating the number
of operations.
level does not include the added impact of general
aviation activities on the total system. Larger air-
craft and incremental improvements in airports
and air traffic control will provide some relief,
but will fail to provide the capacity and service
required. The number of people to be served (see
Fig. 2.6) is still a critical factor. Several of the
Nation's airports are currently at peak-hour satu-
ration, not only in terms of the number of air-
craft they can accept but in terms of overloads on
terminal-building facilities, automobile parking,
baggage-handling, and airport access/egress.
As may be seen from Figure 2.7, with the
1970 average-size aircraft, the number of air car-
rier operations at an average super demand center
in 1985 would be more than two and one-half
times the number carried out at the New York
hub in 1969 and almost six times the number at
the Los Angeles hub in 1969. (It must be kept in
mind that there could be 9 such super demand
centers in 1985.) Using the projected 1985 aver-
age aircraft size reduces the number to about one
and one-half times the number of operations at
the New York hub in 1969.
The existing civil aviation system structure
could not accommodate the projected potential
level of commercial air activities. This proiected
Additional facilities will be necessary. One
solution might be to add new CTOL airports
throughout the United States and continue with
the present system. New CTOL airports, however,
require extensive amounts of land, and opposition
to new airports is great. Many of the areas most in
need of new facilities will not accept the develop-
ment of entirely new land-consuming CTOL air-
ports. An alternative solution is to serve the
short-haul portion of the total demand through
the use of STOL/VTOL systems. Besides requir-
ing much less land, it is possible that a new "good
neighbor" image can be established for a "new"
system concept, if R&D results show - in actual
demonstrations - that the system is "quiet" and
"safe."
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Figure 2.8. Large demand center scheduled air carrier activities. Source: Based on ref. 3.
Figure 2.8 shows how the demand might be
distributed at a large demand center in the future
if a system concept were developed and imple-
mented that contained CTOL, STOL, and VTOL
facilities and systems, each providing service to
that segment of air travel to which it is best
suited. Also shown is the comparable level of
activity that would occur at a single CTOL airport
if the entire potential demand were to be fun-
neled through one facility. This level compares to
the 1969 levels at the three hubs shown in the
figure (typical of today's large hubs). The mixed
concept reduces the number of enplanements at
the C/'OL facility by a third and reduces the
number of operations by more than half. Equally
important, locating the facilities closer to the
demand provides the short-haul traveler with
better service.
Figure 2.9. Aircraft operations. Source: Based on refs. 3, 10, 14.
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The mixed concept provides more relief (per-
centage reduction) to the CTOL airport in terms
of aircraft operations than in terms of enplaned
passengers, and aircraft operations is the priority
area for relief when the impact of general aviation
is considered. Although the number of passengers
enplaned by general aviation is small compared to
air carrier passengers (Fig. 2.6), the number of
general aviation operations is extremely large, as
shown in Figure 2.9.
General aviation operations at a large demand
center in 1985 could be four times the number of
air carrier operations. The majority of these oper-
ations should be distributed to separate general
aviation facilities within the demand center, but a
large number of these (especially nonscheduled
air taxi operations and business jets) will be
handled by the CTOL facility. At the super
demand centers of 1985 there will be an even
greater requirement for dispersal of portions of
air service. Even with separate STOL/VTOL facil-
ities, the potential level of demand is such that
additional CTOL facilities will be required at
some of the future super demand centers.
The Potential 1985 Air Transport System
The previous discussion reflects a philosophy
for a potential air transport system that would
meet the demand for services in 1985. Based on
such a philosophy, and the demand shown in
Table 2.3, the scope and characteristics of an air
transport system for 1985 were defined. Such a
system will necessarily reflect many new charac-
teristics in the primary elements (air vehicles, air-
ports, air traffic system, complementary ground
transportation) resulting from application of tech-
nological advances and developments.
Air Vehicles. To service the potential demand
efficiently, the air carrier fleet (see Fig. 2.10) will
have passenger-seat capacities from 4 (VTOL taxi)
to 900 (CTOL for high-density routes). The
supersonic transport will serve transoceanic routes
in the international market. New CTOL, STOL,
and VTOL aircraft will provide service for the
Nation's short-haul requirements. General avia-
tion aircraft will grow in number to about
287,000 by 1985.
Note: Vehicle seating capacities may differ slightly from seating capacities discussed in other sections of this report.
Nominal values were selected for purposes of this section.
Figure 2.10. Potential 1985 U.S. air carrier and general aviation fleet.
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Theaircraftin the potential1985fleetwill
provideconvenient,economicalservice.It should
benotedthattwo majorforcesactingonaircraft
sizetendto counteract;heobjectiveof conveni-
encedrivestowardsmallersizeto makepossible
the desiredfrequencyof service,whiletheeco-
nomicobjectivedrivestowardlargersize.There
shouldbe morethan35 demandareashaving
enoughtraffic to supportfivedailyroundtrips
with a 900-passengeraircraftat anaverageload
factorof 55%.The largestfive marketswould
requiremorethan20dailyroundtripswithsuch
avehicle.At theotherendof thespectrum,in the
low-densityareaof the air carriersystem,the
requirementto provideadequatelyfrequentser-
vicefor a minimumof fourdailyroundtripswill
require25-to 50-passengeraircraft.
The 1985 air carrier fleet will be structured
to serve the demand with the largest aircraft that
can support reasonable minimum frequencies.
Because a large proportion of the markets today
enjoys more than the minimum desired service
levels, the greatest part of the projected growth
can be accomplished by increasing vehicle size;
the fleet would only double, whereas passenger
traffic can potentially increase to five times its
present level.
Airports. In the projected structure for a
super demand center in 1985, over 50% of the
commercial air operations would be conducted at
STOL and VTOLports. CFOLpotts would thus be
relieved of a large portion of the short-haul load
while access/egress would be improved by
V/STOLports located closer to the demand.
Under this concept, the CTOLports at a 1985
super demand center would not be much larger
than those currently in use. Thus, the improved
airport, air traffic, and complementary ground
transport systems will not be as strained, and will
be better able to provide the capacity, service,
and safety required to efficiently satisfy the
demand.
The alternative of a single centralized facility
(i.e., a "supersize" airport) was also examined.
Although certain advantages of economy accrue
from minimizing the redundancy of investment
and operating costs via centralization, the advan-
tages evaporate rapidly in an operational environ-
ment that is very sensitive to frequent periods of
near-saturation peaking in both air- and
ground-side activity. Moreover, the practicality of
establishing new supersize airports is doubtful -
except, perhaps, in unique circumstances.
In the super demand areas, several general
aviation airports, some with sophisticated landing
aids and some "nontower" airports, will serve the
general aviation market. The tower airports could
also serve as reliever airports for the air carriers.
In about half the large hub demand centers,
the volume of CTOL traffic forecast for 1985 can
be accommodated effectively by a single airport.
The balance will require a second facility. As with
all demand centers, the decision in each situation
will depend on a combination of the traffic level
and the demographic and topographic characteris-
tics of the region. It was estimated that a single
V/STOLport would provide the most
cost-effective solution for the V/STOL interurban
traffic in a large demand center. If the requisite
R&D is achieved to demonstrate that V/STOL
operations will be quiet and safe, the ability to
site such a facility without some of the con-
straints (size, "image") inherent in CTOL airport
location may enable it to be located close to the
demand and the intermodal systems.
In summary, the number of airports across
the country must increase and provide improved
service. STOL and VTOLports, nonexistent
today, would bring together passengers and air-
craft at points closer to origin and destination,
improving the access and egress travel time. Where
necessary, CTOLports will have multiple parallel
runways to handle peak movements. Spacing
between runways will be reduced to minimize
land required and reduce airport investment costs.
New techniques in ticketing and in passenger-,
baggage-, and cargo-handling will upgrade the
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qualityof serviceoverthatofferedtoday.Access
and egress planning will improve intermodal
transfer of air passengers and cargo.
Air Traffic Control System. The air traffic
system postulated for 1985 contemplates accom-
plishment of the FAA's 10-year plan, which
includes the major recommendations of ATCAC
(ref. 9). Some of the control functions would be
automated; conflict prediction and resolution
would be computerized and an automatic digital
ground-air-ground data link would pass the
instructions to the pilot. Next-generation
improvements would include conversion to more
automatic control methods, with more of the
control performed in the aircraft.
It is expected that there will be automatic
altitude reporting and identification for the air-
lines, and more sophisticated general aviation air-
craft to facilitate more efficient handling of
traffic in the dense traffic areas around major
hubs, with metering and spacing of aircraft
approaches to obtain the maximum use of the
airport facilities.
Controlled airspace will extend below the
present 18,000 feet, but there will still be exten-
sive uncontrolled space for the general aviation,
VFR pleasure flier. Safety in these areas will be
enhanced by intermittent positive control.
1985 System Summary
In summary, the 1985 civil air transport
system should provide a reliable and responsive
quality of service to meet the Nation's demands
without loss in safety or efficiency.
The scope of the air carrier portion of such a
potential system was indicated in quantitative
terms in Figure 2.2. The scope of the general avia-
tion portion is shown in Figure 2.11. The poten-
tial levels of investment and annual operating and
maintenance costs associated with such a system
are also shown in both figures.
The achievement of such an air transport
system, with operating and safety characteristics
attractive to the user, environmental characteris-
tics acceptable to the public, and economic char-
acteristics that justify and attract the amount of
capital required will be possible only if significant
advances are made in certain areas of R&D. These
areas are discussed in the following sections of the
report.
aAs of January 1, 1969; based on ref. 7.
bContiguous 48 states; based on ref. 6.
CBased on ref. 2
Figure 2.11 1985 general aviation potential.
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Missions 
COMMERCIAL PASSENGER SERVICE 
INTRODUCTION 
Air transportation has become an accepted 
part of modern life. Many tend to forget how far 
it has advanced in a relatively short time. In 
44 years, U. S. air transport has expanded from a 
primitive short-haul domestic operation to  a 
sophisticated system that can transport people 
and goods t o  any place in the world in one day or 
less. Figure 3.1 shows a 1 IO-mile-per-hour Boeing 
Model 40-B single-engine biplane. photographed 
in 1929. The pilot sat in an open cockpit, and 
four passengers and 1,500 pounds of mail were 
carried in a small enclosed cabin behind the 
engine: this airplane entered airline service in 
1927. In contrast, the total system today includes 
thousands of safe, high-performance aircraft car- 
rying up  t o  360 passengers, a worldwide air traffic 
control system that safely guides aircraft from 
one city t o  another, hundreds of airports that 
handle millions of passengers, and complementary 
ground transportation systems of varying degrees 
of sophistication that transport passengers and 
cargo to and from the airports. 
Figure 3.1. Air transport in 1929. 
GROWTH OF THE SYSTEM 
In 1928,  one of the advanced transports of 
the period - the Boeing Model 80 trimotor - 
entered airline service (Fig. 3.2). A biplane, it had 
a range of 460 miles and a cruising speed of 
11 5 miles per hour and carried 1 2  passengers in a 
luxurious cabin with hot and cold running water, 
forced-air ventilation, four rows of leather 
upholstered seats, and individual reading lamps. 
Few airports of the time had paved runways, and 
during rainy weather the landing fields were 
covered with mud. The airport terminal was usu- 
ally a room attached to the end of a hangar. Air 
traffic control and accurate weather data were 
unavailable, and scheduled passenger flights were 
at the mercy of the weather and were limited to  
daytime operations. Despite these limitations, 
domestic air transportation in the United States 
grew from 1.3 million passenger-miles in 1926 to 
85 million passenger-miles in 1930. 
Figure 3.2. The Boeing Model 80 Transport. 
(Courtesy of The Boeing Company.) 
By 1970. domestic scheduled air service in 
the U. S. totaled some 104 billion passenger-miles 
(F ig .  3 .3) .  Internat ional  U. S.-flag traffic 
a c c o u n t e d  f o r  an a d d i t i o n a l  28 billion 
passenger-miles. This growth is espected to con- 
tinue through 1985. 
CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE SYSTEM 
The character of the air transportdtion sys- 
tem has changed over the years (see Figs. 3.3 and 
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TO 1948 NOT 
LOCAL SERVICE 
Figure 3.3. Growth of U.S. domestic scheduled Figure 3.5. U.S. domestic average overall flight stage 
revenue passenger-mdes: 1926-1969. Source: Ref. 1. length in scheduled service. Source: Ref. 1 .  
Figure 3.4. U.S. domestic revenue passenger originations. 
Source: Ref. 1 .  
3.5) as i t  expanded to provide service to a greater 
number of  cities. In 1938 the Federal Govern- 
ment established the Civil Aeronautics Authority, 
which awarded routes to the existing air carriers 
(now known as trunks) and regulated passenger, 
cargo, and mail rates. In 1945 the local service 
carriers were established to provide feeder service 
from outlying areas to larger cities and between 
communities that were too  small to support trunk 
service. The first helicopter intraurban service was 
started in 1947 to serve the needs of the Los 
Angeles metropolitan area. The supplemental air 
carriers were started in 1948 to  provide charter 
passenger and cargo services, and in 1949 the 
all-cargo carriers were established to concentrate 
on scheduled freight service. In 1969, scheduled 
service was again expanded when the scheduled 
air taxi operators were renamed “commuter air 
carriers” and encouraged to provide more fre- 
quent passenger, cargo, and mail service in small 
aircraft (usually under 12,500 Ib) for the smaller 
communities that were no  longer being 
adequately served by the local service airlines and 
their larger aircraft. 
PROBLEMS OF SHORT-HAUL OPERATIONS 
Operational problems of the local service air- 
lines, the helicopter airlines, and the commuter 
airlines arise from the short stage lengths flown, 
the relatively small number of passengers carried, 
and the large number of cities served. The intra- 
urban system (helicopter service) is handicapped 
by its very short stage length and high unit oper- 
ating costs, resulting in high fares that only a 
small number of  passengers are willing to pay. 
The main problems o f  the local service and com- 
muter airlines Stem from the fact that they serve a 
large number of cities (commuter lines served 
about 1,200 cities in 1969) relatively close 
together which, coupled with the relatively few 
passengers, puts extreme requirements on the air- 
craft and results in high per-passenger-mile costs, 
and hence, fares. On the other hand, the trunk 
lines carry a large number of passengers over rela- 
tively long stage lengths. The problems associated 
with iong-haul operations are different from those 
of short-haul operations. The following discus- 
sion, therefore, will consider each class separately. 
LONG-HAUL SYSTEMS 
The long-haul domestic and international pas- 
senger system consists of those air vehicles that 
customarily carry commercial passengers on stage 
lengths from 500 to  6,000 miles, and those por- 
tions of the airports and the air traffic control 
s y s t e m  t h a t  s u p p o r t  s u c h  passenge r  
transportation. 
Historically the long-haul market has been 
the backbone of the air transport system. Now, 
however, a number of problems, unless solved in 
the near future, will seriously impair the effi- 
ciency, safety, and convenience of long-haul air 
travel. The most pressing problems are noise, ter- 
minal congestion, and lack of an operational 
all-weather takeoff and landing system. 
Figure 3.6. The Boeing 747.  
(Courtesy of the Port of New York Authority.) 
The air transport industry has introduced 
new, more productive aircraft about every seven 
years. The latest aircraft to enter service is the 
Boeing 747, shown in Figure 3.6. The typical 
mixed-class configuration has about 350-360 
seats, but  the aircraft can accommodate 490 pas- 
sengers in an all-economy configuration. T o  com- 
plement the improved aircraft, modern airports 
are distributed around the world. An air traffic 
system provides safe passage for aircraft in almost 
any weather conditions. Much has been accom- 
plished, but it is necessary now to  consider what 
needs to be done t o  assure that progress 
continues. 
VEHICLES 
The most important contributor to the 
growth of air transportation has been the air vehi- 
cle. Each new aircraft has represented an advance 
in technology which resulted in productivity 
increases in terms of seat-miles per hour through 
combinations of aircraft size and speed, usually 
accomplished by significantly reduced operating 
costs. 
Figure 3.7 shows how improvements in pro- 
ductivity have affected the direct operating costs 
(DOC) of the aircraft. Over the years, the 
PROPELLER A 
JET AND FANJET 0 
STRETCHED FANJET 0 
Figure 3.7. Direct operating cost versus productivity. 
Source: Ref. 2. 
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improvements made possible by Government and
industry research and development in aerodynam-
ics, structures, materials, and propulsion have
resulted in reducing the DOC's per available
seat-mile from about 6.7¢ for the DC-2 in 1934
to less than 1¢ for the 747 in 1970. Decreases
in operating costs (resulting from increased pro-
ductivity) have about counterbalanced the rise in
general price levels. Although levels of comfort
and convenience to the passenger have continued
to improve, Figure 3.8 indicates that average
yields (adjusted fares, in cents per passenger-mile)
have remained about constant over the past
30 years (ref. 1). If the results of R&D had not been
applied, aircraft productivity could not have kept
pace over the last 30 years and current fares
would be much higher. If they had varied with
the Consumer Price Index for Transportation
(ref. 3), the average adjusted fare for 1969 would
have been about 12¢ per seat-mile about the
same level as in 1929 instead of 5.64 (see
Fig. 3.8). Assuming that three-quarters of the
improvement in DOC (Fig. 3.7) could have been
obtained by increases in size alone, the increase in
average adjusted fare experienced without the
increased speed would have been 1.64" per revenue
passenger-mile. (Increases in size stem in part
from R&D.) U.S. trunk airlines carried about
Figure 3.8. Variation of average passenger revenue per
revenue passenger-mile for U.S. domestic trunk
service. Source: Based on ref. 1.
89 billion revenue passenger-miles in 1969 domes-
tic scheduled operations. If the fare had been
1.6¢ per passenger-mile higher, the additional cost
to the traveling public in 1969 would have been
almost $1-1/2 billion. The Washington, D. C., to
Los Angeles coach fares, for example, would have
been about $185 instead of $146. The newer air-
craft also provided more convenient, more com-
fortable, and faster service. For example, in late
1930 the first regular all-air single-carrier
cross-country passenger service was initiated.
Some 35 hours and 11 stops after leaving New
York- including an overnight stay in Kansas
City - the flight arrived in Los Angeles. in 1970,
one leaves New York and some 5 hours later lands
at Los Angeles - a nonstop trip with a meal and a
motion picture along the way.
Figure 3.9 shows the chronological develop-
ment of trip time from New York to Los Angeles.
During the 20years from 1940 to 1960, the
one-way trip time was reduced from about
14 hours to about 5 hours. Adding in the 3-hour
time-zone difference for the eastbound flight
gives an indication of the approximate work days
lost in a round trip across the United States. If
airline schedule times had not decreased as a
result of R&D effort and if the same traffic had
been generated in 1968 between New York and
Los Angeles, 1,360 man-years of potentially pro-
ductive time would have been lost in travel on
this route alone (assuming, as ref. 1 indicates, that
50% of the traffic was business traffic). The losses
should, of course, be multiplied several times by
other coast-to-coast traffic. If, through a vigorous
R&D program, the objections to overland flight
of a supersonic transport could be eliminated,
with the traffic growth expected by 1980, the
saving in business man-years on the New
York-Los Angeles route alone would be well
over 5,000.
In the late 1950's, Government and industry
began to consider the introduction of a super-
sonic transport into our air transport industry,
and a Government-industry team was established
to investigate its economic feasibility. Such an air-
craft could substantially improve air service to all
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aOuemight stop at Kansas City. 
Figure 3.9. Historical trip time between New York and Los Angeles. 
parts of the world. Supersonic transports could 
materially improve the current air transportation 
system by reducing flight times, saving valuable 
manpower for productive work by making inter- 
national trips a few hours long and making 
commuting to  Europe a reality. Perhaps much 
more important, a later generation supersonic 
transport could bring the Far East as close to the 
United States as Europe is today. 
Noise and sonic boom are still major prob- 
l e m s  b u t  c o n t i n u e d  R & D  b y  t h e  
Government-industry team will. hopefully, pro- 
vide an environmentally compatible aircraft that 
can operate out  of existing airports. 
VEHICLE FINANCING 
Currently, U. S. manufacturers have made 
heavy capital investments in the development and 
production of new long-haul aircraft now coming 
on the market. Some 5 to  10 years of aircraft sales 
are normally required to  reach a break-even point. 
Similarly, the airlines must go heavily into debt to 
purchase new equipment. A period of 5 to 
10 years is required to  amortize this debt. As a 
result manufacturers and airlines are currently in 
a poor financial position to develop or purchase 
totally new types of aircraft. Thus, for the next 5 
to 10  years airline purchases will, for the most 
part, be 747’s, E - l o ’ s ,  and L- lo l l ’ s ,  with 
possibly a few Anglo-French Concordes. By the 
early 1980’s, if the U. S. manufacturers and the 
U. S. airlines are in an improved debt position, it 
may be expected that they will be actively 
considering new families of aircraft. 
In the past, Government R&D has supplied 
much of the basic technology that made possible 
improvements in operating costs. speed, range, 
and comfort. During the 1940’s and the early 
1950’s. much of the new technology was devel- 
oped for and applied to military aircraft. The 
swept wing and jet  engines were demonstrated on 
military aircraft, for example. This reduced risk 
and R&D expense to  the industry in developing 
new commercial vehicles. Despite this. however, 
development costs associated with a new trans- 
port have grown out  of all proportion to  the assis- 
tance rendered by the Government. For example, 
costs rose from J300.000 for the DC-1 and -2 
to more than a billion dollars for the new 
wide-body jets. I f  the military-funded contribu- 
t i o n  to n e w  t e c h n o l o g y  over the next few 
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years is decreased for any reason, the rate of 
advancement in the development of future trans- 
port aircraft will suffer unless there is some com- 
pensating increase in civil R&D. Without demon- 
stration of  new technology and new concepts, the 
risks to the industry will be too  large for it to 
assume. 
THE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM 
Increasing airline traffic requires improved 
systems to permit efficient traffic flow from one 
airport to  another. Long-haul systems operate rea- 
sonably well at this time with the current instru- 
ment landing system, controlled airways, radar 
surveillance, control towers, and air traffic con- 
trol centers. However, a reduction in the block of 
air space assigned to an aircraft, a fully opera- 
tional area nagivation system, and a safe, efficient 
all-weather landing system will be required to 
accommodate the expected traffic growth in the 
near future. This will require extensive R&D. A 
fully operational all-weather landing system 
would eliminate diversions due to weather. N o  
figures are available on  an industry-wide basis for 
weather diversions, but  it is known that one air- 
line experienced 500 such diversions between 
July 1 ,  1968 and July 1 ,  1969. At an estimated 
cost of $2,000 per diversion, i t  is estimated that 
the cost to  the air carriers was $12 million in 
1969. The cost is expected to increase to about 
$20 million a year by 1985 if a solution to  the 
problem is not found. The solution requires a 
systems approach involving design of airports, 
vehicles, and the air traffic system. 
CONGESTION IN AIR TRAFFIC AT AND 
IN VICINITY O F  AIRPORTS 
T h e  t e rmina l  a r e a s  a r e  particularly 
hard-pressed because of increases in the number 
of aircraft operations. Although some steps have 
been taken to provide fast, efficient handling of 
aircraft in the air and on the ground, some major 
terminals have already reached or  exceeded their 
optimum capacity. The resulting congestion not 
only reduces the time advantage of  air travel but  
also increases operational costs to  airlines. 
The estimated costs of terminal airline delays 
have increased rapidly over the last six years 
(Fig. 3.10). The estimated cost of delays in 1969 
($158 million) is about three times the airlines’ 
total earnings of $53  million. More than 22 mil- 
lion passenger-hours (with a value of about 
$90 million) were lost. R&D is needed in both the 
air traffic system and in airport design if this 
trend is to be reversed. 
II 
Figure 3.10. Estimated U.S. airline cost for terminal 
area delays. Source: Ref. 4. 
Figure 3.1 1 shows an all-too-familiar scene a t  
many of our busiest airports - one which results 
Figure 3.1 . Aircraft waiting for takeoff. - 
(Courtesy of the Port of New York Authority.) 
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in lengthy delays for departing flights. The prob- 
lem has been alleviated t o  some extent in some of 
the more active airports by limiting the number 
of operations per hour. This is only a s topgap 
solution. 
example, drift across both runways and actually 
reduce the acceptance rate. R&D is needed to  per- 
mit detection and alleviation of vortices. Such 
research might, in some cases, provide increased 
airport capacity without additional runway 
construction. 
AIRPORTS 
NOISE AND POLLUTION 
The airport is the interface between ground 
transportation - that provides the passenger 
access t o  and egress from the airport - and air 
transportation. I t  suffers, therefore, from a num- 
ber of problems over which the airport operator 
has little or no  control. However, a major prob- 
lem over which the operator does have some con- 
trol is the peak-hour saturation which exists at  
some of the Nation’s major airports. 
One of the most critical problems today is 
providing runways, ramps, taxiways, etc., to  keep 
up with the rapidly increasing numbers of air- 
craft. The most obvious solution is t o  provide par- 
allel runways. Improved air traffic control sys- 
tems (and research on the effect of the several 
factors that influence runway separation required 
for safety) may reduce the separation require- 
ment below the currently required 5,000 feet. In 
some cases, this will allow using existing parallel 
runways that are separated by less than 5,000 
feet. This advantage may be offset by the trailing 
vortex system left by the passage of  large aircraft 
(see Fig. 3.12). These trailing vortices might, for 
Figure 3.12. Example of trailing vortex flow. 
In recent years, the airport has changed from 
a good neighbor (often a city showplace) to a 
marginally accepted neighbor - accepted only 
because it is a necessary part of the air transport 
system. People recognize the need for new air- 
ports but, because of noise, pollution, and ground 
congestion, want them in someone else’s back- 
yard. An R&D program directed toward reducing 
aircraft noise could reduce the opposition t o  
close-in airport locations. This would save millions 
of dollars by shortening access highways and 
ground-transportation distances. 
Noise currently limits the hours of  utilization 
of some airports. At many airports (Washington 
National, for example) jet operations are not 
scheduled from 11:OOp.m. t o  7:OOa.m. In 
long-haul operations, such restrictions reduce the 
usable departure “windows” because of time-zone 
differences between airports. Flights with arrivals 
and departures near the curfew must often be 
diverted or cancelled, resulting in extra costs t o  
the airlines, time lost, inconvenience to  the pas- 
senger, and disruption of the system by having 
aircraft at  the wrong airport as a result of  the 
diversion. Figure 3.13 illustrates the problem. If 
Vancouver were t o  establish a curfew similar t o  
the one at Montreal and London, a flight from 
V a n c o u v e r ,  British Columbia, t o  Montreal, 
Quebec, t o  London, England, would have to  leave 
Vancouver between 10:30 a.m. to  2:OO p.m. or 
10:30 p.m. to  1 1 : O O  p.m. If the flight were 
required to  go beyond London to  a destination 
with a curfew, it might be forced t o  lay over for 
8 hours at one cf the airports. If air transporta- 
tion is to  benefit from the speed and productivity 
of which advanced transports will be capable, 
R&D on noise alleviation must be accelerated. 
Figure 3.13. Effect of noise curfew on available 
departure times. 
Airports of the future must be developed 
through a systems approach. The approach must 
include ground transportation to and from the 
airport, passenger-processing, baggage-handling, 
aircraft-servicing, and field layout that reduces 
taxi time and aircraft congestion. R&D in all 
these areas is urgently needed t o  assist local com- 
munities in designing their airports. It is recog- 
nized that several solutions to  the accesslegress 
problem have been tried or are planned for the 
future. Although this particular service is n o t  
necessarily the responsibility of the airport, it 
must be considered in planning any future 
airport. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICY 
Because of the importance of long-haul trans- 
portation to this country, the part it plays in 
allowing U. S. industry to  expand its operations 
by providing quick reaction time, and the vast 
amount of business the sale of aircraft overseas 
generates in our aerospace industry, the following 
policy should be pursued: 
Continuation of the current policy of 
Government- industry partnership in 
advancing the state of the art. This means 
that both civil and military agencies of 
t h e  Government must maintain a 
vigorous R&D program to provide the 
data needed to  insure a healthy aircraft 
industry. 
New ways of financing the manufacture 
and purchase of aircraft may be needed 
because of the large financial burden the 
new sophisticated transports entail and 
the added risk resulting from advancing 
the state of the art. Exploration of pos- 
sible courses of action should be begun 
without delay to permit continuation of 
the customer-manufacturer relationship 
that has resulted in the United States 
being the major source of superior trans- 
port aircraft for the world over the last 
40 years. Possible financing procedures 
that could be used to assist the industry 
are: some form of tax relief; guaranteed 
loans a t  reasonable interest rates; free use 
of Government research facilities during 
the design stages of development; and 
Government support of aircraft during 
certification tests. 
The U. S. Government should take a 
more active role in the flight testing of 
advanced aircraft designed to prove new 
technology and to provide a base from 
which regulations can be established. 
SHORT-HAUL SYSTEMS 
BACKGROUND 
The use of air travel for short trips (less than 
500 miles) has sharply increased in recent years, 
providing travelers in smaller cities and less 
densely populated areas with a quick, convenient, 
3-1 0 
and effectiveway to tie in with long-haulair
systems.It also provides an increasingly popular
means of short-distance intercity travel, particu-
larly where surface modes are rapidly becoming
congested or inadequate. Approximately 60% of
all domestic air passenger movements and 80% of
all domestic air carrier aircraft movements cover
less than 500 miles. One-third of the passengers
and two-thirds of the aircraft fly less than 300
miles.
The potential growth of short-haul air travel
is very high because only a small portion of the
large travel markets to be served at short distances
are now accommodated by air (see Table 3.1).
Short-haul travel demand (all modes) could be
expected to increase at least twofold by 1985.
The automobile will doubtless remain the princi-
pal means of short-haul travel, but highway sys-
tems, particularly at junctions in large urban cen-
ters are rapidly approaching saturation. Increasing
public concern over preservation of the natural
environment makes it difficult to expand highway
capacity in many areas.
Increased use of common-carrier (bus, rail,
and air) modes will be required to relieve the
strain on the highway systems. Air systems can be
expected to take over portions of the total
demand, because the inherent route flexibility of
the air mode enables it to respond relatively easily
to increases and shifts in travel demand. A funda-
mental difficulty, however, in achieving profitable
operations over short distances by helicopter, air
taxi, commuter, local services, or trunk-line oper-
ators, shows up in Figure 3.14. Operating costs
Figure 3.14. Average direct operating costs-domestic
trunk, local service, and helicopter airlines, 1968 and
1969. Source: Ref. 2.
TABLE 3.1. PERSON-TRIPS FOR 1967
ONE-WAY
IIIIII I
MILLIONS OF PERSON-TRIPS
TRIP
LENGTH, AUTO BUS RAIL AIR
MILES
LESS THAN 50 a 35.8 0.8 0.4 0.1
50"199 a 181.4 4.9 1.8 2.2
200-499 57.6 2.2 1.2 8.8
500 AND
OVER 26.5 0.9 1.7
WATER
0.3
0.2
0
14.4 0
PERCENT OF TOTAL
COMBINATION
OF TWO OR
MORE MODES
TOTAL
0.1 37.5
1,4 191.9
1.7 71.5
1.5 45.0
LESS THAN 50 95.4 2.2 1.0 0.3 0.8 0.3 100.0
50-199 94.5 2.5 1.O 1.2 0.1 0.7 100.0
200-499 80.7 3.1 1.6 12.2 0.0 2.4 100.0
500 AND
OVER 58.9 1.9 3.8 32.1 O.O 3.3 100.0
aTrips under 100 miles fiom home were excluded when an overnight stay was not involved. Trips of l O0 miles
or more were included regardless of whether an overnight stay was made. Source: Ref. 5.
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increase sharply at trip distances less than about
200 miles. As may be seen from Figure 3.5, heli-
copter airlines and local service carriers are flying
average stage lengths of 18 and 145 miles, respec-
tively; conmuter airlines are averaging stage
lengths of less than 100 miles. All these stage
lengths are at the high-cost end of Figure 3.14.
With the intense competition from other modes
for short stage lengths, it is impossible to establish
a fare curve to match the operating cost curve.
Only the trunk lines can afford to underwrite the
higher costs of short trips with revenues from
their more profitable longer routes.
In short-haul operations, delays caused by air-
port and air traffic congestion and ground access
time amount to a substantial portion of the total
trip time. Increasing public opposition to airports
in populated areas because of noise can add sub-
stantially to access-time requirements and further
reduce the effectiveness of short-haul air travel.
OBJECTIVES AND ALTERNATIVES
Objectives
To relieve constraints on short-haul aviation
systems, changes and improvements must be
made with four basic objectives in mind:
• Economic viability with minimal Federal
support or subsidy.
• Fast and highly dependable service inte-
grated effectively with long-haul air
transportation and ground circulation
and distribution systems, and providing a
high degree of passenger convenience and
comfort.
• Noise and pollution levels at or below
acceptable community requirements.
• Operational safety of high level under all
operating conditions and categories of
service.
Both interurban and intraurban missions were
examined in this Study. Attention was focused on
three principal categories of interurban service:
point-to-point service in low-density areas; feeder
service from low-density to high-density areas;
point-to-point service in high-density areas. These
were examined in three representative geographi-
cal areas: the Northeast Corridor; the north cen-
tral region of the United States; and the western
mountain states region. Intraurban service was
evaluated in three metropolitan areas: Boston,
Detroit, and the San Francisco Bay region.
Alternatives for Feeder and
Low-Density Operations
At the beginning of 1969 there were 9 local
service air carriers operating out of 460 airports in
47 of the 48 contiguous states. They provided
excellent service to some 141 million people-
97% of the metropolitan population (ref. 5).
During 1969, despite receiving $36 million in sub-
sidies, these airlines suffered a net loss of $63
million, compared to the net profit of $91 million
by the domestic trunk airlines (ref. 6). Local ser-
vice operation involves a large number of
low-tra[fic points. Local carriers serve approxi-
mately twice as many points as trunk lines, incur-
ring higher costs per revenue passenger-mile, par-
ticularly in aircraft- and traffic-servicing. With
today's aircraft, more stops at shorter stage
lengths raise direct and indirect operating costs
(Tables 3.2 and 3.3).
Currently, the best available short-haul air-
craft are 80- to ll5-passenger jets. But, for the
sake of economy, the new jets are being used pre-
dominantly on longer routes, while smaller 40- to
60-passenger turboprop aircraft, formerly used in
the long-haul fleet, are relegated to the lower den-
sity, short routes where average loads are about
20 passengers. Such operations have not been pro-
fitable. Operating statistics show that average tur-
boprop load factors are about 45%, although
approximately 60% are required to break even
with existing fares (ref. 2). The CAB has recently
sought to provide "route strengthening" by
awarding longer and more profitable routes to
certain local service carriers, authorizing changes
in the fare structure, and honoring requests by
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TABLE 3.2. OPERATING STATISTICS, 1969
ITEM
LOCAL DOMESTIC
SERVICE TRUNK
CARRIERSa CARRIERS
AVERAGEPASSENGER
TRIPLENGTH,MILES 273 769
AVERAGESTAGE
LENGTH,MILES 145 505
AVERAGENUMBEROF
STAGESPERTRIP 1.9 1.5
TOTALOPERATING
COST,CENTS/REVENUE
PASSENGER-MILE 9.96 6.11
TOTALREVENUES,
CENTS/REVENUE
PASSENGER-MILE 9.70 6.44
alncludes subsidies.
Source: Refs. 1,2,6.
the general aviation market, of about
20-passenger capacity or less) unless specifically
authorized by the CAB (ref. 8). The CAB is cur-
rently investigating the possibility of liberalizing
this restriction. These carriers operate without
subsidies, route protection, or CAB certification,
and are thus highly vulnerable to the hazards of
the market.
Separate analyses were made of commuter
and local service requirements to meet the antici-
pated 1985 travel demand in two representative
areas: one in the western states centered around
Salt Lake City (for low-density operation)and
another centered at Chicago, out to about a
250-mile radius (for feeder operations)
(Fig. 3.15). (Analyses covering operations in the
high-density Northeast Corridor are discussed
later in this section.)
TABLE 3.3. INDIRECT OPERATING COSTS, 1969
SERVICE
COSTPERREVENUE
PASSENGER-MILE,CENTS
LOCAL DOMESTIC
SERVICE TRUNK
CARRIERS CARRIERS
PASSENGERSERVICE 0.61 0.63
AIRCRAFTANDTRAFFIC
SERVICING 2.29 1.08
PROMOTIONANDSALES 0.92 0.73
ADMINISTRATIVE 0.54 0.26
TOTAL 4.36 2.70
Source: Re.[.. 6.
the local service carriers to drop service on unpro-
fitable routes. Nearly one-quarter of the points
served by local service carriers generate less than
15 passengers per day (ref. 7).
Third-level carriers (the commuter airlines)
are now taking over some of the short,
low-density routes. At present, however, they are
restricted to aircraft of less than 12,500 pounds
gross weight (airplanes, developed principally for
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The low-density short-haul air travel market
for 1985 was projected to be five times the 1968
level. A family of four sizes of CTOL aircraft
(8-10 seat, 20-30 seat, 60-70 seat, and 130-140
seat) was considered needed by the commuter
and local service carriers.
The variation in break-even load factor with
aircraft size, determined on the basis of 1969 cost
data (Fig. 3.16), indicates that to be profitable at
load factors of about 50% on short routes,
present-day aircraft must be at least in the 80
passenger size class or larger. Thus existing turbo-
prop equipment just barely begins to break even.
An estimate of the price-versus-size relation-
ships, for a nominal break-even load factor of
50%, was made to indicate where improvements
may be needed in the future (Fig. 3.17). To main-
tain a break-even load factor as the number of
seats is reduced, the aircraft price must be
reduced sharply because crew, fuel, and main-
tenance costs do not decrease in direct proportion
to seating capacity. Consequently, price-related
items must be reduced faster than in direct pro-
portion. If future feeder and low-density
BOISE
Figure 3.15. Regions considered in analysis of low-density and feeder operations.
Figure 3.16. Break-even load factors.
Figure 3.17. Price versus size relationship for a
break-even load factor of 50%.
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short-haul systems are to  operate a t  a profit, some 
or all of the following changes are essential: 
0 
Reduced crew expense 
0 Reduced maintenance costs 
0 Increased fares 
0 Increased subsidies t o  airlines 
Financial assistance to manufacturers 
Significant reduction in initial costs 
Of the principal components of direct operat- 
ing cost (crew, fuel, maintenance, and deprecia- 
tion), crew costs are the least susceptible to  
reduction by R&D. Fuel costs may be cut 
through improved engine efficiencies, and reduc- 
tions in airplane drag and structural weight. Main- 
tenance costs may be reduced through system 
simplification and improvements in component 
reliability. Depreciation, directly related to  initial 
costs, might be reduced through a careful balance 
in improvements in propulsion, airplane weight 
reduction, and  simplicity. 
One of the most promising alternatives is to 
apply R&D toward new aircraft designs optimized 
f o r  economical operation on low-density, 
short-haul routes. Regulatory action may also be 
needed for route protection, for financial assis- 
tance for the commuter airlines. for increasing the 
permissible weight of commuter and air taxi air- 
craft, and for modifying the fare structure or sub- 
sidies for local service operations. 
Ahernatiiyes for  High-Density Operations 
Operations in high-density areas encounter all 
of the problems constraining the effectiveness of 
the short-haul air system. Very large travel 
markets exist in high-density areas, but  the air 
systems have only a small share. They cannot yet 
compete with the automobile in convenience and 
out-of-pocket costs. Air carriers in general have 
suffered financial losses operating short stage 
lengths even in the high-density areas. At the 
major hub  cities, accesslegress and congestion 
problems are particularly ’severe and it is not 
unusual for the travel time to  and from the ait- 
ports t o  exceed the air trip time. Short-haul and 
long-haul operations usually share the same air- 
ports. straining the capacities of both systems, 
but there has been widespread opposition to  new 
or more convenient airports. 
A course of action would be t o  improve the 
existing system. Improvements would include 
developing new conventional takeoff and landing 
(CTOL) aircraft with low noise and low operating 
costs at short ranges: building new airports; 
increasing the capacities of existing airports and 
the air traffic system; and expediting passenger 
handling and processing, by means of limited- or  
exclusive-access high-speed ground transportation 
and intraurban air feeder systems for the airports. 
Some of these improvements have been initiated 
or are planned in a few locations. 
It has been suggested that systems built 
around short takeoff and landing (STOL) and ver- 
tical takeoff and landing (VTOL) vehicles would 
provide the best short-haul travel in highdensity 
areas. It is expected that  STOL aircraft will first 
begin operations from conventional (CTOL) air- 
ports, but t o  realize the  full advantages of STOL 
and VTOL operation, new airport concepts 
(“STOLports” and “VTOLports”) will be needed. 
Figure 3.18 shows one such concept. 
Such systems, operating closer to origins and 
destinations, would provide better service with 
Figure 3.18. Elevated STOLport. Source: Ref. 9. 
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substantialsavingsin total travel time. They
wouldalsorelievethestrainonlong-haulsystems
bymovingawayfrommajorairportsthoseflights
notrequiringinterlinetransfers.Noiseandpollu-
tion wouldbe reducedby steep,curved,and
short-durationapproachesto landingareas.The
totalsystemsapproach,whichwouldbeessential
to therealizationof suchsystems,wouldrequire
completecooperationbetweennumerousand
diverse political, business,private, and
Governmentinterests.
Analysesof the costsand possiblefuture
patronageof STOL,VTOL,andCTOLsystemsin
1975-1985 were made by extending previous
work by DOT in the Northeast Corridor Trans-
portation Project (NECTP). The NECTP
techniques and demand simulation models were
used to examine the sensitivities of several
trade-off factors, including terminal locations and
numbers, access/egress characteristics, system
operating costs, demand levels, population distri-
butions, competing travel modes, and land costs
versus vehicle costs to alleviate noise. Various
STOL, VTOL, and CTOL systems were con-
sidered as possible alternatives in a multimode
situation, against alternative mixes of competing
surface systems that included the tracked
air-cushion vehicle (TACV) along with the auto,
rail, and bus modes. The air systems were treated
as viable commercial endeavors and were
required, with changes in fares, to show a return
on investment after taxes. It was assumed that the
Airport and Airways Trust Fund would provide
the local public authority with 50% of the invest-
ment capital for land, structure, and equipment
for runways and taxiways plus 100% of invest-
ment and annual cost for air traffic control. The
local public authority was assumed to provide
capital for the remainder of the terminal invest-
ment (via a bond issue for example) and to own,
operate, and maintain the terminal. The aircraft
operator would provide his own staff in the ter-
minal and would pay, via rental and landing fees,
the full annual cost to the public authority.
The NECTP analyses emphasize the impor-
tance of terminal location for the short-haul mis-
sion. In the simulations, air travel patronage
increased significantly as total travel time
decreased. Door-to-door trip time was found to
be the strongest single factor affecting the patron-
age of the short-haul air systems, particularly in
the business travel market. Consequently, even
though their fares were higher than CTOL, STOL
and VTOL systems attracted the highest number
of air travelers because their terminals were
located in centers of high demand, where
access/egress time was reduced and low
door-to-door trip times could be achieved (see
Fig. 3.19 and Table 3.4).
The lower total trip times for the STOL and
VTOL systems can be seen in the figure. The
STOL and VTOL central business district opera-
tions resulted in the highest overall patronage
(Table 3.4) even though their fares were highest
(Fig. 3.19). Very little difference was seen
between the VTOL and 1500-foot STOL systems.
The nearly equal costs (fares) shown in
Figure 3.19 reflect the nearly equal trade-off
between the higher initial investment and DOC of
the VTOL and the higher Federal and local invest-
ment in STOL airports for the STOL aircraft (par-
tially passed on to the operator in landing fees).
The nearly equal trip times and patronage
resulted from the comparable performance of the
two vehicles. (The VTOL version tested for 1985
was a tilt-wing turboprop with lower cruise speed
than the fanjet STOL - hence, the slightly longer
total trip time and lower patronage.)
The feasibility of locating air terminals in city
centers will depend strongly on many factors,
including safety, noise, and air pollution.
Trade-off studies indicate that definite benefits
could be gained through noise-suppression treat-
ment of aircraft engines and through increased
climb angles possible with VTOL and STOL air-
craft. Simulations were made using a tilt-wing
turboprop VTOL, with and without
noise-suppression equipment, flying at climbout
angles of 15 ° and 30 °. The results were compared
in terms of costs to the operator (reflected in
increased fares) for the installation of
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Figure 3.19. Total door-to-door trip time and fares for business and nonbusiness travel, Washington-NewYork City, 1985.
TABLE 3.4. NORTHEAST CORRIDOR MODAL
SPLIT, 1985, PERCENT OF TOTAL
OPTIONS
VTOL STOL STOL BB
CBD CBD SUBURBAN CTOL
i
70 69 73 75
13 13 15 17
4 4 5 5
13 14 7 3
Future planning for short-haul requirements
must, therefore, consider high-speed ground com-
petition, particularly in high-density regions.
In any case, STOL or VTOL systems offer
promising solutions for high-density, short-haul
operations.
INTRAURBAN TRANSPORTATION
SYSTEMS
noise-suppression equipment and for the acquisi-
tion of property required as a noise buffer zone.
For a 15 ° climb angle, with noise suppression
equipment, land cost would be 75% less than if
no noise suppression equipment were used. With-
out the equipment, land would cost 38% less for a
30 ° climb angle than for a 15 ° angle.
Significantly, the tracked air-cushion
(ground) vehicle (TACV) appears attractive as an
alternate high-speed, short-haul travel mode for
the Northeast Corridor. For 1985, the corridor
could use a tracked air-cushion vehicle with a
300-mph cruise speed operating on a spinal route
among the major cities. On routes out to 200
miles, TACV would be competitive with STOL or
VTOL in fare, door-to-door trip time, and service
frequency, and definitely superior to CTOL.
Improved intraurban transportation is essen-
tial for relieving growing highway congestion.
Expansion or modernization of the existing high-
way system is only part of the answer. Preferred
would be a fully integrated system incorporating
an expanded highway network and complemen-
tary fast urban mass transportation system. Cur-
rent urban mass transportation systems favor rail
or subway systems supplemented by bus routes.
Future planning is built around improvements to
these same systems (ref. 10).
To be most effective, mass ground transporta-
tion systems require:
An exclusive ground right-of-way.
High-density corridors where there are
predictable passenger travel patterns and
a favorable topography.
3-17
• Approximately 5 to 8 years to plan,
build, and start operation, or 2 to 4 years
to expand an existing system to meet
new demands, even under favorable
economic and political conditions.
• Cooperation of local governments and
agencies along the entire route.
• A relatively large initialinvestment.
An air transportation system, with freedom from
community-disrupting ground corridors, offers
advantages in all these areas, plus the following
unique advantages:
TABLE 3.5. HELICOPTER CARRIERS- NUMBER OF
ORIGINATING PASSENGERS IN SCHEDULED
SERVICE
1957-153,000 1963- 458,000
1958-230,000 1964- 608,000
1959-366,000 1965- 718,000
1960-490,000 1966-1,067,000
1961-431,000 1967-1,222,000
1962-359,000 1968-1,042,000
1969- 737,000a
aLos Angeles Airways strike. Source: Ref. I.
• Collection, distribution, and transfer of
interurban passengers to and from air-
ports and metroports.
• Public transportation to and from a large
city and its surrounding new towns or
satellite developments.
• Public transportation between complexes
within existing relatively low-density,
"urban sprawl" areas (such as Los
Angeles).
• Public transportation over geographic
barriers (water, mountains).
An intraurban transportation system is quite
dependent upon the peculiar demographic
characteristics of the metropolitan area. There-
fore, each area must be evaluated individually to
determine the best system for its particular needs.
Intraurban air transportation systems have
been tried in four metropolitan areas (Los
Angeles, New York, Chicago, and San
Francisco-Oakland), but have met with only
token success. Supported by subsidies, these
systems grew and provided a fast, but infrequent,
alternative to ground modes of transportation. In
1965, Federal subsidies to helicopter airlines were
terminated by the Congress. Although the num-
ber of passengers continued to rise for a few years
(see Table 3.5), Congress' action marked the
decline of helicopter airlines within the United
States.
One reason the subsidies were terminated is
that the service was considered to benefit a select
market (primarily businessmen) rather than the
public as a whole. The Congress reasoned that
scheduled helicopter service should therefore run
on an adequate fare structure. Or, if airlines
considered the service necessary as a feeder opera-
tion, they should subsidize the service. San
Francisco and Oakland Helicopter Airlines, New
York Airways, and Los Angeles Airways were
in fact so subsidized for varying periods.
Only New York Airways and San Francisco
and Oakland Helicopter Airlines continue to pro-
vide scheduled service. Chicago Helicopter Air-
ways terminated its scheduled service to coincide
with the cancellation of subsidy payments. Los
Angeles Airways, after operating 5 years without
Government subsidies and 2 years without finan-
cial support from the trunk airlines, filed for
bankruptcy in October 1970. San Francisco and
Oakland, which never received Federal subsidy
payments, is now operating on a reduced schedule
after filing for bankruptcy in 1970. New York
Airways continues to operate as a scheduled car-
rier because certain trunk airlines provide
financial and service support.
Because of high operating costs of current
VTOL aircraft, poor utilization, and the necessity
to maintain a fare structure competitive with the
other modes of urban transportation, commercial
scheduled systems as currently constituted are
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not economically feasible without subsidies. The
problems are aggravated by extremely short stage
lengths (averaging 18 miles for the helicopter air-
lines) and the commuter-peaking problem.
Because of their special characteristics, how-
ever, VTOL aircraft- including helicopters-
appear to offer certain interesting possibilities to
help solve the problems of transporting passengers
between major airports and urban areas.
Alternatives for lntraurban
Transportation Systems
An analysis of a typical urban transportation
system indicates that trips of 30 minutes or less
(approximately 20 miles) can be made faster by
automobile than by mass transportation systems.
To gain patronage, any mass transportation sys-
tem must provide faster service in the 20 to 50
mile range. The most attractive possibilities
appear to be either a fast transit link (FTL-an
improved rapid rail transportation system) or an
air system.
The FTL system would consist of auto-
matically controlled vehicles capable of operating
either independently or as trains. The vehicle
envisioned for 1985 would be quiet, lightweight,
and low-profile. It would require less precision in
guideways than current rapid transit systems,
such as the San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
(BART). The FTL could be underground, on the
ground, or elevated, and would travel on exclusive
rights-of-way (ref. 10)
An airbus system built around STOL or
VTOL vehicles would also provide an attractive
alternative to the auto for fast intraurban travel
(refs. 11, 12, 13). One study (ref. 11) indicates
that an operating subsidy would be required for a
STOL or VTOL system. It appears possible, how-
ever, that R&D can eventually make possible a
system where operating costs can be met and the
initial investment in aircraft can be paid off.
Another alternative would be an improved
helicopter taxi service. The helicopters would
operate from major airports to relatively austere
helipads at scattered industrial sites and motels,
often eliminating the need for any ground trans-
portation. They would provide demand service
rather than scheduled service, and would not
require terminal services such as ticketing or
baggage-handling. Among the improvements
which appear possible are instrument flight capa-
bility, increases in speed and range, and reduced
operating costs.
In an analysis performed for the Joint Study,
it was concluded that both an airbus system and a
helicopter taxi service can operate within the
same metropolitan area in a complementary
fashion, similar to ground buses and taxicabs. It
was also concluded that a combination of the
options may be preferable for a given metropoli-
tan area. The fast transit link has definite advan-
tages for the mass movement of people along
fixed routes. However, the advantages of an air
system- speed and flexibility- encourage its
consideration for urban transportation. Intra-
urban air systems, while not economically viable
today, could be an important element of future
urban transportation systems if R&D is continued
to reduce operating costs and improve service
dependability to the point that these systems
could operate with subsidies no greater than those
for rapid transit.
BENEFITS
Benefits from the improvement of feeder and
low-density, short-haul systems, from the imple-
mentation of effective STOL and VTOL inter-
urban systems in high-density areas, and from
intraurban air systems in large- and super-demand
centers would include:
• More frequent service to low-density
areas and new service to more
low-traffic-generation points.
• Reduction in total trip time in
high-density areas.
• Increased airport and airways system
capacities in high-density areas.
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For the general public and the Nation, benefits
would include:
• Reduction in required subsidies.
• Contribution toward a balanced
transportation system.
• Reduction in highway congestion.
R&D REQUIREMENTS
To achieve improved short-haul systems will
require a broad-based R&D program covering all
systems elements, as summarized below:
Air Vehicles
The major thrust of R&D programs for
short-haul vehicles should be to continue to pro-
vide a broad base of technology on which specific
vehicle designs can be based when the operational
needs have been defined. Major emphasis should
be placed on those systems having the greatest
potential for achieving the following:
• Safety under all operating conditions.
• Low noise for both approach and
takeoff.
• Flight control and handling character-
istics suitable for steep descent, curved
approaches to minimum-length runways,
and maximum automation of the
approach and landing, with maximum
safety under all conditions to include
operation in wake turbulence.
• Low direct operating cost, high reliabil-
ity, and low maintenance costs.
• Wide public acceptance, attained by good
ride quality and minimum vibration and
noise.
• High cruisc speed for minimum total trip
time.
7he Air 7¥affic System
The air traffic system for short-haul must be
compatible with long-haul as well as other sys-
tems. For short-haul, emphasis should be on the
portions of the air traffic system that will allow:
• Steep and curved instrument approach
and departure routes.
• Area navigation and low-altitude air
traffic control in hub areas.
• All-weather and automatic landing
systems.
• Instrument landing systems at all airports
served by the short-haul system and suit-
able for both low-density and
high-density operations.
Airports and Complementary
Ground Transportation
Short-haul requirements for airports and
access/egress systems will generally be compatible
with those of other mission areas. The principal
goals for short-haul are to achieve:
• Airport designs that provide for
maximum safety, to include arresting
systems for elevated STOLports and
VTOLports.
• Efficient passenger/cargo processing, to
assure that maximum benefit is attained
from reduced total trip-time capability.
• Ground access systems fully compatible
with STOLports and VTOLports located
within congested urban areas.
Demonstration Programs
Additional R&D in the form of
proof-of-concept and system component demon-
strations will be required to support any proced-
ural, technical, or system demonstrations that
may be undertaken. Because of the need to apply
the systems approach to the implementation of
V/STOL systems, such demonstration programs
will undoubtedly be a necessary first step before
V/STOL commercial service can be initiated.
Major Policy Issues
Previous studies by DOT, NASA, and CAB,
and this Study as well, have indicated the need
for decisions on policy regarding the role of the
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Federal Government in facilitating the develop-
ment and introduction of improved short-haul
systems, particularly those using STOL and/or
VTOL vehicle concepts. Two of the more
important policy issues derived from this Study
are:
• The role of the Federal Government in
planning and developing new short-haul
systems.
• The need for the total systems
approach in developing new
short-haul systems, particularly
STOL and VTOL systems, calls for
close coordination in planning by the
Federal, State, and local govern-
ments, and by private enterprise ele-
ments. Of critical importance to
short-haul in the planning process
are: the effective integration of
urban transport systems with the air
system to assure access/egress effici-
ency; and determination of suitable
locations for new airports (including
STOLports and VTOLports), as well
as obtaining concurrences on these
locations by state governments and
local communities. A leadership role
for the Federal Government is essen-
tial if progress is to be made in these
areas.
• Areas of technical uncertainty and
financial risk will be encountered in
developing new short-haul systems.
Demonstrations of short-haul system
technology, service, operating tech-
nique, and market potential will be
required. Criteria need to be estab-
lished for determining the extent of
participation by the Federal Govern-
ment in such demonstrations, partic-
ularly those designed to determine
market potential.
• Financial assistance by the Federal
Government, and regulatory
considerations.
• New short-haul CTOL, STOL, and
VTOL vehicles would better meet
future air transportation demands
and relieve present constraints to
effective operation. The develop-
ment of efficient, economically
viable aircraft could assure continued
U. S. leadership in aircraft manufac-
ture and sales and permit economical
airline operation with a minimum of
Government subsidy.
A third level of airline service, the
commuter airlines (scheduled air taxi
operations), has come into being to
meet demand in low-density regions
and to complement higher density
local service operations. Regulatory
policies restricting the size or weight
of aircraft used by these operators
should be modified to permit a wider
choice of aircraft and thus to
improve operating economics. The
Federal Government should develop
demonstration programs to deter-
mine whether route protection for
the commuter airlines and
fare/subsidy adjustments for
low-density operations would be
beneficial to the system and would
be in the national interest.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The short-haul system is an important ele-
ment of the national transportation system. Sub-
stantial benefits may be expected to accrue from
programs designed to alleviate the constraints to
further growth of the system. The constraints are
currently caused by problems with systems eco-
nomics, which limit profitability; problems with
access, congestion, and convenience, which offset
advantages in speed; and problems with noise and
environmental pollution, which limit public
acceptance of the system.
Because of the diverse nature of the
short-haul system, a variety of aircraft systems
(CTOL, STOL, and VTOL) will be required, both
to alleviate the constraints to growth and to
satisfy all the needs of the system. Efficient
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CTOL systems will yield the most economical and
satisfactory intercity air service in most feeder
operations and in virtually all operations in
low-density areas. STOL and VTOL systems will
be needed to provide adequate intercity service in
high-density areas. Intraurban STOL and VTOL
systems will be needed in some urban areas,
depending on geographic and demographic
circumstances. The latter systems may not be
economically self-sufficient, however, for some
time to come.
R&D areas requiring major emphasis are
those which will make possible more efficient
vehicles with better operating economics, with
noise and pollution characteristics sufficiently
low to gain public acceptance of the system and
thus alleviate constraints to airport locations.
Regulatory changes will also be required to assure
the continued growth and viability of the
short-haul systems.
In view of the potential for growth of
short-haul air systems and the benefits to be
derived therefrom, the following approach is
recommended:
• Continue to assure the existence of a
broad-based vehicle technology program
that will encourage the development of
efficient, new short-haul vehicles and
help assure continued U. S. world leader-
ship in commercial aviation aircraft.
Major emphasis should be placed on vehi-
cle operating economics and alleviation
of noise and pollution.
• Assume a position of Federal Govern-
ment leadership in demonstration pro-
grams for new short-haul aviation
systems. Both inter- and intraurban
systems should be included.
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AIR CARGO
THE TOTAL DISTRIBUTION COST CONCEPT
Air cargo is the fastest growing mode of
freight transportation in the United States,
although cargo rates have remained high over the
past 20 years. The chief reason for this rapid
growth is undoubtedly the great time advantage
of air transport. This growth can also be attrib-
uted, in part, to the recognition and acceptance
of the total distribution cost concept. Under this
concept, total costs of distribution are minimized
by trade-offs among packaging, transportation,
insurance, warehousing, inventory levels, interest
charges, materials-handling, obsolescence, loss,
and damage. Earlier, these costs were treated as
separate entities, without considering the interrela-
tionships among them. Many companies are now
establishing distribution departments, in some
cases elevating major distribution decisions to top
levels of management.
When total distribution costs are considered,
air freight frequently emerges as the optimum
mode of transportation for high-value commod-
ities. In many cases savings in warehousing, pack-
aging, and inventory costs more than offset the
higher rates charged for air cargo transportation.
Studies by the Air Transport Association of
America (ATA) have indicated that distribution
savings up to 40% may be possible for some com-
modities by switching from surface to air
transportation.
portation. Figure 3.21 shows the growth of air
cargo since 1957 and projections through 1985
based on three estimates of annual growth rates
from 1969 to 1985: 12.5% (by Boeing Co.);
17.1% (by Lockheed-Georgia Co.); and 19.1% (by
Douglas Aircraft Co.).
Figure 3.20. Growth of rail, truck, and air modes of
U.S. domestic cargo transport (air includes supple-
mental carriers). Source: Ref. 2, p. 23.
GROWTH OF AIR CARGO
The term cargo as used here includes freight,
express, and mail. Air cargo is now experiencing
the rapid rate of growth that was enjoyed by the
railroads and motor carriers in earlier years
(Fig. 3.20). Domestic and international cargo traf-
fic increased 455% between 1959 and 1969, com-
pared to a growth in passenger traffic of 285%
(ref. 1). The rate of growth can be expected to
level off in about 15 years, consistent with
growth patterns for other modes of cargo trans-
Figure 3.21. Historical and forecast U.S. scheduled air
cargo, domestic and international (does not include
supplemental carriers). Source: Refs. 2-4.
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It isexpectedthatin 1985 O'Hare Airport in
Chicago will originate more than 2 million tons of
cargo compared to 195,000 tons in 1968.
Charlotte, North Carolina; Dayton, Ohio;
Houston, Texas; and Denver, Colorado; will have
a greater volume in 1985 than did O'Hare in
1968. Twenty-seven cities are expected to have
more volume than the 135,000 tons of domestic
cargo handled in 1968 at New York's Kennedy
Airport.
MARKETING
Less than 1% of the domestic intercity cargo
ton-mile market was carried by air in 1970, while
the airlines reported that 67% of their belly and
deck cargo cubic capacity was not used. The
importance of air freight for high-value commodi-
ties may be seen from the fact that in 1969, air
cargo exports and imports at the Port of New
York represented only 0.59% of the weight
handled, but 26.7% of the cargo value (ref. 5).
Air cargo is being used to expand many mar-
kets. Fresh Idaho trout are being flown to Eastern
markets. Florida tropical fish dealers have been
able to achieve lower handling costs by air ship-
ments (ref. 6). Automobile and motorcycle parts
rank first in the list of top ten commodities car-
ried by scheduled airlines in the U.S. (ref. 7).
Sears, Roebuck ships approximately 6,000,000
pounds of merchandise by air to Hawaii each year
to minimize its requirements for warehousing and
inventory in the Islands (ref. 8). J. C. Penneyuses
air freight daily to ship catalog orders from its
distribution center in Milwaukee. Ohrbach's air
freights all of its European fashions into the
United States. Honeywell increased its percentage
of shipments by air from 10% in 1967 to 60%in
1970 (ref. 9), using air for international ship-
ments of all computer parts and 80% of noncom-
puter parts. Motorola distributes replacement
parts by air. Hoechst Pharmaceutical uses air dis-
tribution for replenishment of all its high-value
drugs with a short shelf life. Searle air ships
30,000 to 60,000 pounds of drugs weekly to dis-
tributors throughout the United States. By chang-
ing from surface to air transportation, the Air
Force was able to reduce its purchases of aircraft
engines by almost a billion dollars.
Unfortunately, due to the natural reluctance
of businesses to release proprietary information,
factual data concerning savings from air trans-
portation are usually not available. It appears,
however, that an aggressive marketing approach
for air cargo would lead air carriers to help com-
panies identify cost reduction realizable by using
air shipment. Personnel of one airline, for
example, working with a clothing manufacturer
found that the manufacturer could reduce annual
distribution costs from $1,096,000 to $812,000.
A drug manufacturer, conducting a 10-day test
with another airline, discovered that distribution
costs could be reduced by 43%. At least one air-
craft company (Douglas) has developed an analy-
sis model designed to help airlines and shippers
identify the most economic transportation mode
and to maximize reductions in total distribution
costs (ref. 10). Other aircraft manufacturers have
or are developing cargo cost simulation models.
Market analysts are hampered by lack of
information concerning origins and destinations
of commodities moving by various modes of
transportation. CAB and DOT, recognizing the
need for market data, have recently initiated a
project to develop a system for collecting infor-
mation on air cargo movements, including origin
and destination data and data on costs of handling
and transporting cargo. Such information will be
helpful in policy decisions relative to air cargo
systems improvement programs. It could provide
a data base for aircraft manufacturers to use in
designing cargo aircraft and in the sale of these
aircraft. The airlines could use it in their
cargo-marketing efforts.
The "peaking" effect precludes effective utili-
zation of available air cargo capacity. Cargo is
normally offered to carriers in the afternoon for
next-morning delivery, so most cargo is flown at
night. This makes for poor daytime utilization of
all-cargo aircraft and of the belly compartments
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of passengerai craft.TheCivil Aeronautics Board
has been reluctant to approve off-peak or daytime
incentive freight rates. Most proposals by the air-
lines to the CAB for such rates have included a
provision that freight could be moved at night at
the off-peak rate, on a space-available basis. The
Board felt that approval of proposals with these
provisions would present opportunities for dis-
crimination. The problems of peaking might pos-
sibly be mitigated by multipurpose aircraft which
could be used for short-haul passengers in the
daytime and for cargo at night.
BELLY COMPARTMENT VERSUS
ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT
In fiscal year 1970, passenger aircraft handled
40.7% of the air cargo ton-miles (ref. 11). Cargo
revenues (including certificated route and supple-
mental airline freight, express, U. S. and foreign
mail, excess baggage, and charter revenues)
account for more than 15% of airline transport
revenue (ref. 12). It is apparent that freight car-
ried in the bellies of passenger aircraft is a very
important source of revenue for the airlines. Esti-
mates of the percentage of the tonnage that will
be moving in belly compartments vary from 10%
in 1980 (ref. 2) to 34% in 1985.
The advantages of carrying cargo in passenger
aircraft (as opposed to all-cargo aircraft) include
greater frequency and service to more destina-
tions. There are, however, weight, density, and
size restrictions in belly compartments that do
not exist in all-cargo aircraft. Also belly-cargo
operations add to the congestion in passenger
areas, many of which are already overcrowded.
Additional handling contributes to loss and dam-
age. There is always the danger that passenger
flights will be delayed because of cargo, or that
important cargo will be delayed to accommodate
passenger schedules. More ground-support equip-
ment is required to load a given amount of cargo
in several passenger aircraft than in one all-cargo
aircraft.
THE COSTS OF AIR SHIPMENT
The Civil Aeronautics Board prescribes a uni-
form system of accounts for scheduled air carriers
and requires that detailed financial reports be
filed with that agency. Costs incurred by the air
freight industry would, thus, on the face of it,
appear to be readily available. A fundamental
problem arises in the interpretation of these data,
however, because the airlines may allocate
indirect operating costs between freight and pas-
senger service or between all-cargo and combina-
tion aircraft service in any manner they see fit so
long as the method of allocation is stated. The use
of varying allocation methods and the resulting
proliferation of arbitrary costs in the airline
industry, particularly by combination carriers,
have hindered efforts to make accurate deter-
minations of the real costs of air freight service
(ref. 13). Uniform cost accounting and reporting
procedures are needed.
Since 1963, operating revenues per revenue
ton-mile in domestic scheduled all-cargo service
have been gradually declining (Table 3.6). How-
ever, air freight revenues per ton-mile (14.5 to
19.1¢) are still high compared to rail (1.34¢) and
motor carriers (7.06¢).
Domestic operating expenses per revenue
ton-mile have also been declining, but since 1963
expenses have exceeded revenues every year
except 1966 and the first half of 1967. In con-
trast, international air cargo service has been pro-
fitable in every year since 1963, offsetting losses
in domestic service. The difference between
expenses per revenue ton-mile and expenses per
available ton-mile (Table 3.6) shows that better
utilization of available cargo space could cut costs
by one-half.
To attract more freight, every effort should
be made to reduce operating expenses. In 1969,
direct operating costs (DOC) made up 58% of
total operating expenses for all-cargo service
(ref. 14). Large savings in DOC's may be expected
as larger aircraft come into airline fleets. The
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TABLE 3.6. OPERATING EXPENSE AND REVENUE PER TON-MILE, DOMESTIC SCHEDULED
ALL--CARGO SERVICE
12 MONTHS
ENDING
III
REVENUE PER EXPENSE PER
REVENUE TON- REVENUE TON-
MILE, CENTS MILE, CENTS
COM61. ALL-
NATION CARGO
JUN 30, 1963 22.75 14.82
DEC 31, 1969 19.12 14.46
COMBI- ALL-
NATION CARGO
35.43 20.03
20.71 19.55
EXPENSE PER
AVAILABLE TON-
MILE, CENTS
COMBI- ALL-
NATION CARGO
21.38 12.43
9.32 10_5
Source: Ref. 14.
DOC of a 50-ton payload commercial aircraft is
approximately 3.22¢ per ton-mile. Douglas Air-
craft Company estimates that with today's tech-
nology this could be reduced to 2.42¢ in a
100-ton aircraft and 2.18¢ in a 250-ton aircraft.
Continuing improvements in technology will
lower these costs even further.
The C-141 and the C-5A were designed as
cargo aircraft for the Air Force, but incorporate
features to meet unique military requirements not
needed by commercial carriers. Operating costs
are higher than they would be with a commercial
cargo design. Instead of buying military cargo air-
craft, commercial carriers have converted
passenger aircraft to cargo service. They are not as
efficient from a cargo-handling viewpoint as they
would be had they been designed for freight.
Uncompromised commercial cargo aircraft will
probably be straight-in end-loading designed to
carry standard modular containers. Significant
weight savings will accrue when the aircraft design
omits provisions for passenger comfort or safety.
These savings will permit more payload for the
aircraft.
As direct operating costs are reduced, indirect
operating costs will assume greater importance.
"Traffic servicing" accounted for approximately
43.5% of the indirect operating expenses of
scheduled all-cargo service in 1969 (ref. 14). A
more-or-less typical breakdown of traffic servicing
costs is given in Table 3.7. Cargo handling costs
cannot be isolated under the method of reporting
traffic servicing costs currently prescribed by the
CAB. Detailed information similar to that shown
in Table 3.7 is needed from all airlines if meaning-
ful cost analyses are to be conducted. Traffic
servicing costs for all-cargo aircraft used by Amer-
ican Airlines are approximately $74 per origi-
nated ton of domestic cargo as compared with
TABLE 3.7. TRAFFIC SERVICING EXPENSES (A 1969 CASE)
m
SERVICE COMBINATION ALL-CARGO •
AIRCRAFT, PERCENT AIRCRAFT, PERCENT
i
LOADING AND UNLOADING 36.9 5.7
ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION SERVICE 10.6 14.2
FREIGHT AGENTS 12.2 16.1
WAREHO USING 24.6 47.3
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE 16.7 16.7
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
Source: Refi 15.
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$149 for combination passenger-cargo aircraft
(ref. 15). Analysis of a domestic all-cargo opera-
tion in 1975 utilizing an uncompromised cargo
aircraft, such as the Lockheed L-500, indicates
that traffic servicing costs might be reduced to
about $36 per ton.
Loading and unloading costs for end-loading
aircraft will be substantially lower than they are
for current side-loading aircraft. The cost reduc-
tions, however, are quite small compared to
today's total traffic servicing costs. When the
volume of air freight forecast for the 1980's and
expected improvements in efficiency of the other
activities that make up traffic servicing are taken
into account, loading costs may become a more
significant portion of traffic servicing costs. An
airplane designed for cargo will permit greater
efficiency in loading and thus offer significant
cost savings for the future.
As the air freight market expands, larger
aircraft will be required, the use of standard
modular containers will increase (bringing
improved stacking efficiency), and the volume of
preconsolidated cargo will increase. These factors
will improve the efficiency of cargo handling
operations, and help reduce unit handling costs.
GROUND HANDLING AND
DOCUMENTATION
Even though mechanized equipment is used
to transport cargo from the terminal to the air-
craft, handling of cargo on the ground is still
primarily a manual operation. At best, terminal
operations are semiautomated. Containerized or
palletized loads are positioned in the aircraft and
secured by hand; belly compartment loading is an
inefficient, time-consuming, and costly manual
operation, except where containers are used.
In general, each airline uses cargo handling
equipment designed to its own specifications.
Route structure, service schedules, degree of auto-
mation desired, and capital investment lead each
airline to arrive at a different specification. In
some cases, the airlines specify performance
requirements; in other cases, manufacturers
develop equipment based on their understanding
of airline requirements. As a result, current cargo
handling equipment is expensive, difficult to
maintain, not standardized, and of limited inter-
changeability.
Documentation is a major problem- and a
major cost generator. Each airline has its own
commodity codes for statistical and rate-making
purposes. The Department of Transportation has
been encouraging all modes of transportation to
adopt the same commodity codes. The airlines are
now beginning to use electronic data processing
systems for computerized control of cargo, pro-
viding positive control of shipments from origin
to destination, reduction of paperwork, and
speed-up of documentation. Standardization of
codes is essential if the economies possible with
computerized control are to be realized, particu-
larly when a shipment is handled by more than
one carrier between its origin and destination.
Customs clearance for cargo is available only
during daytime hours (Monday through Friday),
unless the consignee pays overtime charges. Ship-
ments may thus be delayedas much as 16 hours
on a week night and 64 hours on a weekend. The
airlines must provide temporary warehouse space
for the delayed cargo, contributing to high traffic
servicing costs.
FACILITIES
The size of the U.S. all-cargo aircraft fleet
may be expected to grow to about 505 in 1985,
compared to about 100 in 1968. The fleet will
include aircraft with much greater capacity than
current aircraft (see Fig. 2.10 in the "Systems
Status and Potential" section).
Many communities will be faced with the
necessity of building new airports in the next few
years because they will not be able to expand
existing airports. They will have the options of
building specialized airports, that is, all-passenger,
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all-cargo,andgeneralaviationairports,or addi-
tional combination airports. It may prove advis-
able to move major cargo facilities away from the
airport, to one or more locations convenient to
shippers. Generally, land for these facilities will
be less expensive than land at airports, and the
move may postpone saturation.
Consolidation of cargo at off-airport loca-
tions would reduce congestion on surface trans-
portation routes to and from the airports. The
average load on trucks carrying cargo to O'Hare
Airport in Chicago during November 1969 was
1230 pounds (ref. 16). If the average load stays at
this level, by 1985 more than 2670 trucks an
hour will be arriving at O'Hare during the four
peak hours each day. If the average load can be
increased to 12,300 pounds by off-airport consol-
idation, the peak-hour number of trucks will
remain at about the current level.
Combination airports could better utilize
runways and other facilities than specialized air-
ports because most passengers fly in the daytime
and most cargo is flown at night. Communica-
tions and ground-transportation costs would be
higher with specialized airports because of the
requirement to move cargo between
passenger-aircraft belly compartments and
all-cargo aircraft. Specialized airports would be
preferable from a cost-accounting viewpoint.
Land costs for all-cargo airports would probably
be less per acre because they could be built
farther from the cities. The total acreage required
for combination airports, however, should be less
than for specialized airports because common
facilities would be used more efficiently.
On balance, combination airports, with the
maximum use of off-airport facilities, appear to
be preferable to specialized airports, regardless of
the levels of passenger and cargo traffic. However,
all of the alternatives should be carefully consid-
ered before a decision is made in any specific
community.
CONTAINERIZATION
The modular container is one of the
important transportation developments of this
century. Small shipments are now being consoli-
dated in containers for shipment by air, rail,
truck, and water. The use of containers minimizes
costs of packaging, handling, damage, pilferage,
terminal space, and insurance. Container ships
first appeared in international trade in 1966; by
1970 about 125,000 containers were being used
by U.S. maritime carriers. Despite the progress
made, much remains to be done. The greatest
need is for an intermodal container- inter-
changeable among air, motor, and rail carriers.
This development could be as important to the
national economy as establishing a standard rail
gage.
Research and development is needed to
achieve a container light enough for air transpor-
tation while still having the strength required for
handling in all transport modes except ships; it
does not seem feasible at this point in time to
build an intermodal container to meet maritime
handling requirements. The development of an
intermodal container system would be to the
advantage of U. S. carriers and shippers alike since
it would permit door-to-door service in one con-
tainer. Standardization of container sizes, shapes,
and restraining devices is needed. Lack of stan-
dardization may not prevent interchange of con-
tainers, but it increases operating, maintenance,
and initial investment costs.
There will be a need for a container central
control office, employing the latest automatic
data processing systems, to track the location of
containers and associated equipment in the U. S.
and abroad. The office would provide informa-
tion and administrative support to shippers, con-
signees, intermodal carriers, and freight
forwarders, both domestic and international. It
would assist in spotting imbalances in the con-
tainer inventory, identifying shortages, and high-
lighting excessive tie-ups. This concept is already
used by the railroad industry in the interchange,
pooling, and cost allocation of rail cars.
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GOVERNMENTPOLICIES
Transportationproblemstodayare vastly
different from those in the early stages of the
country's growth when regulation was first
imposed. Shippers now have a wide range of
choice in modes and routes. The notion that
transportation is a natural monopoly is no longer
relevant (except for certain commodities in
limited and well-defined markets). It is increas-
ingly clear that the number and variety of trans-
portation alternatives available today have made
comprehensive and complete regulation admin-
stratively infeasible as well as economically
undesirable. The central and primary objective of
an updated regulatory program should be to
establish criteria emphasizing the achievement of
certain broad standards of performance rather
than to prescribe precise specifications for partic-
ular firms or industries.
Companies have been denied certificates to
provide air cargo service because they could not
prove that the service was required as a matter of
public convenience and necessity. In normal busi-
ness, entry or withdrawal from a market is based
on a reasonable relationship to the existing busi-
ness of the firm and on a reasonable relationship
to an existing and prospective market. An appli-
cant should be required to state his expectations
in specific terms, meeting reasonable quantitative
standards. Approval of an application should
depend on performance in a test period to deter-
mine if projected standards were met. Shippers
would benefit from this relaxed form of entry
control because more service would be available.
Competition would be intensified and freight
rates could be expected to drop.
Carriers should be able to provide
door-to-door service. Only motor carriers and
freight forwarders can provide this service today
because the transportation regulatory agencies do
not permit multimodal ownership. There would
be many advantages to the shipper in multimodal
ownership. The division of responsibility for the
quality of service that exists today would dis-
appear. In-transit delays should be reduced. Reim-
bursement for loss and damage would be easier to
collect. Carrier operating expenses would be
lowered by reducing the amount of overhead and
paperwork.
The biggest problem facing air cargo trans-
portation is the lack of a total systems approach.
There is need to coordinate the efforts of govern-
ments, airlines, aircraft manufacturers, shippers,
airport operators, and interfacing modes of trans-
portation. The technological, economic, regula-
tory, and marketing aspects of air cargo must be
integrated if the inherent advantages of this trans-
port mode are to be fully realized. One office
should be designated within the Federal Govern-
ment to perform this coordination and
integration.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed in the section on air vehicles,
little new technology will be required for new
cargo aircraft, and no Government support of
R&D for cargo aircraft seems warranted.
An office should be designated within the
Federal Government to coordinate actions on the
following matters:
• Review of regulatory policies of the
Federal Government concerning rates,
certification of new carriers, and multi-
modal ownership in order to determine
the impact on costs, marketing, innova-
tion, and growth of air cargo.
• Standardization in accounting
procedures, documentation, and data
reporting.
• Improvement of cargo handling
equipment and facilities. Major problems
are evident in containerization, materials
handling equipment, cargo terminals, and
transfer to other modes of
transportation.
• Provision of current and forecast cargo
movement data, to permit more effective
trade-off studies and marketing efforts.
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GENERAL AVIATION
General aviation includes all civil flying
except that of the public air carriers. It covers a
broad spectrum, including personal travel, plea-
sure flying, and private business and corporate
flying. It includes instructional flying and
special-purpose missions, such as firefighting,
aerial mapping and photography, powerline and
pipeline patrol, agricultural crop control, and
highway traffic observation. Air taxi and com-
muter airlines have evolved from general aviation,
and are treated in the "Commercial Passenger Ser-
vice" section of this report (except for the safety
aspect, which is included in this section).
General aviation aircraft range from small,
single-place piston aircraft to very large jet trans-
ports and rotorcraft. Avionics equipment used in
these aircraft ranges from simple navigation and
communications transceivers for visual flight rule
(VFR) flying to complex systems, including
weather radar, autopilot, flight director display
and approach coupler for instrument flight rule
(IFR) capability and Category II landing opera-
tions.
The primary focus of this section is on the
personal operators. The service they provide is
not offered for hire to the general public, but is
primarily for pleasure or is incidental to business
activity. The personal category represents the
largest component of general aviation activity in
terms of number of vehicles and number of pilots
(Table 3.8 and ref. 1). More than 70,000 of the
130,806 aircraft in the general aviation category
are private aircraft.
The general aviation inventory represents
98% of the U. S. civil aviation fleet. It flies 1.6
times as many plane miles and 4.3 times as many
hours as the certificated route air carriers. More-
over, although general aviation generates less than
10% of the total domestic air passenger-miles, it
utilizes 20 times as many airports as domestic air
carriers (refs. 1, 2).
Based on an expected average growth rate of
5.3% per year, by 1985 approximately 287,000
general aviation aircraft, flying approximately 57
million hours, must be anticipated (Figs. 3.22,
3.23). Private operators (personal, instructional,
and other categories shown in Table 3.8 and
TABLE 3.8. COMPARISON OF GENERAL AVIATION WITH U. S. CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR
CARRIERS, 1969
II Ill Ill IIIIII I
NUMBER OF HOURS MILES PASSENGER.
CATEGORY AIRCRAFT, FLOWN, FLOWN, MILES,
DEC 31, 1969 MILLIONS MILLIONS MILLIONS
PERSONAL 70,500 6.0 829.0 1,907
BUSINESSAND EXECUTIVE 24,388 7.1 1,426.0 4,768
COMMERCIAL 11,832 4.9 722.9 1,770
AIR TAXIa 5,642 2.5 - -
AERIAL APPLICATION 5,788 1.4 - -
INDUSTRIAL/SPECIAL 402 0.9 - -
INSTRUCTIONAL 15,655 7.0 910.3 1,274
OTHER 8,431 0.3 38.3 96
TOTAL GENERAL AVIATION 130,806 25.4 3,926.5 9,815
U.S. AIRCARRIERS,
SCHEDULEDSERVICE 2,690/:) 5.9 2,400 125,400
aNonscheduled air taxis only; scheduled air taxis (commuter airlines) are excluded.
bAircraft in use.
Source: Refs. 3, 4.
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TABLE 3.9. COSTS PER MILE PER PERSON
(CENTS)
ORE FOUR-PERSQN SIX-PERSONMODE
PERSON FAMILY FAMILY
PRIVATE AUTO 12.6 3.2 2.1
SCHEDULEDAIR
CARRIER 5.6 4.9 4.5
PERSONAL
AIRCRAFT a 17.3 4.3 3.3
Figure 3.22. Actual and projected number of general
aviation aircraft, by use.
Figs. 3.22 and 3.23) will account for about 65%
of the general aviation inventory and 50% of the
hours flown. Such large numbers of private planes
in the air system, operated generally by pilots less
skilled than commercial pilots, will pose a sub-
stantial load on air traffic control and airports in
the future. This load must be handled with maxi-
mum possible safety.
COSTS
Table 3.9 shows the estimated total cost per
apredicated on substantial usage of 150 hours per year.
mile per person for auto, scheduled air carrier,
and personal aircraft.
Travel cost for a single individual is
substantially less by scheduled air carrier than by
the other two alternatives. Personal air carriage is
the most expensive. For a four-person family,
however, the situation changes completely. The
costs for the private auto and the personal plane
fall below the scheduled air carrier.
The personal automobile provides a family
greater flexibility than the personal aircraft. Also,
a personal aircraft calls for a substantial capital
investment. The initial cost of a personal aircraft
will run at least four to five times that of a car.
Consequently, unless there is a substantial
improvement in the operating and investment
cost, and in utilization of personal aircraft, the
market will continue to be limited.
PROBLEMS
Figure 3.23. Actual and projected number of general
aviation flight hours, by use.
Federal Government actions "to ensure
safety of operations" have a direct bearing on the
cost and usefulness of private aviation. These
include:
• Certification of aircraft and equipment
• Certification of pilots and training
instructors
• Specification of training curricula
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• Establishment and operation of the
Nation's air traffic control system
• Aviation weather service and
flight-service stations
• Aviation communications service
• Airport investment decision through the
Airport and Airway Development Act
(ref. 5).
The way the Government exercises its author-
ity in these areas directly affects the cost of
service and the safety of all general aviation
operations.
Safety
Safety is of particular concern to private avia-
tion. Although the rate of general aviation fatal-
ities has decreased from 40 fatal accidents per
million hours flown in 1955 to less than 30 in
1969 (Fig. 3.24), the number of fatalities has con-
tinued to increase as a result of the large increase
in the number of operations (Fig. 3.25 and
ref. 6).
In 1969 there were 1388 general aviation
fatalities. (In 1970 there were about 100 fewer
fatalities than in 1969.) If accidents continue to
occur at the same rate, approximately 4000 fatali-
ties must be expected in 1980 (ref. 2).
Figure 3.25. Number of annual general aviation fatalities.
Source: Ref. 6.
Data from the National Safety Council show
that the general aviation fatality rate far exceeds
the rate for other transport modes (see
Table 3.10).
It may be seen that the risk is 7.7 times
higher in general aviation than in automobile
travel, and 139 times higher than in scheduled
domestic airline travel. As shown in Table 3.11,
however, in terms of public accidents, general
aviation ranks fourth (ref. 7). In terms of all
TABLE 3.10. FATALITIES AND RATES (PER
100 MILLION PASSENGER MILES) 1969
TRANSPORT NUMBER OF
MODE FATALITIES a RATE
AUTOS AND TAXIS 37,200 2.30
BUSES 150 0.22
RAILROAD PASSENGERTRAINS 9 0.07
AIR: SCHEDULED DOMESTIC 131 0.13
NONSCHEDULED DOMESTIC 6 -
INTERNATIONAL 0 0
GENERAL AVIATION 1,388 18.00
Figure 3.24. General aviation fatal accident rate, 15 years.
Source: Ref. 6.
alncludes passengers only, except for autos, where the
driver is considered a passenger.
Source: Ref. 7.
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TABLE3.11. PUBLIC ACCIDENTAL DEATHS, 1969 a
CATEGORY NUMBER(INRANKORDER)
FALLS 5,500
DROWNING 4,800
ALLOTHERPUBLIC 5,500
AIRTRANSPORT: 1,400b
GENERALAVIATION 1,388c
CERTIFICATEDCARRIERS 158c
FIREARMS 1,100
WATERTRANSPORT 1,100
alncludes deaths in public places or places used in a
public way, not involving motor vehicles. Excludes
deaths in the course of employment.
bDoes not include crew.
Clncludes crew.
Source: Ref. 7.
TABLE 3.12. ALL ACCIDENTAL DEATHS (PUBLIC
AND NONPUBL1C), 1969
CATEGORY NUMBER(INRANKORDER)
MOTORVEHICLES 56,400a
FALLS 19,000
DROWNING 7,300
FIRES,BURNS,ETC. 7,100
FIREARMS 2,600
POISONING(SOLIDS,LIQUIDS) 2,500
MACHINERY 2,000
POISONING( ASES,VAPORS) 1,700
AIRTRANSPORT: 1,40(0
GENERALAVIATION 1,388c
CERTIFICATEDCARRIERS 158c
alncludes pedestrians and others killed by motor vehicles.
bDoes not include crew.
Clncludes crew.
Source: Ref. 7.
accidental deaths, general aviation ranks ninth
(see Table 3.12 and ref. 7).
Tabulations from the National Safety Council
show that general aviation travel is a high-risk
form of transportation when fatalities are corn-
pared on an exposure basis (in terms of
passenger-miles) (Table 3.10). However, a
broadened perspective is obtained when the num-
ber of general aviation fatalities is compared to
the number of other public and private accidental
deaths. Fewer people die from general aviation
accidents because a relatively small portion of the
population engages in private flying. It is to be
expected then that the allocation of public funds
to improve the safety of general aviation opera-
tions would receive a proportionately lower pri-
ority than other areas which are the source of a
number of accidental deaths- such as motor
vehicles, firearms, and poisoning.
Expenditure of public funds for maintaining
the safety of the airspace is an entirely different
issue, because the Federal Government has had a
long-standing role in assuring safety of the air-
ways for those who use public air transportation.
To assure the safety of the air carriers, it is neces-
sary for the Government to control and provide
air traffic services to the private air sector as well.
The problem of safety in general aviation has
two basic dimensions:
• The aircraft andits subsystems
• The airman's proficiency and experience
The Aircraft and Its Subsystems. General avi-
ation accidents and fatalities are occurring at dis-
turbingly high rates. The question then is" Have
technology and regulation been adequately
applied to minimize this problem?
Although the aerospace industry has been
noted for technological progress and innovation,
the technology incorporated in most personal air-
craft is quite old. Today's certificated general
aviation aircraft meet Federal Air Regulations
requirements for airworthiness and safety. How-
ever, the type certificates for one-third of all pri-
vate aviation aircraft produced in the first nine
months of 1970 were issued 12 or more years
ago. Table 3.13 shows the age of approved type
certificate applicable to airplanes recently pro-
duced by a general aviation manufacturer.
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TABLE3.13.TYPECERTIFICATEAGEFOR TYPICAL
AIRCRAFT PRODUCED FROM JAN-SEPT 1970
YEARSSINCE P EN CUMULATIVE m
CERT F CATE ISSUED ERC T - PERCENT •
m
LESSTHAN 6 5.5 5.5 /
6-10 18.0 23.5 •
11-15 70.0 I 93.5 •
Much untapped technology is already avail-
able to improve vehicle safety; this suggests that
something has discouraged change or innovation
by the industry. For example, the costs associated
with the certification process are high; it may be
that they have served as a deterrent, especially
since they must be passed along to the customer
in the form of increased prices. Certification
would appear to be a definite deterrent to radical
changes (such as use of plastics in structures)
since standards are set up on the basis of current
practice and are not easily changed.
mobile. Aircraft that require elaborate "preflight"
checks for safe operations will find decreasing
acceptance- or will produce higher accident
rates. Most people will want to simply check to
see that it is all there (pilots call this "kicking the
tires"), climb in, turn the key, and drive off.
Aircraft designers must make every effort to
make safe operation less dependent on the skill
and expertise of the pilot. Aircraft of the present
generation have adequate stability under normal
conditions but the demands placed on the pilot in
turbulence or under conditions of poor visibility
sometimes prove too great for him and an acci-
dent results. Also, despite the best efforts of
instructors, a few pilots still fly aircraft into trees,
mountains, and each other. There is need for
more crashworthy vehicles to protect occupants
in the event of a crash. Current certification pro-
cesses on aircraft need reappraisal to promote and
foster technological advance in the private avia-
tion industry. Too often, certification minimums,
as written, tend to become design standards.
Another view is that the nature of the market
is responsible for innovation not being as rapid as
it might have been in general aviation aircraft.
The product is costly and the market is very
price-sensitive. The cost of R&D applied to a
small production run can become a significant
addition to the selling price and could act as a
deterrent to acceptance by the purchasing public.
Consequently, general aviation manufacturers
have been motivated to "give the public what it
wants," based on years of successfully gaging the
needs of their market. Even though the aviation
community possesses technologies which could
improve general aviation aircraft, market accep-
tance could likely be low because of the added
Cost.
As the number of users of private aircraft
increases, it is probable that fewer pilots will be
"dedicated" to aviation. Flying will become more
of a means to an end rather than an end in itself.
Private aircraft operation should therefore
become as simple and easy as driving an auto-
The Airman's Proficiency and Experience.
The proficiency of the general aviation pilot
ranges from that of the inexperienced student to
an airline transport-rated pilot. Training for pri-
vate flying has changed little over the past
60 years. Once over the hurdle of the first solo
and the private flight test, in general the individ-
ual pilot has only his experience as an instructor.
Programs for proficiency checks or retesting are
few and purely voluntary. There is no require-
ment for updating on aircraft communications,
navigation, air traffic control procedures, or even
basic aircraft operations. The approach is essen-
tially: once licensed, always licensed. In recent
years, a substantial amount of pilot training
beyond the private pilot certificate was paid for
by the Federal Government through programs
under the Veterans Administration. As a result of
this subsidy, the Federal Government, in effect,
extended the amount of training undertaken. The
experience and proficiency of the present pilot
population is somewhat higher as a consequence
than otherwise would have been the case.
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Themajorcausesof fatalandseriousinjury
asaresultof piloterrorare:
• Failureto obtainandmaintainairspeed
• Continuationof VFRflight intoadverse
weatherconditions
• Inadequatepreflightpreparationand/or
planning
• Spatialdisorientation.
To reducethe accidentrate of the private
pilot, R&D in the following areas should be
expanded:
• Training curricula and training aids
• Psychology of flight
• Low-cost proficiency evaluation and
updating program, using simulators
• Safety awareness on the part of the
private pilot
• Standardization of instrumentation.
Although the basic functions of piloting in
good weather become instinctive- much like
those of riding a bicycle (i.e., once learned,
always remembered) - a safe level of pilot profi-
ciency requires substantial practice. The high cost
of flying, however, tends to limit practice. Simu-
lators could provide less expensive proficiency
training and maintenance than actual flight.
Air Traffic Control
Air traffic control systems are intimately
related to the nature of the aircraft and its subsys-
tems, and to air crew proficiency. Consequently,
the systems selected and the regulations pertain-
ing to their use will have considerable impact on
the cost of private flying. It is estimated that the
annual number of IFR itinerant flights will grow
from 7 million in 1968 to 21 million in 1980. The
proportion of these which are general aviation
will chan_e from 17% in 1968 to 40% in 1980
(ref. 2). This tremendous increase in load on the
air traffic system may sharply limit the use of air
transport in some parts of the country unless
realistic long-range plans supported by adequate
R&D programs are undertaken.
As severe congestion builds around busy
terminal areas, the traditional "first come, first
served" of the present air traffic system will have
to be abandoned. The present approach for allot-
ting time and space is workable only if there is
excess capacity in the system or if users are will-
ing to accept substantial delays. The problem is
compounded because the number of alternate
routes is limited and airborne delays cannot be
too long (not unlike an automobile in heavy traf-
fic). Increasing demands on the traffic system will
require some sort of rationing and priority
scheduling. Increasing the capacity of the current
system may postpone rationing and priorities, but
the cost to the users (in terms of equipment,
reliever airports, etc.) may be substantial.
At certain times and places in the current
system, a "slot" in the air traffic system is not
free. Queues for takeoff and landing as well as
delays for traffic clearance are the price that must
be paid for using the system at that place and at
that time. Alternatively, the cost may be distrib-
uted among users by means of a
rationing/priorities scheme (as now employed at
Washington National, Kennedy, La Guardia, and
Chicago O'Hare). With this approach, the delays
or postponements (costs) are arbitrarily allocated
to some users.
Another approach would be to structure air-
ways and airport user fees to reflect the level of
demand at various places and points in time. The
concept of charging the user a higher price for
"prime" time is not new. It has been employed in
radio and television for 40 years.
The present air traffic control system has two
basic modes of operation: operation under posi-
tive control (essentially operations under instru-
ment flight rules); and uncontrolled operation
(essentially operations under visual flight rules).
In the former, the maintenance of aircraft separa-
tion is the joint responsibility of the air traffic
controller and pilot. In the latter, aircraft separa-
tion is solely the responsibility of the pilot (see
and be seen). Increasing traffic density and the
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mixingof positively controlled (IFR) and uncon-
trolled (VFR) traffic in congested terminal areas
requires both the pilot's eyes and the controller's
radar to maintain traffic separation.
The number of in-flight collisions of general
aviation aircraft has grown by a factor of three
over the past five years. In 1969 there were 45
collisions. Three of these involved an air carrier.
In virtually all aircraft collisions, at least one, and
frequently both, participants were operating
under visual flight rules. The possibility of more
midair collisions and the expected heavier bur-
dens on the air traffic controller suggest the need
for some form of cooperative proximity-warning
indication or collision-avoidance system that
could be carried by all users of the airspace-
general aviation, military, and airlines alike.
Another problem in general aviation safety is
navigation. Many general aviation operations take
place in areas where no signal coverage is available
from the VOR-DME navigation system. A
low-cost navigation aid using very low frequency
has the potential of satisfying this need.
The following R&D is recommended:
Experimentation with alternative pricing
or rationing policies to be used with any
proposed air traffic control system
As a part of the development of a
new-generation air traffic control system,
the parallel development and refinement
of a practicable proximity-warning sys-
tem to permit expanded and safer
"uncontrolled" aircraft operations.
Airports
Present-day congestion in the terminal
airspace and on the airport is largely a product of
the particular pricing mechanism used. A full-cost
pricing system which recognizes that the demand
for service varies with time of day would go a
great distance toward relieving congestion at
terminal airports. Use of a "market mechanism"
for pricing airport services would also ease the
problems of future airport investment decisions
(i.e., decisions such as where, when, and in what
configuration).
In such an environment a private aviation
user who was appropriately equipped to cooper-
ate with the system and willing to pay the price
of admission could be assured access to major
terminals. On the other hand, if he were unwilling
to pay the cost of using a major terminal, he
could use a"reliever" facility at a lower cost.
Many general aviation pilots prefer not to use
the major airports because of the added cost of
airborne equipment, their inexperience, or their
uneasiness over operating in such a complex
environment. Consequently, the private pilot
generally welcomes an air0ort dedicated primarily
to his use. Increases in land values and other
urban pressures, however, have resulted in greatly
increased costs of airports in major urban areas.
(A number of these airports, in fact, have been
closed in recent years.) As a result, users of
general aviation aircraft in large urban areas incur
either higher costs or time-consuming ground
transport between airport and city center, thus
reducing the utility of general aviation for busi-
ness and personal transportation purposes.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (ref. 5) provides for payment of user
charges by the general aviation public. It is antici-
pated that $796 million will be collected from
general aviation from 1971 through 1980.
General aviation will receive funds from the Trust
Fund in three allocations. It will receive $30 mil-
lion per year solely for general aviation airfield
development. It will share $180 million per year
for development of air carrier fields and reliever
airports. The third allocation will come from
sharing the discretionary fund.
The National Aviation System Plan includes a
need for 747 new or converted general aviation
airports to meet the 1980 demand. Fifty-eight of
them will be needed in high-density areas, 100 in
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medium-density areas, and 589 in low-density
areas (ref. 8). Although there will be substantially
more Federal funds available for the development
of general aviation airports, the funds must be
matched by local authorities, who may be
hard-pressed in the future to raise funds because
of mounting pressures to substantially reduce
noise and air pollution. Failure to take positive
action in these areas may make it very difficult to
develop enough general aviation airports to
manage the expected growth.
BENEFITS
The general aviation market has had a posi-
tive influence on the national economy. Total
contribution to GNP by the general aviation
industry in 1969 was about $3 billion. Based on
present growth, it is anticipated that this will
grow to $7 billion by 1980 (ref. 9).
General aviation has also had a positive bene-
fit on regional development, particularly in rural
areas. Studies in Ohio, Minnesota, and other areas
have shown an impressive influence by general
aviation on the areas it serves.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
General aviation R&D efforts need to be
expanded in the area of vehicle safety and utility
and on airways control and safety. Because only a
relatively small percentage of the public engages
in private flying, R&D to improve the utility of
vehicles or propulsion units should be performed
by the manufacturer. Because the Government
has an obligation to assure the safety of the air-
space for public transportation, it is appropriate
for the Government to engage in air traffic con-
trol R&D to tile degree necessary to assure the
expeditious and safe movement and control of all
aircraft, whatever the type, since safety cannot be
assured in the airspace without adequate measures
for all vehicles in the system.
It is therefore evident that the role of the
Federal Government should continue to be that
of a regulator and promoter of safety in airways,
vehicle certification, and pilot proficiency. It may
be necessary for the Government to engage in
some R&D efforts to gain a better understanding
of the nature of these problems and establish rea-
sonable limits of operation.
CONCLUSIONS AND KECOMMENDATIONS
• To improve the utility of general aviation
aircraft and to make them safer for the
average pilot, R&D is required on flying
and handling qualities and on crash-
worthiness. These efforts should be
pursued by the private sector.
• Some technology which would permit
the design of safer and simpler general
aviation aircraft is already available to
the aviation community, and thus the
R&D programs required are not exten-
sive. However, manufacturers of general
aviation products have been slow in
incorporating new technology, probably
because the market is extremely
price-sensitive. New mechanisms need to
be explored by the Federal Government
to encourage the use of new technology
which will improve the safety of general
aviation.
• R&D studies should be initiated to
develop improved training curricula and
training aids for the private pilot.
In-depth analyses of the psychology of
flight and methods to develop a low-cost
proficiency evaluation are also needed.
• Airspace in congested areas should be
looked upon as a commodity with value.
It is recommended that demonstration
experiments be expanded to structure
landing fees to reflect the local demand
at different times of the day. The experi-
ments should cover a range of fees so
that accurate profiles of demand versus
time versus cost are obtained.
• Today, 40,000 to 50,000 aircraft are
equipped with beacon transponders, and
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moregeneralaviationpilotsarepurchas-
ing themasthe complexityof traffic
controlincreases.A regulationcovering
beacontranspondersisbelievedessential
sothat the entiresystemcanbefurther
automatedandthe costlyprimaryradar
systemeventuallyretired.It is recom-
mended,therefore,that afour-stepro-
gram,leadingto a fully cooperativeair
traffic controlsystem,be initiated.The
FederalGovernmentshouldperformthe
R&Dnecessaryto developthestandards
requiredof the avionicsby yearend
1972.Installationof the transponders
shouldoccuronthefollowingtimescale:
1973(year end) - all newly manu-
factured aircraft
1980 - all users flying in
the 30 primary
hub regions
1985 - all users in the
system
(Certain special categories of general
aviation aircraft such as crop dusters
could be exempted.)
Proximity-warning indicators will be
essential elements as air traffic grows and
the probability of midair collisions
increases. Research on promising con-
cepts for such devices should be empha-
sized, with a view to arriving as soon as
possible at the development and refine-
ment of an operational proximity
warning system.
Because of the broad spectrum of pilot
proficiency in general aviation flying, it is
recommended that the displays of all
general aviation instruments be standard-
ized to help promote safety, in much the
same way the automobile gearshift was
standardized for safety reasons. Avionics
manufacturers should have complete
freedom (within the limits of instrument
performance requirements) in the design
of their instruments so long as the read-
outs comply with standards. The Govern-
ment can initiate this change through
certification procedures and low-cost
Government/industry joint efforts to
develop standards.
The cost of type certification may also
inhibit innovation. Certification may not
be a barrier to companies with estab-
lished products but the innovator may
experience penalties since certification is
based largely on established practices.
Deviations from established practices can
be costly and time consuming, encourag-
ing manufacturers to make only modest
changes in their products. Current
certification processes should be
reappraised in order to promote and fos-
ter technological advance in the general
aviation industry.
A more effective and scientific method
for determining causes of accidents and
instituting corrective action must be
developed. Currently there is not an
effective scientific, closed-loop system to
assure that such needed action is imple-
mented. The method should include
improved safety information storage and
retrieval processes and emphasize
investigation plus corrective action.
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Systems Elements 
AIR VEHICLES 
iNTRODUCTION 
As with most transportation systems during 
their formative years, the growth of air transport 
has been paced by the development of new, 
improved vehicles (Fig. 4.1). The air transport 
industry is now facing a number of problems, 
however, that can be solved only by system 
approaches that consider all elements of the air 
transport system - air vehicles, air traffic control 
system, airports, and complementary ground 
transportation. The importance of maintaining a 
cont inuous  R&D effort cannot be over- 
emphasized. Neither can the start of new research 
be delayed if U. S. transport aircraft of the 1980’s 
are to  be the world’s safest and most economical. 
Target objectives should be: (1) reducing adverse 
effects of noise and atmospheric pollution: 
(2) increasing system capabilities and services: 
( 3 )  i m p r o v i n g  o p e r a t i n g  economics: and 
( 4 )  improving safety. Concerted action by 
Government and industry is essential to progress 
in these areas. 
problems that now inhibit progress. The Govern- 
ment industry partnership in R&D that has pro- 
duced such fruitful results in the past must 
continue. 
Economical aircraft for both military and 
civil uses have been made possible primarily 
through significant improvements in propulsion 
systems. The jet engine became a feasible propul- 
sion system during the late 1930’s and early 
1940’s. An active R&D program during the next 
20 years (including application to military 
vehicles) made possible the “jet age,” inaugurated 
in the United States in 1958. 
Propulsion systems are expected t o  continue 
to pace new aircraft developments of the near 
future. A broad base of innovative propulsion 
research (including machines, fuels, and lubri- 
cants) is essential t o  generate the technology 
required if the U. S. is to maintain the lead it 
enjoys in the highly competitive foreign markets. 
The swept wing is another example. A few 
thousand dollars spent in the early 1940’s to eval- 
uate the wing’s benefits resulted in a well-rounded 
research program in the 1940’s and 1950’s. Sub- 
sequently, both military and commercial jet air- 
planes flew faster and more economically than 
If air transportation is to continue to  
flourish, new solutions must be found to the 
Figure 4.1. Growth in selected aircraft characteristics and U.S. domestic revenue passenger-miles. Source: Refs. 1 .  2, 3. 
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their propeller-driven counterparts. The return to 
both the military and  the traveling public from 
R&D expenditures paid off. 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SPECIFIC MISSIONS 
General Aviation Aircraft 
To many people, the Piper Cub (Fig. 4.2),  
produced by the thousands before, during, and 
for ;I short time after world War 11, is still the 
image of general aviation. The Piper Cub, how- 
ever, is n o  longer representative of general avia- 
tion. Today, general aviation aircraft range from 
fast, comfortable, single-engine propeller airplanes 
to large, high-performance .machines, such as the 
four-engine Lockheed Jet Star. 
that these aircraft can use technology developed 
for more sophisticated civil and  military aircraft. 
R&D is also needed to  assure that propulsion 
systems - either propeller or  jet - have satisfac- 
tory noise and pollution characteristics. However, 
improving the utility of general aviation aircraft 
does not appear to be of sufficient interest t o  the 
general public t o  involve the Government. The 
Government should continue its role in establish- 
ing safety and operating criteria and in improving 
air traffic control for general aviation aircraft. 
Short Hdrdl 
Vehicles for the less dense short-haul market 
will probably be conventional takeoff and landing 
(CTOL) aircraft with low operating costs a t  short 
ranges. Technology in aerodynamics, high-lift 
systems,, avionics; and propulsion systems is avail- 
able for designing such aircraft. R&D should be 
directed toward better structures and materials 
(including fail-safe structures) to, providc sa fc, 
efficient aircraft a t  minimum cost. since :a larsc 
portion o f  the operating cost dcpcnds o n  vehicle 
pur c h ;isc price . 
A STOL or VTOL ;iircraft can probably best 
satisfy the needs o f  more dcnsc ,short-haul m:rr- 
kcts. Considerable K&U will be required to  make 
these aircraft economic;ally viable a n d  comfort- 
able, with noise and pollution levels low cnoush 
to  allow operation near densely populated areas. 
Figure 4.2.  Piper J -3  Cub.  
Ccncr;il aviation aircraft in  the past have been 
designed according t o  engineering and technology 
dc~vclopcd in Support o f  uircrnft for other pur- 
poses. Relatively little research has been directed 
s pc c i fi ca 11 y tow ;ir d ge n e ria 1 ;a vi ;L t i o n ;I i  r cr ;i f L  . So me 
problems not directly related to the air vehicle 
itself need study t o  increase the safety and u t i l i t y  
o f  the aircraft i n  the hands of the nonprofessional 
pilot ,  Bccausc large numbers of such aircraft will 
be i n  servicc i n  the 198%’s, and becausc they will 
LISC the s;ime airspace as commercial carriers (near 
airports particularly), R&D is needed to assure 
’ One .of the best STOL aircraft ever developed 
was the’  Ford Tri-Motor A 2 6  (Fig. 4.3). It had 
excellent short-field pcrform;ailcc. I t  also had vcrv 
poor cruise performance and :I rough rocky ride, 
m u 5  t u i a p l ~ ~ ~ ~ i i r t  f o r  thc passengers. The 
Tri-Motor achievcd its goc~d STOL performance 
t h r o u g h  l o w  w i n g  l o a d i n g  a n d  . h i g h  
power-to-weight ratio. Most o f  today’s STOL air- 
craft arc siniply conventional aircraft t.hat also use 
low wing loading, high power-to-weight ratiw, and 
moderately powerful flaps to ’ achieve STOL 
performance. To some degree, these aircraft 
suffer from the s;lme deficiencies ;IS the Ford 
Tri-Motor. 
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Figure 4.5. Internally blown le: flaps. 
Figure 4.3, Ford Tri-Motor. 
If short-field takeoff and landing perfor- 
mance is to be achieved with acceptable cruise 
performance and good ride qualities, the use of 
power-generated lift will be necessary. STOL 
o p e  r a t i  o n s wi t  h 1 a r ge  propeller-powered. 
deflected slipstream aircraft, such as the 
McDonnell Douglas Model 188, may increase 
during the next few years. but development of 
large jet-powered STOL transports is needed. 
Their higher cruise speed capability and improved 
ride qualities (resulting from the high wing load- 
ings of jet-powered aircraft) would make possible 
better service for the user and an  economically 
sounder operation for the airlines. 
The three most promising ways of obtaining 
jet lift are shown in Figures 3.4. 4.5. and 4.6. 
Figure 4.4. External-flow je t  flap. 
I n  the externall!, blown flap concept 
(Fig. 4.4), the jet ensines are s o  located that their 
exhaust blows over a large flap system. increasing 
lift during takeoff and landing. In the internally 
blown flap concept (Fig. 4.5). all o r  part of the 
fan airstream passes through internal wins ducting 
and is blown directly over the flap surfaces o r  
between a twc-piece flap (augmentor wing) to 
achieve higher lift. With the lift-fan concept 
(Fig. 4.6), direct-lift fans are deployed only 
during takeoff and landing. 
Figure 4.6. Direct lift transport. 
Modified CTOL subsonic aircraft engines will 
undoubtedly power the first generation of jet 
STOL vehicles. The accompanying compromises 
in engine thrust-to-weight ratio, bypass ratio. and 
noise will. however. mean compromises in perfor- 
mance. Propulsion systems must be tailored t o  
STOL aircraft. Aerodynamic and propulsion R&D 
must, therefore. be concentrated on efficient 
jet-lift and propulsion systems with acceptable 
noise and pollution characteristics. Another area 
requiring R&D is satisfactory control and perfor- 
mance in the event of engine failure, which could 
be accompanied by uncontrollable - and catas- 
trophic - asymmetric lift during takeoff and 
landing. 
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The internally blown flap seems to be poten-
tially the most efficient STOL system, but
requires development of a propulsion system
specifically tailored to the aircraft. It appears that
an externally blown flap STOL aircraft could be
developed several years earlier than internally
blown flap or lift-fan types. The externally blo_
flap airplane, however, has more problems with
noise generation and engine-out controllability.
Experimental aircraft are needed to permit
study in flight of the operational problems of
advanced jet-type STOL aircraft. Flight research
using such aircraft would also provide data for
establishing certification standards. Handling
quality criteria for STOL vehicles would be
derived from analyses of flight-test results of
experimental vehicles as well as data already avail-
able or being obtained on certain current propel-
ler STOL aircraft and aircraft that have been
modified to simulate STOL characteristics. Flight
tests of the experimental aircraft will also provide
data to industry to aid its development of proto-
type and production aircraft.
For many years, V/STOL aircraft have been
under extensive study and research. A number of
V/STOL flight vehicles of varying degrees of
sophistication have been built and flown
(Fig. 4.7), but the helicopter is the only opera-
tional V/STOL type available today. Although
the helicopter has proven very useful in military
missions, it has not been even marginally success-
ful in commercial transport. High operating costs,
high downtime, low speed, poor ride quality, and
noise have been too much to overcome.
Conventional and compound helicopters,
tilt-rotor, tilt-wing, and lift-fan aircraft appear to
be the most promising types of V/STOL aircraft.
Noise generation and controllability/performance
with one engine out are critical problems for
V/STOL aircraft, as they are for STOL aircraft.
Advanced helicopters can probably be devel-
oped in the near future, but their inherently low
speed will limit them to short-range applications,
particularly intraurban. Efforts are being directed
toward reducing costs, improving ride quality
through reduction of vibration, and reducing
noise levels. Relatively poor handling qualities
must be improved, particularly for instrument
flight conditions in terminal areas.
of the other promising types, the compound
helicopter is further advanced, with the tilt-wing
technology fairly well in hand because of several
experimental aircraft that have been built and
florin. The development of operational lift-fan
V/STOL aircraft will take longer than the devel-
opment of advanced helicopters, compound heli-
copters, or tilt-wing aircraft. Lift fans inherently
generate more noise than rotor systems, so noise
reduction is a prime concern. Because the engines
must provide all the lift for the aircraft during
takeoff and landing and then must be stowed for
cruise flight, the engines must have high
thrust-to-weight and thrust-to-volume ratios
(above 12/1 and 400/1, respectively, as compared
to 6/1 and 200/1, respectively, for current CTOL
cruise engines). Much research and development
on engines is required. Lift-fan aircraft tend to
have a high cruise speed, which makes them
attractive for the longer short-haul flights (100 to
500 miles).
The advanced rotor aircraft using a rotor
system that can tilt or fold, or both will prob-
ably require the longest development period. If
practical methods of stowing the rotor system can
be achieved, however, this aircraft could combine
the low noise and hovering efficiency of a rotor
aircraft with the high-speed cruise capability of a
jet aircraft.
The technology for many of the V/STOL
concepts is not validated sufficiently to give man-
ufacturers the confidence they must have to risk
entering development of prototypes for possible
airline use. Even if the missi(ms were clearly
discernible to the manufacturers and to the air-
lines, there would still be a need for
pre-prototype aircraft to evaluate the operational
problems, to establish the technical feasibility of
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Figure 4.7. The V/STOL aircraft family. Source: Re$ 4. 
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a given concept and to  show that it could be 
viable as a commercial venture. An example might 
be an experimental vehicle using the tilt-rotor 
principle, t o  determine whether the problems 
revealed in flight tests of the Bell tilt-rotor 
research vehicle in the late 1950s have been 
solved by the experimental and theoretical R&D 
carried o n  by Government and industry during 
the last 10 years. 
Research and development on VTOL aircraft 
must cover a variety of vehicles. There is partic- 
ularly a need for combined technology develop- 
ment and market/vehicle trade-off studies to 
resolve the areas of uncertainty and identify 
promising concepts. The operational characteris- 
tics and problems of V/STOL aircraft also need 
continuing study. 
Long Hard 
Long-haul jet aircraft represent the highest 
level of vehicle development yet achieved i n  air 
transportation. The introduction o f  the jet trans- 
port has essentially eliminated both ships and 
trains from com pe t i tio n for t he 1 ong-dis t;i nce 
travel market. The design, development, produc- 
tion, and sale of U. S. jet transports, both at 
home and abroad, have becomc important 
elements i n  our economy (scc Fig. 4.8). 
If air transportation is t o  be offered a t  a rea- 
sonable (and internationally competitive) fare, 
Figure 4.8. Flight linc a t  Scattle. 
(Courtesy of The Hoeing Compuny) 
and foreign aircraft sales are to  be maintained, 
improvements must be made in three major areas: 
efficiency, safety, and noise. 
If, by the early 1980’s, U. S. manufacturers 
and U. S. airlines are in an  improved financial 
position, they may be expected to  be actively 
considering a new generation of aircraft. The 
impetus will probably be twofold. First, advance- 
ments in technology will make possible the design 
of aircraft with considerably improved operating 
characteristics, and, second, the growth o f  
long-haul passenger business may require aircraft 
with a larger payload capability than the 747 
(perhaps 600 to  1000 passengers) for operation 
on major routes. 
The first-generation supersonic transports are 
expected to carry a major share of the scheduled 
overwater traffic during the 1980’s. Aircraft o f  
the 1970’s will probably not be allowed to  f ly  
supersonically over land. Hence, the major goal 
for aircraft of the 1980’s will be t o  develop the 
best aircraft for overland operations on long-haul 
routes. Three possibilities exist: ;I near-sonic 
(M -. 1 .O) aircraft: a boom-free, low-supersonic 
aircraft (M = 1.1 to  1.3): and a low-boom super- 
sonic transport (M = 2 to 3). 
The greatest benefits i n  time-saving to the 
traveling public would be obtained with the 
“low-boom” supersonic transport. The dcvelop- 
ment of such a transport, however, is predicated 
on the assumption of a breakthrough to  make 
possible a supersonic transport with acceptable 
sonic-boom characteristics. This, admittedly, is a 
high-risk project, but the benefits t h a t  would 
accrue from such a vehicle justify a concentrated 
R&D program in  propulsion, aerodynamics, and 
structures to reduce sonic boom t o  an acceptable 
level. 
The near-sonic or “sonic” transport would 
incorporate the latest technology i n  materials and 
structural design to increase the payload fraction; 
improved propulsion systems t o  reduce the fuel 
consumption; and provide a quiet, pollution-free 
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Figure 4.9. Model of modified F-8 with supercritical 
wing. 
power plant, and the supercritical aerodynamic 
technology recently developed by NASA. The 
supercritical technology has been developed in 
wind tunnels using very smooth, carefully con- 
toured models. Confirmation is needed in flight 
on real aircraft - whose wings are not  as smooth 
and do not conform as exactly to  the desired con- 
tour - to assure that the benefits can be realized 
in actual operations, and to  reveal problems that 
require further attention. An F-8 airplane is being 
modified t o  incorporate a supercritical wing and 
contoured fuselage (similar to the model shown in 
Fig. 4.9), and thus validate in flight the 
supercritical-wing concept. Additional flight 
research may be required to validate more repre- 
sentative transport configurations, elastic struc- 
t u res ,  high-lift devices, and lateral-control 
provisions. 
Research is needed to  design shapes that will 
operate efficiently near the speed of sound. Work 
is needed to develop automated methods of struc- 
tural design and fail-safe structures. Research and 
development is also needed on new lightweight. 
high-strength, high-stiffness structural materials 
such as fiber composites of boron and carbon. To 
provide the experience and confidence required 
to  design a commercial aircraft. the research 
results will have to  be validated by designing, 
building, and testing large structural specimens. If 
the "sonic" transport is to be a significant 
improvement over stretched versions of the 
wide-body "jumbo" jets, a vigorous R&D pro- 
gram in such areas must be started and main- 
tained over the next 10 years. 
The low-supersonic transport cruises a t  the 
hlghest speed possible without producing a sonic 
boom on  the ground. The concept is based on  the 
theory that if the ground speed of the aircraft 
(i.e., its actual velocity relative to  the ground) is 
lower than the speed of sound at ground level, the 
sonic boom created by the aircraft flying at 
M = 1.1 to 1.3 d 1  not penetrate t o  the ground as 
a boom but will dissipate into an almost inaudible 
rumble. Recent experimental tests indicate that 
the expected effect does in fact occur. An inter- 
esting result of the speed criterion for this aircraft 
(ground speed about equal t o  the local speed of  
sound) is that it would have equal block times 
regardless of head winds or tail winds. This would 
be of particular importance for westbound trips 
in the United States. It must operate, however, at 
a speed at which aerodynamic and propulsion 
s y s t e m s  performance are inherently poor 
(Fig. 4.10). To attain reasonable performance, a 
highly tailored and carefully integrated conf%ura- 
tion must be developed. R&D is necessary to  
obtain an optimum aircraft for this speed range. 
"SONIC" 
NO BOOM 
SUPERSONIC 
TRANSPORT 
Figure 4.10. Variations of performance factor with Mach 
number. 
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By the late 1980's, a new, improved, super-
sonic transport for intercontinental (overwater)
operations will be needed. It should have better
range and payload capabilities than current super-
sonic transports. R&D should focus on
propulsion-system technology to produce lighter
engines with lower specific fuel consumption,
higher transonic thrust, and low noise. Structural
research should be directed toward lighter materi-
als and fail-safe structures with temperature capa-
bilities that will allow speeds up to Mach 3. Aero-
dynamic research should concentrate on
improving the lift-drag ratio and on configura-
tions and techniques for reducing sonic boom.
Relatively small decreases in specific fuel con-
sumption can result in significantly large increases
in payload. Therefore, propulsion R&D must
emphasize reductions in specific fuel consump-
tion. Methane is attractive as a fuel for aircraft
because of its higher heating value (15%) and its
greater cooling capacity (700% of that for jet
fuel). A 25% increase in range is possible relative
to a jet-fueled supersonic transport. The cryo-
genic nature of liquid methane requires new fuel
logistic systems, different fuel-handling and stor-
age techniques, and modifications in aircraft
design. Its potential advantages are so great, how-
ever, that its technical feasibility and economic
advantages should be fully explored.
Supersonic transports must be able to operate
efficiently over a wide range of subsonic and
supersonic flight conditions. The inevitable design
compromises are further complicated by the over-
riding requirement that the propulsion system
meet anticipated airport noise restrictions. The
inlet noise treatment techniques developed for
subsonic aircraft, the choked adjustable super-
sonic inlet, and the relatively low jet-exhaust
velocity expected in approach conditions should
alleviate the approach and landing noise prob-
lems. Takeoff (sideline) noise, however, will be
extremely difficult to reduce to acceptable levels.
This problem will require reexamination of all ele-
ments of engine design.
Intensive research efforts during the past
decade have led to a general understanding of the
phenomena and the development of noise minimi-
zation techniques, but so far no practical means
have been found to reduce the sonic boom to a
level that would be acceptable for overland opera-
tion. Because of the economic importance of this
single factor, vigorous and expanded research is
urgently needed to make certain that all possible
corrective avenues are explored. Substantial gains
will come from increasing the aerodynamic, pro-
pulsion, and structural efficiency of the vehicle,
but the importance of the problem is such that no
new approach - no matter how exotic - should
be overlooked, to assure an economically sound,
environmentally acceptable second-generation
supersonic transport aircraft.
Looking further into the future, current
efforts to understand the problems associated
with a hypersonic aircraft (M = 6 to 10) should be
continued. The effort should be aimed at develop-
ing a technology base adequate for the feasibility
of hypersonic cruise flight for the 1995 time
frame. The information will be applicable to the
military and space activities of the country and
this effort should be carried on by the
Government.
Cargo Service
Little new R&D related to the vehicle will be
required for new cargo aircraft. The technologies
developed for military aircraft and for civil pas-
senger aircraft will serve. Little new technology is
required but the designer must obtain the best
aerodynamic performance and weight, consistent
with efficient cargo-handling (including considera-
tions of intermodal transfer).
GENERAL RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT (NEEDED
FOR ALL MISSIONS)
Propulsion Research
Past improvements have resulted frommain-
raining a broad base of propulsion research. Con-
tinuing to improve the propulsion system will
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requirea strongcontinuousprogram,just asa
continuingprogramin the 1950'sand early
1960's generated a great deal of propulsion tech-
nology that has been and is still being used in
development.
Aircraft noise will inhibit the development of
all new civil aircraft. The problem will be particu-
larly acute for future short-route-segment STOL
vehicles. Community acceptance of these new
vehicles will depend on whether the vehicles have
significantly lower noise levels (approaching a
maximum of 95 EPNdB at 500 feet) than the
levels currently required for subsonic transports.
Current engine-noise technology has not yet
demonstrated that these noise levels can be met in
a practical system. It is imperative that research
be focused on resolving the problem. NASA has a
Quiet Engine Program under way aimed at estab-
lishing technology to permit development of an
engine that will produce a minimum of noise.
Vigorous and continuing effort of this nature is
an absolute necessity if future transports are to
avoid restrictions on access to new and existing
airports. R&D is also needed to determine the
best methods of acoustic treatment for inlet and
exhaust ducts and to determine conftgurations of
exhaust nozzles that will minimize noise
generation.
of pollution from the oxides of nitrogen will be
difficult since the formation of this class of pollu-
tant increases with flame temperature and with
time available for combustion reactions. R&D is
required to determine the effects of temperature
and combustion dwell-time. High-density,
short-length combustors that reduce the combus-
tion dwell-time appear to offer promise and their
development should be continued.
One of the primary objectives of propulsion
research is to decrease specific fuel consumption
and increase the thrust-to-weight ratio of the pro-
pulsion system. Performance may be improved by
increasing the aerodynamic efficiency of the inlet,
compressor, combustion chamber, turbine, or
exhaust nozzle; by improving the efficiency of
the combustor; or by increasing the allowable
temperature at the inlet of the turbine. Weight
can be reduced by substituting new materials with
improved properties, by cooling components of
the propulsion system so that lighter weight
materials can be used, or by improvements in
component design that allow equal performance
with less material (for instance, shorter inlet
designs or compressors that achieve equal pressure
ratios with fewer stages).
Aerodynamic Research
Air pollution is an important problem in the
development of new engines and attention should
be given to the problem early in the engine design
and development phase. Visible pollution (smoke)
can be controlled by improving fuel and airflow
distribution, by the use of vaporized burner
designs, or by use of fuel additives. R&D in these
areas should continue, to assure further reduc-
tions. Increasing combustion efficiency at
idle-power conditions appears to offer a solution
to the problem of some of the nonvisible pollu-
tants (hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide). To
accomplish this without sacrificing efficiency at
other operating conditions will require R&D in
new combustor concepts, such as variable com-
bustor geometry and staged fuel entry. Reduction
The objective of aerodynamic research is to
define aircraft shapes that have high aerodynamic
efficiency (high lift-to-drag ratio) and satisfactory
stability and control characteristics throughout
the speed-altitude regime for which the aircraft is
designed. All aircraft are required to fly at low
speeds during a portion of operations; even super-
sonic transports, therefore, require research at
speeds from subsonic to landing speeds.
The success, made possible by high-speed
computers, of complex theoretical methods in
accurately predicting aircraft characteristics has
provided the aerodynamic designer with a power-
ful tool. Current computing methods need
improving. The accuracy of theoretical methods
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Figure 4.1 1. The hazard from wing-tip vortices. 
needs developing and validating for those flight 
regimes for which no  methodology exists (current 
methods of estimating performance in  the tran- 
sonic and hypersonic speed regimes are far from 
adequate for aircraft design). Continued aero- 
dynamic research will result in improved lift-drag 
ratios for all vehicles ~ which will reflect directly 
as lower fuel consumption for a given mission. 
Aircraft in  flight generate vortices that trail 
rearward from the wing tips. The energy in the 
vortices is proportional t o  the amount of lift 
being generated by the aircraft. With the recent 
advent of very large aircraft, the generation o f  
wing-tip vortices in terminal areas has become a 
serious problem. The vortices from a large aircraft 
contain such large variations in air flow that 
another (particularly smaller) aircraft flying i n t o  
o r  through vortex may experience severe rolling 
motion or even loss of control (see Fig. 4.1 1 and 
ref. 5). The hazard is especially scvcrc i n  tcrminal 
arcas where many aircraft follow similar flight 
paths. 
The vortex 
aerodynamic lift 
elirninatcd. It is 
is inherent to wing-generated 
and thus cmno t  be completely 
hoped, however, that research 
will discover methods to  generate a number of 
weaker vortices rather than one strong vortex, o r  
methods that will cause the single vortex t o  have 
a larger diameter and thus lower velocity. 
Aircraft  Operating Procedures 
All avenues of noise reduction must be vigor- 
ously pursued if the transport aircraft is t o  
become an  acceptable neighbor. Research and 
development must be continued in the fields of 
operational procedures (and the necessary instru- 
mentation) t o  arrive at  takeoff and landing proce- 
dures, usable under all weather conditions, that 
will rcduce the noise exposure of the airport’s 
neighbors. 
Striictural and Miterials Rrrcarch 
The objective of R&D in structures and 
materials is to reduce the weight of the aircraft 
structure and its cost of fabrication. Reductions 
in weight and cost can bc achieved by more effici- 
ent structural arrangemcnts or  by the usc of more 
efficient materials. 
Aircraft of thc future, particularly those for 
supersonic flight, will have more complex shapes 
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thancurrentaircraft.Structuralresearchshould
be directedtoward producingthesecomplex
shapeswithminimumweightandcost.Newstruc-
tural configurations,uchashoneycomb,have
beendevelopedin recentyears,andresearch
effortis neededto insurethatthebeststructural
configurationcan be selectedfor eachnew
application. New structural materialsare
becomingavailableandmorewill beintroduced
in the future. Researchis neededto arriveat
structuralconfigurationsthat will makemaxi-
mumuseof thecapabilitiesof thenewmaterials.
Theadventof thehigh-speeddigitalcomputerhas
madeverycomplexanalysesof structuresfeas-
ible. R&D effort is neededto assurethe full
exploitationof thiscapabilityin futurestructural
design.
Avionics Research
The current and projected increase in air traf-
fic densities combined with the introduction of
new aircraft types with widely varying perfor-
mance characteristics, presages a need for
increased performance, new capabilities, and
widespread application of avionics equipment to
all classes of aircraft. Emphasis must be given to
improvements in the air traffic control system to
allow it to handle the greatly increased traffic
expected in the future. Both ground-based and
flight avionics equipment must be greatly
improved to provide a high level of safety for the
greatly increased numbers of aircraft. At the same
time, it is important to reduce the workload of
both the pilot and the controller on the ground.
The pilot's workload can be reduced by increasing
automation on board the aircraft and by automat-
ing communications between the aircraft and the
ground. The controller's workload can be reduced
by upgrading the ATC system as discussed in the
"Air Traffic Control" section.
The practical achievement of all-weather
landing would provide direct benefits to air trans-
portation by reducing cancelled and diverted
flights, as well as by reducing the safety hazards
associated with running out of reserve fuel while
flying to an alternate airport. Safety is the prime
consideration in any system that will allow land-
ing with zero visibility. Two independent systems
may be desirable for safety. It will be crucially
important to convince pilots of the reliability of
any systems proposed. The use of automatic land-
ing systems even in good weather could improve
the overall safety level and allow steeper approach
paths with consequent noise reductions.
In all cases, and for all classes of aircraft, con-
tinued effort is needed to reduce the size, weight,
and cost of the avionic equipment. At the same
time, the pilot's workload must be reduced and
he must have displays of the information he
requires for safe and efficient operation of the
aircraft.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
The Joint Study, with the participation of
NASA, DOT, DOD, and industry, evaluated the
level of the research and technology effort
required to maintain the data base needed for air
vehicles to be used by the civil aviation commun-
ity. The research and technology requirements are
those considered essential to the continued
growth of civil aviation, to the requirements of
improving the safety of flight, reduction of noise
levels and pollution due to propulsion emissions,
and to the maintenance of U. S. superiority in the
field of civil aviation. The results of this evalua-
tion indicate the need for an expenditure of $260
to $340 million per year over the next several
years to assure timely solutions to the many prob-
lems previously discussed. This effort represents
only the R&T directly applicable to civil aircraft.
POLICY ISSUES
One of the basic policy issues of air vehicle
development relates to whether the Government
should support pre-prototype aircraft, and if so,
what the criteria for selection should be, and the
roles of the several Government agencies involved.
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Thereareat leastthreekinds of pre-prototype
aircraft. The first is referred to as a research air-
craft; its primary purpose is to develop technol-
ogy, to uncover problems of flight not detected
by theory or by wind-tunnel models, and to
demonstrate that a given aircraft concept is feas-
ible. The WSTOL research aircraft built during
the past decade illustrate the research aircraft
approach. The usefulness of this type of flight
equipment is also illustrated by the highly
successful series of postwar research airplanes,
including the X-1 and the X-15. The second kind
of pre-prototype aircraft may be termed an exper-
imental aircraft, intended to demonstrate that the
appropriate technologies have been brought to a
level suitable for their use in an operational air-
craft. The third kind is the demonstration air-
craft, intended to demonstrate, in a normal
operating environment (including airports and air
traffic control systems), the capabilities possible
in a production aircraft. The objective is to stimu-
late the development of a new transportation
system. An example of this is the 707 prototype
aircraft (the Boeing "Dash-80") that was
test-operated in a normal operating environment.
An important question in considering the
need for a Government role in pre-prototype air-
craft is whether private enterprise would assume
the development risk without Government assis-
tance. In the case of STOL and V/STOL aircraft,
the risk is unclear. A demonstration program will
change this risk situation and encourage the devel-
opment of short-haul air transportation systems
attractive to the public.
In the case of an advanced subsonic or tran-
sonic transport, the risk is much different. Air-
craft manufacturers have in the past developed
new long-haul transports about every seven years
and have in general applied the best current tech-
nology in each of these developments. The latest
examples are the family of 747's (started in oper-
ation in 1970), and the wide-body aircraft that
will shortly begin operation. If their financial cir-
cumstances permit, it may be expected that the
aircraft manufacturers will develop a new family
of long-haul transports in the early 1980's. An
experimental aircraft would increase and improve
the technology available for the development of
an advanced aircraft. The need for an experimen-
tal aircraft should be evaluated, on a case-by-case
basis considering the technical and financial risks
involved and the benefit to the public.
Another issue relates to the continuation of
the past and present industry-Government part-
nership in performing R&D to advance the pres-
ent state of the art. In 1929, the editor of Air-
craft Engineering, commenting on the research
work being done by the National Advisory Com-
mittee for Aeronautics (NASA's predecessor in
aeronautical research), said, "The present-day
American position in all branches of aeronautical
knowledge can, without doubt, be attributed
mainly to this far-seeing policy and expenditure
on up-to-date laboratory equipment." This state-
ment is probably truer today than when it was
made, since the last 20 years have seen an unpre-
cedented advancement in the state of the art. A
continuation of this policy is vital if the United
States is to continue as a world leader in civil air
vehicles.
CONCLUSIONS
The growth of air transportation has been
paced by the development of new, improved air
vehicles over the years. The present
Government-industry partnership in support of
R&D must be continued to assure U. S. leadership
in commercial air transportation and in the pro-
duction and sale of air vehicles. Many pressing
problems must be attacked and solved in the
immediate future if air transportation is to con-
tinue to grow and improve. Foremost is the prob-
lem of aircraft noise. The present effort must be
expanded to assure that future aircraft will be
acceptable to the airport neighbors and those who
live or work under flight paths. Concentrated
research and development is needed to eliminate
pollution of the atmosphere. Work needs to be
done on STOL- and VTOL-type aircraft to pro-
vide the data necessary to establish their future in
4-14
the short-haulmarket. ContinuedR&D to
improvelong-hauland short-haulCTOLtrans-
ports is requiredto assurethat safe,efficient
transportwillbeavailableto fill futureneeds.
Themajorpolicyissueis thatof determining
theextentto whichGovernmentshouldsupport
pre-prototypeaircraft to providethe industry
withdatathatwouldreducetheriskinembarking
on a newprogram.The currentpolicyof the
Governmentof supportingR&Dto furtherthe
technologyandextendthestateof theartshould
becontinued.
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AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL
INTRODUCTION
The air traffic control (airways) system is
composed of facilities, regulations, and personnel
providing services and standard procedures for the
movement of civil and military aircraft in airspace
within the jurisdiction of the United States. It
includes the navigation, weather, and air-traffic
control (ATC) facilities necessary to meet the
objectives of safe and efficient use of the airspace.
The ATC facilities include radar systems, which
are used for data acquisition and control centers,
towers, and communications systems. These
ground-based elements must operate effectively
with airborne navigation and communication
equipment to provide, with full participation and
responsibility by the pilot, an effective system of
air-traffic management.
The system as it has evolved from the late
1940's has grown significantly because of the
rapid increase in traffic and the necessity to
assure safety by controlling traffic separation in a
real time sense. At present, the system includes
27 air route traffic control centers, 287 ATC
towers, 47 combined flight service station towers,
and 336 flight service stations. Ninety long-range
radar and radar beacon systems provide data on
aircraft position to the air route traffic control
centers, and 125 short-range radar and radar bea-
con systems supply data to the terminal facilities.
The navigation system includes 946 enroute navi-
gation and nonprecision approach aids and 304
instrument landing systems. Other landing system
aids include 627 nondirectional beacons and 292
all-weather approach lighting systems.
The availability of ground radar and the
remoting of data from radar sites have enabled
the ground controller to maintain safe separations
while providing instructions and advice to individ-
ual aircraft as he manages the traffic flow. How-
ever, the current system is still based on manual
control using voice communication, and the data
acquisition systems are restricted in capacity and
accuracy. Thus, it is not possible at present to
provide full service to all aircraft, and there is
increasing concern over safety as well as capacity
limitations.
Substantial near-term improvement can be
effected as adequate funds become available for
upgrading the current system using existing con-
cepts and available technology. With the recent
passage of the Airport and Airway Development
Act of 1970 (ref. 1), it is estimated that the total
facilities investment could be increased from the
current value of $1.7 billion to about $4.0 to
$5.0 billion in 1980. Increased investment, how-
ever, must be accompanied by increased produc-
tivity of the controller staff if system operating
costs are to be contained as the system capacity is
expanded. Continuation of present methods of
increasing the size of the controller force at a rate
proportional to the traffic growth would result in
excessive operating costs.
Recently, the DOT Air Traffic Control Advi-
sory Committee completed an 18-month study
intended to recommend an air-traffic control
system for the 1980's and beyond (ref. 2).
Because the current problems are so critical, how-
ever, the committee emphasized immediate needs
as well. The result was a set of comprehensive
recommendations addressed primarily toward
solving short-range ATC problems by upgrading
the present radar beacon system used for surveil-
lance and by progressively increasing the use of
ground computing and automation based on
limited modification of present control concepts.
The committee also pointed out the need to
examine new concepts, new technologies, and
new policies for the longer term improvements
and recognized the necessity for a research and
development program to provide a sound basis for
implementing the system required in 1990.
AVIATION GROWTH AND ITS EFFECT
ON AIRWAYS SYSTEM DESIGN
Aviation forecasts indicate that the total
number of operations will double at approxi-
mately 10-year intervals. The number of aircraft
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requestingcontrolservice,however,isexpected
to growat anevenfasteratesincethedemand
for servicesfromaircraftoperatingunderInstru-
mentFlightRules(IFR)is expectedto tripleby
1980andincreaseightfoldby 1995. The total
need for service in the terminal area, to aircraft
under Visual Flight Rules (VFR) as well as IFR, is
expected to increase between 10 and 15 times by
1995 as a result of the combined effects of traffic
growth, implementation of terminal control areas,
and additional control towers. Overall growth in
the high-density terminal areas is forecast to fol-
low generally the national growth pattern,
doubling by 1980 and increasing fourfold by
1995. These forecasts are based on growth antici-
pated as a result of present policies and vehicle
types.
The initiation of policies for the development
of new transportation services would, in all prob-
ability, further increase the demand for services.
For example, development and use of STOL and
VTOL vehicles to meet a high percentage of the
short-haul demand would nearly double the load
on the IFR system. The use of these vehicles in
high-density areas would probably require seg-
regated route structures in the vicinity of each
STOL/VTOLport. For both safety and economy,
new automated control concepts would be
needed to permit frequent interurban flights.
Traffic increases the interactions between
controlled and uncontrolled aircraft with a conse-
quent deterioration in system safety since the
ATC system only maintains separation between
individual IFR (controlled) aircraft. The separa-
tion of IFR traffic from VFR (uncontrolled)
flights depends primarily on altitude segregation
rules and "see and avoid" techniques during climb
and descent. The current rate of about two colli-
sions per year between air carrier aircraft (usually
controlled) and uncontrolled aircraft is likely to
increase to the order of 10 per year by 1980
unless system changes are instituted (ref. 2).
Restriction of the number of VFR flights within
certain high-density airspace (Terminal Control
Areas) is designed to reduce this problem but also
acts to constrain traffic growth. Collisions
between uncontrolled aircraft are expected to rise
in a similar manner. Hence, as airport-airway
capacity is increased, system changes must be
instituted concurrently to reduce the potential
for collisions.
It is well recognized that the combined
airport-airways system has already reached capac-
ity at several major airports, and landing and
departure quotas are now in effect at some. In
addition, studies recently conducted by the ATC
Advisory Committee indicated that the present
manual control system is approaching its capacity
in many high-density areas including much of the
northeastern United States. Although aviation
traffic growth is inhibited by elements other than
the airways system, such as airports and ground
transportation, the predicted increase in aircraft
density along with the related collision problem
dictates that the present navigation, landing, and
ATC facilities be either upgraded or replaced.
NEAR-TERM IMPROVEMENTS
The system improvements described herein,
needed to achieve the safety and capacity goals
for the 1980 time period, are planned by the
FAA, taking into consideration the recommenda-
tions of the Air Traffic Control Advisory Com-
mittee. The R&D associated with validating
advanced ATC concepts, evaluating alternatives,
and developing the required system components
to provide near-term improvements to the ATC
system must be completed by the mid-1970's to
permit implementation of the system prior to
1980. For this reason, many of the recommenda-
tions were based on extensions of existing devel-
opment programs and, hence represented
improvements that could be developed rapidly.
Although these improvements, when imple-
mented, will provide system elements that will be
useful through the 1980's, further changes are
required to accommodate aviation growth beyond
that time and to provide for the possibility that
growth rates might be greater than expected. The
alternatives for this future time period are treated
in the next subsection.
4-17
The near-term improvements planned by
FAA are summarized as follows:
• Increase traffic capacity in large urban
areas by expanding the capacity of exist-
ing airports. This will require the opera-
tion of closely spaced, dual-lane runways.
It will also require the upgrading of the
electronic and surveillance systems so
that all-weather landing and departure
operations can be conducted on these
parallel runways. This upgrading includes
the development of an improved instru-
ment landing system based on microwave
scanning-beam technology. Improved
methods of detecting wake turbulence
must be developed to minimize its effect
on airport and terminal area operations.
Methods of reducing turbulence must
also be pursued.
• Extend the ATC separation service to
include all aircraft (IFR and VFR) flying
in medium- and high-density regions of
controlled airspace, thus maintaining
safety in high-density traffic areas. Pro-
viding collision-avoidance service from
the ground-based automation system will
assure such safety by providing
collision-avoidance messages to both con-
trolled and uncontrolled aircraft.
• Develop higher levels of automation than
will be provided by the initial operating
capability of the National Airspace Sys-
tem (NAS) automation program for the
enroute control centers and the
Advanced Radar Terminal System
(ARTS) automation program for Termi-
nal Control facilities. Higher levels of
automation will increase the number of
aircraft that can be handled by a control
sector by assisting the controller in per-
forming many of the decision-making
and tactical-control actions. The automa-
tion of conflict-control, flow manage-
ment, and safety-monitoring functions,
in addition to the basic automation of
the present system, is needed to achieve
the required threefold increase in traffic
handling capacity for the critical control
sectors in high-density areas. The imple-
mentation of an automatic
ground-air-ground data link is also
required to transmit computer-generated
control instructions directly to the
pilot/autopilot.
Upgrade the present ATC radar beacon
system to increase accuracy in deter-
mining aircraft position, and provide a
ground-air-ground digital communica-
tions mode. This wide-band digital data
link could ultimately replace the present
very high frequency (VHF) voice com-
munication system for transmitting ATC
separation and collision avoidance
messages.
Improve the very high frequency omni-
directional range-distance measuring
equipment (VOR-DME) navigation
system to provide the signals required for
an area navigation capability in the
domestic airspace. The scanning-beam
microwave landing system will provide
the basis for flexible, low-noise terminal
approach routes, in addition to improved
accuracy in approach guidance. This type
of landing system is much less sensitive
to signal reflection problems and will per-
mit instrument landing capability at
many sites where present equipment can-
not be used. This landing system can also
be used, with suitable airborne equip-
ment, to permit automatic landings
under all-weather conditions with a
resulting improvement in safety by
reducing landing accidents.
The benefits to be achieved through these
improvements were quantified through simulation
and analysis (ref. 2). The results show that the
following potential increases in system capacity
are possible:
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In the enroute and transition control
areas, automation is expected to increase
control-sector capacity as follows:
• National Airspace System (NAS) and
Advanced Radar Terminal System
(ARTS) Automation ...... 20%
• Automating conflict detection and
resolution ........... 180%
• Automating flow management and
terminal spacing function . . 100%
• Total increase in control-sector
capacity ............ 300%
In the terminal area and at individual
airports where the most critical problems
currently exist, implementing these
improvements and upgrading the
airport-airside system are expected to
bring about capacity increases of the
following nature:
• Implementing the dual-lane runway
systems (described in the "Airports"
section), but still using present
manual-control procedures . . 42%
• Automating the sequencing and
spacing function and implementing
the automatic ground-air-ground dig-
ital data links with some procedural
changes ............. 48%
• Reducing minimum longitudinal
separation standards by increasing
the level of automation and by
making other system improve-
ments .............. 68%
The total potential gain per run-
way ............. 158%
Implementing these planned improvements
will bring other benefits. These include reduction
in delays of up to 35% which can be of significant
economic importance (e.g., it is estimated that
delays in 1969 cost $158 million). A significant
reduction in pollution would also result (22
million pounds of pollutants were emitted during
traffic delays in 1969). Another benefit results
from the capability of the new landing system to
permit steeper approach paths since this will
allow traffic routing that minimizes noise expo-
sure to the community adjoining an airport.
FUTURE SYSTEM
CONSIDERATIONS
Since the implementation of the short-term
improvements defined in the previous section will
require several years to develop and implement in
the field facilities, the earliest gains in capacity
will be achieved largely by increasing the number
of control sectors. Studies have indicated that the
traffic capacity can be about doubled in
high-density areas by this method before the con-
trol sector is reduced to the minimum size com-
patible with effective control. Implementation of
the short-term improvements defined above
would bring a threefold increase in capacity by
increasing controller productivity. The combined
effect would be to increase the capacity of the
high-density areas by a factor of six.
Because of the time required to implement
improvements, a shortage of system capacity will
continue to exist for the immediate future. If
traffic distribution can be improved by
influencing the location of new airports, by
expanding existing airports, and by revising air-
ways route structures, it should be possible to
handle the expected traffic growth well into the
1980's. Further system changes will be needed at
that time. The Air Traffic Control Advisory Com-
mittee gave some consideration to such long-term
improvements, but because of many factors, their
work was limited. They recommended, however,
that extensive research be conducted toward very
advanced levels of automation and the use of
satellite systems.
It is important to recognize that, because of
various constraints within the Government, ade-
quate effort has not been applied to the analysis of
advanced system concepts, nor to related
research, performance studies, and evaluation of
technology that might be applied in the future.
The complexity of the problem and the fact that
expenditures of about $40 billion are expected
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during the next two decades for ATC equipment
and its direct operating costs, plus additional
major Government expenditures for airborne
ATC equipment by the military, make such effort
essential. Even if additional capacity were not
needed in the 1980-1990 time period, the oppor-
tunity to achieve reduced operating costs, greater
safety, and improved performance would be suffi-
cient to justify the required research activity.
It must be recognized that projected demand
will outpace system capacity for years to come
unless there is concerted Government action. A
careful assessment of the relative merits of new
concepts of ATC and the related technology alter-
natives is required on a continuing basis to assure
the upgrading of the airways system as rapidly as
resources and technology will permit. This con-
tinuing assessment will minimize the possibility of
making too large an investment in capital
improvements that might become prematurely
obsolete and will, at the same time, guard against
overoptimism about time-availability of new tech-
nology.
The required long-term improvements are
expected to come from research and development
activities in three major areas: the development,
simulation, and evaluation of new traffic control
concepts; the definition, simulation, and analysis
of various system approaches; and the develop-
ment and application of new technology in the
subsystem areas to provide new and improved
equipment capabilities. These activities are
treated separately in the following discussions. A
subsequent subsection will also outline policy
changes needed to achieve the improvements in
system capacity and controller productivity.
The analysis of advanced concepts for traffic
control and flow management must be carried out
with accurate knowledge of the performance that
could be achieved with advanced airborne equip-
ment and new ground- or satellite-based ATC
elements. Concepts and equipment that might
differ radically from that currently in use should
be considered if a clear advantage is shown during
analysis of the technical, operational, and eco-
nomic factors involved.
Traffic Control Concepts
The present ATC system is based on
computer-aided manual techniques using ground
voice control of IFR flights while VFR flights
operate essentiallly independently. Separation
between IFR and VFR flights is achieved by
restrictions on VFR traffic in large segments of
terminal area and high-altitude airspace and by
altitude separation rules when aircraft are in level
flight at the lower altitudes. During good weather
conditions in terminal areas with no airspace
restrictions, separation between IFR and VFR
flights is normally on a "see and be seen" basis
with advisory information from the ground con-
troller as workload permits. Near-term improve-
ments have been proposed that would provide
radar surveillance of all flights in the higher
density traffic areas with instructions to resolve
potential conflicts issued to both IFR and VFR
flights. An increased level of automation based on
computer-generated control instructions and an
automatic ground-air-ground data link would
relieve much of the routine workload on the
ground controller and would automatically detect
and resolve potential collision situations.
As traffic density continues to increase and
control problems become more complex - as is
the case for control sectors that are sequencing
and spacing aircraft in high-density terminal
areas - the control workload, measured in terms
of control instructions generated and delivered,
increases greatly. The result is a reduction in the
number of aircraft that can be handled per con-
trol sector. Capacity can be increased to a point
by increasing the number of sectors and reducing
sector size. However, the limit of this gain is
reached when the sector size becomes too small
to provide effective control. In addition, the
increase in intersector coordination workload will
further serve to reduce traffic. Clearly, any
system that depends on a controller to
"hand-carry" each controlled aircraft in
high-density areas is capacity-limited, and the
capacity limit is set by controller workload
saturation and minimum effective sector size. The
cost of this approach is also a major factor. Each
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newsectorequirescommunicationsfrequencies
andfacilities,sectordisplays,anddataprocessing
capacityto operatethesedisplaysin additionto
newcontrollersto operatethesector.In sucha
systemapproach,thecostof operationincreases
directlywith thenumberof operationsuntil the
systemsaturates.
A measure of relief is afforded by utilizing a
computer to perform the "tactical" functions
(generation of clearance changes including head-
ings, speed, and altitude instructions), and more
routine functions. Currently, in high-density sec-
tors operating at capacity, communication chan-
nel utilization reaches approximately 70%. Auto-
mation of the control functions would allow
some slight increase in channel utilization time
and traffic controlled per sector. However, the
gain is small unless the ground-air-ground voice
communications bottleneck is removed. Imple-
mentation of a digital data link serves to provide
the vehicle for the next increase in
traffic-handling capability. The data link, how-
ever, cannot be effective if the human controller
must still approve each control action. Hence, one
consequence of transition to an automated tac-
tical system is the change in controller role from
one of real-time tactical control to one of longer
term flow planning ("strategic control") and
monitoring of computer performance of the tac-
tical function.
The system improvements to be implemented
by 1980 will provide automation in the ground
ATC system of the routine, tactical, and
flow-planning functions. The gains in capacity to
accommodate the traffic expected after the
1980's, however, will require a change in the basic
method of control in order to reduce the control
workload per aircraft. A change with high poten-
tial would be a strategic control concept charac-
terized by the assignment of a route-time profile
to each aircraft. This approach would use the
ground computer system to perform a very much
upgraded planning and flight monitoring function
while returning to airborne systems the responsi-
bility for the tactical control (i.e., speed, altitude,
and heading changes) needed to achieve the
assigned profile.
Several alternatives exist for obtaining the
benefits available from use of strategic control
methods. One approach would provide a ground
ATC system that automated both the strategic
and tactical methods of control. In this approach
the computer would generate the route-time pro-
files and issue tactical control instructions to the
aircraft to achieve the desired performance.
Although this system would reduce the
ground-air-ground communications workload
somewhat, the reduction in workload per aircraft
would not be large. Further, major ground system
failures would affect the level of airborne safety
to a greater extent than a different approach, a
system where the entire strategic plan would be
available in the aircraft and tactical control would
be conducted therein. The latter approach, which
appears to provide more effective system opera-
tion and reduced workload for itinerant flights
operating on IFR clearances, would relegate the
tactical functions back to the aircraft for those
aircraft equipped to accept and follow route-time
profiles. This approach should reduce ground
ATC processing, control, and communications
workload per flight to the point where further
major expansions in capacity would be possible.
It must be recognized that not all user
missions are ideally suited to flow (strategic) con-
trol. Hence, it is expected that users will continue
to be segregated, to the extent possible, by air-
space volume based on the type of service desired.
Airborne equipment requirements would be
determined by the service desired and the airspace
volumes used. Hence, for the foreseeable future,
the ATC system must accommodate a spectrum
of airborne capabilities. Further, the realities of
daily operations require that the system effi-
ciently cope with disturbances such as moving
weather fronts and thunderstorms. Segregation of
users by equipment capability into different air-
space volumes, however, allows implementation
of strategic control in some airspace. Since a
higher ATC system workload is associated with
handling nonequipped aircraft, the capacity of
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the airspace volumes used by these aircraft may
well be less than that of the airspace volumes used
by equipped aircraft.
The short-term improvement program
(items 1 and 2 in Table 4.1) in concert with a
doubling of the number of control sectors in
high-density areas will result in a sixfold increase
in capacity by providing automation of routine,
tactical, and planning functions. This program
will provide an improved level of service to the
users and will meet the growth requirements at
least through the 1980's. Meeting growth require-
ments beyond 1990 will necessitate implementa-
tion of new control concepts, such as some form
of strategic control combined with increased
structuring of the airspace. Recent analyses of the
gains that could be achieved through use of the
strategic concept were based on models of a route
from New Orleans to Boston via Atlanta,
Washington, and New York. In addition, the
Chicago terminal area was modeled for various
control concepts. The results indicated that a 30%
gain in capacity (beyond the 1980 system) could
be achieved if all itinerant air carrier and military
IFR flights were conducted on a strategic control
basis. The models were also exercised to deter-
mine the gain that could be achieved if all itiner-
ant IFR flights were conducted on a strategic
control basis. This approach resulted in a pre-
dicted gain of 4.4:1. Although the latter case only
determined the maximum gain from this concept,
the results point out the system gains to be
achieved by encouraging or requiring higher levels
of IFR capability in general aviation aircraft. Th,_
capacity gains that may be achieved from imple-
menting selected alternatives are summarized in
Table4.1. The tabulation also indicates the
approximate time period in which the capacity
gain would be required.
Table 4.1 relates to capacity increases in
high-density areas. At present, 64 high- and
medium-density terminals handle in excess of
80% of the commercial passenger operations and
70% of the total instrument operations. In addi-
tion, approximately 60% of the general aviation
fleet is based in these areas. Hence, any system
concept that does not solve the high-density
terminal and associated enroute control problems
will do little to increase the capacity of the IFR
system. Figure 4.12 shows the approximate
level of system capacity that can be achieved by
the Advanced Radar Terminal (ARTS) and
NationalAirspace (NAS) systems, those systems
with the short-term recommended improvements
added, a hybrid tactical-strategic system where
air-carrier and military itinerant flights are con-
ducted under strategic control, and an all-strategic
control system. The curves represent the approxi-
mate increase in system capacity that can be
TABLE 4.1. CAPACITY INCREASE AS A FUNCTION
OF CONTROL CONCEPT
IIIIIIII
ATC SYSTEM CONCEPT
ADDITIONAL CONTROL SECTORS (COMPUTER-AIDED MANUAL)
AUTOMATED TACTICAL (SHORT-TERM IMPROVEMENTS)
AUTOMATED HYBRID TACTICAL-STRATEGIC
(COMMERCIAL-MILITARY AIRCRAFT COMPUTER EQUIPPED)
AUTOMATED GROUND STRATEGIC AND AIR TACTICAL
(ALL IFR AIRCRAFT COMPUTER EQUIPPED)
II II
Illl
CAPACITY INCREASE
FACTOR a
2.2
6.0
7.8
26.4
I
III I
APPROXIMATE TIME
PERIOD REQUIRED b
1970-1980
1980-1990
1985-1995
1995-2005+
I
aAll numbers are referenced to 1970 levels and are
cumulative.
bperiods are valid if present forecast of traffic growth
is valid.
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achieved in high-density areas. Each curve follows 
the demand line to  the point where airspace satu- 
ration starts in the major terminals. The curve 
then rises at a slower rate than the demand line to  
show continued growth in areas where saturation 
has not yet occurred. The difference between the 
two lines (i.e., demand line and system concept 
capacity line) represents a lack of system 
capacity. 
Figure 4.13 represents the approximate size 
of the controller work force required for each of 
the system concepts. The size of  the work force, 
in each case, is that required t o  achieve the capac- 
ity gains shown for the same concept in 
Figure 4.12. For the ARTS and NAS system a 
growth in traffic capacity (based o n  1970) of four 
to five times can probably be achieved by expand- 
ing the controller force t o  between 80,000 and 
100.000. By comparison, a growth of  eight t o  ten 
times appears achieveable by implementation of 
the short-term improvements supplemented by 
the hybrid control concept. In this case, it 
appears possible to  level off the controller force 
Figure 4.12. Capacity gains versus control concept. 
CONTROLLER FORCE POST 1980 -- 
WITH SUCCESSIVE SYSTEM 
IMPROVEMENTS 
--- 
Figure 4.13. Controller force versus control concept. 
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at about30,000if thesesystemchangesareinsti-
tutedatthetimesshown.
Thecurveswerebasedonpresentforecastsof
traffic growth. If traffic growssubstantially
faster,thetimecycleof introducingthenewcon-
ceptsandtheir supporting roundandairborne
systemsmustbeexpedited.Similarly,areduction
in the rateof growthwoulddelaythe timeat
which the improvementswould be needed.
Althoughthe curvesshoweachconceptbeing
introducedatthemomentwhenthepreviouscon-
cept has causedtraffic saturationin some
high-densityareas,earlieror laterintroductionis
also possible.Earlier implementationwould
appearto offer thepossibilityof earlierleveling
off of thegrowthof thecontrollerwork force.
This potentialreductionin cost,however,must
bebalancedagainstR&Ddevelopmenttimesfor
new conceptsandsystemequipment.A major
considerationwith respectto thelatteristhecost
andtimerequiredfor userstoequiptheiraircraft
with therequirednewavionics.Laterimplemen-
tation, in all cases,resultsin a lackof airway
systemcapacityin thehigh-densityareas.
Sincethemajorityof thecapacitygainsand
workloadanalysesarebasedon limitedanalysis,
the curvesare intendedto showonly general
trendsandthe needto activelypursuedevelop-
mentof improvedcontrolconcepts.Thealter-
nativesusedin thisexamplexploitedthepoten-
tial capacitygainsto beachievedbyevolvingto a
systemusing the strategiccontrol concept.
Althoughimplementingthisconceptappearsto
offer theneededgrowth,otherconceptshould
beconsideredandfurtherevaluated.
TheR&Dactivityin thisareawouldinclude
taskstoevaluate,throughsimulationandanalysis,
systemapproacheswithvariousdistributionsof
functionsbetweengroundandairbornesystems.
It wouldalsoassesstheimpactof variouspolicy
alternatives,andvarioustraffic-flowmanagement
conceptson systemperformanceandcost.The
choiceof approacheswill be affectedby the
extentto whichtheground-air-groundcommuni-
cationsloadcanbe reducedby delegatingfunc-
tions backto the airborneelectronics system.
Systems where the majority of the computations
are performed by the ground-based ATC
computers and resulting control instructions
transmitted to the aircraft impose heavy com-
munications loads on the data acquisition and
data link systems. Such an approach tends to
favor the choice of a ground-based data acquisi-
tion and data link system. On the other hand,
systems that depend heavily on an airborne elec-
tronics capacity to follow a preassigned route
profile tend to be more compatible with
satellite-based systems.
Technology
The selection of concepts for application in
the long-term improvement of the air-traffic
system depends on the development of advanced
navigation, surveillance, and automated control
techniques, and the use of improved systems anal-
ysis and operations research methods in evaluat-
ing these techniques for future usc. It is possible
at this time to discuss only broadly some of the
key system elements; however, insight into some
of the important research and development needs
is given in the following discussion.
Position Determination. Knowledge of air-
craft location, including both geographic coordi-
nates and altitude, is necessary for navigation by
the pilot as well as for ground surveillance during
the management of traffic flow and the resolution
of potential conflicts between aircraft. Currently,
navigation is carried out using a group of
ground-based radio navigation aids that are
entirely independent of the surveillance system,
which relies primarily on radar (and radar beacon)
techniques. These independent navigation and
surveillance systems permit a clear separation of
responsibility for navigation by the pilot and
contribute to overall reliability.
In considering the design of future systems,
attention must be given to defining and providing
adequate accuracies for both the navigation and
guidance systems if the independent systems
approach is maintained. Alternatively, a common
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primarysystem can be considered for providing
the navigation and surveillance functions;
however, in the design of such a system it must be
realized that high reliability requirements must be
met. A common system might ultimately permit
better precision in achieving the desired separa-
tion and spacing of aircraft since it would not be
necessary to allow for the cumulative errors of
two independent systems. Also, it should be
noted that certain classes of aircraft cause special
problems. For example, VTOL and STOL vehicles
operating at low altitudes encounter problems
regarding accurate low-altitude coverage by both
the current and upgraded radar beacon systems as
well as similar problems for the present types of
ground-based radio navigation aids. These prob-
lems result primarily from the shadowing caused
by high terrain or other obstructions between the
aircraft and the radar site or navigation aid.
Research and development are needed for
fully evaluating position determination methods
that might be applied in the future. These
methods are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
Satellite Systems. Satellite systems can
provide accurate surveillance coverage
over wide areas with almost no restric-
tions due to terrain features. These
systems can be designed to permit
independent measurement of aircraft
altitude. However, present technology
imposes a weight and cost penalty on the
aircraft because communications are
required over the 22,000-mile path to a
synchronous satellite. Practical limita-
tions on satellite transmitter power also
restrict the number of aircraft that can
be served with systems requiring high
rates of data transfer with individual air-
craft. In addition, the geometry involved
in determining position from satellite
altitude requires greater measurement
precision than in many ground-based
systems. Nevertheless, satellite systems
appear to deserve careful examination for
the following applications:
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* Systems for Transoceanic Traffic. In
this case the number of aircraft
involved is relatively small, and is
restricted almost entirely to large
transport vehicles that can carry the
airborne systems necessary for com-
munication, surveillance, or naviga-
tion by satellite. Alternatively, com-
munication and surveillance
functions might be performed by
satellites that use inertial systems or
other navigation methods. Studies by
the President's Science Advisory
Committee have shown that annual
savings on the order of $50 to $100
million could result during 1978 to
1982 if satellite systems were used to
permit more optimum operations
over the North Atlantic. For the
immediate future, aircraft in
opposing lanes are separated laterally
by 60 to 120 miles, depending upon
altitude assignment, and are spaced
15 minutes apart in each lane. This
limits the ability to take optimum
advantage of high-altitude winds and
to select the best routes associated
with origin and destination points.
• Either Navigation or Surveillance for
the Continentat United States.
Navigation data might be provided to
unlimited numbers of aircraft by uti-
lizing passive techniques not requir-
ing transmission from the aircraft or
involving high data rates. Feasibility
would be determined by the cost of
receiving and computing equipment
required on board the aircraft.
Another alternative is to provide sur-
veillance of large numbers of aircraft
from a single satellite system. It
would probably be necessary to use
pulse compression techniques to
limit the peak power required in the
aircraft transmitter and to restrict
the data rates and employ advanced
coding and detection methods to
permithandlinglargenumbersof air-
craft (5,000to 50,000)in a single
system.The feasibilitywould be
stronglyinfluencedby the costof
equipmentrequiredin generalavia-
tion aircraft. Considerablecaution
wouldappearto benecessaryincon-
sideringsystemsthatinvolveaninte-
grateddatalink functionsincethe
power required for
aircraft-to-satellitecommunications
is about100timesgreaterthanfor
aircraft-to-groundcommunications.
• Advanced Radar Methods. These include
new radar beacon techniques designed
for extensive tracking and communica-
tions functions in high-density traffic
environments. Full attention should be
given to concepts that permit modular
system components to meet the eco-
nomic and weight needs of general avia-
tion aircraft as well as the requirements
imposed by compatibility with military
systems.
• Multifunction One-Way Velocity and
Distance Measurement Systems Based on
Precision Time Methods. Precise,
synchronized time references can be
obtained in each aircraft by methods that
permit one-way range and velocity mea-
surement relative to ground locations and
other aircraft (these are sometimes
referred to as time-frequency tech-
niques). System designs are possible that
would allow various degrees of ground
surveillance along with air-to-air informa-
tion exchange for traffic spacing and col-
lision avoidance. Attention should be
given to methods compatible with the
economic constraints associated with
various classes of aircraft and the inter-
ference and saturation problems resulting
from large aircraft population.
• Multilateration Systems Requiring Trans-
mission to Two or More Ground
Locations. Advanced modulation
methods and coding schemes based on
modern information and statistical com-
munications theory should be explored
as one means of removing current limita-
tions that result in saturation and diffi-
culties in system designs for practical use
in the existing frequency spectrum.
Hyperbolic Grid Methods Similar to
Those Used by Loran-C, Loran-D,
Decca, and Omega. For navigation pur-
poses, position might be determined in
the aircraft by a passive, nonsaturable
method with data transfer to the ground
utilizing high-capacity communications
techniques. If ground wave propagation
is feasible, coverage would be possible at
all altitudes as well as on the airport sur-
face. Also, there is the possibility of
simply, yet accurately, measuring ground
speed in the aircraft, which could be val-
uable in controlling flights and main-
taining a desired traffic flow.
Advanced modulation and detection
methods are needed to reduce the effects
of interference, precipitation static, and
atmospheric noise now limiting the use-
fulness of these systems. Advanced
designs employing new microelectronic
data processing methods would be
required in an effort to seek economi-
cally feasible systems with the capability
of handling the extra baseline computa-
tions that probably are necessary from
reliability considerations.
At present, satellites and hyperbolic grid
ground-based systems appear to be the only tech-
niques with the potential of providing coverage of
aircraft at almost any altitude over a large geo-
graphic area. However, considerable development
would be necessary to achieve economically
feasible airborne equipment.
Communications. One of the most important
future needs is the development of radio com-
munications techniques for application in a
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high-densityaircraft environment.Suchtech-
niquesareessentialto theproperdesignof com-
municationslinksneededfor ground-air-ground
informationtransfer,air-to-airdataexchange,and
trackingfor surveillancepurposes.Thepresent
approachemployssimplemodulationtechniques
andrelativelyhighpowersto assurereliablecom-
municationswhenanaircraftisatlowaltitudesor
whenthe antennacoverageis not good.Conse-
quently,strongsignalsare radiatedfor many
hundreds of miles. As the number of aircraft
increases, the situation becomes self-defeating
because of the interference produced at distances
far beyond the desired range of communications.
Research efforts are needed to develop and
apply modern statistical communications
methods for the high-density aircraft environ-
ment. Generally, the approach involves relatively
low powers and random-type modulation
methods with coding techniques to permit the
sorting of signals or, possibly, with a return link
to assure that the message is received (and if not,
repeated with certain changes until it is
received). This is the same technology being
applied to high-security, multiple-access military
systems and to deep space communications. In
the high-density aircraft environment, the
emphasis would be on the simpler implementa-
tion methods, efficient use of the limited radio
spectrum, and obtaining a high degree of reli-
ability without resorting to high powers and creat-
ing difficult interference problems. Attention
should be given to techniques applicable to both
ground and satellite systems.
Related Elements. In addition to systems
analysis of basic control concepts and research on
advanced position determination methods and
communications techniques, several other areas
require emphasis in considering future systems.
Among these are the following:
Computer System Design Both
ground-based and airborne computers are
expected to play an important role in
future systems. The organization and
design of these computers require an
intense effort to achieve the reliability to
assure flight safety consistent with one
accident in one million flight hours, or
better. With advanced levels of automa-
tion, systems must be free from the
effects of failures when considered with
backup elements or alternate operating
modes. A key item is the design of a
ground-based system with computer
elements that can be distributed among
several geographic locations and operated
in a highly reliable, redundant manner so
that catastrophic failures at one or more
locations would not have significant
impact on system performance.
Advanced Flight Control Systems. An
important element in future systems will
be the capability of air carriers and
high-performance aircraft to sustain
rigorous operating schedules from take-
off to landing. During much of this time,
the flight may be under computer con-
trol with key input information from the
ATC system and related navigation aids.
Increased attention in the future must be
given to the capability of advanced air-
craft control systems and interaction
with the ATC system.
Displays. Effective displays for
presenting position along the desired
flight path, traffic situations, and naviga-
tional data are needed for the higher per-
formance aircraft. In addition, the avail-
ability of economic but lower
performance versions could greatly
influence the method of operating with
general aviation aircraft. Advanced dis-
play and data presentation methods are
also needed for ground personnel.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
As may be seen from the preceding discus-
sions regarding near-term improvements and
future system considerations, it is important that
an intensive research and development program
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be initiated now and continued for some time to
come to develop solutions for the critical airways
problems. These solutions must provide the abil-
ity to achieve the safety and capacity goals in an
economically viable manner but must not unduly
constrain the growth of any of the various avia-
tion segments. In conducting this research, it will
be necessary to determine the impact of advanced
air-traffic control systems and operational
restraints on the design of aircraft and aircraft
systems, as well as the impact of new aircraft on
the airway system structure. The urgency of
vigorously attacking both of these problems can
be emphasized by the following: first, the
air-traffic control situation is critical now in some
major hub areas so improvements are required in
the immediate future; and second, a definition of
the configuration of the future air-traffic control
system, especially with respect to the ground
system elements, is needed at as early a time as
possible to assure that the implementation of
near-term improvements will permit a reasonable
transition to the future system.
Near-Term Development Requirements
The following program is based largely on
improving existing system elements to achieve
increases in capacity as rapidly as possible. This
program should permit implementation at the
earliest possible date to achieve an increase of at
least a factor of three in sector capacity. The
major elements of this program are:
• System engineering, simulation, and
trade-off studies.
• Development of techniques to permit
substantial increases in automation of
ATC functions, including flow manage-
ment, safety enhancement, flight plan
processing, integration of automated
communications, and data processor
expansion.
• Development of an upgraded data
acquisition system including data link
interrogators, ATC data link trans-
ponders, and an improved radar system.
Development of an upgraded communi-
cations system, including expansion of
the digital communications network and
definition of data link services and
message formats.
Development of upgraded navigation and
landing systems, including the improve-
ment of the enroute VHF Omni-Range
(VOR) system, development of terminal
Precision VOR (PVOR) equipment,
capacity expansion of the Distance Mea-
suring Equipment (DME), development
of an oceanic navigation system, and
development of an all-weather
scanning-beam microwave landing
system.
Future System Research and
Development
The following program should be initiated
now to provide a system design for the traffic
demands of the late 1980's and beyond. This pro-
gram must include research, advanced technology
evaluations, and development steps as well as con-
cept simulation before the design of an advanced
ATC system can be established. The major
activities associated with this program include:
• System engineering, simulation, and
trade-off studies (including development
of new control concepts and approaches
for optimum airspace utilization) and
economic evaluation of policy alter-
natives on system design and
implementation methods.
• Research on ground- and satellite-based
position determination methods for
navigation and surveillance and for both
functions simultaneously. Attention
should be given to highly accurate
systems with good low-altitude coverage
and the performance of these systems
with new landing aids.
• Research on communications techniques
for application in a high-density aircraft
environment. This includes propagation
and multipath effects, and advanced
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modulation and coding methods for both
ground- and satellite-based systems.
• The development of high-capacity
fail-safe ground-based computing
systems; highly reliable airborne com-
puters and processing techniques; and
advanced data acquisition and display
methods.
• Continued analysis of the impact of new
classes of aircraft, noise reduction
advances, and improved weather and
turbulence detection methods.
R&D Funding Requirements
The FAA 10-year plan estimates that the
initial automation steps now under way will result
in about a 20% increase in controller productivity
(ref. 3). A much greater increase in capacity, how-
ever, is needed by 1980. The R&D funding level
should, therefore, be increased sufficiently to per-
mit implementing near-term improvements by
1980 to achieve a factor of three increase in con-
trol sector capacity, as well as to permit a
vigorous attack on the future system problems.
The annual R&D funding level required to
support the airways program has been estimated
for the next 10 years. The requirements for the
1970's average $160 million per year, or a 10-year
cost of about $1.6 billion (based on 1970 dollars)
(ref. 4).
The projected R&D program for the fol-
lowing 10-year period (the 1980's)is expected to
average $200 million per year, or a 10-year cost
of $2.0 billion (based on 1970 dollars).
The total R&D program for the next 20 years
is designed to meet the capacity growth forecast
on the basis of existing or anticipated vehicle
types. It also includes development efforts
tailored to the unique requirements of STOL
vehicles. These include a scanning-beam type of
microwave landing system and improved low-level
navigation system. It should be noted that the
R&D level is based on doubling capacity at about
10-year intervals. If substantially higher growth
rates are experienced as a result of rapid implemen-
tation of STOL systems or accelerated growth in
general aviation, higher funding levels will be
required. In addition, it should be noted that
R&D funding must provide for the expansion of
existing research capability and the establishment
of new test facilities to permit development and
evaluation of new concepts and equipment in
both experimental and operational environments.
Some facilities located with operational ATC
facilities are needed to evaluate proposed system
improvements under normal air-traffic conditions.
In addition, a demonstration airport would
greatly expedite the development of improved air-
port systems by allowing demonstration of
improvements in all the ground and airborne
elements.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Changes in control concept and implementa-
tion of new, more capable technologies can
produce the desired results only if they are sup-
ported by effective policies. The goal of these
policies is to produce a system that meets the
demand and safety requirements in a timely
manner at a minimum overall system cost. The
policy considerations presented in the following
paragraphs affect both short- and long-term sys-
tem improvements. The policies are aimed at
increasing the speed of implementation to allow
the system to "catch up" quickly as well to
increase system effectiveness by implementation
of a more capable set of airborne equipment in all
aircraft flying in the system.
Segregation of Airspace Users
Future systems will continue to provide a
spectrum of service levels to permit uncontrolled
VFR flight in some areas, controlled VFR flights
in other areas, controlled VFR flight in some
terminal areas, and IFR operations between many
of the nation's airports and throughout much of
the airspace. Consequently, the following policy
is recommended"
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Segregation between airspace users should be
based on the type of service (i.e., IFR, IPC,
controlled VFR, and uncontrolled VFR). Air-
borne equipment requirements, pilot profi-
ciency, and rules and procedures for each
type of service will be established by Federal
Air Regulations.
Performance Standards for Airborne Equipment
Among the major problems in converting to
any new system are the time and cost required to
convert the airborne avionic systems to the new
equipment capability. An associated problem of
equal importance is the difficulty of achieving air-
borne system performance matched directly to
the ground ATC system. Variations in airborne
system capabilities and performance, in turn,
mean that the ground automation system must
provide an interface with a wide spectrum of
avionic systems of varying performance and capa-
bilities. The impact of processing inaccurate or
incomplete data is greatly increased cost in the
ground ATC system. The establishment of
minimum acceptable performance standards for
all airborne equipment interfacing with and form-
ing a part of the ATC system would reduce
system costs appreciably.
To reduce the problems and overall system
cost resulting from a wide spectrum of avionics
equipment capability, the Government must par-
ticipate in the development of standardized
performance specifications for airborne
equipment. A second policy is therefore
recommended:
The Federal Government should sponsor the
R&D necessary to define performance stan-
dards for that portion of the airborne equip-
ment that forms a part of the air traffic
control, navigation, communications, and
data-acquisition systems, and that is
associated with each type of service (IFR,
IPC, controlled VFR, and uncontrolled
VFR).
Avionics
As aircraft used for IFR flights become better
equipped and capable of operating more effici-
ently under new control concepts, a larger pro-
portion of system operating costs is associated
with handling minimum-equipped aircraft operat-
ing in mixed airspace or in airspace in the vicinity
of high-density terminals. Conversion to a fully
cooperative system, where each aircraft would be
equipped to respond to interrogation by the
data-acquisition system with sufficient data that
its position could be determined to the required
accuracy, appears to offer large potential savings
and significant improvement in system perfor-
mance. In addition, a message exchange capabil-
ity, ground-air-ground, would be provided with
only that sophistication required in each aircraft
for the class of service desired (e.g., VFR, IFR).
There appears to be the possibility that this type
of system would permit most of the primary
radar systems to be decommissioned with a sub-
stantial reduction in total system cost.
The increasing number of near midair colli-
sions resulting from the increasing density of air
traffic in hub areas is causing the establishment of
Terminal Control Areas, which require users to
have a minimum airborne equipment comple-
ment. Studies of future traffic growth indicate an
increasing need for additional capability to permit
the ATC system to exercise separation control
over all aircraft operating in high-density areas to
maintain air safety at a reasonable level (ref. 2).
The Intermittent Positive Control System repre-
sents a way of meeting this need and requires
users to have a minimum airborne equipment
complement based on expansion of the present
beacon system and incorporation of a data link
function and collision-avoidance indicator in the
cockpit. With such minimum equipment on all
aircraft, the need to increase the extent of posi-
tive control areas can be minimized.
Forecast general aviation growth indicates
that more than half of general aviation activity
will be located in hub areas by 1980. Aircraft
based in these areas would be equipped to
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respondto IPC.In addition,othertrafficwould
besubjecto IPCwhenvisiting hub areas. If the
remainder of the air fleet were equipped with the
minimum cooperative equipment, appreciable
savings could result and improved service
rendered to the users of the airspace.
Recent studies of a model of an
all-cooperative system indicated that a substantial
reduction in total system cost could be achieved.
The system model studied assumed a starting date
of 1980 and was based on retaining 56 radars at
the medium- and high-density terminals to pro-
vide adequate backup for cooperative equipment
failure. In Table 4.2, various funding alternatives
are examined to evaluate their benefit
(saving)-to-cost (Government and user) ratios.
Figures 4.14, 4.15, and 4.16 illustrate the
cumulative savings that accrue by reducing the
size of the radar plant, costs to the user, and the
excess of benefits over cost for Case Ill. The
upper line in Figure 4.14 shows the approximate
cost of continuing to upgrade, expand, operate
and maintain the present primary radar system.
The lower curve starting in 1980 indicates the
same costs for the 56 terminal radar systems that
are retained and the area between the lines indi-
cates the savings that accrue through reduction in
the size of the primary radar network.
Figure 4.15 shows the cumulative costs for equip-
ping 30% (related to aircraft voluntarily
equipped), 60% (relates to aircraft based in hub
areas), and 100% (relates to aircraft equipped in a
fully cooperative system) of the general aviation
aircraft. The difference between the 30% curve
(actual percentage varies with the year) and the
100% curve is the added cost to the user of an
all-cooperative system. Figure4.16 shows the
cumulative difference between user costs and
Government savings based on a system start time
of 1980.
The potential reduction in overall system cost
that could be achieved by requiring each aircraft
to be equipped with at least the minimum cooper-
ative device is highly dependent on policies that
facilitate airborne equipment implementation.
The cost savings that can be achieved and the
length of time taken to increase system capacity
are directly dependent on the rate at which air-
borne equipment implementation takes place.
TABLE 4.2. COST/BENEFIT RATIOS, FULLY COOPERATIVE SYSTEM
CASE I USERS PAY ENTIRE COST OF EQUIPMENT. (GOVERNMENT SAVtNGS-TO-COST RATIO)
CASE II GOVERNMENT FURNISHES NEW IPCBEACONSONLYTO SINGLE-ENGINE GENERAL AVIATION USERS
AT NO COST.
CASE III PRESENT LEVEL OF VOLUNTARY EQUIPPAGE CONTINUES (ABOUT 30%) GOVERNMENT FURNISHES
NEW IPC BEACONS AT NO COST TO REMAINDER.
CASE IV GOVERNMENT PAYS $700 OF COOPERATIVE EQUIPMENT COST TO ALL SINGLE-ENGINE GENERAL
AVIATION USERS.
CASE V GOVERNMENT FURNISHES NEW IPC BEACONS TO ALL GENERAL AVIATION USERS AT NO COST.
BENEFIT/COST RATIO a
(BASED ON 1970 DOLLARS)
10.52:1 (8.50:1)
2.45:1 (1.36:1)
2.65:1 (1.5:1)
3.56:1 (2.11:1)
2.t:1 (1.16:1)
aActual or budget dollars were used to determine savings-to-cost ratios. Numbers in parentheses indicate the ratios
derived using discounted dollars (I 0% annual rate).
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Figure4.14.Primaryadarcost. Figure4.16.CumulativesavingslessGovernmenta d
usercosts.
Figure4.15.Userequipmentcosts- IPCtransponder.
SumFHary
The above policies provide the basis for early
implementation of a system that can meet the
growth and safety requirements. They also
include the mechanism for achieving substantial
reductions in system cost. Without policies of this
type, implementation times will be substantially
increased, perhaps by as much as 10 years, and
system performance, efficiency, and safety will be
compromised.
CONCLUSIONS
Early growth in system capacity depends on
prompt increases in R&D levels to permit expedit-
ing the implementation of the recommended
short-term improvements. Supporting policies
relative to airspace use and airborne equipment
improvements and installation are needed. A
cooperative system requiring all aircraft to carry
minimum equipment would accomplish substan-
tial system cost savings and facilitate system
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implementation.Thecooperativesystemshould
beachievedasearlyaspracticable,preferablyby
1980.
Capacityincreasesand improvementsover
the longtermrequirea newsystemconceptand
the exploitationof new technology.If this
approachis takenandthesystemprogressesin an
evolutionarymannertowardincorporatingnew
controlconcepts,theforecastof growthneeded
in airwaysystemcapacitycanbe met at least
throughtheturnof thecentury.
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AIRPORTS THE CURRENT SITUATION
INTRODUCTION
This section covers the airport factors that
influence the air transportation system on the
ground:
Airport airside- that which primarily
supports the movement of aircraft
(airfield area).
Airport landside- that which primarily
supports the movement of people and
goods (terminal area).
Airports divide naturally into two principal
elements, the airside and the landside. The
demarcation between the two is at the gate at
which passengers enplane or deplane or the point
at which cargo is loaded or off-loaded. The land-
side may be further divided into segments at the
points where passengers or cargo enter or leave
available ground transportation. The segments
and their functions are shown in Figure 4.17.
This relatively simple arrangement works
satisfactorily only when all elements of the air-
port are in balance, that is, when the flow across
all interfaces is approximately equal. When there
is an imbalance in the elements of the airport and
one or several elements are saturated, relatively
minor delays can cause major disruptions of traf-
fic. Temporary delays caused by weather or by
equipment failures quickly clog the traffic inflow
from the landside. Unexpected or unplanned
arrivals of several wide-body large-capacity air-
craft at the same time create wall-to-wall jamming
in terminal buildings and chaos at the curbside.
Critical difficulties are arising because airport
development and ground-transportation facilities
have lagged far behind vehicle development.
Intensive aeronautical research and development
have made possible aircraft whose size and perfor-
mance are well beyond the handling capabilities
of present airport-landside facilities.
There are 817 airports in the United States
that provide certificated airline service. The total
number of aircraft landing facilities, however,
(including airports, heliports, and seaplane bases)
is about 11,200 of which 6,913 are privately
owned and 4,252 are publicly owned; 3,504 have
lighted runways; 3,733 have paved runways (only
about 55 of these are more than 10,000 feet
long); 244 have a Category I Instrument Landing
System (ILS) (31 have two ILS runways); 126 are
radar-equipped medium-and high-density termi-
nals; 161 are tower-equipped lower density termi-
nals; and 47 have combined flight service station
towers.
Approximately 3,200 of these facilities,
including the 817 used by certificated airlines,
have been identified as essential to the Nation's
air transport system and thus are included in the
FAA's National Airport Plan (see Table 4.3 and
ref. 1).
Four of the Nation's major airports are at
peak-hour saturation, not only in terms of the
number of aircraft they can accept, but also in
terms of demand on terminal-building facilities,
automobile parking, and airport access. To com-
plicate the problem further, competition for avail-
able land and funds in large urban areas where
airport congestion is more severe, coupled with
environmental and jurisdictional problems, have
in many cases seriously delayed development of
badly needed new airport facilities.
Additional landing facilities are needed to
meet current and future demand; more than
1,200 additional airports (the majority for general
aviation) are identified in the FAA's 1971
National Aviation System Plan (ref. 2) as needed
to meet the 1981 aviation demand requirements.
An increase in the total number of landing facil-
ities, however, does not necessarily mean better
transportation service nor does it assure increased
capacity where it is vitally needed.
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Figure 4.17. The airside and landside segments of the airport. 
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The present inadequacies of some major air-
ports relate in part to the manner in which they
have developed. Past development has tended to
concentrate commercial passenger operations at a
few major airports in each urban area. The result
has been saturation of the airport, airway, termi-
nal, and access/egress system (the complementary
ground transportation). If the historic growth
trend continues, the existing problems will be fur-
ther aggravated. As airport activity grows, sup-
porting services saturate, access-road congestion
increases, and passenger delays for the trip to and
from the airport increase. To provide an effective
air transport system, instead of larger airports
(toward which there is currently a trend), a more
effectively distributed system of airports tailored
to specific user needs is required - a system that
can grow with demand. This will take time and it
will undoubtedly be necessary to increase capac-
ity at existing airports until a new airport plan has
been developed and becomes effective.
It is clear that demands on the airport system
in 1975 to 1995 cannot be met simply by the
construction of additional runways and airports
based only on current design standards and pro-
cessing methods. Some airports must be designed
for location closer to major population or activity
centers, where provisions for intraurban transpor-
tation can be provided efficiently and at low cost.
Airport design must be specialized for particular
vehicle types, such as STOL and VTOL, or for a
particular type of service, such as large CTOL
regional passenger jetports, general aviation, train-
ing, or test facilities, or possibly for
special-purpose cargo airports, or for specific
mixes of vehicles and functions.
TABLE4.3. NATIONAL AIRPORT SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS, 1972-1981
SYSTEM
CLASSIFICATION
PRIMARY SYSTEM
HIGH-DENSITY
MEDIUM-DENSITY
LOW-DENSITY
TOTALS
SECONDARY SYSTEM
HI GH-DENSITY
_[: MEDIUM-DENSITY
LOW-DENSITY
;_ TOTALS
FEEDER SYSTEM
_' HIGH-DENSITY
_ MEDIUM-DENSITY
LOW-DENSITY
_ TOTALS
NATIONAL SYSTEMTOTALS
CURRENT
5Y31LM
OF
AIRPORTS
11
13
6
30
32
178
162
372
98
1,287
1,451
2,836
3,238
PROJECTED SYSTEM ADJUSTMENTS
SYSTEM
ADDITION_
12
5
2
19
24
135
46
205
7O
345
588
1,003
INTRA-
SYSTEM
CHANGES
+ 20
- 2
+ 6
+ 24
+ 96
+147
- 30
+213
1,227
+573
+120
-930
-237
PROJECTED
1170 INATIONAL
SYSTEM i
43
16
14
73
152
460
178
790
741
1,752
1,109
3,602
4,465 i
alncludes new airport construction requirements and the privately and publicly owned airports that will be added to the
national system over the 1O-year period. Source: Ref. 2.
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Until recently,Federalinvolvementin civil
airportswas directed primarily toward public
safety, and toward fostering civil aviation through
financial assistance in construction and expansion
of airport airfield facilities. Guidance and advi-
sory services have been provided by the Federal
Government to airport owners, builders, and
operators. There is a Federal interest in siting of
airports to enhance efficient and safe usage of the
airspace. There is also a requirement that the civil
airport system be developed with sufficient capac-
ity to operate as a balanced element of a national
air transport system that complements and sup-
ports, rather than constrains, the air traffic
control system.
Unfortunately, limited Federal interest in the
past has helped create an imbalance of airport
capacity. This limited interest resulted in a pau-
city of assistance and guidance for the develop-
ment needed in the airport's terminal area to pro-
duce a viable and balanced total airport complex.
The crux of the problem lies in the lack of a
total systems approach to airport planning and
development. With only a few exceptions, air-
ports in the United States are owned, operated,
and maintained by a multitude of local author-
ities. Often the airport's major approach and
departure paths pass through areas outside the
political jurisdiction of the user community.
Although this diversity of ownership has been
regarded as socially and economically desirable, it
unquestionably has complicated the standardi-
zation and balanced development of a national
system of airports. In addition, the lack of an
overall air transportation system plan, realistically
defining the demands and characteristics of pas-
sengers and cargo and the interrelationships with
other modes, contributes to much of the conges-
tion that exists within the system today.
There are a few notable exceptions. The
Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan
satellite-reliever airport system is a result of
Minnesota's decision 25 years ago to create a
metropolitan airport commission with responsibil-
ity for the area's aviation needs. The objective
was to provide general aviation facilities to relieve
and supplement the major airline-served airport.
This was accomplished by moving more than 75%
of the general-aviation-based activity to the satel-
lite relievers. Another exception is the Federal
Government's Dulles International Airport that
was planned and developed as a result of foreseen
limitations of Washington National Airport. The
latest airport design concepts of that period
(1956- 1958)were incorporated, including zon-
ing restrictions, design for the rapid flow and pro-
cessing of people, and provisions for high-speed
access and egress.
New concepts now require extensive systems
engineering, including simulation and demonstra-
tion projects, to determine not only their opera-
tional and economical feasibility but also their
priority and trade-offs within the total system's
development. Despite huge capital investments,
airport authorities spend very little on research
and development. Airport associations have not
gathered technical people who could undertake
such research, nor have they sponsored any signif-
icant amount of university research. With a few
exceptions, these associations do not maintain
planning staffs of any national consequence.
Under these conditions, significant improvement
is not likely unless the Federal Government
shapes, guides, coordinates, and promotes the
required national effort.
Airlines can acquire additional airlift capacity
within about two years by initiating the purchase
of in-production aircraft models. Manufacturers
can produce improved aircraft in quantity in less
than four years. Significant improvements in air
traffic control now take a decade or more to
become operational. The location and develop-
ment of major new airports requires even more
time. Thus, there is fundamental incompatibility
in forward planning and phasing for the several
elements of the air transportation system. Wher-
ever possible, the overall planning should be
paced by the progress of the leading element
rather than geared to the pace of the slowest.
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CUMULATIVE % CUMULATIVE
OF PASSENGERS NUMBER OF
ENPLANED AIRPORTS
NAME OF
AIRPORT
8.1 1
14.2 2
18.9 3
23.5 4
27.1 5
30,7 6
33.8 7
35.9 8
39.7 9
42.5 10
49.0 13
51.1 14
67.0 25
71.3 30
77.2 40
81.5 5O
84.5 60
)'HARE
LA INT'L
JFK
ATLANTA
S.F. INT'L
LA GUARDIA
LOVE FIELD
NATIONAL
MIAMI
BOSTON
Figure 4.18. Number of enplaned passengers, all services, total system operations, U.S. certificated route air carriers
(excluding helicopters): 12 months ended June 30, 1969. Source: Ref. 3.
IMPACT OF GROWTH ON THE AIRPORT
SYSTEM
An immediate problem is increasing the
capacity of airport facilities that are at, or
approaching, saturation. This must be done in
parallel with the upgrading of all airports required
in the national system. Passenger enplanements
are expected to increase more than 2.5 times at
10-year intervals (1965-1975 and 1975-1985).
The use of larger aircraft, however, should keep
the increase in airport operations down to a fac-
tor of about two (a doubling of airport capacity
at 10-year intervals).
Enplanements at certificated airports of the
60 largest air transportation hubs in this country
(Fig. 4.18) comprise 85% of the U.S. total
(ref. 3). Failure to meet the projected demand at
these communities may compromise the growth
of air passenger traffic and deprive the Nation of
the benefits of flexible, fast. and economical air
transportation.
At four key airports Kennedy, La Guardia,
Washington National, and Chicago O'Hare - user
demands already exceed capacity. These airports
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operate under a quota system that limits hourly
operation rates. Factors causing these restrictions
include access roadway congestion, lack of auto
parking facilities, limited airspace and holding
patterns, limited runway capacity, lack of ramp
space and gate positions, and required aircraft
noise-abatement procedures. Unless substantial
improvements are made, between 20 and 30 U. S.
airports will reach this condition by 1980, and
twice that many by 1995. Restrictions in airport
operations impose losses on the community, both
in service and in commerce generated or served by
air transportation.
Any reduction in total trip time achieved in
the airside (and airborne) segments of the overall
system may be negated or lost without significant
improvements in the airport landside (terminal
area). The scarcity of space for almost any land-
side function creates long queues that can back
up and cause malfunctioning in other airport
operations and, by causing air traffic delays, cause
departing aircraft to be held.
The predicted growth in passenger and cargo
traffic through 1995 will also impose a tremen-
dous strain on airport terminal facilities. Critical
problems are passenger-, baggage-, and
cargo-handling, automobile parking, and curb
space.
Airports for the 1975-1995 period will
require extensive new access systems to handle
peak movements of people and goods. Traffic at
the busiest long-haul CTOL airports in 1985 is
expected to approach 100 million passengers per
year. Estimates for the future busiest STOL and
VTOLports range from 5 to 10 million passen-
gers. The largest air transportation hub in the
Nation may well consist of three or four long-haul
airports and 10 to 20 short-haul airports. Two
aspects of an access/egress system must therefore
be considered: the requirements at each airport;
and the total system for providing efficient intra-
city airport access. Further discussion of airport
access/egress will be found in the section on
"Complementary Surface Transportation."
SHORT-TERM CONCEPTS AND
BENEFITS - PREVIOUS STUDIES
Increasing the capacity of existing air-
ports for aircraft, passengers, and cargo appears to
offer the optimum near-future solution for most
major community airports. Political problems,
high costs, ground-transportation limitations, and
airspace restrictions involved in the establishment
of new airports, plus increasing costs of land
around existing airports, inhibit other solutions.
Despite public opposition to the noise generated
by aircraft operations, land value tends to
increase around an airport because of its desirabil-
ity as a focus for business activity. Land costs
alone can amount to $500 million for a
20,000-acre plot as acreage approaches $25,000
per acre (Fig. 4.19), while land values around the
busiest airports are typically $50,000-$100,000
per acre and more. It will take time to investigate
such new concepts as satellite (remote) terminal
facilities and special-purpose cargo airports.
The Air Traffic Control Advisory Committee
(ATCAC) (ref. 4) recognized the difficulty of
obtaining new airport sites in the vicinity of
major urban areas and noted in its report that
short-term gains in capacity must be achieved
through expansion of existing capacity.
Figure 4.19. Increases in land value around U.S. airports.
The Committee concluded that runway
capacity could be increased 2.5 times by replacing
the present single runways with dual runway
systems. The runways, one for landing and one
for takeoff, would be separated by 700 feet.
Although the runways would be operated inter-
dependently, the interaction between arrivals and
departures would be much reduced compared to
the present system. Replacement of the runway
by itself, however, provides only a 40% increase.
To achieve the full potential of any new runway,
it will also be necessary to replace the present
instrument landing system with a microwave
scanning-beam system that does not suffer from
reflection problems, to provide computer control
of aircraft spacing, to implement a wide-band dig-
ital data link from the ground system to the air-
borne system, and to eliminate or counteract
trailing wing-tip vortices (ref. 4).
Further increases in capacity could be
achieved if runway spacing for simultaneous
instrument landings was reduced from the present
5,000-feet separation to 2,500-feet separation.
This would permit installation of additional run-
ways adjacent to or between existing parallel
runways at some airports.
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Increasingaircraftoperationscouldgreatly
accentuate the existing noise problem unless posi-
tive measures are taken to reduce the approach
and departure noise. The Committee recom-
mended, therefore, that approach and departure
routes be designed to route aircraft over water
and over unpopulated areas wherever possible.
Implementation of a recommended curved
approach/departure route system would require
development of an airborne computer utilizing
the signals radiated by the microwave
scanning-beam landing system. Other recommen-
dations aimed at reducing noise included runway
relocation, noise-abatement procedures, and
installation of quiet engines on all jets. An anal-
ysis of Kennedy airport indicated that implemen-
tation of these procedures could possibly reduce
the area exposed to noise annoyance by 75%
(ref. 4).
EVALUATION OF FUTURE SYSTEM
ALTERNATIVES
Although expansion of existing airports pro-
vides much of the needed short-term gains,
longer term capacity growth must be based on
distributing traffic to additional landing sites.
This is partly because of limitations on real estate
available near the major airports and partly
because of saturation of the local access/egress
system. At some traffic densities, the gain to be
achieved through expansion of an airport is offset
by a generalized loss of efficiency. Although the
point at which this occurs has yet to be deter-
mined, alternative solutions are required no later
than the 1980's.
Alternatives to permit further growth include
the shifting of cargo- and passenger-processing
facilities to off-airport locations, establishment of
special-purpose cargo or cargo/general aviation
airports, building of regional airports away from
large urban areas, creation of STOL and
VTOLports, and development of additional facil-
ities for general aviation.
Transfer of passenger- and cargo-processing
facilities to off-airport locations could release
land needed for other airport operations. The
extent to which this alternative should be pursued
would depend in large measure on the availability
of additional land at each location.
Improvement is also needed in the processes
for handling cargo and passengers. Within the ter-
minal area itself, the passenger must move
through a series of loosely integrated processes -
ticketing, baggage checking, movement to the
gate, seat selection, and boarding. These steps are
not only time-consuming to the traveler but
costly to the airline since a number of people are
involved. Today it costs up to $15 to get one
passenger boarded, posing a fruitful area for
future R&D.
Passenger and cargo processing steps lack bal-
ance. Delays often occur at the interfaces
between the systems elements, which lengthen
the door-to-door trip time. Many of the delays
experienced in cargo-handling are due to regula-
tory barriers, different documentation practices,
and lack of intermodal standardization of such
things as cargo containers. Lack of standardi-
zation in baggage handling of the travelers also
results in poorer service to the patron and greater
operating cost among the airlines, as the carriers
are not taking full advantage of the economy of
scale that standardization can offer. The terminal
area is one of the most visible parts of the avia-
tion system to the traveler- it is believed that
balancing the many processing steps in the termi-
nal will stimulate even greater use of air travel
when improvements in passenger-handling effici-
ency become evident to the patron of the system.
Present baggage and cargo handling methods
on the ramp also contribute to congestion. In
1969, about 70% of the cargo capacity of U. S.
airlines went unused. The 30% that was used con-
tributed15% of the airlines' total revenue. As
wide-body jets increase in number and belly
capacities correspondingly increase, there will be
even greater pressure to utilize this unused capac-
ity. Cargo-carrying surface vehicles and handling
equipment will contribute to more and more con-
gestion at the loading ramp as cargo capacities are
utilized, accentuating the need for greater
automation.
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Special-purposecargoairportscouldgreatly
expeditehandlingof "nonbelly" cargoand
increaseto someextent the passenger-handling
capacityof somemajorairports.All-cargoaircraft
operationsarecommonlyconductedin off-peak
hours,exceptwhereprohibitedby lateevening
noise-curfewrestrictions.Two gainsof moving
cargooperationsandfacilitiesto independent
airportswouldbe the releaseof landat major
airportsto otheroperationsandthereductionof
highway congestion because of local
freight-transferoperations.Thisapproach,how-
ever, raisesa questionon optimumtransfer
methodsfor "belly-carried"freight.
Another approach,involvingthe use of
V/STOLvehicles,wouldoffer somemajorrelief
to theexistingmajorairports.TheV/STOLsys-
temsshouldpermitreducedtotal trip timefor
passengerst avelingrelativelyshortdistances-
lessthan500miles.Tobeeffective,thesesystems
musthaveSTOLandVTOLportslocatedcloseto
thepotentialuser'soriginanddestination,which
wouldoftenbea city's centralbusinessdistrict.
The STOLandVTOLportsmay,therefore,be
locatedin bothoutlyinganddowntownareasto
meetthetransportationobjectivesof thesystem
(seethe "Short-HaulSystem"discussionin the
"Missions"section).EachSTOLandVTOLport
wouldhavethe potentialof handlingapproxi-
mately5 to 10millionpassengersannuallycom-
paredwith perhaps100millionpassengersfor a
major urbanCFOL airport. Thus, a system of
STOL and VTOLports could be effective in reliev-
ing the load at major airports and reducing
door-to-door travel time for relatively short trips.
ENVIRONMENT
Environmental considerations will play a crit-
ical role in future airport system development.
Effort must be directed toward solving
system-capacity constraints such as noise and
safety hazards, including wake turbulence and
weather.
Possible noise remedies include improved
sound barriers and structural soundproofing of
buildings in the airport vicinity, changes in land
use, changes in locations and configurations of
airports, and special operational procedures at air-
ports. Studies to date indicate the need for more
refined noise-impact criteria and noise-impact
analyses for each proposed airport location.
Current procedures for minimizing the
adverse effects of aircraft wing-tip vortices, hazar-
dous to other aircraft operations, may well
become ineffective as larger aircraft and more
V/STOL types come into use. Continued study
must be conducted toward economical and opera-
tionally feasible systems to detect and dissipate
aircraft vortices.
Increased all-weather utilization of airports
under Category III operation will increase the
pressure for more effective snow-removal tech-
niques. The FAA is investigating snow-removal
methods, including airborne techniques and
in-runway heating systems. Studies are also under
way to develop techniques for describing weather
conditions by automatic means. It is possible that
applied R&D might produce schemes for weather
evaluation and control for use at airports within a
few years.
Control of birds around runways is another
airside problem that requires continuing R&D.
Current FAA studies of bird strike statistics and
migratory habits are under way to assist in the
development of procedural avoidance techniques.
It is important to evaluate the effects of noise and
pollution on animal and plant life as well.
Present FAA R&D requirements also include
the need for developing additional and updated
information for airport operators on fire-fighting
agents, equipment, and techniques, including the
use of air-cushion vehicles and helicopters for
fire-fighting and rescue.
An R&D program is needed to develop tech-
niques for assuring minimum restrictions on air-
craft operations that involve minimum real-estate
consumption and minimal environmental impact.
This is the basic task of achieving public accep-
tance and support of airports. Problems
encountered by the interstate highway system on
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urban routingsand by airport authoritiesin
enlargingoraddingto airports uggestthatserious
problemsin intergovernmentalrelationsrequire
Federalsupport in operationsresearchand
planning.
Planningconsiderationsfor airports are
numerousand complex,yet few quantitative
systemsengineeringapproacheshavebeendevel-
opedto assistin theplanninganddevelopmentof
airportandterminalfacilities.
TECHNOLOGY
In thepast,majortechnologicaldvancesin
civilaviationhavebeenachievedwithairvehicles
ratherthantheairportandits operatingenviron-
ment. Technology,however,hashad a major
effecton thedirectionof theairportprogram.A
majorproblem affecting airport system develop-
ment is aircraft noise. There is little question that
many communities have reached their
noise-tolerance level. Success in reducing noise at
its source- the air vehicle- will have a most
significant influence. The short-term improve-
ments defined by ATCAC include measures to
reduce noise. Beyond this point, however, mecha-
nisms such as a Federal airport development land
bank to provide buffer zones around airports or
regulations to define noise-compatible land use
may be required to permit further expansion. The
problem becomes more critical for proposed
downtown STOL and VTOLport locations. The
practicality of early establishment of downtown
STOL and VTOLports is highly dependent on the
availability of water areas or noise-tolerant indus-
tries close to the desired STOL or VTOLport
locations. Realization of the potentials of
elevated and off-shore STOL and VTOLports will
require additional R&D.
Optimum location of airports cannot be
determined without extensive systems analyses,
including considerations of community impact,
and trade-offs between proximity to population
centers and time savings to be gained through
effective high-speed ground transportation, intra-
urban air movements, or other access/egress
methods. The systems analyses must be comple-
mented by an equally systematic approach to the
institutional (social, political, and financial)
problems involved.
There is a need to analyze airports in the
broadest systems context, considering the total
airport and its interfaces with the air traffic con-
trol system and the surrounding community.
Analyses of aircraft, flow of passengers and cargo,
ticketing, documentation, baggage-handling,
access/egress, and other airport processes (see
Fig. 4.17) must be treated together in the design
of compatible facilities and operations.
POLICIES
Policies for an adequate and safe national
system of airports should supplement the Airport
and Airway Development Act of 1970 (ref. 5),
and provide the basis for defining and implement-
ing the required increase in airport capacity. The
policies should extend Federal responsibility and
assistance in the areas of airport planning, imple-
mentation, design, and access/egress system
interface.
The Federal role in the planning and develop-
ment of airports has been reasonably successful
within the scope of available resources, legislative
authority and responsibility, and the aviation
environment during the 15 years after passage of
the Federal Airport Act of 1946. (Total Federal
funding under the Federal-Aid Airport Program
amounted to $1.2 billion from inception in 1946
to termination on June 30, 1970.) However, the
growth rate of aviation and changes in other fac-
tors affecting airport-development needs led to
problems whose solutions were beyond the scope
of the Act (ref. 6).
The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970, in addition to its provision for an airport
airfield development grant-in-aid program, also
authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to
grant funds to planning agencies for airport sys-
tem planning and to public agencies for airport
master planning. This new program will greatly
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assistindividualpublic and private planning
agenciesin locatinganddevelopingairportsmore
effectivelyand,it is hoped,leadto amoreade-
quatenationalairportsystem.However,it does
not by itselfprovidetheguidanceandresources
requiredto developthe Nation'sairportsasa
totalsystem.AlthoughtheActauthorizestheuse
of assetsfrom theuser-chargetrustfundfor air-
waysresearchand developmentby theFederal
Government,nosuchprovisionisincludedforair-
ports.Thedeterminationof needandthesitingof
newfacilitiesto accommodateforecastdemand
compatiblewiththeirfunctionalroleandenviron-
mentrequireboth quantitativeandqualitative
analyses(ref.5).
Demandforecastsfor generalaviation,air
carriers,andthemilitarymustbestudiedandcat-
aloguedto provideadatasourcefor useindeter-
miningservicerequirements.Improvedforecast
methodologymustalsobeprovidedto Stateand
localofficialsandairportmanagementsfordeter-
miningthe airport'slandrequirementsandfacil-
ity needs,consideringthe effectof air vehicle
types suchas STOL,VTOL, and supersonic
transports.
Analysesmust be madeof technological
changes,and guidanceprovidedon how these
changescanbeincludedin theplanningprocess.
Growthanddevelopmentpatternsof criticalair-
portsandair corridorsmustbeanalyzedto study
the dynamicsand problemsassociatedwith
regional,State,or metropolitanareaairtranspor-
tationsystems.Analyticalandsimulationcapabil-
ities mustbedevelopedto predictandtestthe
consequencesof networkexpansionstrategiesand
to determinetotalcapitalrequirements.
It is primarilyin theareaof atotalsystems
approachto airportplanninganddevelopment,
andin thedevelopmentandprovisioningof plan-
ning tools and guidance, that the Federal Govern-
ment can contribute most effectively to solving
the problems of airport congestion, design
configuration, ground control and guidance,
environmental considerations, and
passenger/cargo handling.
Federal leadership will be needed to achieve a
long-range national airport system plan that will
effectively define aviation's role in meeting over-
all transportation requirements, and in stimulat-
ing growth in some areas. The goals and objectives
of the national transportation system must be
translated into a plan that defines the anticipated
growth for each area, selects among alternatives
for meeting this growth, and works with the local
airport administration to develop the overall plan.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 requires that a National Airport System
Plan, which accomplishes the above, be published
by May 1972.
The foregoing actions alone will not suffice
to increase capacity even though they should
clearly establish the air transport and airport
requirements for each area. Implementation of
the plan places the dual responsibility on the
Federal Government to conduct the research and
development necessary to make the airport an
"acceptable neighbor" and also to develop the
mechanisms needed to aid local administrations in
land acquisition, airport development, and
access/egress system development. This responsi-
bility should also encompass the establishment of
additional funding policies to support land acqui-
sition for future airport needs in much the same
manner that Federal assistance is given to pur-
chase land for future parks and recreational areas.
A third area in which the Federal Govern-
ment needs to provide leadership is in the
development of improved designs for terminal
facilities. Up to this time, such development has
been the responsibility of local airport authorities
and users. Much improvement in the efficiency of
land use and in speed of handling passengers,
cargo, and baggage can be achieved by using a
systems approach to the development of a "termi-
nal system." The present approach encompasses a
variety of subsystems operating independently.
The result is a continual degradation in terminal
efficiency.
The above concepts suggest the steps neces-
sary to meet future airport demand. None will be
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truly effective,however,until the Federal
Government has developed an effective long-range
national airport system plan and assures its timely
implementation.
This suggests another policy area in which the
Federal Government could contribute more effec-
tively to long-range airport system development.
Under the present Airport Development Aid Pro-
gram established by the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970, the FAA and DOT
have contractual authority to enter into grant
agreements with airport sponsors for periods of
up to three years only. As a result, many airport
sponsors are either unable or reluctant to under-
take long-range development because of the
uncertainty about resources that will be made
available under this program.
If the contract authority of the FAA and
DOT under the Airport Development AidProgram
could be extended to the full term of the Act
(10 years), annual appropriations would then be
required only to liquidate obligations incurred for
airport development - with the major advantage
of providing a more stable development-planning
base for airport sponsors. Although the Act recog-
nizes the merits of contractual authority to cope
with the long-range development needs of the
system, equal recognition should be given this
requirement by the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government so there will be no question
as to the accomplishment of needed development
within a prescribed time frame.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 also authorizes the Administrator of the
FAA to establish minimum safety standards for
the operation of airports serving air carriers certif-
icated by the CAB. The development and estab-
lishment of certification criteria should be based
upon a coordinated R&D program designed to
insure that such criteria are reasonably valid and
necessary to assure safety in air transportation.
MAJOR R&D REQUIREMENTS FOR
AIRPORTS
The broad R&D requirements for airport
system improvements that must be implemented
over the next 10 years to meet future demand
include:
System Engineering, Simulation, and
Trade-off Studies. The development and
evaluation of new concepts for airports,
concepts for expanding existing airport
system capacity (e.g., special-purpose
cargo airports, off-shore airports, STOL
and VTOLports), improved terminal
design, improved cargo-handling
methods, and new approaches to the
access/egress problem.
The systems approach would include the
development of models to study the flow of pas-
sengers and goods through various types of air-
ports to permit testing and evaluating various
design options and optimum levels of activity; the
development of techniques and criteria to predict
the need, proper location, and timing for new air-
ports in the system to provide for airport facilities
when and where needed; the identification and
development of decision criteria on trade-offs
affecting the external design of airports for the
interface with the vehicle, the airways system,
and access/egress to the intermodal system(s), to
provide the proper airport functional design as
part of an integrated transport system; and the
designation of airports that can be used as
research and development test facilities to test
and evaluate future system concepts and tech-
niques (i.e., runway/taxiway design configura-
tions, safety equipment and techniques,
passenger/cargo processing devices,
weather-control techniques, etc.).
Airport Airside (Airfield). The develop-
ment of a high-capacity runway-taxiway
configuration, pavement design and
testing, development of an automated
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surface-andground-control system, cri-
teria development for off-airport con-
struction, wake-turbulence detection and
dissipation, improved terminal-weather
forecasts, fog dispersal, and improved
methods for clearing runways, reducing
airport noise, and handling accidents.
These would include the development of
ramp/gate criteria and design guidance to opti-
mize time and cost factors; the development of
guidance methods and equipment to improve air-
craft servicing at the gate, to reduce noise, pollu-
tion, turnaround time, and vehicle count; the
development of new or improved techniques and
materials for elevated and off-shore STOLport
construction, maintenance, and operational effec-
tiveness; and the development of ground-based
safety-support systems (fire-fighting, lights, arrest-
ing gear, crash, and rescue) that could be
pilot-activated at both attended and unattended
facilities.
Airport Landside (Terminal Area). The
improvement and development of
passenger-, cargo-, and baggage-handling
techniques, development of
terminal-flow simulation and analysis
models, investigations of off-airport
systems for handling passengers and
cargo and cost-effectiveness analyses of
alternatives, and participation in the
planning and conduct of model demon-
strations or appropriate general-purpose
system simulations.
The benefits sought through research are
minimizing passenger- and baggage-processing
time at the airport by providing appropriate
terminal-area-design guidance; shortening total
portal-to-portal time of both passengers and
cargo; and reducing total real-estate requirements
of the airport.
Airport Community Access and Egress.
The development of improved methods
of forecasting demand for passenger-,
cargo-, and baggage-handling service
requirements, and development of
improved methods and techniques for
handling large traffic flows.
The research would include the identification
and development of methods for determining
access/egress capacity, and criteria to select
appropriate system(s) to provide airport author-
ities with economic and technical criteria upon
which selection(s) can be based; and participation
in the planning and conduct of demonstration
programs and projects.
Regional Area Planning. The develop-
ment of long-range models to evaluate
the effectiveness of totally new air trans-
port system concepts and the generation
of planning criteria for airport
development.
This would include the development of plan-
ning methods to determine total regional air
transportation demand as a quantitative basis for
planning new or expanding existing airports and
for determining distribution of demand within
the region; and the investigation and identifica-
tion of approaches and procedures to implement
airport plans through cooperation and coordina-
tion with State and local authorities to maximize
the possibility of timely system development.
It is clear, however, that airport congestion
problems (primarily within the terminal area and
access/egress systems) and environmental con-
straints (such as noise, wake turbulence, and
weather) hindering system capacity expansion
today should be given priority consideration.
OTHER REQUIREMENTS
Because data are lacking on some of the prob-
lem areas that cause congestion, selected demon-
strations are recommended so that systems
choices and their alternatives can be more clearly
understood. The Federal airports (including
NAFEC, and Edwards AFB), and, if needed,
several conmercial airports should be designated
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demonstration airports as sites for both market
and operational experiments. Some recommended
experiments include:
• Off-site passenger and cargo processing.
• Integrated passenger processing.
• Runway/taxiway design and ground
control of aircraft.
• Premium-rate landing fees for prime time
at congested airports to level traffic load.
Edwards AFB could be effectively utilized to
demonstrate the operational feasibility of runway
and taxiway layouts as they may be affected by
the characteristics of the aircraft and the terminal
approach control system and of automated
ground control concepts for aircraft. New runway
and taxiway configurations could be inexpen-
sively and quickly painted on the desert floor and
tried with a minimum of effort. Once perfected,
the experiment could be moved to NAFEC for
further validation and eventually to a full opera-
tional trial at an operating airport.
Little data is presently available on the
effect of altering landing fees and fares to corre-
spond to level of demand throughout the day. A
surcharge might be levied on landing fees, tickets,
or both to determine if there were better tech-
niques than the present ones to gain greater utili-
zation of an airport throughout the entire day.
There are proponents on both sides of this pro-
posal as to the effect of such an experiment.
Neither side has data to support its point of view,
lending further weight to the need for such a trial.
Vehicle development has utilized numerous
demonstration techniques ranging from wind tun-
nels, proof-of-concept, to demonstrations in a
"live" environment. Consequently, vehicle
trade-offs are generally well-known. Airports have
not taken full advantage of such a test approach.
Thus, lack of accurate data has impeded innova-
tions designed to relieve congestion in and around
the terminal area.
DISTRIBUTION AND LEVEL OF R&D
EFFORT
The airports R&D program recommended
here is designed primarily to assist in the timely
development and integration of airport planning
and development required to anticipate and meet
the needs of civil aviation with that of other
national,State, and local land-use plans and trans-
portation programs. The local socioeconomic and
environmental factors that have a major impact in
the planning and development processes are basi-
cally in the public interest. Only the Federal
Government is in the overview position necessary
to shape, guide, and promote the required
national effort. Successful execution of the
recommended program will require adequate
resources- men, money, material, and time. A
continuity of purpose must be provided so that
the resources may be properly applied. Stability
of R&D management must be maintained over
the projected development period to assure
timely and effective progress.
The total funding needed to support the air-
ports R&D program is about $200 million over
the next 10years (ref. 7). The R&D program
recommended represents only approximately 4%
of the estimated total costs of the required con-
struction and expansion in the airport/airside area
in the United States over the same period.
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COMPLEMENTARY SURFACE
TRANSPORTATION
INTRODUCTION
The time saving that is the main advantage of
air transportation can easily be lost, as has already
happened in some cities, by inadequate
access/egress and complementary surface trans-
portation. Much of the technological progress in
air transport is being offset by a lack of corre-
sponding progress on the ground.
COMPLEMENTARY SURFACE
TRAVEL
As can be seen from Figure 7.3 in the "Bene-
fits" section, between 1955 and 1965 increases in
airplane speed brought about a significant reduc-
tion in the airborne portion of total trip time.
The air travel portion of the trip has remained
fairly constant since then. Except for flights using
supersonic transports, the air time may not be
expected to change markedly by 1985.
Unless remedial action is taken, however, the
surface portion of total trip time may be
expected to increase between 1970 and 1985,
principally because of further deterioration of
surface transportation.
Commercial air passengers normally move to
airports today by highways (unlimited, limited, or
exclusive access) and occasionally by rapid transit
or elevated rail. The longevity and inflexibility of
a fixed-right-of-way system precludes easy adapta-
tion to the changing patterns in patronage charac-
teristic of air transportation. Scattered origins and
destinations usually do not have a sufficiently
concentrated demand to warrant an exclusive ser-
vice system.
Airport-destined travel is only a relatively
small fraction of total urban travel.
Surface-commuter peaks overlap airport-access
peaks. To achieve overnight service, the delivery
of air cargo shipments to the airport usually takes
place at the end of the business day. It thus adds
to the evening commuter-vehicle peak and to the
evening passenger peak.
The highway and the automobile currently
dominate airport access/egress, and, in the
absence of any concerted counteraction, will con-
tinue to do so for the next two decades. The
interstate highway system, now about 85% com-
plete, has generally improved surface movement
to and from airports. Completion of the remain-
ing mileage may improve surface access to the
airport in additional areas. Since highway usage is
also expected to continue to rise, some of the
anticipated gains may be short lived.
Airport access, in most cases a part of the
urban transportation, is provided by local and
State authorities. The myriad of
political-jurisdictional entities at Federal, State,
county, city, and borough levels impedes a
smooth systems approach to the problem. The
"gestation period" of planning and implementa-
tion is measured in terms of years. Progress of
airport access is paced by the rate at which total
urban transportation is improved. The rate
depends on financing, community acceptance,
planning, technological developments, and local
politics.
When an access system is to serve the airport
exclusively, costs are harder to recover and it is
difficult to secure the allocation of local public
resources to a system that appears to serve only a
small part of the local population. An exclusive
airport access system can usually be justified only
to serve a new, very large airport located at a
considerable distance from a large metropolitan
area - for example, Dulles International Airport,
serving Washington, D.C. Some communities,
however, look upon the airport as a "profit cen-
ter" that not only pays its way but materially
contributes to the city's wealth, and might thus
look more favorably on a system to provide fast
and convenient access to the airport.
Economic viability also influences the avail-
ability of airport access. Public transit systems'
operating revenues depend largely on high-peak
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commutertraffic.Whethernonrush-hourutiliza-
tioncanbesignificantlyincreasedthroughvarious
incentive"gimmicks"maybecomea dominant
economicfactor.
Improvedaircraftcanbeproducedin quan-
tity in lessthanfouryears.Substantialimprove-
mentsin airportaccessystems,however,may
well requirea decadeor more.Nontechnical
(includingpolitical)factorsstretchthetotaltime
beyondthatrequiredforconstruction- whichin
itselfmaybevery lengthy.Waysmustbefound
to accelerateheimprovementofairportaccessat
aratecompatiblewithairtravelexpansion.
Transportationregulatoryagenciestendto
discouragemultimodalownershipby U.S.com-
moncarriers.Any intermodalcoordinationthat
takesplaceisvoluntary.Incentivesmustbefound
if the differentmodesareto workbettertoge-
ther. Almostby definition,intermodalconnec-
tions fall into a "no-man'sland." Evenbetter
wouldbeacommitmentby theairlinesto under-
take jointly a completestudy of the
portal-to-portalproblemwith the intent of
activelyparticipatingin its solution.If this is to
happen,encouragementmust comefrom the
CAB, the ICC, and local municipalregulatory
authorities.
The FederalGovernmentmaybe ableto
influenceairport roadaccessindirectlythrough
its matching-fundmechanism.Thisworksonly
whenthelocalelectorateapprovestheproposed
projectandthenecessaryfunding.
One may foreseegradualimprovementsin
urban mass transportation, in general. The San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit and the D. C.
Metro projects should stimulate further develop-
ment. When access to the airport can be provided
by modest extensions of an existing urban sys-
tem, economic operation of the airport runs may
be possible (e.g., Cleveland Transit to Hopkins
Airport).
AIRPORT LANDSIDE
Today's airports are mainly passenger/cargo
collection and distribution systems to connect the
urban transportation system to the aircraft board-
ing gates. These gates, usually numerous, are
spread out along the airport terminal's ramp area.
The urban transportation system has a much
smaller number of connecting "gates" at the air-
port. Washington National Airport, for example,
which is served by 24 airlines, has 41 aircraft
boarding gates, but only 4 taxi loading stations, 4
limousine stations, 3 urban bus stops, and 3 rental
car check-in points. The imbalance of public sur-
face transportation, especially during peak hours,
is readily apparent. It results in frustrating
delays.
Another imbalance important to the
time-limited air traveler who drives and parks his
personal or rental car is the shortage or distant
location of airport parking spaces. This method of
ground travel is utilized far more than all the
others (Fig. 4.20). The parking problem is per-
haps the most critical one facing the landside of
the airport today. It triggers a chain reaction of
congestion that adversely affects the airport and
the air traveler.
The airport serves also as an interchange
point among airlines and between flights of the
same airline. Extensive cooperation takes place
among the airlines, and the needs of the air trav-
elers are served to a substantial degree. Neverthe-
less, there exists a passenger-congestion problem
which is obvious. The baggage problem has come
painfully to the attention of some passengers. The
transfer of interline baggage from one aircraft to
another is a major determinant of the time air-
craft must spend at the gates. It influences not
only airline flight scheduling, but also the daily
utilization of aircraft. It also has a strong
influence on the number of gates required.
Usually, services within the airport's
airfield-interface area are subjected to careful and
vigorous planning by the airlines.
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Figure 4.20. Air-passenger use of private versus public transportation, July 1967, by major airports. Source: Refi 1.
TABLE 4.4. SUMMARY OF TOTAL ACCESS MOVEMENTS EXPECTED 1N 1985 BY AIRPORT AND HUB
TYPES a, b
AIRPORT
TYPE
AIR CARRIER
DOMESTIC CTOL
INTERNATIONAL CTOL
DOMESTIC/INT'L
CTOL (JOINT-USE)
V/STOL
TOTAL
GENERAL AVIATION
I I I i I ....... "'i" 'T',' .......... i
ANNUAL ACCESS MOVEMENTS, MILLIONS c
SUPER LARGE MEDIUM SMALL NON ALL
HUBS HUBS HUBS HUBS HUBS HUBS
349.2
524.7
180.0
1,053.9
81.9
TOTAL 1,135.8
650.0
136.8
592.8 a 144.5 d 73.0 d
766.8 592.8 144.5 73.0
68.4 66.3 85.0 8.0
835.2 659.1 229.5 81.0
i i
349.2
524.7
1,440.3
316.8
2,631.0
309.6
2,940.6
I
I
!
aHubs are defined in "Systems Status and Potential" section.
bTo include egress, double the number of access movements shown.
Clncludes air passengers, meeters and greeters, employees, vendors, etc.
dlncludes anticipated V/STOL operations.
IMPACT OF AVIATION GROWTH
The expected growth of air passenger and
cargo traffic will put a tremendous strain on air-
port access systems and their intermodal connec-
tions (see Table 4.4). An FAA forecast indicates
that several of the largest airport hubs may handle
more than 100 million passengers a year. An ATA
forecast supports this estimate (refs. 2, 3). Air-
port peak hours (normally 7 to 9 a.m. and 5 to
4-50
7 p.m.) could produce an hourly traveler and
visitor rate of 38,000. This peaking coincides with
the day-shift movement of 10,000 or more air-
port workers, making a total surge of 48,000
people per hour.
Air cargo volume is expected to grow signif-
icantly during the next 20 to 25 years, generating
by 1985 an average of 2 million tons annually at
the major airports. If conditions do not change,
truck traffic on access roads and at the airport
will cause serious congestion. If no improvement
is made in the manner in which truck capacity is
being used today, during busy handling hours-
which coincide with early morning and late after-
noon passenger movement- some 2400 trucks
per hour will be required. Even with cargo consol-
idation and other improvements in truck utiliza-
tion, it must I_e expected that more than 400
trucks per peak hour will be required.
Today's intermediate-size airports (e.g.,
Phoenix, Indianapolis, and Orlando) may be
expected to grow proportionately to demand,
approaching the size of present-day large terminal
facilities. Major airports are now generating
ground-travel volumes equivalent to the central
business districts of some fairly large cities. The
ground movements at San Francisco International
Airport, for example, equal those in downtown
Phoenix.
Surface transportation for a busy short-haul
airport should be less difficult to provide than for
a busy long-haul airport, but both requirements
are expensive to meet, particularly if the principal
access is by auto and taxi. A future short-haul
V/STOLport handling about 10 million annual
passengers, for example, would require 10 city
streets or more than 3 exclusive freeway lanes to
accommodate the peak-hour movements without
delays, whereas a future long-haul CTOL airport
handling 100 million annual passengers would
require 100 city streets or 33 exclusive lanes. The
latter requirement would be so expensive and dif-
ficult to meet that it will undoubtedly impose a
limit on the size of future airports. The
V/STOLport may well require an associated
12,000 auto parking spaces, and the long-haul
CTOL airport 120,000 spaces (almost 1.5 sq mi).
Most commercial air travelers arrive and
depart from points other than the central business
district.On the average, 60% of their trips begin or
end at home, and only 25% begin or end at the
central business district (refs. l,4). Airport
ground travel has a widely spread pattern.
Because of this, it has been unprofitable in most
cities to develop a good public intermodal system.
If the dominance of the automobile as a means to
reach the airport is to be overcome, there must be
a worthwhile incentive for the air passenger to use
a public conveyance. It must be convenient, fre-
quent, and dependable- not merely low fare.
Each individual airport will represent a different
planning problem.
Large metropolitan airports, from Boston to
Norfolk, from Seattle to San Diego, and from
Chicago to Pittsburgh, are major candidates for
early complementary surface transportation plan-
ning and for its early implementation. Several
planning groups are taking action to meet the
problem. Financing appears to be a major
obstacle in executing access and intermodal plans
commensurate with the needs of the 1980-1990's.
The problem is often complicated by the need to
relocate a city's airport or to build an additional
major airport. Popular concern over environ-
mental effects has delayed a number of such deci-
sions. Many decisions on airport location may
have to be deferred for another 3 to 5 years. Such
deferment contributes to growing congestion and
to ground travel problems at already overtaxed
municipal airports.
TECHNOLOGY AND FUTURE SYSTEM
CONCEPTS
Planning and integrating complementary sur-
face transportation with air transportation is an
essential factor in solving some of the problems.
The actual planning, financing, development, and
operation, however, is the responsibility of local
communities.
Assistance with complementary surface trans-
portation is coordinated within the Department
of Transportation by the office of the Assistant
4-51
Secretary for Policy and International Affairs, the
Urban Mass Transportation Administration, the
Federal Railroad Administration, and the Federal
Highway Administration. Their efforts are coor-
dinated by the Office of the Secretary of Trans-
portation. Each DOT entity, however, is pri-
marily concerned with specific transportation
modes - only secondarily with modal interfaces.
The interfaces, as pointed out earlier, occur
throughout the door-to-door trip. They tend to
occur at the responsibility boundaries of different
jurisdictions.
The Federal organizations involved are:
Office of High-Speed Ground Transporta-
tion (OHSGT). This DOT office sponsors
R&D in materials, aerodynamics, vehicle
propulsion, vehicle control, communica-
tions, guideways and research testing on
new systems, components, and tech-
niques. It also provides for demonstra-
tions to establish the contributions that
high-speed ground transportation systems
can make to more efficient and
economical intercity transportation.
Of the conventional systems, only
high-speed rail service has reached the
stage of full-scale intercity demonstra-
tions. Experience with the Metroliners
and Turbotrains has indicated that con-
venient and comfortable high-speed
ground transportation can attract and
keep increased patronage.
R&D has also been undertaken to define
promising new transport system alter-
natives. Research has focused on innova-
tive systems able to reduce door-to-door
time, largely through higher speeds.
Systems intensively studied include the
advanced monorail, the tracked
air-cushion vehicle, the tube vehicle, the
automated highway, auto-carrying pallet,
and the autotrain. Some details of pos-
sible high-speed ground transportation
alternatives arc given in Table 4.5.
Despite road congestion, accidents, air
pollution, and its inefficiency as a carrier
of large numbers of people, the auto-
mobile, more than any other transport
mode, provides maximum flexibility for
door-to-door transportation. The OHSGT
is focusing emphasis on automobile
transporters: the autotrain; small vehicles
to carry single automobiles (a pallet
system); hybrid air-cushion/wheeled
buses capable of operating on guideways
as well as roads; and guideways capable
of automatic guidance and control of
automobiles (automated highways).
Urban Mass Transportation Administra-
tion (UMTA). In the 2 years of its his-
tory, UMTA has focused its research,
development, and demonstration efforts
on"
• Circulation and distribution systems
to move large numbers of people
over relatively short distances in
small, densely developed
major-activity centers, with conveyor
belts or moving capsules to carry
several passengers with parcels.
• Personal rapid transit systems that
would extend over most of a metro-
politan area on a guideway network
or grid of lines spaced one or two
miles apart. Small vehicles would
travel over the guideway network
using standard routes, or possibly
automatically from origin to destina-
tion. In this system, the vehicle
could convert easily from travel on a
street under driver control to travel
on the automated network.
• Fast transit link systems to provide
rapid access throughout a metropoli-
tan area between a number of distant
points. These systems would move
relatively high volumes of people
between central cities and suburban
growth centers, and between satellite
centers and airports. Vehicles would
travel faster than 100 mph, carry 20
or more passengers, be automatically
controlled, and be capable of operat-
ing either independently or coupled
into trains.
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The UMTA'snationalurbantransportation
R&Dactivityalsoseeksto understandthesocial,
economic,andinstitutionalbarriersthat con-
straintheapplicationof transportationtechnol-
ogyto improvethequalityof urbanlife.Thepar-
ticipationof Stateandlocalgovernments,public
agencies,privateindustry,laborandtradeassocia-
tions,andindividualsis beingsolicited.(Airport
accessi only oneof themanyproblemsincluded
inurbanplanning,andit oftenhasalowpriority.
A majornear-termR&Deffort for surface
transportationconcentratesonimprovingbusser-
vices,includingbettermanagement,moreeffici-
ent operations,newtechniquesfor routingand
scheduling,newvehicledesigns,andnewpropul-
sionsystems.Objectivesareto usemanpowerand
equipmentmoreefficiently,to improvethequal-
ity and coverageof service,andto makethe
vehicleslessobtrusiveandlesspolluting.
Increasing quality and service levels will
greatly increase the probability that bus service
will play an important role in complementary air-
port ground transportation. Advances such as
automatic fare collection, computerized tech-
niques for vehicle location, schedule adherence
and routing, traffic control systems giving buses
priority traffic clearance and routing,
demand-responsive bus-routing traffic systems,
comfortable bus interiors, and new propulsion
systems will attract more users.
The major problem, however, in the
labor-intensive bus transportation industry is
financial. Bus systems must be considered from a
total community and, perhaps, Federal, State,
and local viewpoint, because level of earnings is
directly related to level of tax revenues collected.
This should lead to adequate community (or
broader) financial support.
The air traveler may also benefit from future
progress in urban rail trarisportation. Improve-
ments may be expected in rail equipment use and
safety, in the use of existing urban railroad track-
age by a dual-mode railbus, in use of underground
tunnels with improved environmental control, in
ride quality, and in propulsion.
A number of projects are currently under
way to advance surface transportation, ranging
from actual construction to exploration of new
concepts. At the Dallas-Fort Worth regional air-
port, a collection and distribution project will
permit UMTA to use the new airport as a site for
demonstrating a prototype transportation system
for possible use in a wide number of urban appli-
cations. The plan includes construction and test-
ing of a vehicle, guideway, and control system.
This will be closely coordinated with public trans-
portation systems of Dallas and Fort Worth.
The San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit
system is well under way. Inauguration of service
is expected in mid-1972. Initially, this system will
not serve San Francisco International Airport.
Later extensions will serve both the International
and the Oakland Airports.
A demonstration of tracked air-cushion vehi-
cles is planned between Los Angeles International
Airport and the San Fernando Valley, with one
station west of Beverly Hills. The Department of
Transportation, through UMTA, has provided an
engineering and feasibility grant. The 150-mph
speed permitted by existing tracked air-cushion
vehicle technology is adequate for the 16-mile air-
port access run.
A feasibility study has been made for a
high-speed access system to a proposed new jet-
port in southern Florida. Vertical and short take-
off and landing airborne vehicles, in addition to
high-speed rail, monorail system, and tracked
air-cushion ground vehicles, were examined as
candidate systems.
OFF-AIRPORT FACILITIES
off-airport passenger and cargo satellite con-
solidation and distribution systems would reduce
the main source of ground congestion at the air-
port- roadway traffic. Passengers and cargo
would make use of the airport for enplaning and
deplaning only. All ticketing, booking, and con-
solidation processes could be accomplished at
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TABLE 4.5. POSSIBLE HIGH-SPEED GROUND TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES
SPEED RANGE,CLASS CHARACTERISTICS
mph
TRACKED AIR- Vehicle guided along track and sup- 150-300
CUSHION SYSTEMS ported by air cushions
GUIDEWAY
Flat concrete horizontal surface for
support and vertical surface for guid-
anca. Inverted T, box and U
ROLLING-
SUPPORT
SYSTEMS
I,-
_. Ambient
=1' Atmospheric
PressureF-
TUBE-
VEHICLE
SYSTEMS Evacuated
Electro-magnetic
Suspension
MULTIMODAL
SYSTEMS
Vehicle guided and supported by
either conventional surface rails or
monorail
Vehicle guided and supported by en-
closed guideway or subterranean tube
Evacuated guideway reduces aero
drag. More expensive to construct, but
potentially more economical to
operate
Vehicle guided and supported electro-
magnetically in tube
Vehicle uses both conventional sur-
face routes and new automated guide-
ways for intercity portion of trip.
Optimum configuration depends on
urban system interface: bimodal or
ferry pallet
Conventional autos, along with drivers
,.:, AUTO-TRAIN and passengers, are loaded on a carrier
_'. SYSTEMS vehicle and transported over the high-¢=
o speed link
==
AUTOMATED-
HIGHWAY
SYSTEMS
Conventional autos and highways are
modified to provide automatic control
of traffic flow on the high-speed link
of intercity trips
CONTINUOUS- Transportation is available contin-
CAPACITY uoudy. Employs variation of endless-
SYSTEMS belt principle
II_
Source: Ref. 5.
150-300
Conventional or improved rail road-
beds or elevated structures modified
to be straighter and more level
150-300
Concrete or steel tubes. Can be locat-
ed above-ground, on surface or under-
ground
Same as above, and pumping systems200-400
and airlocks also required
200-500 Passive aluminum loops or structure
buried in guideway
80-150 Suspended and over-running
100-150
Standard gage for lengthwise loading
and _ 17 _ for crosswise loading of
autos
Higher than present auto speeds
Conventional concrete highway, spe-
cial-purpose or modified to accom-
modate appropriate control system
15-25 Enclosed belts, elevated or subsurface
IIII
satellite facilities, located at strategic points in the
metropolitan and suburban areas. Each airline
would disperse its staffs to decentralized facilities.
Special buses and trucking services would shuttle
consolidated passenger and cargo loads to and
from the airport and distribute loads to and from
the points of origin and destination. No other pas-
senger or cargo vehicles would be needed at the
airport. Sightseers and visitors could view aircraft
operations from some convenient outside
location.
Unless the airport owned the satellite system
as well, some loss of revenues to the airport-
from parking fees and concessions - would occur.
It must be recognized that with today's system,
airport congestion and passenger delays actually
contribute to increased revenues.
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SUSPENSION
Air cushions pressurized by centrif-
ugal or axial compressors
Steel wheels on welded steel rail;
rubber tires
Wheels, rails or air cushions
Primary wheels on rails
Electromagnetic forces generated by
superconducting magnets on vehicle
Steel wheels; or rubber tires; magnetic;
air cushions
Steel wheels on welded steel rail
Auto wheels with conventional sus-
pension
Rollers; wheels; air
I
PROPULSION
................................................. __JLL
Linear electric motor with reaction
rail in guide_y; propeller driven by
ges.turbine or rotary electric motor
Rotary electric motor; gas-turbine en-
gine (both with drivethrough wheels);
linear electric motor
Electricity preferable to combustion
on_n_
Linear electric motor. Pneumatics and
gravity-assisted acceleration and brak-
ing
Same as above
Linear electric motor; rotary electric
motor; internabcombustion engine
Rotary electric motor; gas-turbine en-
gine; diesebelectric locomotive
Internal - or external - combustion
engine or electric motor
Rotary and linear electric motorc, air
pressure
IIIIIII I
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES
Guideway may be cheaper to build
and maintain; smoother ride at high
speeds then rail system; no wheel hop
or traction limitations
Since wheels support vQhicle, no ener-
gY is required for support. Power is
required only for propulsion. Extends
conventional technology to a higher
_0eedrange
Can minimize disturbance to environ-
ment or corridor community. All-
weather operation. The one system
offering complete aerodynamic con-
trol. More chance of straight-line
paths
High speeds because of reduced aero
drag, in addition to above advantages
Presently the only smpensiem candi-
date for systems running in evacuated
tubas at speeds unsafe for metallic
wheels
May offer shorter door-to-door travel
time. Retains advantages both of pri-
vate auto and high-speed mass transit.
Possibly compatible with urban sys-
terns
Offers door-to-door service. No park-
ing problem at terminal
Offers increased safety and density
over existing highways. Driver be-
comes backup controller. Door-to-
door service. No terminal interface
required
Offe_ uninterrupted, pontinuousl V
available service to many passengers
DISADVANTAGES
Power to support weight of vehicle is
high. Air-cushion equipment may be
noisy. Switching is difficult
Wheels start to slip at high speeds.
Guidewa y maintenance cost may be
high. Monorail poses switching prob-
lems
Tunneling costs are high at present.
Existing power-pickup devices are un-
suitable for high speeds. At pre_nt,
tube-vehicle technology is not as ad-
vanced as that of some other classes.
Evacuated system poses special safety
and maintenance problems
Intense magnetic fields may affect
passengers and subsystems. Vehicles
may require haew shielding
Vehicle unit costs/passepger are higher
than for conventional auto or mass
transit; maintenance of privately
owned vehicles may require verifica-
tion before use on public goideway
Flexibility of loading for different
destinations is poor for lengthwise
loading
Vehicle maintenance may be beyond
control of system operator and there-
fore ivk_deqoate; merging for entry,
exit and lane changing requires com-
plex central control system
Passenger acceptance is not wide
spread. Slow, Not suited for growth or
intercity speeds
I
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
REQUIREMENTS
R&D for an effective passenger collection and
distribution system, including both complemen-
tary surface transportation and its interfaces with
air transportation, should be aimed at the
following objectives:
A geographic area generating air travel
demand should be covered by a system
of collection and distribution points with
a density depending on expected patron-
age. The distance between a collection
and distribution point and the passen-
ger's origin or destination should be suffi-
ciently small to encourage the use of a
public system instead of a private
automobile.
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• The frequency of service and the length
of transit time should make the surface
portion of the trip a reasonably small
fraction of the door-to-door trip time.
• Travelers should be able to check their
baggage close to their point of origin and
recover it close to their final destination.
They should not be required to carry
baggage over long distances.
Baggage-carrying assistance should be
available to the aged, the infirm, and the
encumbered. Travelers with baggage
should not be mixed with rush-hour
commuters.
• Modal interchanges should be convenient
and fast, and require minimum walking.
• The system should have flexibility to
adapt to traffic growth, to new airports
in areas already served by existing air-
ports, and to shifts in regional population
patterns.
• Complementary ground transportation
should have levels of comfort, safety, and
security at least as high as those of air
travel.
• Advanced technology should be
exploited to the fullest extent permitted
by economic profitability or by subsidy
set by social policy.
• The system should have the ability to
attract and retain patronage.
An intensification of ongoing research is
required to insure continued improvement of
complementary surface transportation and inter-
modal connections associated with air
transportation.
High total costs, and thus resultant high rates
or requirements for subsidy, are probably the
major impediments to improvement. It is recom-
mended that research be oriented toward lower-
ing costs, and that the cost-reduction potential of
research projects be an important consideration.
There is the need to experiment with differ-
ent systems at several airports to establish public
acceptance, patronage, reliability, and realistic
costs. Links of 15 to 50 miles would offer a
chance to find the best solutions by actual operat-
ing experience. In these demonstrations, special
attention should be given to the interface
between the access link and the
intra-airport people and cargo movers.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
In 1970, the Congress expanded the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964 to provide for a
"coordinated urban transportation system as part
of a comprehensively planned development of the
urban area." The Act (ref. 6) now provides a
mechanism for disbursing at least $10 billion
between 1970 to 1981 in partnership with local
communities. Included, but as a limited portion,
is recognition of the airport access problem. The
Act also explicitly calls for cooperation among
Federal agencies and authorizes the Secretary of
Transportation to take overall Federal
responsibility.
The UMTA has been the DOT focal point for
encouraging, evaluating, and assisting local com-
munities applying for financial assistance in terms
of actual projects, technical studies, or R&D
grants. Local communities can also receive aid on
a 90%:10% ratio from the Federal Highway
Administration, and can obtain funds in selected
cases from the Federal Railroad Administration
on a 67%:33% cost-sharing basis.
The local community, and not the Federal
Government, has the final say about where
emphasis is to be placed in its urban transporta-
tion system. Airport access and complementary
surface transportation are considered by most
communities to be a subordinate part of their
overall transport problem. Urban pressures to
solve transportation problems that plague the
nonair commuter often have higher priority and
preempt funds.
Congress, in the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1970 (ref. 7), provided that in approving Federal
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highway projects, the Secretary of Transportation
shall give consideration to projects that will pro-
vide adequate, direct, and convenient public
access to passenger and cargo terminal buildings
and public airports or seaports.
The present airport access problem, with its
large dependence on intermodal connections,
raises questions of philosophy as well as practice.
It would seem fruitless to develop a national
system of airways and airports geared toward the
year 2000 if intermodal adjuncts are retained at
the operational and design levels of 1960. Tradi-
tionally, airport access is the responsibility of the
local community. This inhibits any nationwide
systems approach to solving airport access/egress
problems.
Local officials have attacked airport-access
problems with varying degrees of success. They
are swamped with other pressing problems that
have left them with scant planning lead time and
limited funds to meet their responsibilities
towards the air transport system. As a result, the
record on improvement of airport access has not
been remarkable.
The Federal Government must not preempt
the role of the local community in the matter of
airport access, but there is a pressing need for
closer cooperation with local planners. This
should be in the form of technical assistance,
selected demonstration programs, and criteria for
airport grants-in-aid that more fully recognize the
importance of door-to-door trip or shipment
concepts.
FAA advisory services and development stan-
dards should consider the total airport situation.
Communities applying for financial aid should be
required to demonstrate that proposed airport
access and intermodal adjuncts can handle normal
peak capacity effectively for a long time in the
future.
The Secretary of Transportation should
assure that there is a formal plan for
airport-access intermodal interface associated
with grants in financial aid dispensed by all the
DOT modal administrations. National air trans-
portation "systems planning" advisory services
should be developed jointly by DOT agencies and
should provide guidance to metropolitan
planners.
The Federal Government should also recom-
mend intermodal performance standards and eval-
uate their application jointly with the local com-
munity. Examples might be standards for the
longest allowable walking distance from a
baggage-claim area to a taxi-loading stand or for
the maximum allowable time from baggage claim
to the departure of downtown transportation.
Compliance with such standards could be a
prerequisite for Federal funds.
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Special
ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
It is evident that the application of new tech-
nology to serve man's needs must first be
approved by a pubhc that has become greatly
concerned with the quality of its environment.
The public is unwilling to tolerate applications of
technology that degrade the quality of the envi-
ronment, even in technical areas that have
become a part of our daily lives, and is expressing
a very strong intent to prohibit new encroach-
ments.
The developer and sponsor of technological
systems must approach this new situation from
the outset knowing that compatibility with the
environment must be achieved and that the public
must be informed of the plans and the ultimate
nature of the technology. This public service by
the sponsor should not stem from a reaction to
existing national or local legislation but should be
a result of true concern over any adverse impact
new technology might have on the quality of the
environment. The developer and the sponsor of
any new technological application today must
convince both users and nonusers of its impor-
tance to the community and its compatibility
with the public's expectations regarding the
quality of the environment.
Public concern about the environment can be
divided into six elements: (1) noise; (2) air pollu-
tion; (3) water pollution; (4) esthetics; (5) ecolog-
ical disturbances; and (6) meteorological changes.
These elements must be studied and adequately
handled in planning and informational activities.
They represent constraints which the developer
must carefully consider in assessing the adequacy
of the technology base and the economic
trade-off.
The problem here is that absolute require-
ments do not exist and may never be fully quanti-
fied because of the difficulty of defining the
"quality of the environment." A flexible
approach in planning and implementation of new
systems must therefore be taken at the outset to
Considerations
realistically appraise environmental requirements
and provide compatible system characteristics. In
addition, resources must be allocated to permit
developing factual information and providing it to
the public, and there must be a capability to react
sympathetically to environmental concerns. From
a historical point of view, such an allocation of
resources may seem unreasonable, but when
weighed against the price of delays in implemen-
tation and income lost because of delays, the
importance of such an allocation is evident.
The effects of the failure of sponsors to antic-
ipate public reactions can be seen by examining
some of the noise problems around large airports.
The high-noise area around the J. F. Kennedy Air-
port in New York, for example, includes 35,000
dwellings, 22 public schools, and several dozen
churches and clubs (ref. 1). This area plus the
high-noise area around the Los Angeles and
Chicago airports covers three times as much
ground as all the land redeveloped during the 16
years of urban renewal (42,000 acres) at a cost of
$5 billion. In Los Angeles, as of January 1971,
there were 34 suits against the airport for
damages arising from jet noise, and the Los
Angeles Unified School District is seeking $95
million in aircraft noise damages.
This section of the report is devoted to a
discussion of noise and air pollution. At the pres-
ent time, sufficient data are not available for an-
accurate assessment of meteorological and cli-
matic changes that might be due to aircraft emis-
sions. Those effects warrant further study but will
not be treated here.
AIRCRAFT NOISE
For aircraft, noise is undoubtedly the most
critical of the environmental or
nonuser-acceptability problems. Solutions to
noise problems in some cases solve many of the
other problems associated with acceptability of
new technology by the nonuser community. Con-
versely, noise may be the trigger mechanism for
public reaction against many of the other
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, community-acceptabilityproblemsof the air
transportindustrytoday.
Publicobjectionto aircraftnoisecreateda
groundswellthatresultedin thepassageof alaw
fief. 2) that, amongotheritems,empowersthe
FAA to certificate new aircraft for noise. It also
provides a mandate for the immediate and effec-
tive relief of airport noise by the FAA. The first
rule promulgated under this authority pertains to
new subsonic turbofan aircraft with engines of
bypass ratio of two or more, and revised versions
of existing aircraft requiring new type certificates.
Specific noise levels for these aircraft are promul-
gated in Part 36 of the Federal Air Regulations
(ref. 3) as a function of the aircraft gross weight.
In general, this rule, as it applies to changes of
existing turbine-powered aircraft, prescribes no
absolute numbers but rather requires that such
changes do not result in a higher noise level than
that generated by the parent aircraft.
As mentioned in the "Commercial Passenger
Service" section, the short-haul systems that can
be most effective in meeting future transportation
goals in high-density areas will require new vehi-
cles, new STOL-ports and VTOLports, and new
operational procedures. The acceptance of these
new systems by State and local authorities, and
the community, will depend on being able to
demonstrate a minimum of disbenefits such as
excessive noise. The short-haul systems will there-
fore have to fit into the community noise pattern.
Effect #Noise on the Growth of
Civil Aviation
Some of the many ways in which noise has
direct and indirect effects on the growth of civil
aviation'are discussed below.
Airports require more land.
One way to reduce the noise impact in
the vicinity of an airport is to provide
noise buffers by acquiring more land in
the airport approach and departure areas.
There are two main consequences of
using land as a noise buffer. First, the
additional land is a cost to the aviation
system - a cost that presumably should
be met by system users. Second, the
noise-buffer land has an opportunity cost
to the community; that is, there may be
uses for the noise-buffer land that could
serve the community better were it not
for the aircraft noise.
Airport capacity is reduced.
Noise has reduced and will continue to
reduce airport capacity in three ways.
First, noise (typically, no jet operations
from 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.) limits the
number of hours the airport can be used.
This has the additional adverse effect of
adding the nighttime traffic (some of
which may ideally operate at night, cer-
tain cargo, for example) to the daytime
traffic, which may already have peak
demand problems. Second, it is common
to restrict runway usage because of noise
(usage of certain runways may expose
more people to noise than others). Thus,
the utilization of an airport's existing or
potential runways is reduced. Third,
flight-path restrictions in the terminal
area airspace generally make certain por-
tions of the airspace unusable and thus
further reduce airport capacity and often
increase aircraft travel time and cost.
• Existing airports are threatened.
At the same time that aircraft noise
intensity and noise events have been
increasing, many communities have been
closing in around airports. The continued
existence of an established airport is
threatened at the very time it needs to
grow. Increased operations will generate
more noise and hence more pressure to
reduce and even prohibit airport activity.
• Suitable locations for new airports
cannot be found.
• As the Nation grows and evolves new
patterns of distribution of popula-
tion and industry, new airports will
be needed if aviation is to offer a
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viable alternative in a balanced trans- 
p o r t a t i o n  s y s t e m .  Even  w i t h  
increased airport size to  accommo- 
date noise buffers, community reac- 
tion to  potential airport noise is such 
that suitable new locations are diffi- 
cult to find. 
The effects of aircraft noise are not 
confined t o  the most immediate air- 
p o r t  neighbors, they also cause 
appreciable reaction in more distant 
c o m m u n i t i e s  along flight paths. 
Large numbers of citizens can see 
themselves as potential airport neigh- 
bors or potential residents under 
heavily used flight routes. Unless the 
noise problem can be resolved, sites 
will be selected that are not best 
suited to supporting the air mode in 
a balanced transportation system, 
with such adverse side effects as 
increasing user travel time and cost 
of getting to  and from airports. 
Aviation growth is impeded. 
Although aircraft noise a t  airports has a 
much stronger impact on  short-haul avia- 
tion, the handicap to long-haul is also 
appreciable. For example, if the effect of 
noise were to  cause an airport to  be 
located 10 miles further from the popu- 
lated area it serves, the additional cost t o  
travelers and employees could exceed 
$30 million annually for each major 
airport. 
Gods of Noise Reduction Efforts 
Noise is measured by a variety of techniques, 
each yielding different indicators of noise sever- 
ity. One of these, Perceived Noise Level. is a mea- 
sure of the subject annoyance of  a sound and is 
expressed in units of PNdB (perceived noise in 
decibels). Figure 5.1 presents typical noise levels 
for a number of sources in terms of PNdB. 
The value of Perceived Noise Level adjusted 
for the presence of discrete frequencies as well as 
for the time history has been adopted by the 
FAA as the official measurement standard and 
has been designated Effective Perceived Noise 
Level, expressed in units of EPNdB. Considera- 
tion in the study of the problem of public accep- 
tance of new systems has led to  the recomrnenda- 
tion of a long-term research goal of 80 EPNdB at 
the airport boundaries for STOL and VTOL vehi- 
cles that must operate in areas of high population 
density. I t  is believed necessary to establish goals 
at these difficult-to-achieve levels t o  properly 
Figure 5.1. Typical noise levels. 
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stimulateandorientR&Dactivitiessothat the
objectiveof gainingpublicacceptanceof newair
systemscanbe achieved at the earliest possible
time.
The ultimate goal of the noise-reduction
activity should be to reduce the noise of civil avia-
tion systems to a level acceptable to the com-
munity. Specifically, these goals may be
expressed as follows:
• Reduce the noise of the air transport
system sufficiently to provide an accept-
able noise environment at existing facili-
ties.
• Reduce the noise of future air transport
systems so that this factor will not con-
strain their growth.
• Develop a technology base such that
future aircraft systems can be designed
and introduced into commercial use with
minimum noise impact.
Magnitude of the Noise Impact
The importance of aircraft noise-reduction
programs can be shown by estimates of the cost
of various alternatives for makin_ noise tolerable.
Although data are not available for firm
conclusions on each of the available alternatives,
it is at least clear that the cost of noise will
involve billions of dollars. Thus, R&D programs
to guide the selection of alternatives can be
expected to produce large payoffs.
The following items illustrate the magnitude
of potential noise costs.
• Cost of land.
The area of land encompassed by the
110 PNdB takeoff contour of a long-haul
four-engine civil jet is approximately 600
acres', the additional area .of land encom-
passed by the 100PNdB contour is
approximately 7,000 acres. Assuming
that a typical airport has eight runway
ends, a 10-PNdB noise reduction would
"relieve" about 50,000 acres. To buy this
acreage, assuming a new airport were
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being established, say, 30 miles from a
major city, would cost some $350 mil-
lion at an assumed cost for undeveloped
acreage of $7,000 per acre. Assuming
that three new airports were involved,
the savings would equal the billion dol-
lars estimated as the cost to quiet the
current civil aviation jet fleet. To achieve
the same noise exposure reduction
around existing airports (where land
costs are much higher, as may be seen
from Figure 7.6 in the "Benefits" sec-
tion), the land purchase costs would be
many billions.
An intercity STOL system will be viable
only if STOLports are located relatively
close to population centers. Although
STOL runways are shorter and flight
paths steeper, the cost of land can be as
much as $500,000 per acre. Thus, the
cost of noise-buffer Land to reduce noise
by 10 PNdB at STOLports will be com-
parable with the cost at large CTOLports
that are distant from populated areas.
Aircraft operating delays.
Many airports are experiencing delays in
aircraft operations because of
noise-caused restrictions on the use of
runways and airspace. It is conceivable
that noise restrictions could reduce the
capacity of an airport by 20%. Thus, an
airport with an annual demand of
450,000 operations could suffer an
annual aircraft-delay cost of about
$1 million. Although this value is
considerably lower than other costs pre-
viously discussed, it must be realized that
this particular cost is encountered to
some degree at all existing airports where
noise-abatement procedures have been or
will be implemented.
The above estimates are based on broad
general assumptions but they demon-
strate that there is significant reason for
Government concern. It should also be
notedthat therewill be costsbeyond
thosediscussedabove.Someexamples
arethe costof a newairportrequired
becauseof noise;thecostof establishing
alternativetravelmodeswherenoisecur-
tails short-haulair service;andtheeco-
nomicimpacton an areafromlackof
adequateairservice.
Sonic Boom
Sonic booms were infrequent in the early
days of experimental and military supersonic
flights and were considered a minor nuisance
compared to the airport noise problem. Since the
early 1960's, growing interest in a commercial
SST and the realization that many people might
be exposed to sonic booms many times a day has
aroused concern over the effects and acceptability
of sonic booms over communities. This concern
has reached the point where it could severely
restrict or even prohibit use of supersonic trans-
ports in some areas. Since current technology can-
not reduce sonic boom enough, supersonic flight
over land will not be possible in the near future.
A Department of Transportation notice of
proposed rulemaking to ban civil supersonic flight
over land was filed on April 10, 1970, and was
published in the Federal Register on April 16,
1970 (ref. 4). In addition to filing this proposed
amendment to the Federal Aviation Regulations,
the President of the United States, the Secretary
of Transportation, and other representatives of the
Executive Branch have said that commercial
supersonic flight over land will not be permitted.
Despite these assurances, some critics contend
that the regulation might be changed or revoked
when commercial supersonic flight becomes a
reality.
To dispel these fears and to assure the
American people that there would be no overland
flight in this country by civil supersonic aircraft
at speeds causing a sonic boom, the United States
Senate, 91st Congress, adopted the language of
the Department of Transportation's proposed
regulation in a bill approved by the Senate on
December 2, 1970 (refs. 5, 6). The bill, however,
failed to come up for a vote in the House of
Representatives.
The intent to prohibit sonic booms legally
was based on the belief that the statute would not
affect the economic viability of the U.S. civil
supersonic transport. In fact, the prototype SST
program has been proceeding for a number of
years on the assumption that commercial super-
sonic flight over land would not be permitted,
and most marketing and economic projections
have been based on this premise.
If the effects of the sonic boom could be
considerably reduced, long-haul overland flights
by future generation supersonic transports would
be possible, resulting in a greatly increased poten-
tial market for supersonic transport aircraft. How-
ever, the development of a high-speed (Mach 2+)
transport with acceptable sonic boom characteris-
tics would require a technological breakthrough.
The benefits that would accrue from such a
vehicle justify pursuing a concentrated R&D pro-
gram in the fields of propulsion, aerodynamics,
and structures aimed at reducing the sonic boom
to an acceptable level while still permitting design
of a viable commercial transport aircraft.
Reason for Government Involvement
Although it is clear that the effects of aircraft
noise on civil aviation are substantial, it might not
necessarily follow that the Federal Government
should be deeply and intimately involved. The air-
craft noise problem could be placed in the cate-
gory of a local matter, which would allow the
Federal Government to take only an indirect
interest. However, several overriding issues appear
to establish the Federal Government's direct
involvement.
• There is no suitable market mechanism
to quickly and equitably correct the
noise problem.
The nature of the free-enterprise system
encourages the market mechanism to
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supply the needs of the user. In special
cases where the market is neither operat-
ing properly nor in the public interest, it
may be appropriate for the Government
to intervene to secure the desired results.
In the case of aircraft noise, there
appears to be no market mechanism that
can respond promptly and effectively to
the deleterious effects of aircraft noise
on the growth of civil aviation. That is,
no one is directly in the business of buy-
ing quietness.
Government is broadly involved in
setting environmental-pollution stan-
dards.
Aircraft noise is but one aspect of the
much more general problem of environ-
mental pollution. Since there is consider-
able Federal Government concern, as
well as Government programs to set stan-
dards and make regulations, an attack on
aircraft noise is only part of a broader
Federal policy.
Government certification of aircraft.
In its role of protecting the public, the
Government certificates aircraft for air-
worthiness. Since certification of aircraft
for noise is akin to certification for air-
worthiness, it is proper that this task be
the responsibility of the Government.
Government participation in airport
location and development.
In the past under the 1946 Federal Aid
to Airports Act and in the future under
the Airport and Airway Development
Act, the Federal Government, recogniz-
ing its responsibility to promote a safe
and efficient air transport system, has
had a voice in, and has contributed funds
to aid in, the selection, development, and
modification of airports. The Govern-
ment responsibility regarding airports has
been reinforced by creation of the
Department of Transportation to effec-
tively meet the challenge of achieving a
balanced transport system.
Government establishment of flight
paths.
Airport runway use and the terminal area
approach and departure paths are most
important in determining what urban
areas will be exposed to noise. All of
these are established by the FAA.
Courses ofAction
Aircraft noise is an extremely complex
problem that is being attacked in three general
ways: by decreasing it at the source; by opera-
tional changes; and by land-use compatibility.
Reduction of Noise at Source. Most aircraft
propulsion systems in the commercial air fleet use
the turbofan engine shown schematically in Fig-
ure 5.2. The major noise sources are." the primary
exhaust stream, the fan exhaust stream, the fan
and compressor forward-radiated blade noise, and
the fan aft-radiated blade noise. Noise from tur-
bine blades and other sources is radiated rear-
ward. Other minor forms of aircraft noise (e.g.,
noise radiated from the turbulent flow over flaps,
spoilers, and landing gear) are generally masked
by the intense noise from the major sources.
The magnitude of the source noise-reduction
problem can be better appreciated when it is
recognized that the energy converted to noise is a
small fraction of the total energy (about 1%).
Devices that give appreciable reduction must rad-
ically change the mechanism through which the
acoustic energy is generated, or provide absorp-
tion or attenuation of the sound after it is
generated.
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Figure 5.2. Noise-generation sources in the turbofan engine. 
The noise emanating from a typical turbojet 
engine is shown in Figure 5.3. The dominant 
noise source during takeoff is the jet ,  whereas 
under approach conditions, the dominant source 
is the fan. The engine-inlet and fanexi t  noise can 
be significantly reduced by insulation procedures. 
R e c e n t  NASA research work on inlet and  
fan-exhaust insulation has demonstrated as much 
370 FT ALTITUDE 
THREE JT8D 7 ENGINES 
0 .-.-.-.-.-.-.- 
APPROACH THRUST 
Figure 5.3. Peak perceived noise level in a B727-200 
flyover. Source: Ref 7. 
as 15 EPNdB reduction under approach condi- 
tions. Noise reduction under takeoff conditions, 
where the primary jet  noise predominates, is dif- 
ficult tosuppress, and there has been only limited 
success in this area so far. 
A recent study of acoustic treatment of exist- 
ing commercial aircraft shows retrofit costs to  be 
between 5200,000 and $1 million per aircraft. In 
addition t o  this initial conversion cost. other fac- 
tors may increase the operating costs (ref. 8). I t  is 
evident that  controlling noise a t  the source is very 
costly. Additional studies are necessary to deter- 
mine if these costs are justified and if this is a 
cost-effective approach to the solution of the 
aircraft-noise problem for current aircraft. 
Although the NASA Quiet Engine Program 
has shown some very successful results and  plans 
are being made to extend this activity (ref. 9), it 
appears that  further intensive research in this area 
may yield significant gains. A program is needed 
to investigate basic noise-generating mechanisms. 
This should lead to  a better understanding of the 
phenomena and should indicate other potential 
solutions for noise reduction at  the source. This 
technology could then be incorporated in future 
5-9 
enginedesignswherenoisemustbetreatedasone
of the primary design variables, at least on a par
with the traditional parameters of thrust/weight
ratio and specific fuel consumption. Such
research and development activities may require 5
to 10 years to reach fruition. Experience in other
_elds has shown that a combination of stringent
goals and high levels of activity in applied
research tends to produce results far beyond what
can normally be projected on the basis of the
current state of the art. The need to find better
solutions to the noise-generation problem at the
source cannot be challenged. Approaches that
minimize the penalties on performance and pro-
vide for lower cost in implementation are essen-
tial ingredients for rapid and continuing progress
in this area.
Path Control. The noise level at any point on
the ground is a function of the throttle setting,
the aircraft flight path, and atmospheric effects.
Aircraft operational procedures are closely con-
trolled by Federal regulation, and changes in
operating procedures to reduce noise must be
carefully planned and tested to ensure that there
is no degradation in safety. The mechanisms for
accomplishing the noise-abatement operating pro-
cedures are based on the concept of ensuring
maximum separation between the noise source
and the receiver or reducing operating power
while overflying noise-sensitive areas (or both).
Takeoff procedures have been explored in consid-
erable depth in the past, and various
noise-reduction power-cutback techniques have
been applied in practice. Approach procedures
have also been investigated; it is in this area that
considerable potential for improvement appears
to exist. Figure 5.4 shows representative approach
profiles (aircraft altitude as a function of distance
from airport threshold). Current procedurcs
generally consist of an approach at about
1,500-feet altitude with an intercept of a 2.75 °
glide slope at about 5 miles, which is followed
until touchdown. The figure indicates that alter-
nate intercept altitudes as well as variable-glide
approach angles may be utilized for
noise-abatement approaches (ref. 10).
Figure 5.4. Noise-abatement operational procedures
approach profiles. Source: Ref. 10.
The combination of the 3,000-foot intercept
altitude and the two-segment (6o/3 °) approach
path might permit a noise reduction on the order
of 10 dB over appreciable distances. These
approaches, shown schematically, are overly sim-
plified for clarity. Even further gains might be
realized by a variable-angle approach that in turn
could be integrated with effective programming
of approach configuration and approach power.
The higher approach path and rapid climb
characteristic of STOL aircraft will be beneficial
with respect to noise. It has been estimated that
the area affected by a given level of noise expo-
sure for a STOLport may be only about 5% as
large as for a conventional jetport. It should be
remembered, however, that the low cruise alti-
tude for STOL aircraft on short-route segments,
perhaps under 50 miles, must not be permitted to
introduce new noise problems.
Noise Receiver. Aircraft noise signatures
involve different, very complex spectral, tempo-
ral, and special functions of the sound pressure. It
is difficult to develop a single noise evaluator for
all types of aircraft. The development of effective
perceived noise level in the units of EPNdB
appears to have great potential, but continued
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TABLE 5.1. SIGNIFICANT AIRCRAFT-NOISE-
RELATED EVENTS
DATE EVENT
1952
1956
1957
19r,a
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
AiRFORCEAIRBASENOISESTUDIES
JETEXHAUSTNOISESUPPRESSORDEVELOPED
PERCEIVEDNOISELEVELCONCEPTINTRODUCED
PORTOFNEWYORKAUTHORITY112PNdBLIMIT;
707SERVICE
LONDONAIRPORT110PNdBDAYAND102PNdB
NIGHTLIMITSESTABLISHED
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development is necessary to improve the ability
to more accurately assess the psychoacoustic
impact. Many attempts have been made to
develop number rating systems for cumulative air-
craft noise exposures related to community
acceptance. The Noise Exposure Forecast is a
methodology currently used to predict such single
number ratings of the noise. The factors involved
include the absolute noise level, noise spectrum,
maximum tone, noise duration, aircraft type, mix
of aircraft, number of operations, runway utiliza-
tion, flight path, operating procedures, and time
of day. The Noise Exposure Forecast contours
about a given airport may be computed using the
mathematical procedures involved. By relating
contours of different magnitudes to receiver
assessment of noise impact, it may be possible to
control the residual aircraft noise through
selected use of the airport adjacent land areas.
The most effective utilization, however, of noise
exposure forecasting in land use phnning tech-
niques is realized at new airports under
development.
Additional areas of action for land use
include soundproofing buildings, purchasing noise
buffer zones, locating airports on the peripheries
of cities, operating only V/STOL aircraft "in
noise-sensitive areas, and building airport-
compatible cities.
Governmen t Policy
Before examining the Government's policy
with respect to aircraft noise abatement, it is
desirable to review the historical events leading to
the present position. Table 5.1 outlines some of
the significant events in the chronology of the
modern day aircraft noise problem.
In 1952 the Air Force initiated some of the
early R&D activities directed at aircraft noise
reduction. The introduction of the 707 and DC-8
aircraft to commercial service in 1958 and 1959
clearly pointed out the need for more effective jet
noise suppressors.
Some of the suppression devices developed
then are still used today. Possibly the first U. S.
airport proprietor to establish noise standards was
the Port of New York Authority in 1958. Using
the then evolving concept of perceived noise level,
the Port Authority established 112 PNdB as a
monitored limit for the protection of the airport
neighbors. London-Heathrow Airport followed
suit with the establishment of 110 PNdB for day-
time and 102 PNdB for nighttime operations.
The first major improvement in the aircraft
noise situation followed the introduction of the
turbofan engines, which extract energy from the
jet exhaust to drive the bypass fan. The bypass
flow also mixes with the primary engine flow,
thereby achieving lower jet velocity and hence
lower jet noise.
While the technological advances were taking
place, significant legal action was under way and
in 1962 a major decision was reached in the
"Griggs versus Allegheny" case. In that case it was
determined that the land of the airport neighbors
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wasbeingtakenby airportoperations.It was
decided that the legal responsibility for that "land
taking" lay with the airport operators, in that
they had original control of laying out the airport
and developing flight patterns.
The Oren Harris Congressional hearings in
1959-62 represented the first Congressional recog-
nition of the seriousness of the aircraft noise
problem. Congressional attention to noise has
increased significantly since then. Hempstead,
N.Y., and Park Ridge, Ill., passed ordinances
aimed at the Port of New York Authority and
Chicago's O'Hare Airport, respectively, to restrict
aircraft operations thereby reducing noise. These
restrictions were not allowed by the courts, and
subsequent attempts to impose curfews on airport
operations have been denied on the grounds of
constraint of interstate commerce.
In 1965 the Government's position was
further defined when the President established a
study group in the President's Office of Science
and Technology. This group coordinated the
activities of the Government agencies involved
until 1967, when the interagency aircraft
noise-abatement program was transferred from
the President's Office of Science and Technology
to the Department of Transportation. Now all
Governmental bodies involved in the problem of
aircraft noise are participants in this program, cur-
rently directed by the Department of
Transportation's office of Noise Abatement.
In 1968, the FAA received Congressional
authority under Public Law 90-4ll, to establish
standards for relief from present and futurc air-
craft noise. In November 1969 the FAA issued
the Part 36 noise rule, which was responsive to
the Public Law in that it attempted to ensure in
new generation aircraft the maximum noise
reduction that technology would permit, within
the constraints of economic reasonablcncss. This
rule has been adopted in concept as the basis for
the International Civil Aviation Organization pro-
posed noise rule.
Current Policy. The current Government
policy is to ensure that maximum noise-reduction
techniques, consistent with the technological
state of the art and reasonable economic con-
straints, are incorporated in future aircraft
designs. The Government's role is of necessity an
aggressive one of pushing a continuing reduction
of permissible noise levels on a continuing time
scale. The Government therefore finds itself in
the position of requiring technological progress in
an area where technological progress has not
occurred spontaneously. This policy leads not
only to the establishment of acoustic standards,
but also to the role of promoting the acoustic
research necessary to assure that the noise stan-
dards are established on a valid scientific basis.
Recommended Policy. To meet the objective
for acceptance of new air systems by the com-
munity and local governments, and to avoid
further constraints in the operation of existing
systems in an area of increasing concern for the
environment and the "quality of life," the
Federal Government policy with regard to aircraft
noise should be to:
Establish long-term research goals to
reach operating noise levels that will be
compatible with community and local
environmental objectives. (These research
goals need not be based on what is con-
sidered to be economically and tech-
nically feasible.)
Establish regulatory standards, on a
specific timetable, to attain operating
noise levels that will be compatible with
community and local government objec-
tives.
Provide funding and direction for basic
research, applied research, and advanced
development activities, including the
necessary facilities, directed at noise
reduction at the source, by operational
changes and by land use modifications
and planning.
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Cost Considerations
Cost to Airport Neighbors. The cost of noise
to the airport neighbors may be described as an
"external" cost, since it is a cost imposed by the
generator of the noise and for which payment is
usually not provided to the airport neighbor. In
some cases, the purchase of air easements repre-
sents an attempt to internalize the cost of airport
noise, but the effectiveness of this technique is
minimal. Some attempts have been made recently
to evaluate the cost of noise in terms of the
annual relative depreciation of houses within cer-
tain noise exposure areas. Although this deprecia-
tion is not an actual cost to the owner, it could be
interpreted as an amount he would have to spend
to obtain a similar house in a quieter area. Other
evaluations of the cost of noise to the airport
neighbor may be developed in terms of the cost
of housing insulation necessary to realize a signifi-
cant noise reduction. A very rough estimate of
this cost would be about 10% of the initial house
cost for a noise reduction or transmission loss
through the house walls of about 15 dB. It is too
early to judge the effectiveness of awards in legal
damage suits as measures of the cost of airport
noise because of the small number of awards to
date and the large number of cases still under
litigation.
Development of Effectiveness Parameters.
The cost/benefit ratios of noise reduction can-
not be quantitatively determined until appropri-
ate benefit parameters are developed. In the
development of these parameters, it is clear that
the cost of obtaining a given decibel reduction on
an aircraft will first have to be quantified.
Second, this cost will have to be integrated into a
total cost for the number of aircraft so reduced in
noise-generating potential. Next, it will be neces-
sary to evaluate what this given noise reduction
will mean in terms of reduced noise exposure. It
then becomes necessary to evaluate the monetary
and social improvement realized by the airport
neighbors exposed to the noise. This last quantity
is particularly intangible as it may vary with many
social factors of the exposed population.
The Role of Government
The development of new technology aircraft
has led to correspondingly quieter aircraft, but
incentives are needed to encourage the replace-
ment or retrofitting of the current noisier aircraft
in the commercial fleet. The cost impact of a
large replacement/retrofit program at the present
time would impose a large financial burden on an
air transport industry that is currently experienc-
ing financial difficulties. Several forms of Govern-
ment support (e.g., low-interest, long-term loans;
tax benefits for the replacement of noisier aircraft
with quieter aircraft; and even direct subsidy)
have been proposed. Leadership in such a pro-
gram seems clearly a Government role.
Regulatory actions for aircraft noise abate-
ment are governed by Public Law 90-411, which
provides for applying "the results of research,
development, testing, and evaluation" and consid-
ering "whether any proposed regulation is eco-
nomically reasonable, technologically practicable
and appropriate." It is important that these guide-
lines be projected into the future so that
commercial operators and manufacturers can plan
appropriately in the design of future systems. It is
recognized that accomplishing this on a realistic
basis will be a difficult task, one that will require
maximum cooperation on the part of industry
and Government, and coordination with inter-
national aeronautical authorities, such as ICAO.
However, failure to act now to establish future
regulatory goals on a time-phased basis would
compound the current problem in a way that
might severely limit the growth of commercial
aviation.
Research goals should be established on the
basis of the desired end result, that is, the achieve-
ment of noise levels that will permit the introduc-
tion of new systems which will be compatible
with future environmental goals, This will require
the acceptance of these systems by local com-
munities so that the appropriate airports can be
located, and suitable operations conducted at
locations that will satisfy the transportation needs
in an optimum way.
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At this time it appears that meeting the above
criteria will require a combination of improved
vehicle capability, more flexible operational pro-
cedures, and more effective land-use planning.
The objective should be aircraft operations in
which the observed noise levels, at or beyond the
airport boundaries, are compatible with the noise
pattern of the community. The bottom line on
Figure 5.5 is the recommended maximum
perceived noise level of the aircraft at the airport
boundaries when operating in accordance with
optimum approach and climb-out procedures;
that is, 80 EPNdB for smaller aircraft, including
VTOL and STOL vehicles, operating out of areas
close to major activity centers, and 90 EPNdB for
larger aircraft operating out of more remote jet-
ports. As indicated, the measuring points should
be at the airport boundaries. Other monitoring
points beyond the boundaries should be used to
make sure that the background levels are not
being exceeded. In the planning of future air-
ports, where land or land easements may be
acquired at reasonable cost, it may be possible to
establish airport boundaries for noise control
several miles beyond the traditional runway and
terminal area boundaries.
It is recognized that establishment of such
ambitious research goals at this time is a contro-
versial issue but the failure to establish a low-level
noise goal now could result in the application of
scarce resources to R&D activities that may fail to
provide the desired solution to the noise problem
on a long-term basis.
The target time period for achievement of the
proposed research goal is dependent upon the
resources made available, the effectiveness of the
management of the R&D programs, and the
actual rate of technological progress. A consensus
of several experts in the field has indicated that,
with appropriate funding, it should be possible to
achieve a reduction of about 10 dB from the cur-
rent state of the art in a 10-year period. The
dashed line on Figure 5.5 illustrates this objective.
As additional environmental data become avail-
able, it is expected that a more definitive evalua-
tion of the noise-level requirements for compati-
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Figure 5.5, Aircraft noise levels.
bility and acceptance of new systems will be
possible. For this reason, it is proposed that the
area between these two lines be considered as the
broad-band objective for a 10-year research
effort, that is, the "1981 research goal."
Proposed regulatory standards should also be
established, at least at 5-year intervals. It is impor-
tant that the industry know now what is to be
expected in 1976 and 1981 if it is to proceed
with confidence with new system designs. Quali-
tative evaluations of those standards must be pro-
jected into the future to determine the
cost/benefit relationships and the probable
impact on the industry.
R&D Requirements for Noise Reduction
R&D requirements may be grouped in the
following categories:
• The need to improve the fundamental
understanding of noise generation, propa-
gation, and attenuation.
• The evaluation of the psychoacoustic
impact of noise, particularly for V/STOL
and other new vehicle concepts.
• The development of new concepts of
vehicle and propulsion systems with min-
imum noise a basic design parameter.
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• Research on the generation, propagation,
and alleviation of the sonic boom.
• The conduct of environmental systems
demonstrations.
• The need for additional acoustic research
and development facilities.
• The need to develop instrument landing
systems suitable for curved approaches,
steep descent, and other operational
techniques to minimize noise impact.
• The need to develop personnel suitably
trained to solve complex acoustic prob-
lems and able to participate in
new vehicle and propulsion-system design
and development.
• The improvement and implementation of
land-use planning techniques, operational
procedures, and other means of minimiz-
ing the impact on the environment.
• The development of analytical methods
for the evaluation of cost, social impact,
and technical factors to permit optimiza-
tion of the approach to the solution of
the overall noise problem.
Aircraft noise is the largest single impediment
to the orderly growth of air commerce, and
should be minimized by a vigorous
industry/Government noise-reduction program.
This program should seek to achieve noise levels
for the existing fleet that are compatible with the
communities around airports, and should seek to
ensure that new forms of air commerce, such as
STOL, VTOL, and supersonic transport systems,
can be introduced in an acoustically compatible
manner while still retaining most of their eco-
nomic potential.
AIR POLLUTION
concern with air pollution caused by aircraft, it is
notable that national emission inventories attri-
bute to aircraft only 1/10 of 1% of the total par-
ticulate emissions from all sources to aircraft
(ref. 11).)
Table 5.2 shows the inventory of air pollu-
tants on a nationwide basis. This is the "normal"
presentation, which includes only aircraft emis-
sions below 3,000 feet. It is assumed that the
inversion layer at 3,000 feet traps emissions in the
air below. Emissions above this level are assumed
to be dispersed and restructured by thermal and
chemical processes. The effect of including the
emissions above 3,000 feet will be subsequently
illustrated.
Although it provides useful statistical data,
Table 5.2 does not allow comparison of the trans-
port modes on the basis of equal productivity.
Figure 5.6 permits this comparison by showing
the emissions of automobiles (complying with
1972 and 1975 emission standards, respectively),
STOL aircraft, and rapid rail for a hypothetical
case of 22.5 billion passenger-miles per year
(slightly less than present intercity bus productiv-
ity) on an average trip distance of 100 miles.
The total air pollutants emitted by
automobiles complying with the 1972 emission
standards would be reduced by a factor of seven
if intercity passenger travel were transferred from
automobiles to STOL airplanes with current, state
of the art, high bypass ratio turbofan engines. On
the other hand, this pollution would be further
reduced by a factor of four if the same ridership
were transferred to electrified rapid-rail systems
drawing power from stationary power-generating
stations.
Nationwide Air Pollution Inventory
Air pollution caused by aircraft, especially
the particulate emissions visible as smoke, has
become a matter of national concern. In response
to this concern, an initial retrofit program to cut
down on particulate emissions has been put into
motion by the country's airlines. (Despite the
Pollution at Airports
Although the emissions from aircraft
represent a small percentage of total emissions on
a national basis, there has been some speculation
as to whether pollutant concentrations near air-
ports are possibly higher than national inventories
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TABLE 5.2. 1968 ESTIMATED NATIONWIDE EMISSION (MILLIONS OF TONS PER YEAR)
CARBON
SOURCE PARTICULATESMONOXIOE
NITROGEN
HYDROCARBONS
OXIDES
SULFUR
OXIDES
TRANSPORTATION 63.8 1.2 8.1 16.6 0.8
MOTORVEHICLES (59.2) (0.8) (7.2) (15.6) (0.3)
AIRCRAFT a (2.4) (n)b ( n ) (0.3) ( n )
OTHERS (2.2) (0.4) (0.9) (0.7) (0.5)
FUELCOMBUSTION IN
STATIONARY SOURCES 1.9 8.9 10.0 0.7 24.4
INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES 9.7 7.5 0.2 4.6 7.3
SOLIDWASTE DISPOSAL 7.8 1.1 0.6 1.6 0.1
MISCELLANEOUS 16.9 9.6 1.7 8.5 0.6
TOTA L 100.1 28.3 20.6 32.0 33.2
b(n) = negligibleaonly aircraft emissions below 3,000 feet are included.
Source: Ref. 11.
Figure 5.6. Air pollution trade-off- intercity travel modes.
would indicate, in view of the proximity to fre-
quent aircraft operations. To assess this possibil-
ity, a study was made of the pollution
concentrations in the New York metropolitan
area and at the three major New York air facili-
ties. Table 5.3 indicates that at each of the air-
ports, the quantities of certain types of pollutants
are greater than the average for the New York
metropolitan area; however, overall pollution at
each airport is less than the overall area average.
Although this is true for the New York area, it is
possible that in many regions of the country, the
airport has the highest concentration of pollu-
tants. If so, the emissions from automobile traffic
associated with and concentrated near the airport
are a factor.
Aircraft Versus the Auto
To further compare the relative emissions
between air and auto, Figure 5.7 shows the emis-
sions associated with the various stages of a trip
from the central business district in Washington,
D.C., to the central business district in Chicago,
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TABLE 5.3. ESTIMATED POLLUTANTS - NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA AND AT NEW YORK
AREA AIRPORTS (TONS/SQUARE MILE/DAY)
CARBON NITROGEN HYDRO-
AREA ALDEHYDES PARTICULATES
MONOXIDE OXIDES CARBONS
KENNEDY 0.6 0.3 0.7 0.7 02
LA GUARDIA 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.1 0.4
NEWARK 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.03 0.1
AVERAGE 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.06 0.2
AVERAGE FOR NEW YORK
METRO. AREA 4.2 0.6 1.1 0.02 0.2
Source: Ref.. 12.
Illinois, by 70 passengers. The passengers go from
Washington, D.C., to Washington National Air-
port by car, from National to O'Hare Interna-
tional Airport in Chicago by air, and from O'Hare
to Chicago's central business district by car. The
air pollutants assigned to automobile transits to
and from the business district and the airport
assume some doubling up (60 vehicle trips for 70
passengers) but do not assume vehicle round trips.
Total emissions for each discrete trip segment
(including the flight segment above 3,000 feet)
are presented at the top of the figure. It should be
noted that the emission indices used for the auto
in Figure 5.7 are based on 1972-1974 National
Air Pollution Control Administration new-car
standards.
The lower left-hand portion of the figure
shows the percentage of the total emission as a
function of the percent of the total trip distance.
If aircraft emissions above 3,000-feet altitude
(assumed to be dissipated in the upper atmos-
phere) are excluded, over 65% of the total emis-
sion results from auto travel to and from the
airport, about 3% of the trip. The lower
right-hand portion of the figure shows this rela-
tionship in terms of pounds of pollutants per
passenger-mile. The value that obtains for the
automobile in 1969 is also shown for comparison.
It can be seen that on a productivity basis, even if
all emissions are considered, the aircraft emissions
are an order of magnitude lower than automobile
emissions.
With the continued Federal drive to reduce
automotive emissions, and if recent Congressional
action to force the development of a
"pollution-free auto" by 1975 is successful, the
comparative picture may change in future years.
Although aviation can point to statistics such as
those in Table 5.2 to indicate that aircraft contri-
bute a small amount of the total pollution, the
fact remains that if aviation is to grow to meet
the potential demand, reductions in pollution
must be evident to the public so new facilities
(such as STOL/VTOLports) can be established.
It is interesting to note that the recent airline
program to replace all burner cans on the JT8D
engine (which powers the B-727, B-737, and
DC-9) was brought about by public demand for
elimination of smoke around the airports- a
result of the very small particulate emissions. The
aircraft figures shown for 1975 represent the sum
of emissions assuming all JT8D engines are oper-
ated with the "smoke-fixed" burners instead of
the original "bill of material" burners.
The information presented here is intended
to place air pollution by aircraft in perspective as
only one source, and not the principal source, of
air pollution. This does not mean there should be
a relaxation of efforts to minimize air pollution
due to aircraft operations. On the contrary, as
improvements are made to reduce pollution by
other sources, increased efforts will be needed in
civil aviation.
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MODE
DISTANCE
_i EMISSIONS
FUNCTION
WASHINGTON
CBD DCA
AUTO
4 MI
23.7 LB
TO AIRPORT
0
37.4 LB
IDLE, TAXI,
T.O.,CLIMB
TO 3000 FT
70 PASSENGERS
AIR
612 MI
248 LB
CRUISE ABOVE 3,000 FT
0
24.6 LB
DESCEND, LAND,
TAXI, IDLE
CHICAGO
ORD CBD
AUTO
17 MI
99.9 LB
TO CBD
Figure 5.7. Air pollution - Washington to Chicago.
RECOMMENDATIONS
R&D programs continue to be needed
urgently to improve aviation fuels and aviation
engines, to lessen the amount of pollutants
emitted, and to eliminate noxious emissions. A
better understanding of the processes controlling
engine emissions is needed. Better data on com-
bustor conditions, especially species distribution,
are needed to design minimum-emission com-
bustors. Study and evaluation of the effect of air-
craft emissions on the upper atmosphere should
be continued.
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FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS BACKGROUND
The U. S. aerospace and air transport indus-
tries are facing formidable financial difficulties.
After an all-time net profit peak of $496 million
in the 12 months ended September 1967, the
U. S. certificated air carriers experienced a loss of
about $150 million in 1970. The ATA estimated
in December 1970 that the major carriers (domes-
tic trunks plus Pan American) would have a loss
of about $190 million in 1971. This estimate
assumed that fares would not be increased
fief. 1). It should be noted that the airline indus-
try has a net worth of approximately $3.4 billion.
The Business and Defense Services Adminis-
tration estimated in mid-1970 that the value of
shipments from aerospace manufacturers in 1970
would drop 15% below 1969 levels and 24%
below 1968 levels. They also estimated that 1971
shipments would drop an additional 8.5% below
1970 levels (ref. 2).
Aerospace industry net profits after taxes at
the end of the first quarter of 1970 were 2.3% of
sales, compared to 3.5% for the same period in
1969. Reduced earnings will probably continue
through 1971 because major firms have incurred
higher debt loads due to high facility costs,
unreimbursed Government program costs, and
reductions in revenue-producing commercial sales
(ref. 3). Equity-to-debt ratios are at an all-time
low (in the third quarter of 1970, the
equity-to-debt ratio for aircraft and parts manu-
facturing was 1.29, compared to 2.29 for all man-
ufacturing corporations) (ref. 4).
The depressed general business situation
during 1970, coupled with high interest rates, has
made it difficult to finance purchases of new air-
craft. For some time, the aerospace and airline
industries have been unattractive for investors,
although recent increases in prices of airline
stocks may signal some improvement for the
airlines.
Specialized air transport manufacturing and
scheduled airline operations began in 1926 with
the introduction of the Ford Tri-Motor and the
passage of the Air Commerce Act. From the
beginning, the economic health of both industries
has been cyclical. Since 1926 no fewer than seven
cycles of economic peaks and valleys have been
recorded.
For the manufacturers, recovery from
extreme financial difficulties has usually been
accelerated by increased U. S. Government spend-
ing for R&D and for procurement of advanced
military aircraft. It has become axiomatic that a
strong commercial aircraft manufacturing base is
essential to support the defense of the United
States. In a period of lower defense budgets, a
strong civil aeronautics industry would serve to
sustain this very important industrial base.
Some of the factors that have contributed to
the cyclical nature of the industry are discussed
next.
External Forces
Some of the factors have been outside the
control of the industry; for example:
• Three major wars - World War II, Korea,
and Viet Nam.
• Six depressions, recessions, or "technical
adjustments" - in 1929-1936,
1946-1948, 1953-1954, 1957-1958,
1960-1961, and 1970.
• Lags in Government actions to fit
changing technological and economic
levels (e.g., continuation of certain certif-
ication requircmcnts for jet transports
that were based on experience with recip-
rocating engines).
• The inflation from 1965 to 1970.
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TABLE 5.4. TECHNOLOGY IMPROVEMENTS IN CIVIL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT
AIRCRAFT TYPE YEAR
FORD TRI-MOTOR 1926
BOEING 247; DC-2; DC-3 1933-36
DC4 1945
CONSTELLATION; 0C-6 1946-47
SUPERCONSTELLATION; DC-7; DC-7C 1953-56
VISCOUNT; ELECTRA 1955-59
B-707;DC-B 1958-59
B-747 1970
IMPROVEMENT
ALLMETAL CONSTRUCTION, MULTI-ENGINE RELIABILITY
LONGER RANGE; HIGHER SPEEDAND PAYLOAD; 14 ST ALUMINUM
HIGHER SPEEDAND PAYLOAD; OVERWATER OPERATIONS; LONGER
RANGE; FOUR-ENGINE RELIABILITY; 24 ST ALUMINUM
HtGHER SPEED AND PAYLOAD; PRESSURIZATION; LONGER RANGE;
HIGHER CRUISE ALTITUDE
HIGHER SPEED, PAYLOAD, AND RANGE; TRANSCONTINENTAL
FLIGHT TIME UNDER 8 HOURS;75 ST ALUMINUM
TURBOPROP,LESSVIBRATION AND NOISE; HIGHER SPEED
,JET POWER; SPEED; BETTER PASSENGER COMFORT; 7178ST
ALUMINUM
WtDE-BODYCAPACITY; HIGH-BYPASS-RATI0 ENGINES
Technological Advances
Over the );ears, eight distinctly different
levels of technology have been introduced into
scheduled airline service in the forms of landmark
t_nsport _ircr_t't or en_nes (Table 5.a).
Each of these technological advances
followed a period of research and development,
largely funded by the U.S. Government. For
example, each improvement was based on new
power plants developed under U. S. Government
auspices for military programs. Cabin pressur-
ization, one of the major advances, was initially
developed in the mid-1930's through
Government-funded programs. (See also refs. 5
and 6.)
Attitudes, Practices, and Conditions Common
to the Aerospace and Airline Industries
About 75 cents of every dollar spent in the
production of commercial transports is for labor.
Nearly half of the cash expenditures by the air-
lines are for labor. This high cash-flow require-
ment creates a supersensitivity to economic varia-
tions. As a consequence, the average profit margin
on sales has been only 3.48% for the airlines, with
a return on total investments of 6.9% since 1947
(first CAB-published data). A 2.4% margin on
sales from 1941 through 1969 is recorded for the
aircraft manufacturing industries (negative profit
years counted as zero), as compared to 5.4% for
all manufacturing industries over the same period.
Figures 5.8 and 5.9 show selected financial trends
for the airlines and for the aircraft manufacturing
industries.
The increasing size, complexity, and higher
technology levels of new transport aircraft are
causing the cost of development, production, and
testing to become larger than any one U. S. manu-
facturer's financial capability. Both the aircraft
and airline industries have required large
debt-financing to continue to build or purchase
advanced transport aircraft. This introduces an
important noncontrollable, nonoperating expense
that is seriously affecting the profits of both
industries. Figure 5.10 shows the increase in total
investment and the attendant increase in interest
on the long-term debt incurred by the airlines in
the past 20 years. Figure 5.11 shows the amount
of long-term debt financing of major aerospace
companies since 1937 as a percent of total
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Figure 5.8. Total U. S. certificated route air carriers' return on investment and net profit/loss: 1947-1969 (annual).
Source: Re]:. 7.
Figure 5.9. U.S. aircraft industry's profit as percent of
sales and percent of net worth (return on equity).
Source: Refi 8.
Figure 5.10. Total U.S. certificated route air carriers'
total investments and interest on long-term debt;
1947-1969 (annual). Source: Re];. 7.
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TABLE 5.5. AIRCRAFT DELIVERED OR ON
ORDER, DOUGLAS AIRCRAFT COMPANY,
JUNE 1970
NO. DELIVERED ORTYPE
ON ORDER
DC-9-10 103
-10MC 5
-1ORC 19
-20 10
-30 401
-30AF 6
-30CF 7
-30RF 10
-40 24
C-9A 12
NUMBER OF
AIRLINES
19
1
1
1
37
3
2
2
2
1 (USAF)
Figure 5.11. U. S. aerospace industry's debt financing
as percent of total capital. Source: Ref. 8.
Source: Refi 9.
capital. Debt-servicing expenses for the aerospace
industries over this period are not readily
available.
Attitudes and Practices Pecuiiar to the
Aircraft Industry
Although civil transport aircraft may be built
in large quantities, they are tailored to each cus-
tomer's desires. As an example, Douglas Aircraft
Company reported in June 1970 that 597 DC-9's
had been delivered or were on order (ref. 9). A
breakdown of the types, number delivered or on
order, and number of airlines is shown in
Table 5.5
Although these aircraft are of the same basic
design, they vary greatly in detail. The airlines
demand different cockpit arrangements, different
galley arrangements, different lavatory arrange-
ments, and different cabin interiors. As a result,
the aircraft become "custom jobs," the economy
of large-scale production is not achieved, and
costs are significantly increased.
Because the competition is intense, an air-
craft manufacturer will rarely turn clown an
order, even though a special requirement might
disrupt planned and efficient production flow.
The manufacturer therefore incurs higher costs
for tooling, facilities, training, etc., than he would
if an orderly and even production line were main-
tained.
The aircraft manufacturing industry has
become so large that some companies have not
maintained an economical control of programs.
Engineers tend to make unnecessary changes and
improvements in design without due considera-
tion for program costs. Often, "advancing the
state of the art" has created unnecessarily high
costs because of more sophistication, greater com-
plexity, and increased requirements for testing.
Engineering departments sometimes become over-
specialized as the older "generalist" type
engineers retire. An attendant loss of communica-
tion among the several design disciplines can
result in unnecessary costs.
Attitudes and Practices Peculiar to the
Airline Industry
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) is fre-
quently blamed for the overcapacity, low revenue
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yields,and excesscompetitionin the airline
industry.It canbeargued,however,thattheCAB
merelyreactsto requestsubmittedby theair-
linesfor approvalof specificactions.Noone
forcestheairlinesto applyfor newroutesthatare
alreadyadequatelyserved.However,theCABhas
to considerthe airlineor airlinesalreadyserving
theparticularroutes,andasCABViceChairman
WhitneyGillillandsaidin November1970,"It is
possibletherehasbeena tendencyto bemore
liberalin resolvingdoubtsin favorof theexpan-
sionof competition than the facts have justified"
(ref. 10). It may well be that the airlines would
not want elimination of Government regulation,
since the regulatory agencies represent impartial
bodies to turn to in times of stress.
The effect of price elasticity on traffic and
profits is still not accurately known. The Air
Transport Association stated recently:
The decline in yield (6.24¢ per
passenger-mile to 5.34¢ in 1968)resulted
mainly from the host of discount and
promotional fares introduced by the
scheduled airlines throughout this period.
The Civil Aeronautics Board would not
permit airlines to alter the downward
trend in unit prices until it became
almost too late (ref. 1 ).
Nevertheless, the airlines decided that this 15%
decrease in average yield per passenger-mile was
advantageous. Commenting on promotional or
developmental fares at the IATA Annual General
Meeting in Teheran (October27, 1970), lan
Sinclair, Chairman of CP Air (formerly Canadian
Pacific Airlines, Ltd.), said:
Development rates are common to most
transport media. The logic is simple-
establish rates at an artificially low level
to encourage a particular market to
develop and then increase rates to a fully
compensatory level. By doing so, the
argument runs, you build up markets and
ensure profitability in the long term. A
very convincing argument - except that
it never works quite that way. Develop-
ment rates become sticky on the upside
and it never seems to be quite the appro-
priate time to increase them. Develop-
ment goes on and maturity is never
reached. Nor is a profitable transporta-
tion operation ever achieved .... I can see
it happening now in airline pricing and I
must express my concern (ref. 11).
Although promotional or development rates
have been used often, there is a serious lack of
data to show the effect of such rates on traffic
and profits. Decisions on the use of promotional
rates are thus based on qualitative judgements
rather than quantitative data. Some experiments
are needed. Studies of the effect of various stages
of deregulation should also be made.
The lessons of history are often not fully uti-
lized in planning for the future. This can be illus-
trated by a comparison of a quote from the Air
Transport Association and the actual annual
growth rates reported to the CAB by U. S certif-
icated route air carriers, as shown in Figure 5.12.
The important point is that "historical trends"
referred to in the quote were obtained by exami-
nation of the period 1963 to 1967. Thus, many
airline decisions were based on consideration of a
short period that showed a constant or increasing
growth rate. Consideration of a longer time span,
showing the impact of such uncertain factors as
recession or inflation might have tempered some
of the decisions.
It appears reasonable to plan for a period of
some overcapacity following the introduction of
new, larger aircraft, such as the wide-body jets.
This overcapacity can be desirable from the stand-
point of attracting additional passenger demand.
However, this expected overcapacity, coupled
with such fluctuations as shown in Figure 5.12,
can result in severe financial difficulties. It is
obvious that the airlines must conduct rigorous
analyses of future requirements before commit-
ting to the purchase of aircraft in quantities.
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Figure5.12.AnnualgrowthrateoftotalU.S.certificatedrouteaircarriers'evenuepassenger-miles.
All segmentsof the traveling public are not •
paying their share of operating costs. The
long-haul, high-density routes have subsidized the
short-haul, high-cost routes. In 1968, in the con-
tinental United States, 65% of all flight stage
lengths were less than 300 miles, although only
34% of all passengers made trips of less than 300
miles. Many factors affect short-haul economics •
(see "Commercial Passenger Service" section), but
one problem (or result) is that U. S. aircraft man-
ufacturers have not yet produced an aircraft that
operates profitably in short-haul operations. Air-
lines have tended to use their older and
depreciated aircraft on short hauls in hopes of
cutting losses. This has never been financially •
successful.
CONCLUSIONS
Both the aircraft manufacturers and the
airlines are experiencing the severest
financial difficulties in their history.
These difficulties have been encountered
several times in the past. Historically,
recovery of the manufacturing industry
has been accelerated by U.S. C_vern-
ment R&D, plus procurement contracts.
The increasing size, complexity and
higher technology levels required for new
transport aircraft are causing develop-
ment costs to become larger than any
one U.S. manufacturer's financial capa-
bility.
Both the aerospace and the airline
industry have incurred large long-term
debts which seriously affect their profits.
U. S. airlines are hard pressed to obtain
financing for the purchase of new and
advanced aircraft.
Disruptive instabilities in the aerospace
industry and in its civil markets must be
alleviated in the national interest.
• Government-guaranteed loans for new
development programs and for aircraft
purchases would contribute to financial
stability in the aviation industries.
• The effects of fare changes on traffic and
on profits are not well known. Studies
are needed to determine the effects of
government regulation of fares and com-
petition on the airline industry.
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RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES
Impartial, in-depth studies are needed to
determine the probable effects of a wide range of
possible Government actions. The studies should
include, but not be limited to, the effect of:
• "De-regulating" completely or, in part,
airline routings and fare structures. This
would permit the "free market" to deter-
mine the future posture of the air carrier
industry.
• Permitting competition to continue but
under further restraints, such as allowing
no more than two airlines to compete
between most city pairs.
• Establishing the airlines completely as
public utilities. Implicit in this arrange-
ment would be virtually guaranteed
profits rather than the present "target"
rates of return, plus increased regulation
of activities.
In addition, it is recommended that the
following actions be considered, as measures to
increase the capability of, and the options for,
financing the development and purchase of new
air transport systems.
• Government financial underwriting for
U.S. manufacturers, with payback and
profit to the Government through royal-
ties as aircraft are sold.
• Government-guaranteed loans for pur-
chase of aircraft by the airlines. Under
such arrangements the private sector
could be more liberal in commitments
for large, longer term loans. Precedents
have been set for such actions; the Ice
was permitted to guarantee loans for the
railroads; DOT is authorized to guarantee
loans to local, feeder, and short-haul air-
lines fief. 1 2).
• Reintroduction of the investment tax
credit for the purchase of new air trans-
port systems. Such financial support
could stimulate new developments.
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FOREIGN COMPETITION
BACKGROUND
Since World War II, the U. S. aircraft industry
has enjoyed the dominant share of the aircraft
market in foreign countries and has had relatively
little competition from abroad for the market in
the United States. One of the principal reasons
for this success has been the technical,
production, and economic superiority of U. S. air-
craft and parts.
This superiority was due in great part to the
large bank of available R&D data that existed at
the end of World War 1I and which the commer-
cial aircraft and component manufacturers were
able to develop quickly and economically into
commercial products. The U.S. Government
sponsorship of R&D efforts began to increase
significantly long before World War 1I when it was
realized that the United States was falling far
behind European countries in aeronautical tech-
nology.
Foreign concerns and governments are now
concentrating greater technical, financial, and
political efforts on capturing world aviation mar-
kets. They seek to become less dependent on the
United States for commercial and military air-
craft, and hope to gain a significant share of the
U. S. domestic market.
Another significant reason for the superiority
of U.S. commercial aircraft products is the
domestic competition that has existed among the
major U.S. aircraft manufacturers for the U.S.
airline market, the major market for two decades
following World War I1. In addition, the sale of
U.S. aircraft overseas has been aided by the
"total-package" approach. Training, spares,
repairs, full-time service personnel, and some
financing are generally provided with the aircraft.
Under this approach, a wide spectrum (or
"family") of aircraft has also been developed to
fit the varying needs of airlines. But now aircraft
industries in Western Europe and Japan have suf-
ficient strength to begin to offer the same "total
package" as U.S. manufacturers. In some cases
they are outbidding U. S. concerns, particularly
with respect to financing. As a result, U. S. indus-
try may have to accept a significantly smaller
share of the world market.
U. S. AIR CARRIER COMPETITION FOR
INTERNATIONAL MARKETS
Airline passenger traffic is expected to grow
about five times between 1970 and 1985 through-
out the free world (Table 5.6). The U. S. share of
this traffic cannot be expected to grow propor-
tionally. Foreign-flag air carriers are overcoming
the economic setbacks of World War 11 and are
extending their routes into markets previously
served almost exclusively by U. S. carriers.
In international transportation, foreign car-
riers have grown more rapidly than the U. S. car-
riers in recent years. To reduce cost, inter-airline
consortia have been formed to standardize
equipment, reduce maintenance and training costs
TABLE 5.6. FORECAST OF FREE-WORLD AND
U. S. SCHEDULED PASSENGER-MILES AND
U. S. SHARE OF TOTAL
PASSENGER-MILES IN
1970
SCHEDULED SERVICE
1975 1980 1985
TOTAL FREE WORLD,
242 460 800 1,300
BILLIONS
U.S. DOMESTIC
AND INTERNATIONAL, 57 54 52 50 !
PERCENT OF FREE WORLD
and spare parts inventories. In addition, they are
maintaining a competitive position by buying the
most modern equipment. They can, however, no
longer be considered captive markets for U. S. air
transport equipment. Improvement in the margin
of technical and economic superiority, coupled
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withliberalizedfinancing terms, should assure the
continued sales of U. S. equipment abroad.
Foreign governments are also moving to
strengthen their aircraft manufacturing industries
by encouraging the formation of multinational
consortia. While U.S. companies are also
acquiring foreign partners, it seems likely that the
foreign consortia have more to gain than the
United States from internationalization.
U. S. SALES OF AVIATION PRODUCTS IN
FOREIGN MARKETS
With the introduction of the DC-3 in 1936,
American-made aircraft began to establish a
strong position in world markets. In 1958, 83% of
the transport aircraft in operation in the free
world were of American manufacturer (ref. 1).
That proportion has declined but, supported by
the world-wide popularity or American-made jets,
it is still about 76% (ref. 2).
The advantage which the United States has
enjoyed as a result of transforming a large tech-
nology base into commercially attractive products
is declining at an accelerating rate as foreign man-
ufacturers strengthen their aviation industry. It is
essential that research and development efforts in
this country- specifically directed toward civil
aviation requirements - be increased if U. S. pre-
eminence in world aviation markets is to be main-
tained. In addition, aid to assure that U. S. manu-
facturers are able to offer financial terms at least
as attractive as their foreign competitors, is essen-
tial.
Foreign manufacturers are quite familiar with
the technologies currently used by U. S. airplane
and component manufacturers. Furthermore,
their governments are assisting them by under-
writing innovative R&D programs. Some
foreign-built aircraft and items of equipment have
already attained a quality equal or superior to
products from the United States. A few examples
of technical equality include:
• Vickers VC-10jet aircraft
• Rolls-Royce turbine engines
• Nihon YS-11 turboprop aircraft
• Numerous avionic items
• All-weather operating equipment
Examples of foreign superiority are:
• Lift engines
• Cold-weather operating equipment and
techniques employed by Canada,
Sweden, and the U.S.S.R.
• V/STOL aircraft
Foreign purchases of U. S. civilian-type avia-
tion products (e.g., aircraft engines, parts, and
accessories) accounted for about 35% of the
industry's sales from 1958 to 1969 (ref. 1). A
major U.S. airframe manufacturer estimated in
1970 that the combined dollar value of passenger
and cargo aircr.aft required by the world's airlines
from 1970 through 1980 will be about
$88 billion- $52 billion for the United States
and $36 billion for foreign suppliers (ref. 2). This
forecast indicates that the ratio between domestic
and foreign sales may be expected to continue
over this decade. The increasing size and complex-
ity of future transport aircraft and the resulting
increase in the cost of development, construction,
and testing may exceed any single manufacturer's
financial capabilities. Financial commitments
presently facing the three major U. S. transport
airframe manufacturers (Boeing, Douglas, and
Lockheed) are several times their combined net
worth ($1.43 billion reported in 1969 (ref. 3)).
McDonnell Douglas Corporation, for example, had
a net worth of $315 million in 1969. By the time
the first DC-10 is delivered to an airline in 1971,
the net worth is estimated to be $400 million, but
the company will have invested $1.25 billion in
that program (ref. 2). Indications are that Boeing
and Lockheed face similar situations with the 747
and the L-1011 programs.
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Foreignairlineshavebecomemuchmore
demandingthanin thepastwithregardto financ-
ingtermsfor the purchaseof U.S.-builtaircraft
andequipment.In additionto directloansand
subsidiesto theirmanufacturers,foreigngovern-
mentshaveshownwillingnessto supporttheir
industrymarketingeffortsby meansof attractive
financingarrangements,includinglongerpayback
periodsthanthoselegallypermittedby theU.S.
Export-ImportBank.Theyhavealsoadopted
practiceseliminatingrequirementsfor supplier
financialparticipationandfor guaranteesfrom
the governmentof the purchaser;insomecases,
theyarealsoprovidingsubstantiallyowerinterest
rates.
Since1945, the Export-Import Bank of the
United States has been the principal lending insti-
tution participating in the financing of U.S.
export products. It has made outstanding
improvements within the past two years in
arrangements for financing U. S.-built commercial
transports for foreign airlines. The Bank, how-
ever, is handicapped by certain statutory and pro-
cedural factors, it is restricted by a statutory limi-
tation to $13.5 billion for export financing
(refs. 4 and 5). In addition, in 1968 the Bank was
brought into the Federal Government's "Unified
Budget" process, requiring it to operate under an
annual appropriation procedure, thus reducing
its ability to operate as a separate profit-making
entity.
Despite the Export-import Bank's active par-
ticipation in the initial round of wide-body tri-jet
ordering, the highly competitive situation per-
mitted the foreign airlines to demand and secure
increased financial participation from U. S. manu-
facturers. This required the manufacturers to
obtain additional financing from private and
expensive sources to make up for the limitation in
Export-import Bank participation. Today many
foreign governments offer much better terms for
the purchase of aircraft equipment. The U. S. is
likely to meet increasingly stiff competition in
financing. The annual appropriation process of
the Export-Import Bank compounds the problem
of lending because aircraft financing is inherently
long term.
The value of the aerospace industry to U. S.
export trade is illustrated by Table 5.7.
TABLE 5.7. U. S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY EXPORTS
AND IMPORTS, 1969 (IN MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS)
EXPO RTS
i i tM TOTAL
CIVIL MILITARY TOTAL
AIRCRAFT 1,236 618 1,854 104
ENGINES 102 51 153 31
ACCESSORIES,
ETC. 610 377 987 171
MISSILES, ETC. 157 157
TOTAL
Source: Ref. 1.
The aerospace contribution toward a favor-
able balance of trade in 1969 was $2.8 billion.
The net balance of trade for the United States in
1969 was only $1.6 billion. Between 1965 and
1969, the aircraft industry contributed 58.9% of
the total favorable balance of trade, with civil air-
craft contributing 34.6% (ref. 2).
The economic importance of the foreign mar-
kets for the U. S. aircraft industry lies not only in
generating a favorable balance of trade but also in
providing the major source for potential profits
and longer production runs, resulting in lower
manufacturing costs. This is reflected in lower air-
craft and equipment costs and in lower operating
costs for U. S. airlines.
General Aviation
General aviation aircraft form a foundation
for all civil and military aviation activities. Nearly
all pilots first learn to fly in this type of aircraft.
General aviation is the fastest growing category of
aviation products in the world market. Its growth
has been stimulated by an increasing realization
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of thevalueof discretionarymobilityandspeed
offered by general aviation aircraft.
As with transport aircraft, U.S. manufac-
turers of general aviation aircraft in the past have
dominated the world market, largely because of
technical superiority, pricing policies, marketing
techniques, and aftersales support of their prod-
ucts. Foreign manufacturers are now, however,
providing real competition to U.S. export and
domestic sales.
The potential of the general aviation aircraft
market can be seen in Table 5.8. The data for the
year ending 1969 are for licensed aircraft in active
use. The free-world forecasts for 1975 and 1980
are based on growth trends as published by the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
in May 1970 (ref. 6). The forecasts for the United
States were made by the FAA in January 1970
(ref. 7).
Between 1960 and 1969, the U. S. general
aviation industry increased its annual export units
from about 1,500 with a value of $47 million, to
2,500 units, with a value of $150 million. The
total exports of general aviation aircraft from
1960 through 1969 were 20,512 units, with a
value of $990.5 million.
During this same decade, foreign manufac-
turers of general aviation aircraft increased their
annual export sales from about 200 units to
nearly 900 units. The value of these exports has
increased from some $5 million to $125 million
annually.
The value per unit exported by both U. S.
and foreign general aviation mmufacturers has
also increased significantly. This trend is expected
to continue. In 1960 the average value per general
aviation aircraft unit exported by both foreign
and U.S. manufacturers was about $30,000. In
1969, however, while the average value per unit
exported by U. S. manufacturers had increased to
approximately $63,000, the value for
foreign-manufactured exports had risen to about
$140,000 per unit. This seems to indicate that
foreign manufacturers are concentrating more on
sophisticated business aircraft than on personal or
pleasure aircraft. Because of increasing foreign
competition in the decades ahead, the U. S. share
of the total free-world general aviation fleet is
expected to drop from 79% in 1969 to about 64%
by 1980.
CHANGING WORLDWIDE COMPETITIVE
CONDITIONS
Most flee-world governments now recognize
the great value of civil aviation activity, both
manufacturing and operating, as an instrument of
national and regional policy. Accordingly, they
are providing direct financial and political support
to developments that benefit their civil aviation
TABLE 5.8. FORECAST OF NUMBER OF FREE-WORLD AND U.S. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT
PERIOD TOTAL FREE WORLD
1969 FLEET, ACTUAL 177,258
1975 FLEET. PROJECTION 260,400
1980 FLEET, PROJECTION 350,400
............................ I ' II I ii ¸
FREE WORLD,
UNITED STATES EXCLUDING
UNITED STATES
130,118 a 47,140
178,000 82,400
225,000 125,400
I
aNumber actually used and floum as distinguished from the number of eligible aircraft (130,806). As shown in other
sections of this report, the number at the beginning of 1969 was 124,23 7.
Source: Based on refs. 6, 7.
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activities.BritishandFrenchGovernmentcon-
tributionsfor research,development,andproduc-
tion facilitiesfor theConcorde,for example,will
exceed$2billion. Financingfor the European
consortiumA-300 airbusseemsassuredand
involvesbackingbygovernmentsof theEuropean
EconomicCommunityof about $400million.
Now that the British Aircraft Corporation
twin-engine,wide-bodiedairbus(BAC311)has
beendropped,theotherpartnersin theEuropean
EconomicCommunityare pressingthe U.K.
Governmentto participatein theA-300program.
WithoutofficialparticipationbytheGovernment
of the UnitedKingdom,the HawkerSiddeley
Companyhasinvestedabout$35millionof its
ownprivatecapitalin theA-300program.
TheJapaneseGovernment is also strongly
supporting the development and expansion of its
civil aviation activities. In addition to continuing
production of the standard YS-11 twin-engine
turboprop transports, Nihon Aeroplane Manufac-
turing Company is now offering, with government
backing (up to 100% of the net worth of the
company), four-engine turboprop STOL and
twin-engine jet versions of this aircraft. The
60-seat twin-jet version YS-11J is being offered at
a price slightly over $2 million delivered in the
United States, with very liberal financing terms.
There is no comparable U.S. product being
offered, although at least four U. S. local service
airlines have expressed more than casual interest
in this program. Nihon Manufacturing is also
developing, with government backing, the
100-plus passenger tri-jet YS-33. It is expected to
be operational by 1974 and will be directly com-
petitive with the DC-9, B-737, and B-727 aircraft,
particularly on the mainland of Asia. Boeing is
considering entering into a joint program with
Nihon to build a 200-seat airplane. American
manufacturers may look increasingly for a
low-cost labor market in the future to be able to
compete more effectively for the short-haul
market.
In the postwar years, American manufac-
turers enjoyed an assured U. S. domestic market
of sufficient size to break even on development,
manufacturing, and testing costs on almost all
new aircraft introduced. Export sales were the
major source of profits. In contrast. European
builders have been restrained by the realization
that they could expect to break even on a new
aircraft only if substantial export sales could be
achieved. In the face of tariff and other trade
barriers, and severe American competition, they
were seldom inclined to take the risk. Further-
more, their inadequate capitalizations and
management policies resulted in protracted devel-
opment times which allowed the United States to
capture the bulk of the market, as in the cases of
the 707 and DC-8 versus the VC-10. The forma-
tion of consortia will undoubtedly relieve many
of these constraints. Concurrently, the reduction
of trade barriers among the European partners
will confer significant advantages on their own
aircraft vis-a-vis American models.
The impact of foreign government participa-
tion in the manufacturing, marketing, financial,
and political aspects of the air transport industry
is increasing at an accelerating rate. The percent-
age of all transport aircraft of U. S. manufacturer
flown by airlines of the free world has declined
during the past 10 years. The continuing trend of
penetration by foreign transport aircraft is evi-
dent. Normally, 63% of the total foreign fleets
have been of U. S. manufacturer, but aircraft on
order from U. S. manufacturers has fallen to 59%
(ref. 8). Table 5.9 shows the U. S. manufacturers'
share of the free-world aircraft fleet and aircraft
on order as of December 31, 1969. Although the
difference in the number of aircraft is not yet
great, the avowed intent of foreign manufacturers
and governments, if inadequately countered by
the United States, will significantly change the
fleet composition.
Foreign Sales of Aviation I¥oducts in
tile United States
U. S. airlines have paid deposits to ensure
delivery positions on 38 Anglo-French supersonic
Concorde transports valued at over $900 million.
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TABLE 5.9. FREE-WORLD AND U. S. FLEET
SIZE AND AIRCRAFT ON ORDER AS OF
DECEMBER 31, 1969
FLEET STATUS
AIRCRAFT
NO. PERCENT
PRESENTFREE'WORLD AIRLINE
FLEET SIZE 6,711
U.S.MANUFACTURERS' SHARE 76
i
TOTAL ON ORDER (UNOELIVEREO) 1,166 i
U.S. MANUFACTURERS'SHARE 899 i 77
U.S.AIRLINES FLEET 2,736
U.S.AIRLINES FLEET OF FOREIGN
MANUFACTURERS" AIRCRAFT 174 6
FOREIGN AIRLINES FLEET 3,975
FOREIGN AIRLINES FLEET OF U.S.
MANUFACTURERS' AIRCRAFT 2,524 63
U.S. AIRLINES ON ORDER,TOTAL 608
U.S. AIRLINES ON ORDER FROM
FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS 38 6
FOREIGN AIRLINES ON ORDER,TOTAL 558
FOREIGN AIRLINES ON ORDER FROM U.S. 329 59
Source: Ref. 8.
Flight simulators from the United Kingdom,
valued at over $20 million, are being placed in
service by U.S. airlines. Canada and Italy are
making major assemblies for McDonnell Douglas
transports, and if the current financial crisis at
Rolls-Royce can be resolved, it may still supply
the engines for the Lockheed L-1011 transports.
Unless competing U. S. aircraft are developed
soon, the Japanese may make significant inroads
into the U. S. short-haul CTOL markets with their
economical YS-11's. These requirements are cur-
rently served mainly by obsolete aircraft, some of
which have been modified to turboprop versions.
The YS-11 has been fully accepted by the opera-
tors and traveling public as an excellent aircraft.
If the A-300 wide-body twin-engine airbus pro-
gram is successful in excluding competing U. S.
products from Europe and European areas of
influence, it is entirely possible that a large por-
tion of the U. S. requirement for this type of air-
craft (estimated by a major airframe manufac-
turer to be about 600 aircraft worth $8 billion in
the next decade) could be filled by foreign-built
aircraft. If the foreign market potential is seri-
ously reduced, U. S. manufacturers will be reluc-
tant to compete on a marginal profit basis.
Most STOL aircraft developments are in
Europe and Canada, and more recently in Japan.
A recent aeronautics study for the Science
Council of Canada recommended that the
Canadian aircraft industry concentrate on the
development of V/STOL systems, with Govern-
ment financial and facility assistance for the
necessary R&D (ref. 9). If VTOL and STOL
short-haul interurban system development is
delayed any longer in the United States, foreign
manufacturers will have a competitive edge which
will adversely affect the U.S. share of the total
market.
Competitive Trends
The Transportation Products Division of the
U.S. Department of Commerce has noted the
f,_llowing trends:
• Production consortia are emerging as a
key hope for European aerospace com-
panies to generate a strengthened com-
petitive posture vis-a-vis U.S.
manufacturers in the world market.
• During the next two decades the demand
for aircraft by European airlines and mili-
tary forces will be very large. If these air-
craft are manufactured mainly outside
Europe, the European balance of trade
will be seriously handicapped. Another
factor dictating the further development
and strengthening of the European air-
craft industries is the stimulus that the
aircraft industry provides to many allied
industries, such as electronics and com-
puters, which helps Europe to continue
to be a leader in the advanced
technologies.
• The U. S. wide-bodied tri-jets, along with
the Boeing 747's, are being sold world-
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wide. Of the some700 DC-10'sthat
McDonnellDouglasexpectsto sellby
1983,between300and400will bepur-
chasedby foreigncarriers.Lockheed's
forecastsare similarand foreseethat
about 200 L-1011'swill be sold in
Europealoneby 1980.Bothcompanies,
aswellasGeneralElectric,acknowledge
a trendtoward"quid pro quoaccords"
in internationalaircraftsales,meaning
that U.S.manufacturerswishingto sell
aircraftabroadwill find it advantageous
to arrangefor manufacturingparticipa-
tionbythecountriesinvolved.
Withregardto thelastpoint,advancedU.S.
technology,suchastitaniumstructures,canhelp
the UnitedStatesmaintainits leadershipbykeep-
ing virtually100%of theproductionprogram
for newU.S.aircraftconfinedto U.S. plants.
This cancombatthe increasingtendencyfor
foreignbuyersto demand"offsetagreements"on
theproductionof aircraftbasedonexistingtech-
nologywhichsubstantiallydecreaseU.S.balance-
of-paymentsposturein foreignsales.
In anticipationof competingin theU.S.mar-
ket with the Yak-40,the U.S.S.R.isexpressing
willingnessto equiptheaircraftwith U.S.-built
enginesandwithU.S.avionicsproducts,adirect
reversalof its previousposition.Significant
improvementsin the qualityof its salesbro-
chures,itswillingnessto exchanget chnicalinfor-
mation,and greatlyimprovedproduct-support
planningis furtherevidenceof the seriousness of
its intent to penetrate the market. Other civilian
aircraft already flying and being offered for sale
to free-world airlines by the U.S.S.R. include:
Tu-144, supersonic transport (Mach 2.3)
I1-62, four turbofan engines, 180-passenger,
similar to the VC-10.
Tu-154, three turbofan engines,
150-passenger, similar to the B-727.
The Russian airline Aeroflot has been increas-
ingly interested in worldwide acceptance and has
recently requested membership in the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association. This is the first
step toward entering the competitive market in
world airline travel.
The introduction of the A-300 European
wide-body twin-engine jet will make inroads into
the U. S. wide-body tri-jet market.. More impor-
tantly, the A-300 would be in direct competition
with possible twin-engine derivatives of the U. S.
tri-jets.
Although the U.S.S.R. has not been a serious
competitor in the free-world international air
transport market, its fast-improving technology
and strong desire to enter this field could make it
a strong contender before 1985. The U.S.S.R. was
officially accepted recently as a member of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
This membership is a first and vital step towards
the recognition of Russian transport and other
civil aircraft by the free-world's certification
bodies. Three 30-seat Yak-40 tri-jets were recent-
ly sold (on a barter basis) to the airline in
Afghanistan for $500,000 each, with an interest
rate of 1-1/2%, and repayment in 30 years.
CONCLUSIONS
• The United States is facing rapidly
increasing competition from foreign air-
lines and aircraft/component manufac-
turers. This competition is challenging
U. S. leadership in the commercial avia-
tion industry, particularly through
foreign government support and financ-
ing of their aircraft/component manufac-
turers. Private U. S. companies with their
large but limited financing capacity will
find it increasingly difficult to stand up
to foreign government supported compe-
tition.
• Coincident with this emerging foreign
competition, the U. S. aerospace industry
is losing its financial and technical vital-
ity due to reduced financial ability of
U. S. airlines to purchase new equipment
and to large cost increases. These factors
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haveweakenedtheindustry'scapacityto
challengethe newforeigncompetition.
It will requirecooperativeeffortsbythe
U.S. aerospaceindustryandthe U.S.
Governmentto assurethat the aircraft
exportmarketsarenotlost.
The UnitedStateshasmaintainedits
leadershipositionby translatingasub-
stantialtechnologicalbaseinto highly
desirableproducts.Theheavyemphasis
on development,coupledwith superior
productiontechniquesandafter-salesser-
vicing, havebeenkey factorsin the
attainmentof thisleadershiposition.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Concentrationon strengtheningthe
domesticmarketwill keep the civil avia-
tion industry favorably competitive in
world markets. Therefore, it is recom-
mended that joint Government-industry
efforts particularly concentrate on the
development of quieter, cleaner, and
more efficient engines, and the develop-
vehicles and short-haul systems.
• If military procurement of vehicles
should decrease, an important source of
production "know-how" will dissipate. It
will be important to initiate R&D on pro-
duction techniques to make up for any
significant decrease in the volume of
military-vehicle manufacturing.
• Greater flexibility of company-sponsored
research and development programs, in
the form of recognizing them as allow-
able expenses (IR&D), under Govern-
ment contract should be encouraged.
• The capability of private lending institu-
tions and the Export-Import Bank to
offer more attractive financing for export
sales should be increased by:
• Increasing the statutory limit of
$13. 5 billion on the Export-Import
Bank to at least $20 billion to reflect
the increased costs of new civil
aviation exports.
Increasing the participation allow-
ances of the Export-Import Bank
financing to the previously permitted
level.
Dissociating the receipts and dis-
bursements of the Export-Import
Bank from the budgets of the
Federal Government and exempting
such receipts and disbursements
from limitations on annual
expenditures and net lending.
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MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO CIVIL
AVIATION
INTRODUCTION
It has been suggested (ref. 1) that military
R&D in the future will be of less benefit to civil
aviation because of a divergence between civil and
military aeronautical requirements. On further
consideration of this question, one of the points
explictly covered by the Senate Committee on
Aeronautical and Space Sciences in recommend-
ing that the present study be made was that the
"study might also include a detailed analysis of
the divergence of military and civilian aeronauti-
cal requirements in order to assess better the
diminishing benefits to civil needs from military
R&D" (ref. 2).
CHARACTER OF MILITARY
AERONAUTICAL R&D
Military R&D is basically oriented toward the
development of complete weapons systems to
support national defense. Recognizing this crucial
necessity for ' _ • _1 weai)ui_ls 'tecnnoiog_ca_y sup_iu_
the Congress provided for the Department of
Defense (DOD) to engage in R&D on weapons
systems and other military requirements. Thus,
military R&D programs in aeronautics are aimed
toward the solution of military problems and not
to the direct support of civil aviation R&D. How-
ever, the aeronautical technology produced for
military programs in the aircraft industry is gener-
ally available for use in civil aviation applications,
except for limited national security exclusions.
HISTORICAL FACTORS IN AVIATION
DEVELOPMENT
From the days when the World War I
Handley Page bomber was converted to a com-
mercial transport to the present-day thrust into
the supersonic regime, military aircraft have often
paved the way for advances in commercial avia-
tion. The basic necessity for the development of
technologically superior weapons has contributed
to the rapid rate of aircraft obsolescence, which,
along with commercial competition, has stimu-
lated aircraft design changes within the aviation
industry. Thus, the design competitions of proto-
type aircraft for military aviation have frequently
provided an impetus to better performance of
civil aircraft (ref. 3). For example, even the casual
observer readily detects a similarity in the
present-day commercial jet transport to the
B-47, B-52, and KC-135 military aircraft. Also,
military R&D programs have led to the design and
production of many of the basic aircraft engines
that have been used in commercial aircraft
(ref. 4).
A review of the growth of the aircraft indus-
try in the United States leads to the observation
that the industry's development has also been
influenced largely by factors peculiar to specific
time periods (ref. 5). Figure5.13 shows the
impacts starting with World War I and the produc-
tion of 13,991 military aircraft in 1918 (ref. 6).
While this aircraft production, sparked by the
Liberty engine of 1917, was of little significance
in the overall war effort, it did establish the begin-
ning of the U. S. aircraft industry. The boom in
civil aircraft demand, highlighted by Lindberg's
flight in 1927 was short-lived; the sharp falloff in
this early demand for civil aircraft was coincident
with the depression. The industry's founders did
recognize, however, the need for establishing
national policies directed toward developing com-
mercial aviation as a necessary element for
dynamic growth of the industry. The sustaining
effect of Government contracts for producing
military aircraft and carrying mail also affected
the future structure of the industry.
The modern civil airliner was born in 1933
when early twin-engine transport prototype air-
craft, such as the Boeing 247 and the
Douglas DC-1, made their initial flights (ref. 7).
These were the first transport aircraft designs
offering the commercial aviation passenger the
promise of speed, reliability, and comfort with
upholstered, fitted seats and balanced acoustic
cabin designs. By 1940, the four-engine Boeing
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Figure 5.13. U. S. aircraft production, all types. Source: Refi 6.
Stratoliner, the first pressurized airliner, was
carrying airline passengers at 215 mph (ref. 8).
That aircraft used B-17C wings, tail designs, and
supercharged engines.
The period from 1940 through 1945 includes
the aircraft developments and immense
production expansion of World War 11, during
which U.S. aircraft industry produced about
300,000 aircraft of all types at a cost of about
$45 billion. The "Jet Age" that found its opera-
tional beginnings during World War II was based
on experimental engine developments in Great
Britain and Germany during the 1930's. The
British turbojet engine design of Frank Whittle
first ran successfully on a testbed in 1937.
Modified Whittle designs flew in a Gloster
E. 28/29 in 1941 and became operational in the
Meteor fighter in 1944. A turbojet engine based
on Whittle's designs powered the F-80 Shooting
Star fighter for the U.S. Air Force in 1944
(ref. 9).
In 1946 the virtual shutdown of military air-
craft production was accompanied by a convul-
sive shift to civil aircraft production that was
short-lived and led into the postwar contraction
in the industry. From 1950 to 1970, military
R&D had major effects on civil aviation that sup-
ported civil aircraft production growth even while
military aircraft production decreased.
The helicopter also emerged from experimen-
tal status with the production of the Sikorsky
R-4B for the Army in 1942 and soon thereafter
other manufacturers began producing helicopters
of similar configuration, such as the Bell
Model 30.
Figure 5.14. Civil aircraft sales as a percentage of total
(civil plus Government) sales. Sales of complete
aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, and parts to U.S.
Government and others (curve smoothed). Source:
Ref. 6.
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AIRCRAFTSALES
Militaryaircraftdollarsalestillrepresentthe
majorportion of total U.S. aircraft industry
sales,but thecivilsectorof themarkethasgrown
steadilyduringthe past15years,ascanbeseen
from Figure5.14.Althoughthis sectionof the
reportprovidesafocusonthemilitaryinfluences
in theaircraftindustry,it isalsopertinenttokeep
the defenseaspectsof commercialaviationin
properperspective.Thecommercialsectornot
only providesthe Civil ReserveAir Fleet,but
there cannotbe, in all reality,the necessary
militaryaviationwithout a strongcivil aviation
industry capableof quickly respondingto
increasedmilitaryproductioneeds.
SIGNIFICANCEOF MILITARY
R&D TO CIVIL AVIATION
From today's perspective, it is apparent that
military aviation developments have directly
influenced the growth of the commercial aviation
industry in both its producti,_n capabilities and its
technology base. The benefits accruing to civil
aviation cover nearly every phase of aviation, but
are essentially derived from two major influences
of military programs: (1) indirect economic sup-
port by fiscal expenditures for military programs;
and (2) direct economic support of the develop-
ment of new technology.
Aeronautical R &D Funding
The aeronautical industry is technically
oriented, and its growth requires a strong national
technological base. The level of funds for research
and development is one measure of the activities
contributing to this technology base. Federal
funds, most of which come from DOD programs,
as noted in Figure 5.15, represent about
two-thirds of the total annual aeronautical R&D
funds (ref. 10). The major portion of the non-
defense Federal expenditures supported the aero-
nautical R&D activities of NASA and DOT.
aData on composite aeronautical R&D funding include
estimates for R&D facilities construction, salaries, and
allowances for other support costs. Federal contracts for
production, as opposed to contracts for research and
development, provide about one'-half of industry R&D
funds as allowable costs under Federal contracts.
Figure 5.15. Aeronautical R&D funding. Source: Refi 10.
Utilization in civil aviation of the aeronauti-
cal technology derived from military programs
can be extensively illustrated. However, an anal-
ysis made by the Joint Study indicates that
although advances in aeronautical technology
derived from military R&D have potential for
substantial application to civil aviation needs, it is
the prototype aircraft developments, of all types,
that contribute most directly to the industry's
overall capability to maintain design and produc-
tion leadership.
The estimated distribution of DOD funds
between prototype aircraft developments and
activities in the technical disciplines is shown in
Figure 5.16. This figure shows that although (on a
constant dollar basis) DOD-sponsored funding for
prototype development (the major part of aero-
nautical R&D funding) declined from the 1963
peak, the trend was reversed in fiscal year 1970
(ref. 10). Military funding for research and tech-
nology represents an average of about 30% of the
total defense aeronautical R&D funds and, in
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recent years, is estimated to represent annual
funding levels between $200 and $300 million.
An assessment of Air Force projects resulted in
an appraisal that as much as 50% of the funds
expended toward advancing military technology
in the aeronautical disciplines cover areas in
advanced technology that are potentially useful
to civil aviation.
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 compare broadly
derived aeronautical activity data that include
manpower cost factors. Therefore, numerical
values do not directly reflect the Federal R&D
budget figures of the agencies aad departments.
Development of New Technology
The development of any aeronautical system
depends upon the availability of technology to
satisfy its operational demands. The accumulation
of a technology data base is a continuing process,
and in general, progress is dependent upon the
continued utilization of resources. Technology,
aData derived from several sources including selection of
those pr¢qects considered to be aeronautics oriented from
DOD RDT&E "Project List" and estimates for construc-
tion obligations for aeronautical R&D facilities. Estimates
fi)r salaries and other support costs are also added to the
selected projects funding obligations.
Figure 5.16. Distribution of DOD aeronautical R&D
funds. Source: Ref. 10.
like science, involves commonality in skills and
knowledge, which results in a general transfer of
technology within industry and Government to
meet the varying demands of civil and military
aviation. For example, military R&D in support
of the XB-70, YF-12 interceptor, and the
SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft advanced the tech-
nology base in structures, propulsion, and aero-
dynamics for Mach 3 flight, the civil considera-
tions of which are being further explored in joint
Air Force/NASA flight programs utilizing the
YF-12 aircraft and also in the civil supersonic
transport prototype development program. To
provide the technology to meet the needs of a
broad spectrum of military aircraft developments
and use by the military services, military aero-
nautical technology programs include such areas
as aircraft structures and materials, flight controls
and stabilization, aerodynamics, flight mechanics,
avionics, communications, navigation, tactical air
control and landing aids, safety and survivability,
noise, fuels, reliability and maintainability, rotors,
propellers, and propulsion. Research in future
composite structures for military aircraft offers
promise and is being observed closely for direct
civil application. Military-sponsored developments
in lightweight propeller structures and other
advanced propeller designs are contributing to the
current industry progress in shrouded prop-fan
concepts that could contribute to reducing
engine-noise levels of future transport aircraft.
Military research and development in propul-
sion have led to the development of virtually all
of the aviation engines in the United States. Since
the propulsion system directly affects aircraft per-
formance and is basic to aircraft designs, a close
interaction has always existed between the mili-
tary and civil sectors for the development of
new-engine technology. While engine manufac-
turers have a substantial financial burden in devel-
oping their own specific civil engine models to
most effectively meet various civil aircraft charac-
teristics, the basic engine technology has generally
been provided through military research. How-
ever, engine technology exchange is essentially a
complete two-way flow between the military and
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civil aviation sectors. For example, the private
sector developed the JT3D series turbofan
(fanjet) engines to increase the efficiency of
designs derived from the J57 military turbojet.
The success of these engines then led to the fur-
ther development of fanjet engines for military
applications.
Compressor technology for the very large tur-
bojet engines has its origin in the development of
the J93-GE-3 military turbojet for the experi-
mental XB-70A Mach 3 aerodynamic research
aircraft. More recently, the engine competition
for the Air Force C-5A resulted in the design of
the large TF-39 military and JT9D commercial
fanjet engines. The General Electric TF-39 was
selected for use in the C-5A, while the Pratt and
Whitney JT9D commercial engine derived from
STF-200 technology is now being used in the
Boeing 747 commercial transport. Also, the
General Electric CF-6 turbofan engine to be used
in the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 commercial
transport has been derived from TF-39 gas
generator and compressor designs, with the addi-
tion of new CF-6 fan and afterbody designs.
Besides the benefits derived from military
R&D, other Government-sponsored programs
contributing to jet-engine developments include
the NASA Quiet Engine Program and the develop-
ment of the civil GE-4 engine for the SST. It is
essential in cost-effective aircraft design to
suitably "marry" the best available engine tech-
nology to the desired airframe characteristics and
performance.
The Role of "New Starts" in Aircraft
Developments
For a period beginning in the early 1950's,
military aircraft were deemphasized in favor of
ballistic missiles and space activities. Despite this
deemphasis, the numbers of new starts per year
for military aircraft of all types in 1956, and in
1962, almost equalled the 1950 level. Such new
starts in aircraft development add to the design
expertise and exercise the R&D capabilities of the
aircraft industry. Since 1950, the production of
civil aircraft increased in two major steps
(Fig. 5.13); the 1958 high level of production can
be related to the many new DOD aircraft starts in
1950-52 (Fig. 5.17). The doubling in the level of
civil aircraft production in 1965 can be related to
the high levels of new military aircraft starts in
1956.
Technical Risk Considerations
Technical risk is an important consideration
in any development activity. The criteria for the
acceptability of risk are generally different for
military and civil aviation systems. Economic
viability is the dominant factor in development
leading to commercial applications, whereas
superior combat performance or the threat of
technical obsolescence is usually dominant in
developments leading to military aircraft weapons
systems. Thus, R&D for military equipment tends
to provide early operational application in aero-
nautical weapons systems of advanced propulsion,
aerodynamics, structures, and avionics technol-
ogy. When this occurs, it reduces the technical
risks that would otherwise be encountered in
applying the same technology to civil systems.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
1N REQUIREMENTS
One way to assess the potential for future
benefits that may accrue to civil aviation from
military R&D is to compare areas having some
degree of common interest. It has been recog-
nized that civil and military requirements result in
different emphasis on specific aircraft mission
characteristics (ref. 11). For example, efforts to
provide commercial transport versions of aerial
weapons carriers have generally proven unsuccess-
ful over the years (ref. 12). The mission differ-
ences have the greatest impact in the area of
development, that area in which the body of
knowledge is directed primarily at an end prod-
uct. Thus, there is little possibility that a
high performance military airplane designed as
an integrated aerial weapons system can be used
by civil aviation to any appreciable extent, even
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Figure 5.17. Annual number of aircraft development starts by the Department of Defense (including experimental
aircraft and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft of all types).
though substantial benefits may later be derived
from advances in aircraft production techniques
and subsystem components.
Utility Transportation, Special Activities, and
Logistic Support Transports
There is a substantial degree of commonality
between military and civil requirements relating
to light fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. For
rotary-wing aircraft, both civil and military
requirements directly relate to the helicopter's
ability to take off and land vertically and maneu-
ver in relatively short distances. Therefore, the
same vehicle concepts can accomplish special mili-
tary missions and yet have applicability, with
little change in basic design, to civil helicopter
operations. Development emphasis for future
military applications is expected to stress opera-
tional and maintenance simplicity, immediate
operational availability, low noise level and econ-
omy; these all should enhance the civil usage of
the aircraft. For light fixed-wing aircraft, military
requirements (for multipurpose utility aircraft for
utility transportation, combat-unit support, and
other special activities) have been met basically
by off-the-shelf procurement of commonly used
civil aviation aircraft. Examples of the wide vari-
ety of these aircraft, which are produced in both
military and civil versions, are listed in Table
5.10.
Also, military and commercial airline require-
ments for future medium-size STOL/VTOL
transport-type aircraft appear to have an apprecia-
ble degree of similar characteristics. The capabil-
ities airlines want for future short-haul
STOL/VTOL commercial transports are similar to
those being considered by the military for future
tactical airlift aircraft. Continuing coordination
between the airlines, aerospace industry, military,
and civil agencies will ensure that wherever prac-
tical, benefits in technology and hardware can be
applied in both civil and military sectors to meet
common requirements. However, considerations
of relative priorities and funding constraints
within the military and civil sectors indicate that
the initiative for early development of a new
medium STOL transport aircraft rests with the
civil sector.
Logistic Support Cargo Transports
The global military airlift capability provided
by such military transports as the four-engine
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TABLE 5.10. SELECTED ILLUSTRATIONS OF SIMILAR CIVIL-MILITARY VERSIONS OF
ROTARY-WING AND LIGHT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT
CIVIL MODELS MILITARY DESIGNATIONS AND MISSIONS
BELL MODEL 47G SERIES
BELL MODEL 205A
BELL MODEL 206A
(JET RANGER)
BELL TWIN 212
BOEING-VERTOL 107-11
HUGHES 506
HUGHES MODEL 269A
SIKORSKY S-58
SIKORSKY S-61A, S-61R
SIKORSKY S.65C
(SEA STALLION)
SIKORSKY S-64E
(SKYCRANE)
0H-13 G/T,
HTL 6/7
UH-1H
TH-57A,
OH-58A
UH-1N
CH-46A
OH-6A
TH-55A
CH-34
SH-31A
CH-3B
CH-53C
CH-54B
OBSERVATION,
TRAINING
UTILITY HELICOPTER, "HUEY"
TRAINING,
OBSERVATION
UTILITY HELICOPTER
CARGO, TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
LIGHT OBSERVATION HELICOPTER
TRAINER
LIGHT TACTICAL TRANSPORT
ASW HELICOPTER,
TACTICAL TRANSPORT
HEAVY TACTICAL (ASSAULT)
TRANSPORT
HEAVY-LIFT CARGO
LIGHT FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT
CIVIL MODELS MILITARY DESIGNATIONS AND MISSIONS
BEECHCRAFT QUEEN AIR
BEECHCRAFT B55 BARON
CESSNA MODEL 172
BEECHCRAFT QUEEN AIR 65
BEECHCRAFT MODEL 50
TWIN BONANZA
DE HAVILLAND BEAVER
DE HAVILLAND oI"rER
HELLO COURIER
BEECHCRAFT KING AIR
MODEL BBO
CESSNA MODEL R17 E
CESSNA MODEL 185 SKYWAGON
CESSNA MODEL 310
CESSNA MODEL 337
PIPER PA-23.250 AZTEC D
T41A
U-8F
U-8D
U-6A
U-1A
U-10
VC-BA
T41B,
T-41C
T-41D
U-17
U-3
0-2
U-11A
UTILITY TRANSPORT
ARMY, INSTRUMENT/TRANSITION
TRAINER
ARMY, SINGLE-ENGINE TRAINER
7-PLACE UTI LITY TRANSPO RT
6-PLACE COMMAND/LIAISON TRANSPORT
6-PLACE, SINGLE-ENGINE, UTILITY
11-PLACE UTILITY STOL
6-PLACE STOL UTILITY AIRCRAFT
LIGHT PERSONNEL TRANSPORT
ARMY, SINGLE-ENGINE TRAINER
LIGHT, SINGLE-ENGINE UTILITY
LIGHT, 13NIN-ENGINE UTILITY
LIGHT OBSERVATION AIRCRAFT
LIGHT, TWIN-ENGINE UTILITY
Douglas C-54 and Lockheed Constellation during
World War II significantly expanded concepts for
utilization of air transportation. Also
combat-support air operations of both sides in the
conflict highlighted the need for specialized
designs in military transport to handle bulky
military equipment and the capability to deliver
assault troops and their supplies to forward
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combat areas. The large six-engine German
Me 323 military transport appeared in Europe
with large nose-opening doors and a 10-wheel
landing gear mounted in the fuselage (ref. 13).
However, the design having only nose doors pre-
cluded the air-dropping of large equipment loads
to combat troops. Therefore, military transport
designs soon appeared with rear cargo doors. The
prototype XC-82 Fairchild Packet with clamshell
cargo doors in the rear flew in 1944 and was in
production for the Air Force by the end of World
War II.
Military developments, including the C-141
and the more recent C-SA, have contributed
heavily to the technology for cargo aircraft and
cargo-handling equipment. Military cargo, how-
ever, on the average has a density two or three
times that of civil cargo, and military cargo air-
craft must accommodate outside loads such as
tracked vehicles and helicopters (in contrast to
the standardized modular containers for which
future civil cargo aircraft will be designed).
Because of these and other specialized require-
ments, the operating costs for military cargo air-
craft have been higher than they would be for
commercial cargo designs, and commercial car-
riers have chosen to convert passenger aircraft to
cargo service rather than to purchase military
cargo aircraft.
Avionics Systems
Both civil and military aircraft are common
users of the National Airspace System, and conse-
quently there is a broad base of commonality in
requirements for avionics systems. Commercial,
military, and civil agencies are participating in
cooperative efforts to identify common require-
ments and standards in such areas as com-
muncations, aircraft identification, altitude
reporting, weather-data collection and reporting,
and the development of advanced aids in naviga-
tion and landing. Such cooperative efforts are
exemplified by the activities of Special Com-
mittee 117 of the Radio Technical Commission
for Aeronautics to define a system concept for a
new national precision guidance system for
approach and landing (ref. 14).
MILITARY/CIVIL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER PROCESS
Since many of the same developers of avia-
tion products serve both the civil and military
sectors, there is substantial transfer of technology
within the aerospace industry. This transfer is of
significant value to civil as well as military avia-
tion and, in general, functions effectively.
Government agencies involved in aeronautical
R&D are coordinated at various administrative
and policy levels through interagency agreements
and existing Government mechanisms, such as the
National Aeronautics and Space Council, the
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board
and its Panels, the NASA Research Advisory
Committees, the DOD Advisory Committee on
Federal Aviation, and the FAA's Defense Coordi-
nation Advisory Committee. These coordination
interfaces within the Government among the
DOD, NASA, and FAA appear to work
reasonably well.
Aeronautical R&D facilities operated by
Federal Government agencies and the military
services provide mutually supporting capabilities,
including exchange of trained personnel, which
impact upon both the civil and military sectors.
These facilities also provide extensive technical
experience in R&D program planning, systems
analysis techniques, and program management for
the development of complex systems that are of
potential benefit to the further development of
civil aviation. In this regard, the interface of
Government research and development personnel
is significant. In the normal day-to-day process of
formulating and implementing Government pro-
grams involving both the military and civil avia-
tion sectors, these personnel act as catalysts for
information and technology transfer through
close, personal interaction with manufacturers
and technical people across the entire aviation
spectrum.
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Another important segment of the transfer
process is the participation on an ad hoc basis of
aeronautically oriented professional and manage-
ment personnel in professional societies and in
advisory groups for both Government and indus-
try. Informal groups also exist in certain disci-
plines and, in fact, contribute significantly to
technology transfer at the engineering level. An
excellent example of such an informal group is
the Interagency Propulsion Panel composed of
propulsion engineers from NASA, DOD and its
agencies, and FAA. In the past such groups have
participated in the assessment of the feasibility of
applying a technology to a vehicle concept. Their
ability to function in this capacity stemmed from
their knowledge of the availability of the new
technology that traditionally comes partially
from NASA-sponsored aeronautical research,
military sponsored R&D, and privately funded
supplemental research. In the past this process has
been effective in fostering the rapid growth of
commercial aviation and the timely development
of new aircraft.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Military aviation and its development
have been major factors in the growth of
civil aviation. Although military R&D
programs are aimed toward the solution
of military problems, these programs
have and will continue to provide major
support for civil applications. Civil avia-
tion is interested primarily in the eco-
nomic aspects of aircraft performance,
while the military concentrates more on
the prevention of technological obsoles-
cence. Continuing advances in aeronauti-
cal technology will make military aircraft
obsolete and the military will have to
support the development of new types of
aircraft. Such new aircraft starts will, as
in the past, make it economically feasible
to produce new types of civil aircraft.
• There is a common technology base on
which aviation manufacturers draw to
produce aircraft designed to meet mili-
tary and civil requirements. Although
military oriented research and develop-
ment has had a significant impact on
aviation technology, in certain areas,
such as engine efficiency, the advances
stem from civil aviation requirements.
The switch of the dominant role from
military to civil needs has historically
been influenced by factors peculiar to
specific time periods. Civil aviation now
has the dominant role in the develop-
ment of at least one type of aircraft - a
short-haul STOL transport.
The direct economic influence on the
aircraft industry of aircraft sales to the
Government, as compared to the private
sector, has diminished during the past
15years because of the more rapid
growth experienced in civil aircraft sales.
However, sales to the U. S. Government
still represent more than half the total
dollar sales of the U. S. aircraft industry
and are important for the continued
strength of that industry.
The formal Government technology
transfer structure is effective. There also
is a reasonably effective informal transfer
process that operates through the trans-
fer of information from Government to
industry and among aeronautical manu-
facturers, by representatives serving on
coordinating groups. These processes
should be exploited, whenever it
becomes necessary to enhance the tech-
nology transfer process, by the mutual
exchange within Government of
technical personnel.
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Policy
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
INTRODUCTION
Nontechnical factors that impede the growth
of civil aviation and impede the application of the
results of research and development have been
explored. The specific objectives were: to identify
those institutional factors that inhibit the process
by which new or improved systems and equip-
ment are developed, implemented, and ultimately
operated in response to civil aviation needs: to
postulate alternative means (options) of removing
these inhibiting constraints: and to catalog the
advantages and disadvantages of the selection of
any given option as a guide to national policy
makers.
This section is based on data collected by a
series of more than 175 field interviews of key
persons in Government and industry. Interviewees
included suppliers, customers of civil aviation
R&D, Government officials at all levels, academi-
cians, and other participants in civil aviation. The
findings from the interviews have been categor-
ized into a number of factors constraining the
process by which the results of research and
development are effectively applied to the
improvement of civil air transportation. A full
report of the findings is contained in reference 1.
CATEGORIES OF CONSTRAINTS
AFFECTING THE CIVIL AVIATION
R&D PROCESS
Recognized Needs for New Civil Aviation
Technology Have Not Been Translated Into Effec-
tive Market Demand. Effective market demand
involves the readiness of consumers to pay for
what they want (their needs), and the willingness
of producers to commit resources to satisfy those
needs. In civil aviation there is a disparity
between established new technology needs and
their satisfaction; recognized needs for new avia-
tion technology have not been translated into a
clear market to which private enterprise can
respond. Without identifiable markets that offer
an opportunity for gain commensurate with the
risks involved, private industry has rationally
avoided committing its resources to meet needs
such as the "short-haul market," "the airways
market," or the "airport-access market."
The need for improved airport access has not
been translated into a visible market with profit
potential; as a consequence, private industry has
not invested its resources to satisfy this need. The
lackluster financial performance of urban mass
transit in the country has discouraged potential
energizers; costs of a fixed right-of-way system
are high, and a lack of market deters producers
from undertaking the required R&D. The people
who want improved airport access are probably
too few to be willing to pay a fare set on a fully
cost-reimbursable basis. It seems doubtful that pri-
vate enterprise will perceive a market for fixed
right-of-way access systems to airports - in terms
of making a reasonable return on investment - if
it must build and operate the system. Fragmenta-
tion of responsibility for parts of the total trip
and the resultant lack of a systems approach are
the major obstacles to progress on the access
problem. There is an urgent need for integration
of airport access planning with overall mass rapid
transit planning. The difficulties affect the
movement of air cargo as well as passengers.
A complete STOL system has long been dis-
cussed and studied as a possible solution to the
country's growing short-haul transportation
needs, yet it has not become a reality. No pro-
ducer of any segment of a STOL system can see a
market for his product until he is certain that all
other elements of the system will be ready to
operate when his is ready. The total costs of the
entire system must be reasonable if the fare level
is to be within reach of enough air passengers to
produce a sufficiently large demand to support
profitable service. No responsible participant in
the system can estimate confidently what the
total costs might be - or more importantly, what
his share of the total cost burden might be. In the
face of so many uncontrollable and unknown vari-
ables, no producer of any segment of a STOL
system has been willing to risk investing in it.
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In ATC one encounters traffic congestion,
travel delays, controller strikes and slowdowns,
and an increasing number of near-misses. All
clearly indicate that the Nation's air traffic
management system is not able to keep up with
the demands of civil aviation.
The issue is not, then, whether needs do or
do not exist, but why established needs are not
being met. Where needs exist, institutional factors
have often inhibited the development of an effec-
tive response, by preventing the emergence of a
firm and visible market for the need, and by limit-
ing the resources of potential suppliers (including
the R&D community) to produce, and users to
acquire new technology.
The Translation of Recognized Needs Into
Effective Market Demand is Inhibited by a Web
of Institutional Factors. The principal institu-
tional obstacles of the flow of new technology
into civil aviation may be categorized as attitudi-
nal, political, and financial. Clearly, there is a
great deal of overlap among these categories. A
constraint that is manifested as financial may
actually stem from political factors (e.g., specific
statutes or regulations). Nevertheless, by
categorizing constraints, however imperfectly, the
search for options to remove them is facilitated.
In this section, airports and STOL systems
are used to illustrate a number of constraints. Cer-
tainly, these are not the only problem areas in
civil aviation; but because they illustrate the over-
lap and interrelationship Of institutional con-
straints, and because of their obvious importance,
they have been discussed frequently.
• Attitudinal or social factors are those
based on attitudes that people have
adopted, whether for sound reasons or
not. Two important attitudinal factors
constraining the development and imple-
mentation of_new technology are a wide-
spread conviction that air transport is
important to only a small segment of the
population; and that aircraft are noisy,
threaten the safety of populated areas,
contribute to traffic jams, and create
other objectionable conditions. Improve-
ment of the civil aviation system is
indeed constrained by lack of a broad
constituency.
• Financial factors. Certain financial fac_
tors are transitory, due to cyclical
business patterns, while others are of a
more permanent nature. The most impor-
tant financial factor currently impeding
the R&D process is the depressed
economic condition of both the aero-
space and airline industries. The aero-
space industry is less willing and able to
commit resources to new technology; the
airline industry is less able and willingto
acquire and implement new technology.
The impact of financial factors within
industry may become more deleterious,
through managerial deficiencies stem-
ming from individual inadequacies,
organizational inefficiencies, or lack of
appropriate incentives.
• Political factors are those stemming from
existing legislation and the regulatory
policies that implement existing legisla-
tion. These factors also stem from atti-
tudes, Of course, but because they are
generally codified, in the form of
enabling legislation or regulatory policy
documents, they are subject to more
finite solutions, in that specific legal re,)i-
sions can be identified as goals for their
resolution. Managerial policies and proce-
dures are also included in this category.
These practices encompassbehavior that
is discretionary within existing legal and
regulatory parameters, and behavior
specified by law and regulation. In many
cases, it is difficult to separate managerial
behavior into distinct causal groups..
J
Attitudinal Factors
Aviation's limited political constituency is a
major obstacle inhibiting the translation of civil
a_,iati-on needs into effective market d_mand. This
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realitymust be considered in evaluating the likeli-
hood that major new or revised legislative, regula-
tory, or financial programs are politically feasible.
Flying- except for sport or pleasure - is essen-
tially a means of getting somewhere. One travels
by air to conduct business, to visit friends or rela-
tives, or to enjoy a vacation. Because whether to
travel or not is often a matter of choice and
because alternative transportation means exist, it
cannot be expected that civil aviation will be
valued by society as highly as new homes, for
example.
In fact, civil aviation is unpopular with many.
The rapid growth of civil aviation has been
accompanied by increasing and severe resistance
to the expansion of aviation activities. Since the
advent of the jets, aircraft movements at many
major airports have been increasingly restricted
during certain hours of the night. In response to
community demands to reduce noise and objec-
tionable factors arising frcnn aircraft operations,
other airports have limited their operations to
smaller aircraft. At least one community has peti-
tioned the Civil Aeronautics Board to limit fur-
ther air services, because airport noise was already
exceeding acceptable levels.
The role of air transportation in the total
national transportation system is not easily per-
ceived. To put the situation into perspective, it is
significant that as of 1967, almost half (45%) the
U. S. population had not made even a single inter-
city trip by any mode in the previous year. Of
those who had made one or more domestic inter-
city trips, 88% of the trips were by auto, with
air accounting for only 7.5% of all the trips.
Clearly then, only a small fraction of the popula-
tion travels by air. The overwhelming proportion
of all domestic intercity travel is by private auto.
However, in the domestic intercity
common-carrier market (which excludes auto),
64% of the trips and 81% of the passenger miles
were by air (ref. 2). Since air carried such a large
proportion of the travelers, it is clear that the air
mode serves a large cross section of the traveling
public. This is confirmed by the fact that in 1967,
the median income for all U.S. families and
unrelated individuals was $6,889: of those who
had taken a trip by any mode, the median was
$8,225; of those who had taken a trip by ship,
$13,764; of those who had taken an air trip,
$11,922; by auto, $8,021; by train, $6,759; and
by bus, $5,714. Thus, although the median
income of air travelers was significantly higher
than the median for the general population, the
air traveler's median income of $11,922 shows
that air travel is not the province of the wealthy
(based on ref. 2).
Although there are many indirect benefits of
civil aviation for virtually all of the population,
these lack visibility and immediacy. Economic
growth, for instance, is directly and indirectly
affected by aviation progress; but for the most
part, the importance of aviation's contribution is
not appreciated by the general public.
The fact that aviation has always been a con-
cern of Government, mainly through a mixed pat-
tern of regulation, subsidy, and support of
research, means that many key decisions affecting
the fortunes of the industry have been made in
the political rather than the market arena. The
removal of institutional constraints on aviation,
therefore, involves the building of political consti-
tuencies. In other words, market demand alone is
not sufficient to drive the public-private aviation
industry to technologically improved systems. If
people generally view air travel as an elitist trans-
port mode, and airports as objectionable neigh-
bors, it will be difficult to generate enthusiasm
for projects that involve relieving constraints
through institutional change.
The major consequence of aviation's limited
political constituency is a constraint on airport
development. Although the last decade has wit-
nessed unparalleled growth in airline traffic and
major improvements in aircraft, airports have not
developed at an equivalent pace - in number or
quality. Illustrations include the saturation of
Kennedy, La Guardia, Washington National, and
O'Hare airports. Over the past 14 years, various
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proposalsto builda fourthmajorairportin the
NewYorkCity areahavemetwith suchstrong
communityresistancethatanacceptablesitehas
not yet beenfound,with theresulthataircraft
activitiesat New York's airports must be
rationed.
Financial Factors
Economic conditions in the aerospace and
airline industries are inhibiting the translation of
new technology needs into effective market
demand.
Because a disproportionately large number
of enplanements occur at a relatively small
number of major airports, their failure to develop
apace may impede the growth of the total civil
aviation system. Indeed, resistance to airports and
associated landside development is perceptibly
slowing the ability to make use of new
technology.
Airports interact in many complex ways with
the communities where they are located, but the
overall attitude of the community is invariably
negative. The reasons - noise, safety, atmospheric
pollution, the attraction of unwanted ground
traffic - are understandable, but the adverse reac-
tions stimulated in those citizens who live near
airports are translated into a virtual paralysis of
those agencies charged with planning their expan-
sion or improvement, or with building new ones.
Unless airports can be designed that will fit more
harmoniously into their surroundings, and an
effective pro-air transportation constituency can be
developed that will aid in solving such intransi-
gent problems as siting, decision-makers will con-
tinue to be frustrated in efforts to keep airport
development up with other parts of the system.
Resolving the questions of airport feasibility and
acceptability will provide industry with consider-
able guidance concerning the appropriate R&D
effort it should place behind STOL, VTOL, or
V/STOL systems. By the same token, Govern-
ment may more safely support demonstration
projects, knowing they are politically feasible and
likely to trigger further interest of producers and
consumers. In short, the stakes here are of para-
mount importance; if major airports are effec-
tively stopped through either political indecision
or a failure to understand which types of airport
configurations are acceptable to the people
directly affected, the economy, the traveler, and
the aviation industry will be the worse.
A few key figures tell the story of the grow-
ing interdependence of the aerospace and air
transport industries, and the dependence of both
industries on favorable financial conditions for
the flow of new technology between them. In
1969, purchasers other than the U.S. Govern-
ment accounted for 63% of the backlog of orders
for aircraft and related equipment and parts
reported by major manufacturers in the aerospace
industry. (Comparable figures for other years are
33% for 1959, 25% for 1962, and 46% for 1965,
based on ref. 3.) Meanwhile, procurement of aero-
space products and services by the U. S. Govern-
ment is forecast to decrease from $21.4 billion in
1968 to $17.6 billion by 1971, the most
protracted and sizable decline since 1948 (ref. 3).
Thus, if it is to maintain current levels of
employment and sales, and if it is to grow, the
aerospace industry must increasingly look to the
air transport industry as a market for new tech-
nology. Therefore, the economic well-being of the
air transport industry, and its propensity and abil-
ity to acquire and implement new technology are
now matters of serious concern to the aerospace
industry. Currently, both industries are experienc-
ing grave financial difficulties.
Since 1966, the airline industry has been
unable to attain a satisfactory return on invest-
ment, in accordance with the standards for a fair
and reasonable rate of return determined by the
Civil Aeronautics Board. In 1969, the U.S.
scheduled air carriers reported a net profit of only
$53 million on a total investment of $8.6 billion
(ref. 4). Two out of every three scheduled carriers
reported a net loss for the year. The Air Trans-
port Association estimates that the scheduled air-
lines will suffer a net loss in 1971, as they did in
1970 (ref. 5).
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A consequence of the industry's severe and
deepening financial problems is the growing
threat to its current reequipment program.
Already, cancellations of orders previously placed
with airframe and engine manufacturers have
been announced. Tenuous financial arrangements
for new aircraft are being jeopardized, with the
possibility that the airlines will be unable to
finance deliveries of aircraft for which orders are
still firm.
Are the current financial problems transi-
tory? Or do these problems have long-run implica-
tions for the magnitude and viability of the air
transport industry as a market for new technol-
ogy? These are questions of major importance to
the air transport and aerospace industries, and to
the Nation as a whole.
The aerospace industry, traditionally depen-
dent for much of its sales on the needs of national
defense, is notoriously cyclical. In 1940 it was a
$370 million industry; by 1944 it had grown to
$16 billion, but three years later, with the end of
World War 11, its sales were down to $1.2 billion.
It remained depressed until the Korean War
buildup. A slowdown in the late 1950's, a marked
increase in activity in the early 1960's, and a brief
subsequent slackening were followed by the
Vietnam War. Simultaneous with increased mili-
tary aircraft procurement from 1965 to 1969
came the principal economic impact of the
Apollo program and extensive airline purchases of
new long-, medium-, and short-haul transports.
The manufacturing capacity of both airframe and
engine companies became greatly strained, exten-
sive subcontracting with both domestic and
foreign sources was resorted to, and industry
employment increased substantially.
The manufacturers of civil aircraft and
engines have some unique problems. Boeing,
Lockheed, and McDonnell Douglas have made
investments in the Boeing 747, L-1011, and
DC-10, respectively, of approximately $1 billion
each. Similarly, United Aircraft and General Elec-
tric have very large investments in the JT9D and
CF6 engines. In the case of the aircraft manufac-
turers, these outlays are larger than the total
equity of the firms, and will not be recovered in
full until 200-300 or more of each type of aircraft
have been sold. Near the end of 1970, aircraft
orders plus options totaled 197, 178, and 237,
respectively. Both the economic situation of the
airlines and the existing overcapacity in passenger
seats make it questionable whether any of these
programs will break even for some time to come,
and, as mentioned earlier, there are questions con-
cerning the ability of the airlines to finance the
present orders. These programs have required
such a commitment of resources by a substantial
portion of the aerospace industry that they effec-
tively preclude comparable investments in newer
ones until present investments have been
recovered.
The general aviation manufacturers face a
somewhat different problem. To recover their
development costs, although much lower than
those of larger airframe manufacturers, an annual
increase in sales of around 15% is needed. Sales of
twin-engine and turbine-powered aircraft are very
closely correlated with corporate investment in
new facilities and equipment, and those of smaller
general aviation aircraft with personal disposable
income. Thus, general aviation sales are highly
dependent on the perceived state of the general
economy. The current depressed economic situa-
tion has not only arrested the growth of general
aviation aircraft manufacturers but reversed it.
Neither the large nor the small airframe com-
panies currently are in a position to continue the
more-or-less orderly progression of new model
development that has characterized the industry
for over a decade. This would not necessarily be
critical except that, because of a similar
slowdown in new military programs, there are few
other projects in most companies to which
unoccupied development engineers may be trans-
ferred. The industry faces a situation in which its
vital development base may erode through disuse.
Traditionally, the airline industry has not
been the initiator of detailed technical require-
ments for new commercial aircraft. The aircraft
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manufacturers have maintained a detailed famili-
arity with airline growth and operations, initiating
proposals for new aircraft models when they per-
ceived the time to be ripe. The airlines, on the
other hand, have made skillful use of the highly
competitive nature of the airframe and engine
industries to obtain aircraft more closely suited to
their particular requirements and to encourage
price cutting.
Except for the recession of 1960-1961, the
years following the introduction of the Boeing
707, the Douglas DC-8, and their successors were
profitable for the airlines. These aircraft were
much more productive than their predecessors,
and, stimulated by a buoyant economy, passenger
volume increased greatly. By 1965 the combina-
tion of growing demand, air terminal congestion,
and high expectations for air cargo led the three
major airframe companies to propose new
high-capacity aircraft. Through 1966 and 1967
the airlines ordered enough 747's, L-101 l's, and
DC 10's to launch all three programs. Competi-
tive pressures forced many air carriers into reluc-
tantly ordering this new generation of equipment
before they had adequately digested the 707,
DC 8,727, DC 9, and 737.
The airbus market, which could probably
support one manufacturer in comfort, is being
shared between Lockheed and McDonnell
Douglas, both of whom have large sums at risk
and are far short of a break-even level of sales.
Furthermore, there is considerable overlap in
range and productivity among the wide-bodied
jets on many routes, and the availability of the
tri-jets at appreciably lower prices ($16 million
versus $23 million) has contributed to a slow-
down of 747 sales. To summarize the situation,
too many manufacturers are extensively com-
mitted to aircraft for which tile airlines are not
really ready, either financially or in terms of
capacity. The suppliers and the users appear to
have overstimulated each other, and the result is
disruption and financial strain for both parties.
An examination of the earnings experience of
the airline i.ndustry during the 25 years since
World War I1 adds further support to the view
that periods of depressed earnings encountered by
the industry are not solely due to cyclical down-
turns in the economy. During the economic
downturn of 1949, the industry's rate of return
was higher than it was in the two previous years.
In the 1953-1954 economic downturn, industry
rates of return were among the highest levels of
the postwar period. However, starting with the
downturn of 1957-1958, the industry seems to
have reached a state of maturity that no longer
enabled it to remain immune from the ills of the
general economy. In 1958, 1961, and 1970, traf-
fic growth came to a virtual halt and profits
slipped markedly.
The cycling of airline earnings also appears to
be related to industry's reequipment programs,
which usually increase existing passenger and
cargo capacity significantly beyond demand. The
low rates of return experienced between 1947
and 1949 coincide with reequipment with pres-
surized propeller aircraft. The low rates of return
experienced in 1957 to 1963 and 1970 coincide
with reequipment with the final pressurized pro-
peller aircraft series, introduction of turboprop
and turbojet aircraft, and introduction of the
wide-body 747.
The incentive to overequip comes from com-
petitive desires to be first in the marketplace with
the most of the best aircraft, and to longstanding
beliefs in the industry that capacity and fre-
quency of service stimulate traffic. Statistics have
generally confirmed that this is indeed the case.
This compelling line of reasoning has recently
been constrained by the financial problems of the
industry. Air carrier equipment purchasing power
was limited by credit standing. However, in suc-
cessive waves of financing, the airlines have pro-
gressed from highly conservative bank credit
sources, to insurance companies, and now to the
leasing company. With each wave, the industry
has moved to less restrictive sources of capital and
reached new levels of overcapacity.
Reequipment brings not only overcapacity,
but also a set of secondary effects on airline oper-
ation, all of them costly and some difficult to
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foresee.Theseincludeinducedneedsfor addi-
tional trainingof flight and ground personnel on
new aircraft, additional or new ground facilities,
special aircraft-related equipment of all kinds, and
the customary "bugs" in new and highly complex
aircraft. The net effect is a sharp rise in operating
costs resulting in depressed earnings.
The coincidence of reequipment and
depressed earnings is a chronic problem that
affects the implementation of new technology
and is impairing both the economic health of the
air transport industry and its standing as a market
for aerospace products and services. The
manifestations of this problem directly affect the
aerospace industry in two ways. There is a natural
incompatibility between the need of the aircraft
manufacturer to achieve and maintain an eco-
nomic rate of production on a large run of air-
craft and the ability of the airlines to absorb new
equipment, particularly now when equipment
comes in increments of 350 seats and $23 million
per aircraft. Progressive rounds of reequipment
have usually resulted not only in overcapacity for
the airlines but an increase in the capacity of the
aircraft manufacturing industry. Second, the eco-
nomic perturbations set up by the reequipment
cycle within the airline industry tend to make it a
less stable and receptive market for the aircraft
manufacturing industry.
It can be correctly argued that these risks are
inherent to the flee enterprise system, and so
should be accepted by the participants. However,
it is also true that civil aviation is a national asset,
one of the largest employers in the country, one
of our principal technical resources, and a vital
factor in national defense and balance of pay-
ments. When the scale of resources required to
develop a commercial aircraft or engine
approaches that needed today, the results of mis-
calculation or unforeseeable events may be catas-
trophic. Disruptive instabilities in this industry
and in its civil market must be alleviated or miti-
gated in the national interest.
Political Factors
The full potential for technological develop-
ment is being constrained under the present
regulatory system.
Economic regulation of the transportation
industries in the United States results from many
years of experience in balancing the interests of
private firms with the public interest. Although
statutory authority for transport regulation
derives from the powers granted to the Congress
under the Constitution, the economic basis for
regulation is rooted in the concept of natural
monopoly.
Nowhere in the development of regulation
are there specific instructions directing regulators
to take the effects of technology into account.
Such considerations are, however, implicit in a
section of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 that
directs the Civil Aeronautics Board to consider
the encouragement and development of an air
transport system properly adapted to the future
needs of commerce as being in the public interest,
and in accordance with the public convenience
and necessity (ref. 6).
One of the problems is that regulation can
work to the detriment of technological innova-
tion. Entry into, and exit from, markets, as well
as price competition, are closely controlled. The
benefits conferred on the public by the regulatory
process are not free of cost, however. Among the
costs of this system are the partial loss of tech-
nical and managerial innovation that might be
expected to result from a struggle for competitive
advantage if transport firms were subject only to
free market forces.
The requirement that the Board certify for
service applicants who are "fit, willing, and able
to perform.., transportation properly," pro-
vided that such proposed transportation "is
required by the public convenience and neces-
sity" places an enormous burden of proof on
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applicantsfor entry.It servesto assurethatonly
the mostconservativeproposalsreceiveserious
considerationby the Board.Yet thehistoryof
technologicalinnovationin the UnitedStates
amplydemonstratesthatthesuccessfulintroduc-
tion of newdevelopmentsin themarketoccurs
not becausemarketfeasibilityhadbeenproved,
but becausesomeone-eitherthroughforesight
or luck- hada strongconvictionthat the idea
wouldwork.Theconcepthat the marketplace
shouldbethefinaljudgeof valueisbasicto our
economicsystem,and hasservedto stimulate
technicalinnovation.Onemightquestionwhether
suchinnovationsasxerography,computers,or
eventheairplaneitself wouldhavebeendevel-
opedandsoldif the final decision depended on
an adjudicatory agency finding an applicant fit,
willing, and able, and in consonance with public
convenience and necessity.
Another constraint imposed by economic
regulation is system sluggishness- that is, the
inordinately long time it takes the regulatory
system to rule that an air carrier will be permitted
to respond to a need even when the technology to
do so is available or can be made available. The
CAB's Northeast Corridor STOL Investigation has
been under way for two years; the Phase I report
was issued in September 1970. It is conservatively
estimated that the Phase 11 hearings may take at
least another two years. The CAB has concluded
that such a system is needed, yet as many as five
years probably will have passed before significant
action is taken to meet this need. The following
excerpt from the Phase I hearing states the prob-
lem and provides a good summary of many insti-
tutional constraints that are holding up STOL
system development:
that a properly implemented metroflight
system will be responsive to (the) major
public need and.., such a system is both
technically and economically feas-
ible .... We recognize that the establish-
ment of a comprehensive metroflight ser-
vice.., will not be free of difficulty,
since its chief components - suitable air-
craft, landing sites, and navigation tech-
nology - are not yet fully developed. All
these elements, however, are clearly
within the ambit of existing technology,
and could be available within a relatively
short space of time with the active com-
mitment of the aircraft manufacturers
and governmental bodies involved. A
chief obstacle to progress toward metro-
flight has been the cycle of inaction that
has affected the participants in its devel-
opment; local authorities lack incentive
to develop landing sites in the absence of
some assurance that appropriate
VTOL/STOL aircraft will be available to
use them, manufacturers are reluctant to
begin active production to aircraft until
they have sufficient orders, and carriers
are unwilling to order equipment unless
they can look forward to suitable landing
sites. It is our hope that the Board's
action in authorizing metroflight opera-
tions will break this impasse and serve as
a catalyst for more active implementa-
tion of a viable VTOL/STOL system
(ref. 7).
The slow development of short-haul markets,
air-cargo traffic, and resolution of the
12,500-pound weight restriction inhibiting devel-
opment of commuter-market aircraft are
examples of the deleterious effects of regulatory
lags.
THE PRESENT CAPABILITY OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO DEAL
WITH THE PROBLEMS
The nature of the civil aviation problem is
such that only the Federal Government is in a
position to provide the leadership and direction
necessary to break the institutional impasses and
inadequacies that stand in the way of realizing the
full R&D potential. The Government cannot solve
all the problems, but it can solve some and at
least establish a viable framework for the ultimate
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resolution of others. What then are the con-
straints within the Federal Government that are
inhibiting it from assuming a more forceful and
effective leadership position on civil aviation
research and development?
The ability of the Federal Govern-
ment to formulate a comprehensive
civil aviation policy is severely
limited, given the nature of the prob-
lem and the institutional structure in
which it must operate.
Traditionally, transportation planning
occurred on an ad hoc basis, or when considered
comprehensively, by mode. Canals, roads,
sea-going vessels, autos, and finally airplanes
spurred a fragmented Government response that
ultimately produced the present modal adminis-
trations within the Department of Transporta-
tion. The current array of regulatory agencies
(Federal Maritime Commission, Interstate Com-
merce Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board) was
also produced by this long process. The evolution
of committees, bureaus, and agencies to deal with
each transport mode was determined by eco-
nomic and political muscle wielded at various
times by each mode, and by the Government's
special needs for expertise to contend with a par-
ticular modal requirement. The question of
allocating scarce resources among competing
needs was never so important as it is today - the
traditional approach resembled a requirements
approach, and the problem of measuring "policy
trade-offs" did not exist.
The problems in achieving a national trans-
portation policy constrain the formulation of civil
aviation R&D policy, and ultimately the marshal-
ing of Federal attention and action to address the
problems. The technical means are available or,
with sufficient R&D funding, can be made avail-
able. Civil aviation R&D, however, is competing
with other significant national needs, generally
deemed to have higher priority, for limited
national resources. The question is where civil avi-
ation needs stand in national priorities. The
Federal Government has not been able to resolve
this question.
The full potential for technological devel-
opment is constrained by fragmentation
of the decision-making process at all
levels of Government, including Federal.
The fragmented nature of the
decision-making process is one of the most serious
obstacles to attaining technology's full potential
in aviation. Perhaps nowhere in civil aviation is
this more apparent than in the cluster of prob-
lems surrounding the Nation's airport system.
This complex and interrelated system requires
extensive, coordinated, and informed
decision-making; in addition to this, the airport
planning and executing function must respond to
mounting resistance over questions of siting, land-
side planning, access, and finance. The fact that
lead time from conception to completion is so
long for airports- 10 years or more- further
complicates the problem. Renewed emphasis on
the urban environment has raised the stakes, but
the ability to site new facilities has not grown.
Although the need for higher capacity air-
ports has long been recognized, very little
research is being done to achieve technical solu-
tions to the challenge. The airport, which serves
as the key interface for all segments of the air
transport system, has no one group or owner with
the motivation or authority to perform the R&D
necessary for improvements. For example, air-
ports are concerned with traffic development and
operations; FAA jurisdiction and funding author-
ity cease when air safety is no longer a factor.
Airlines have not been willing to extend their
R&D concerns beyond their legitimate franchise
areas; they have focused very little R&D attention
on baggage-handling, ticketing, etc., probably
because they are not convinced that more people
would fly if air travel delays and irritations were
significantly reduced. As yet there is no recogniz-
able market for improved airport-access systems.
These are the province of local govenmental
agencies and have low priority when compared to
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otherpressingurbanproblems.This fragmenta-
tion of interests and authority through many
local, state, and national jurisdictions, combined
with diverse interests of the private sector has
resulted in a near-impasse that obstructs the flow
of technology into airport development.
The need for a better short-haul system is
generally accepted. Airborne and ground delays in
short-haul flights have frequently nullified the
benefits of speedy jet equipment. Today, the
block-to-block time of a Boeing 727 flying from
New York to Washington has not improved appre-
ciably from what it was a decade ago using
DC-6B's.
Given the historic unprofitability of
short-haul routes, the lack of success in develop-
ing successful STOL is perhaps not surprising, it
seems unlikely that aircraft development itself
can solve the problem. Any new short-haul air-
craft that must operate in the same air traffic
control, runway, and airport environments as
long-haul aircraft will continue to be subject to
most of the same delays experienced by the cur-
rent generation of short-haul aircraft. A new
short-haul system is needed that can function
compatibly with the long-haul system.
Institutional fragmentation has blocked any
substantive achievements toward this goal. The
development of an operational STOL system
must involve the integrated efforts of a large num-
ber of private organizations and government
agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels.
Two major components ofa STOL system are the
responsibility of the Government - the air traffic
control system and the airport, or STOLport. The
customers must look to the Government (CAB)
to delineate the circumstances under which STOL
aircraft could operate, while the manufacturer
must look to the FAA for certification of the
aircraft and engines. Finally, both the private
sector and the Federal Government must look to
state and local governments for the approval and
development of STOLports. A STOL system has
not been instituted because no single participant
in the process needed to create the entire system
has the ability to proceed independently of the
others.
The foregoing discussion suggests that R&D
in the physical sciences alone is not sufficient to
bring about the desired improvements in civil
aviation.
CLASSES OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO
DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH
THE CIVIL AVIATION R&D
PROCESS
There are a number of options open to the
Federal Government to improve the civil aviation
R&D process. None of these is easy to implement,
since all depend upon support from the Adminis-
tration, the Congress, and ultimately the public.
On balance, however, the options seem feasible
within the context of current national values and
priorities. Moreover, the options discussed here
are thought to be the most important ones
stemming from this part of the Study.
Civil aviation research and develop-
ment should be redefined to include
both physical and social sciences and
the necessary steps should be taken
to organize and staff R&D activities
to reflect this new approach.
Specifically, the Federal Government should
augment its physical science staff at its various
research and development agencies and centers
with experts in such areas as economics, finance,
government, market research, and sociology.
These people should be encouraged to interact on
a day-to-day basis with technical staff members so
that a multidisciplinary attack can be launched on
the problems of civil aviation. Thus, problems in
both the physical and social sciences, and confu-
sion about the direction research should take can
be flagged early in the development process - not
after it might be discovered, too late, that a solu-
tion was being offered for a nonexistent problem,
that because of institutional constraints a new
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technologycouldnot beapplied,or that work
wasnotunderwayonaproblempossiblysolvable
by technology.The currentorganizationalnd
conceptualseparationof physicaland social
sciencesR&Dmustceaseif theNationisto avoid
fallingintomanyofthepitfallsof thepast.
The potentialbenefitsof suchanapproach
aresuggestedby Departmentof Defense experi-
ence. Within the Office of the Secretary, the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering has
a staff organization that is mission-oriented rather
than geared to technical disciplines (e.g., tactical
warfare or strategic and space systems rather than
electronics, missiles, or aircraft). In this office,
the technological disciplines have been blended,
and operational personnel are included in each
mission office. These latter personnel represent in
effect, the social sciences. Although the analogy
between defense and transportation R&D is a
weak one, the concept of combining technical
with nontechnical personnel signals a recognition
by DOD of the benefits that can accrue from such
an arrangement.
in the air transport R&D field, where prod-
ucts must be responsive to public needs and
values, social and physical science considerations
should be explored simultaneously. Ignoring or
deferring the latter has inevitably resulted, and
will continue to result, in either the rejection of
technologies that have been developed or the fail-
ure to develop needed technologies.
• The Federal Government should con-
sider the commitment of substantial
resources to Market Demonstration
Programs. These provide a unique
opportunity to overcome institu-
tional inertia and test promising solu-
tions to civil aviation problems
(needs), without committing
resources to a _dl-blown system
that might not succeed.
Demonstration programs afford an
opportunity to suspend temporarily many of the
institutional constraints that have inhibited the
introduction of new technology into civil avia-
tion. In some cases they may provide the only
opening for the application of technology to meet
the Nation's legitimate air transport needs.
Demonstrations should be employed in a far
more extensive and imaginative manner than they
have in the past. A few very important technical
(proof-of-concept) and market demonstrations
have been attempted in commercial aviation. Sub-
sidization of helicopter, domestic trunk, interna-
tional, and local service carriers are examples.
Without such assistance, the U.S. air transport
system as we know it today - the strongest in the
free world - might not have come into existence.
Demonstration projects are an important
means of mustering resources to solve special
problems when normal institutional processes
inadvertently conspire to prevent the application
of new technology. The introduction of radically
new air transport systems like STOL, for
example, presents so many uncertainties that no
single participant seems capable of taking the lead
to produce an operating system. It is under pre-
cisely such circumstances that demonstration pro-
grams can be used to help prove or disprove
plausible, but untested concepts.
in the initial CAB decision on the use of
VTOL and STOL aircraft in the Northeast Cor-
ridor, the Examiner noted that, not only was the
"existence of a carrier fit, willing and able to init-
iate the service.., obviously an essential ingre-
dient," but also that "the prospect of the carrier's
economic success is germane to the question
whether it will undertake the operation. If it were
shown that there is no chance of financial success,
due to lack of patronage, or excessive costs, this
would raise serious doubts regarding the
institution of the service" (ref. 8).
The groundwork is thus set for a demonstra-
tion program rather than the much riskier venture
of establishing a full-blown STOL service. How-
ever, a STOL demonstration program, unless pro-
perly planned and implemented, could do more
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harmto theultimatedevelopmentof STOLthan
no demonstration at all. The operation of a Twin
Otter or a Breguet 941 in the current air traffic
control system, using an existing instrument
approach system, might only demonstrate that
people would rather fly in a DC-9, which can do
the same thing with greater passenger comfort.
Similarly, a demonstration using too few vehicles
and providing poor service because of infrequent
schedules might yield wholly erroneous informa-
tion on market acceptance.
The costs of demonstration programs, if pro-
perly implemented, can be far less than costs
required to establish a full-blown system. A valid
STOL demonstration program might cost several
hundreds of millions of dollars for the aircraft
and engine-design competition and resulting
demonstration equipment, the new ATC system
for routes selected, a steep-gradient approach
system, and the STOLport. The Federal Govern-
ment would probably have to finance a major
part of such a system. Commencing today, the
system would probably not be ready for demon-
stration until the mid- or late 1970's.
Because of the institutional constraints on
the development and introduction of a STOL
system, a demonstration program of this magni-
tude is probably the only way the "iron ring" can
be broken. Deciding whether or not the costs of
such a demonstration would be justified in terms
of future benefits to the Nation is a separate mat-
ter. It seems clear, however, that if a STOL sys-
tem is in the national interest, this is the direction
the Federal Government must take, since it alone
has the financial resources and authority to
initiate such a project.
Demonstration programs of a more modest
nature arc also needed to provide a better under-
standing of how the market and the airlines are
likely to respond to various innovations in service,
fares, and competition. For example, very little is
known about what might happen if airline fares
were increased significantly in the short-haul mar-
ket. Would traffic drop off drastically, slightly, or
not at all? Should airline fares be based on the
cost of operating any given route segment rather
than on the aggregate costs of all routes? With
fares based on route-segment costs, would aircraft
be priced out of the short-haul market, thus
firmly establishing boundaries on the "natural
markets" of aircraft versus, say, high-speed trains?
A demonstration program could also address
the question of allowing unrestrained competition
on high-density routes, thereby providing some
test-tube answers to the relationship between reg-
ulation and the marketplace.
• Airports could enlarge their political
constituencies by exploring multiple
use of land.
There is considerable evidence that the
Nation's largest urbanized regions will not readily
endorse further airport development. Unless ways
can be found to make airports "bctter neigh-
bors." CTOL and STOL airport devclopment in
and around the largest hubs appcars blocked.
Research and development in the areas of
enginc-noise suppression and pollution control
may alleviate the problems, but it cannot do the
wholc job. New CTOL airports, which require
vast acreages and accessibility from principal col-
lection points within a region, will preempt land
at the urban periphery. Community opposition to
airport siting and expansion indicatcs that imagin-
ative ways must be sought to translate
airport-relatcd land acquisitions into multiplc-use
projccts.
Therc are several options that could aline
disparate interests behind airport development.
Urban areas face many decisions relating to
land-intensive functions that are carried out on or
near the urban periphery. For instance, reservoirs,
land reclamation projects, cstuarine preservation,
rccrcational areas, and public open spacc offer
opportunity for acquiring large land arcas for
multiple uses. Whilc not all land-use activitics arc
compatible with airport devclopmcnt, a flexible
strategy of advance acquisition of land, fundcd
partly or wholly under the Airport and Airway
Trust Fund could gain support for airports from
sectors which are not hostilc.
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Conservationistsandopen-spaceenthusiasts,
for instance,arefrustratedoverthelackof funds
availablefor stateandlocalacquisitionof park
land,wildriver-basinareas,andothernaturalland
areasthat areaccessibleto ourexpandingurban
populations.If landis not setasidefor merito-
rious publicpurposes,continuingurbansprawl
will preemptpresentopenspacefor privateuse.
It is importanto pointout thattheproblem
of interagencycoordinationcanbesubstantially
alleviatedthroughthe developmentof whatare,
in effect,interagencyobjectivesandprograms.A
presentconstraintoncoordinationis thelackof
mutualprogramsamongagencies.Multiple-use
projectscouldserveas the rallyingpoint for
furtherpositivecoordination.
A political constituency could be developed
for airports by means of an airport
land-acquisition program - if two conditions are
met. Funds must be diverted for acquisitions
years ahead of actual need; consideration must be
given to acquisition of multiple sites near urban
areas. Groups interested in conserving land for
recreational or other land intensive activities
could aline with airport proponents to prevent
scarce open spaces from being developed for
low-density residential, commercial, or industrial
uses. Political support here is predicated on the
belief that environmentalists will endorse a con-
structive program that guarantees them at least
some of their land needs now. Multiple-site
acquisition in advance of airport needs would per-
mit community leaders to avoid committing any
particular site for airport development.
When airport development is required, the
Federal Government could sell superfluous sites
to state and local governmental bodies, perhaps at
a price equal to the original acquisition cost, plus
an accrued interest equivalent. This approach
assures that funds would flow back into the Air-
port and Airway Trust Fund and other Federal
sources, and that the price would be attractive to
other governmental units. The Federal Govern-
ment would actually be involved in a landbanking
operation that temporarily transfers airport funds
to real estate holdings, at no cost to airways users.
In the long term, the real economic cost would
also be minimal, because the option does not
sacrifice or utilize community resources; rather, it
provides for transfer of ownership of existing
resources, most of which have few alternative uses
(e.g., swamps, wetlands, and agricultural land).
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POLICY ISSUES
A systematic review of the current and pro-
jected positions of U.S. civil air transportation
reveals that past Government policies of financial
support, guidance, and protection of the aviation
complex were originally appropriate but have
now produced an environment that constrains
R&D innovation and adaptation to changing
socioeconomic conditions. Some of the problems
suggesting that policy has not kept pace with
changing conditions are:
• Short-haul air transport has almost invari-
ably been unprofitable.
• Door-to-door travel time has improved
very little since about 1960; it is even
forecast to get worse instead of better.
• Terminal air traffic capacity has been
exceeded at four airports, with 20 to 30
overcapacity airports forecast by 1980.
• Existing airports, hemmed in by urban
growth at their boundaries, cannot
expand to meet demand.
• Employment and earnings in the industry
have dropped sharply; this is due to air-
craft overcapacity and high costs of
introducing new aircraft - aggravated by
a slowdown in the general economy.
• STOL systems appear to have great
potential in the short-haul market, but
no comprehensive implementation plans
have been undertaken.
A common characteristic of these problems is
that they transcend technology alone. Nontech-
nological- institutional factors including eco-
nomic regulation, legal structures, multiple polit-
ical jurisdictions, changing social priorities, and
complex interactions among multiple Federal
agencies are seriously affecting the climate for
technological innovations. Some of the
symptoms, while basically physical in nature (for
example, airside and landside congestion at air-
ports), in reality are largely products of
institutional factors.
Although air transportation and the functions
it fulfills have changed radically in just the last
decade, regulation and policy- the "ground
rules" - have not kept pace. Policies once appro-
priate to protection of an embryonic industry are
no longer applicable to an industry that is one of
the largest employers and also one of the largest
exporters in the Nation. Appropriate civil aviation
policy is essential to the utilization of future
R&D because policy can create an environment
conducive to new market development or can
completely stifle it; policy can make efficiency
the motivating factor (thus encouraging R&D) or
it can encourage a preoccupation with protective
practices; policy can give impetus to initiate R&D
to attain self-sufficiency or it can foster
dependency.
Four policy issues have been selected for spe-
cial analysis because they are important to the
continued growth of civil aviation in the decades
ahead. These issues are:
• U.S. leadership in civil aviation
• Demonstration programs
• Removal of regulatory and legal con-
straints on integration of transportation
systems
• Airport location and landside integration
with the airside system
U.S. LEADERSHIP IN CIVIL AVIATION
The Issue
How and to what extent should the U.S.
Government act to ensure that American aircraft,
aviation-equipment manufacturers, and scheduled
and nonscheduled airlines achieve an adequate
share of current world equipment sales and traf-
fic, and in addition assure that they are in a
strong position to move into new major markets
opened by technological advancement?
The President has recently reaffirmed the
U.S. policy of maintaining world leadership in
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civil aviation. His statement called for Federal
support of new aircraft development when such
development was vital to maintaining our future
position in world markets (ref. 1). With the policy
stated, the U. S. leadership issue becomes one of
examining alternate courses of action open to the
Government, and determining the crucial points
where action will produce the greatest effect.
U.S. leadership in civil aviation can be
defined as the achievement and holding of a
recognized first-rank position in any one or a
combination of a large number of measures of
civil aviation progress. The measures differ
depending on the role of the interested parties.
To manufacturers, leadership means that,
given a free choice, prospective customers will
purchase U.S. products more often than not.
U.S. industry will thus lead in sales to both
foreign and domestic customers for most items
(and particularly for high-cost items).
7b air carriers, leadership means that U.S.
carriers, having the opportunity to compete on an
equal footing in all significant air travel markets
in the world, will gain a larger share of the total
market for passengers and cargo than any of their
competitor foreign-flag carriers.
To air travelers and shippers, it means that
the service provided to them by U. S. carriers is
second to none in terms of safety, reliability,
economy, convenience, character, and quality of
service.
7b the general public, U. S. leadership in civil
aviation means a number of things perceived as
accruing to the Nation as a whole. These are:
• A favorable balance of trade in aviation
products
• A high contribution to domestic employ-
ment and to GNP from civil aviation
• A strong and balanced transportation
system
• Use by other nations of U. S. air traffic
control, navigation, and safety concepts,
as well as U.S. aircraft and associated
equipment
• Maintenance of a strong civil aviation
industry as an element of national
security
• "Showing the flag" by having many-
and excellent- U.S. products in evi-
dence in other countries
The interests above are of concern to a multiplic-
ity of Government agencies (Commerce, State,
Treasury, Transportation, Labor, Civil Aero-
nautics Board, and Defense).
This discussion of U.S. leadership will be
focused on the sales of aircraft and
aviation-equipment manufacturers to both domes-
tic and foreign buyers, and on the market share
achieved by U. S. carriers. Preeminence in each of
these two areas is considered to be the dominant
factor in maintaining overall U. S. leadership in
civil aviation.
Current Leadership Status
The United States clearly enjoys a world
leadership position in civil aviation today as it has
for the past several decades. An examination of
the factors influencing leadership indicates the
extent to which leadership has been attained:
• 76% of the free-world commercial
aircraft are U.S.-manufactured (ref. 2).
• 63% of the aircraft operated by
free-world foreign airlines are
U. S.-manufactured (ref. 3).
• U.S. airlines operate 41% of the
free-world airplanes (ref. 2).
• The seven largest airlines in the free
world are U.S. carriers (as measured by
combined passenger and cargo ton-miles
flown in 1969) (ref. 3).
• in 1969, more than 57% of the
free-world scheduled passenger-miles
(domestic and international) were flown
by U. S. carriers (ref. 4).
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• More than one-third of the total value of
U. S. civil aviation products are exported
(ref. 5).
• The U. S. exports almost three times the
number of general aviation aircraft as the
rest of the free world.
• The dollar value of U. S. exports of parts
and engines is more than half the value of
U.S. exports of complete aircraft
(refs. 6, 7).
• Although aerospace employment in
Western Europe is about one-third of
U.S. aerospace employment, Western
Europe aerospace sales are only 15% of
U. S. aerospace sales (ref. 8).
• The net contribution of civil aviation to
the balance of trade in 1969 was $1.5
billion; this is about equal to the total
positive U.S. balance of trade in 1969
(refs. 5,9).
• Civilian aerospace employment is a
strong national asset (in 1968, it
amounted to 830,000, counting both
direct and induced employment).
Factors Contributing to U. S. Leadership
United States leadership in civil aviation did
not arise suddenly or result from a deliberate
plan. Rather, it was the result of a series of events
and circumstances spanning at least the past
40 years. A few of the significant factors are
(refs. 10, 11):
• Charles Lindbergh's flight in 1927, which
provided an emotional stimulus that
caught the imagination of the country.
• The rapid growth in the 1930's of
United, American, Pan American, Trans
World, and Eastern airlines, which
became models for airlines in the rest of
the world.
• The I2 S. need for long-range strategic
aircraft in World War II, which laid the
foundation for the development of
long-haul transcontinental and interconti-
nental air systems.
• The geography of the United States, with
large population centers 1,000 miles or
more apart, often separated by physical
barriers that handicapped surface trans-
port and made long-distance travel a
highly desirable goal.
• The Douglas DC-2, which in 1934
opened the eyes of the world to the new
quality standard of U. S, transport air-
craft (which, before 1934, were sur-
passed by the aircraft of France,
Germany, and Great Britain).
• Worldwide use of 10,000 C-47's
(DC-3's) during World War I1, which
brought the attention of the world to the
capabilities of U. S. transport aircraft.
• The production of about 300,000
aircraft during the 1940-45 period,
which resulted in the establishment of a '
gigantic industry, with a few large com-
panies and a high degree of automation,
capable of producing the types and quan-
tities of aircraft required for the civilian
sector.
• Military funding of airframe and engine
research and aircraft production during
the war and postwar years, which
resulted in a large reservoir of technology
adaptable to civil aviation.
• Following World War 1I, most countries,
occupied with rebuilding their economy,
were unable to concentrate on aviation
manufacturing for 5 to 10 years. As a
result, they made large purchases of U. S.
aircraft.
• U.S. manufacturers developed the ability
to move quickly into fields often
originated by others.
Many of the leadership factors previously
listed resulted from large-scale production of air-
craft for military use, coupled with large-scale
production of civil aerospace items within the
same industry. Together, they have provided
skilled management, production workers, and
facilities (with the "learning curve" largely paid
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for by theGovernment),thescaleof operations
and incentiveto increaseproductivity per
employee,anda sizeandstrengthto undertake
the long and expensivedevelopmentand
tooling-upperiodthat precedesthesaleof new
largeaircraft.
The superiorityof U.S.-manufacturedair-
craftis notdueto atechnologicaledgealone,but
to the entiremarketingpackage-technology,
salesskills, adaptabilityto customerneeds,
financing,productiontechniques,reliability,
family of products,andafter-saleservice.The
combinationof thesefactorshaspermittedlevels
of productionandsales,andqualityof servicing
of vehiclesnotasyet beenmatchedby foreign
competition.This leadershipositionresulted
fromasetofhistoricalcircumstancesthat,for the
mostpart,werenot initiatedbythecivilaviation
industry.Whetherthis positionof worldleader-
shipis maintained,strengthened,or lessenedwill
dependonthe policiesfollowedby industryand
Government.
Changing Quality of Foreign Competition
At the moment, the U. K. and U.S.S.R. are
the only countries with technical capabilities and
comprehensive aerospace industries comparable
to those of the United States. However, Japan,
France, West Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands,
and Canada are not far behind. Although the
United States spends four times as much for space
and defense R&D as do Western Europe, Japan,
and Canada combined, these countries are spend-
ing more for civil aviation R&D at the present
time than the United States. Currently, foreign
countries equal the United States with such devel-
opments as the VC-10 and all-weather landing
equipment, and lead the United States in such
areas as supersonic aircraft, STOL aircraft, lift
engines, cold-weather operating equipment, and
fiber composites. While this does not mean U. S.
leadership is immediately threatened, continued
aggressive efforts on the part of these countries
must be expected to make competition for world
markets more difficult in the future.
Consortia. The potential expansion of the
European Economic Community (with the inclu-
sion of the U.K. in the Common Market) will
make the European "equivalent domestic mar-
ket" as large as that in the United States. The
aerospace companies of several nations are
already working together and in some cases com-
bining. Consequently, Western Europe could be a
much more potent competitor than in the past
(particularly in the short-haul market, since most
flights on the continent are short-haul).
Foreign Customer Financing. As a step
toward enabling American companies to compete
with the low financing rates offered by foreign
companies helped by Government underwriting
or nationalized banks, the U.S. Government,
through the Export-lmport Bank, has authorized
or guaranteed loans to assist in financing civil
aerospace exports valued at more than
$3.5 billion in the past 10 years. The statutory
limitation on the lending authority of the
Export-Import Bank is $13.5 billion. More than
$10 billion of this is committed (refs. 12, 13).
Without this source of funds, the marketing posi-
tion of U. S. aviation products abroad would be
weakened.
Subcontract Work. The large amount of work
being subcontracted to foreign countries by U. S.
manufacturers helps the sales of U. S. products
abroad by virtue of the purchasing power gained
and the association of the foreign country with
the development of a product.
Busbless Slowdown. A factor favoring
foreign competition today is that Western Europe
is not having the economic slowdown that pre-
vails in the United States.
Industry Financial Situation. U. S. airlines as
well as aerospace manufacturers are experiencing
a serious recession. This is partly due to the fact
that the introduction of a major change in aircraft
has produced a temporary overcapacity. It is fur-
ther accentuated by inflation, cutbacks in space,
and the high cost of delays arising from terminal
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congestion.Asa consequence,theaircraftmanu-
facturershavecut backemploymentby 20%in
1970(ref.14).Withsalesdropping,R&Discut
back- bringinga potentialadverse ffecton
futuresales.Themanufacturers'annualinterest
on long-termdebtwas$186millionin 1969and
climbing,further compoundingthe problem
(ref.5).
Airlineovercapacityand businesscutbacks
haveresultedin theworstearningslossinaircar-
rierhistory.Addingto theproblems,airlinewages
increased64%in 10 years and rose another 11%
in 1970 (ref. 15). Terminal area delays alone cost
the U.S. airlines $158 million in 1969, an
amount about equal to their expected net losses
in 1970 (ref. 16). If all these factors continue, in
the long term, the basic health of the industry
could be undermined.
Aircraft Development. Today, it requires an
investment of about $1 billion by an aircraft
manufacturer to develop a new aircraft of the size
and complexity of the 747, the DC-10, or the
L-1011 - a sum which is several times the com-
pany's net worth. No appreciable financial return
accrues to the manufacturer for 5 to 10 years
after he begins such a program. With more than
20,000 suppliers and vendors involved in a major
aircraft development, delay- or failure- to
deliver by any key supplier or vendor can cause
an added financial strain on the aircraft manufac-
turer. On the positive side, the skills developed in
recent years in the management of very complex
programs (e.g., Apollo) puts the United States in
a better position than other countries to control
and direct such comprehensive operations.
R&D. The importance of R&D to sales is
apparent when it is recognized that 52% of 1973
aerospace sales will be derived from new products
not in existence in 1969 (ref. 17). Military-funded
R&D has supported civil aviation to a consider-
able extent either directly as in the case of
engines, or indirectly from military-oriented R&D
programs that provided technology usable by civil
designers. A number of specific civil needs, how-
ever, will not be satisfied by military R&D in the
future, and additional specific and concentrated
efforts will be required by the civil sector. Such
things as noise and air-pollution research, better
low-speed flight characteristics, reduction of wake
turbulence, better crosswind landing capabilities,
anticollision systems, fire hazard reduction,
improved ATC, and all-weather operations affect
capacity, economics, safety, and environment.
The manufacturers (or countries) that provide
economically acceptable solutions to these prob-
lems, especially in noise reduction, can gain com-
petitively, particularly if they also have a strong
marketing capability.
Technology. Today, no country has the
leadership in basic technology, since technical
knowledge is fairly universal. This is due in large
part to the activities of technical societies and
international organizations, and to modern com-
munications. Technical advantage now depends
principally on maintaining technological lead
time. The strength of the U. S. aviation industry
lies mainly in its ability to develop and implement
new technology generated here or abroad. For
example, although the jet engine was developed in
the U. K., the inability of British manufacturers
to fully develop and apply the advance to trans-
port aircraft produced in large numbers has cost
them heavily. The U. S. aircraft industry, on the
other hand, has not experienced constraints in
development and production.
Examination of the factors that appear to
have brought leadership to the United States and
future trends in those factors indicates that there
is a link between our strong domestic market and
such leadership. Consequently, it is believed that
any actions taken to build a strong domestic mar-
ket will strengthen U. S. leadership as well. For
example, if the United States produced quiet
engines or developed an economically sound
short-haul system, the probability is high that
other countries would also find the products
involved attractive.
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Leadership Indicators
The factors that have contributed to U.S.
leadership in civil aviation are many. These fac-
tors, when quantified and compared over time
with the same factors for other nations of the
world, can provide a valuable perspective by help-
ing to define and measure the somewhat
imprecise concept of leadership and provide a
possible basis for formulating policy. The indica-
tors are analogous to the economic indicators that
have become accepted as elements in the measure-
ment of the health and activity of the economy -
and that are carefully studied in the process of
formulating any new national economic policy.
The following indicators are presented as
measures of the major facets of leadership in civil
aviation. The list of indicators is tentative; it
clearly needs further development and refine-
ment. Lack of data on many of the indicators for
nations other than the United States prevents
comparison among civil aviation industries of the
world. Even when comparable data are available
caution must be exercised in drawing conclusions
or establishing cause-and-effect relationships until
greater experience is gained with the indicators.
Military Indicators. Military R&D and
procurement has had a significant influence on
the health of the U. S. civil aviation industry. As
the aerospace industry's single largest customer,
the Department of Defense has heavily supported
the development of production skills for military
products the industry has applied to its produc-
tion of civil products. This spinoff has contrib-
uted to a production efficiency for the U. S. air-
craft industry unequaled by any other country.
Annual sales to the Department of Defense, over
the past decade, when measured in constant
dollars, l have been fairly level (Table 6.1). This
indicates that there has been as yet no substantial
downward trend in military procurement of aero-
space products and supports the conclusion that
the U.S. aircraft industry currently enjoys the
benefits of continued Department of Defense sup-
port for its products, little different from what it
enjoyed a decade ago.
TABLE 6.1. AEROSPACE SALES TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (BILLIONS)
Source: Ref. 5.
1All constant-dollar figures are based on 1968.
Although the ratio of total aerospace sales to
civil sales has dropped significantly (Table 6.2),
examination of the data making up the ratio
shows that civil aviation sales have been gaining at
a much faster rate than total aerospace sales, a
healthy sign for civil aviation. If military sales
should decrease, however, the allowance of R&D
TABLE 6.2. SALES IN THE U. S. AEROSPACE
INDUSTRY
SALES AND SALES RATIO
TOTAL U.S. AEROSPACE
SALES: CIVIL SALES
U.S. AEROSPACESALES,
CURRENT DOLLARS,
BILLIONS
1961 1963 1965 1967
8.6 12.2 6.7 5.4 4.7
16.4 18.3 18.7 24.7 24.2
i
1.5 2.8 4.6
1968
_ CIVIL AVIATION SALES,
CURRENT DOLLARS,
Source: Ref 5.
costs as part of the overhead expenses of military
contracts will also decrease. In difficult financial
times, the industry may not be able or willing to
invest as heavily in R&D when a smaller percent-
age of such costs can be charged to government
contracts. Funding of research and technology
may be reduced in order to meet development
and production commitments. Thus the future
technological strength of the industry may suffer.
R&D Indicators. R&D expenditures indicate
to some extent the technological strength and
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ability to move into new markets, although it
must be recognized that the United States has
also been very successful in marketing technology
developed in other nations. Important indicators
include those shown in Table 6.3.
Total aerospace R&D as a percent of all aero-
space sales is an important indicator, since much
of the military R&D is transferable to civil avia-
tion. This ratio has remained nearly constant over
the past decade.
Both civil aviation R&D and civil aircraft
sales have increased to approximately 2.7 times
their 1961 levels and, as a result, the ratio of civil
aviation R&D to aircraft sales has remained stable
over the decade.
Independent R&D (IR&D) makes up the bulk
of civil aviation R&D and is composed of private
R&D plus funds supplied indirectly by the
Government as an allowable cost on Government
procurements. 1R&D increased by 40% in con-
stant dollars between 1961 and 1969, but civil
aerospace sales increased by 120% during the
same period. Although private R&D is increasing
its portion of IR&D, private R&D as a percent of
civil aerospace sales has fallen off over 30%
(refs. 5, 6, 7). (IR&D has limited usefulness as an
indicator, since no comparable indicator exists for
other nations of the world.)
In the past, propulsion advances have often
led to the development of new vehicles. To the
extent that this remains the case, the propulsion
R&D indicator can provide an early glimpse of
future market strength. Propulsion R&D fell off
about 25% between 1961 and 1969 when mea-
sured in constant dollars (refs. 6, 7). Before any
TABLE 6.3. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN R&D AND SALES IN THE U.S. AEROSPACE INDUSTRY
R&D AND SALES
TOTAL AEROSPACE R&D:
TOTAL AEROSPACE SALES
TOTAL AEROSPACE R&O,
CURRENT DOLLARS, BILLIONS
TOTAL AEROSPACE SALES,
CURRENT DOLLARS, BILLIONS
CIVIL AVIATION R&D (DIRECT):
CIVIL AIRCRAFT SALES
R&D, CURRENT DOLLARS, MILLIONS (DIRECT)
CIVIL AIRCRAFT SALES,
CURRENT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
TOTAL INDUSTRY R&D (REIMBURSED
PLUS PRIVATE R&D)
CURRENT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
CONSTANT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
PRIVATE R&D
CURRENT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
CONSTANT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
PRIVATE R&D: CIVIL AIRCRAFT SALES
PROPULSION R&D
CURRENT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
CONSTANT DOLLARS, MILLIONS
1961 1963 1965 1967 1969
t
0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
2.1 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.8
16.4 18.3 18.7 24.7 24.2
0.17 0.23 0.14 0.17 0.16
315 348 401 772 835
1,876 1,485 2,816 4,632 5,064
599 577 657 1,017 1,066
701 658 723 1,057 1,010
306 284 353 565 609
358 324 389 587 582
0.16 0.19 0.13 0.12 0.12
342 245 291 334 347
400 379 320 347 331
Source: Refs. 5, 6, 7.
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conclusionscanbe drawn,however,a careful
breakoutof propulsionR&D and comparable
dataforothernationsareneeded.AnR&Dbreak-
out by obiectivesuchasnoiseandair-pollution
reductionandbyfundingsource,particularlypri-
vatefunding,arenecessaryfurtherrefinements.
Production Indicators. A recognized strength
of the U. S. aviation industry has been its greater
output per labor dollar and its greater output per
employee compared to the rest of the world.
Maintaining this edge is essential to the future
success of the industry.
The value added-per-labor-dollar indicator
(Table 6.4) shows the United States with a slim
margin over some other industrial areas of the
TABLE 6.4. COMPARISON OF PRODUCTION
INDICATORS, UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, AND GREAT
BRITAIN (1966)
Large production runs, resulting from the factors
that have raised the United States to its position
of leadership, have benefited from, and contrib-
uted to, favorable cost-and-marketing-indicator
comparisons, as discussed in the next section.
Orders, including deliveries and options on record
as of October 1970, are shown in Table 6.5 for
selected aircraft comparisons.
Marketing Indicators. U. S. aviation products
have sold well throughout the world. Statistics
show the dramatic increase in world market share
enjoyed by U.S. manufacturers over the past
decade. The ratio of U. S.-manufactured planes
on order to foreign-manufactured planes on order
was 1.4:1 in 1960, 3.4:1 in 1965, and 5.0:1 in
1969 (ref. 20). The large U.S. domestic market
for aircraft has guaranteed to airframe and engine
TABLE 6.5. CURRENT ORDERS FOR SELECTED
AIRCRAFT
EUROPEAN UNITED
INDEX ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY STATES
INDEX OF VALUE ADDED
PER LABOR DOLLAR 1.0 1.0 1.1
INDEX OF VALUE AODED
PER EMPLOYEE 1.0 0.68 1.99
INDEX OF LABOR COST
_iPER EMPLOYEE 1.0 0.88 1.79
VALUE ADDED (U.S.) 1961 1963 1965 1967
VALUE ADDED/EMPLOYEE
CURRENT DOLLARS
CONSTANT DOLLARS
Source: Refs. 7, 18.
world in 1966. Whether the margin is still favor-
able to the United States today is not certain
since wages have increased by 17%, from an
hourly wage of $3.30 in 1966 to $3.87 in 1969,
but increases in productivity have not kept pace
(ref. 5).
Another significant indicator is the length of
a production run for a particular aircraft type.
ORDERS PLUS OPTIONS
TWIN-ENGINE JETS
DC-9 654
BAC-111 200
THREE.ENGINE JETS
B-727 851
HS TRIDENT 82
Source: Ref. 19.
manufacturers production runs sufficiently long
to allow them to offset costly initial cash outlays
for development. (It should be noted, however,
that the full advantage of large production runs is
not realized because the manufacturer must tailor
transport airplanes to each customer's desires-
see section on "Financial Considerations.") The
large domestic market for civil and military air-
craft has also permitted U. S. manufacturers to
accumulate sufficient statistical data on the per-
formance of their products to modify them so as
to achieve even greater economy and efficiency.
It has not been sufficient for a country to develop
an element of advanced technology first:
6-24
althoughthe U.K. wasthe first to developthe
turbojet,it wasU.S. manufacturerswith their
guaranteeof anenormousdomesticmarket- and
therebyassuranceoflargeproductionruns- who
capitalizedon the turbojetmarket.Ordersfor
U.S. turbojetsversusforeignturbojetswerein
theratio of 675to 82 in December1969. In
December 1960, the ratio was 290 to 130
(ref. 20).
More striking is the comparison of the dollar
values of the orders, indicating increasing sales
volumes for the U.S. aerospace industry's civil
products. The ratio of value of
U. S.-manufactured planes on order to the value
of foreign-manufactured planes on order was
1.8:1 in 1961, 6.4:1 in 1963, and 19.7:1 in 1969
(based on ref. 20).
That the excellence in American civil aviation
products is recognized by foreign airlines as well
as our own is evidenced by the $1.9 billion in
U. S. exports of civil aircraft, engines, and parts
reported for 1969. The balance of trade for civil
aviation products is dominated by exports: U. S.
imports of civil aviation products amounted to
$0.2 billion for 1969, giving a net trade balance
for the aerospace industry of $1.7 billion
(Table 6.6).
TABLE 6.6. U.S. BALANCE OF TRADE
(BILLIONS)
Source: Refs. 5, 9.
Comparing the U. S. trade balance for all air-
craft, engines, and parts (including military) with
that of a close competitor, the U. S. balance in
1969 was more than 60 times that of the U. K.
(ref. 21). One obvious reason for U.S. aircraft
selling well abroad relative to foreign aircraft is
their profitability, as indicated by direct operating
cost (DOC) over the lifetime of the vehicle. A
comparison of DOC's for two sets of competitive
aircraft, one U. S. and the other foreign, is shown
in Table 6.7.
TABLE 6.7. DIRECT OPERATING COST
COMPARISON (PLANNING ESTIMATE)
AIRCRAFTTYPE INDEX OF DIRECT OPERATING COST
ON A SEAT-MILE BASIS
TWO-ENGINE
DC-9 (U.S.) 100
BAC-111 (U.K.) 106
THREE-ENGINE
B-727 (U.S.) 101
HS TRIDENT (O.K.) 103
Not only are the marketing indicators favor-
able to the U. S. but the trend seems to indicate
improvement with time. The total free-world bal-
ance of trade on aviation products has eroded
over the past four years while the U. S. position
has improved by an almost equal amount. The
percentage point spread on DOC's between U. S.
and similar foreign aircraft can amount to several
hundred thousand dollars per airplane over its
lifetime. Multiplied by an entire fleet, the cost
differential can amount to millions of dollars - a
very important factor when profits are tradi-
tionally a very small percent of sales.
Financing Indicators. The ability to offer
attractive financing often determines the consum-
mation of a sale. The Export-Import Bank has
been an important factor in stimulating sales
of U.S. aircraft abroad.
The indicators (Table 6.8) show a substantial
increase in involvement on the part of the
Export-Import Bank. As its total lending author-
ity of $13.5 billion is approached (at present
$10 billion is committed), this source of aviation
funding should be watched closely to assure that
its effectiveness is not lost (refs. 12, 13).
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TABLE 6.8. FINANCING OF U. S. CIVIL
AIRCRAFT EXPORTS BY THE
EXPORT-IMPORT BANK
INDICATOR 1960-64 1965-69 i
PERCENTRECEIVING FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE 11 40
CIVIL AIRCRAFT EXPORTS,
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS 4,372 7,447
EXPORTSRECEIVING FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE,MILLION OF DOLLARS 490 2,982
Source: Ref. 12.
Air Carrier Indicators. Besides serving as
obvious monitors of the health of the air carrier
industry, these indicators (Table 6.9), particularly
overall (ton-mile) load factors, can serve as
advance indicators of the need for aviation
products.
The air carrier indicators show an uneven pic-
ture. U. S. air carriers are increasing their share of
the market, but profits are falling and over-
capacity is appearing throughout the entire indus-
try. Non-U. S. airline profits have followed the
pattern of U.S. profits, but at a lower level.
Value added per U.S. air carrier employee is
growing - although it may have fallen in 1970.
Considering all of the indicators, the most sig-
nificant indicators appear to be:
• Ratio of total aerospace sales to civil
aircraft sales
• Ratio of total aerospace R&D to total
aerospace sales
• Value added per labor dollar
• Length of production run
• Ratio of value of U.S.-manufactured
aircraft on order to value of
foreign-manufactured aircraft on order
of the five indicators, none seems at present
to indicate leadership problems for the U. S. civil
aircraft industry, although no comparable data
for other nations were found for the first two
indicators. The ratio of total U. S. aerospace sales
to U. S. civil aircraft sales, although falling, seems
to indicate that civil sales are growing at a much
faster rate than military sales. However, a decline
in military procurement will also cause a reduc-
tion in the allowance for IR&D, which may deter
industry from investing in as much research and
technology. The ratio of total U.S. aerospace
TABLE 6.9. AIR CARRIER INDICATORS
INDICATOR 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969
PERCENTU.S. REVENUE PASSENGER-MILES
(DOMESTICPLUS INTERNATIONAL)
PERCENTU.S. REVENUE TON-MILES
(DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL)
VALUE ADDED/U.S. EMPLOYEE,
CURRENTDOLLARS
CONSTANT0OLLARS
PROFIT ASA PERCENT OF OPERATING REVENUES
U.S.AIRLINES
NON-U.S.AIRLINES
U.S.AIRLINES: NON-U.S.AIRLINES
OVERALL (TON-MILE) LOAD FACTOR
U.S.AIRLINES
ALL ICAO AIRLINES
54.8 55.2 55.7 58.2 57.6
53.7 54.7 58.9 64,0 54.1
9,950 11,510 12,710 13,570
11,710 13,100 14,000 14,100
-2.0 5.8 12.1 9.5
-2.1 3.2 6.9 5.0
1.0 1.8 1.8 1.9
NA 49.2 50.3 50.9 46.7
51.7 50.6 51.7 50.7 47.7
Source: Refs. 4, 6, 15, 22, 23.
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R&Dto totalU.S.aerospacesalesappearsto be
holding constant. Value added per labor dollar,
although favorable in 1966, is of limited useful-
ness without data for additional countries and
without data for other years to permit establish-
ing a trend over time. The length of production
run is very favorable for those aircraft-type com-
parisons that were included. Finally, the ratio of
the value of U. S.-manufactured planes on order
to the value of foreign-manufactured planes on
order indicates a strongly improving U.S.
position.
For the air carrier industry, all of the indica-
tors noted are considered significant. U. S. air car-
riers appear to be in a strong position relative to
non-U. S. air carriers. Falling profits and over-
capacity, as evidenced by falling load factors,
appear to be plaguing the entire industry. As pre-
viously noted, load factor in particular can serve
as an advance indicator of the need for aviation
products.
In summary, the overall position of the U. S.
civil aviation industry is very favorable. The sub-
stantial momentum of the industry can be
expected to sustain this position over the next
few years, although individual companies will
neither contribute nor share equally. Such
momentum, however, should not be cause for
complacency. Once the momentum is lost, it is
likely to be significantly more difficult to regain
than to have retained it through timely minor
actions.
C_nclusions and Recommendations
• In the past, substantial Government
support of both military and civil
aviation has been the key factor bringing
worldwide leadership in civil aviation to
the U.S. This leadership position came
about largely as a by-product of building
a strong national defense and a healthy
domestic market.
• Most indicators reflect increasing
strength. One indicator- the level of
propulsion R&D funding- is decreasing
and warrants more detailed analysis.
While growing overcapacity in the air car-
rier industry portends problems for the
airlines as well as the aerospace industry,
the U.S. leadership position does not
appear to be currently threatened
thereby.
Analysis of the indicators shows that the
U.S. position in civil aviation is still
strong and no specific Government
action is suggested at this time to
improve that position. These indicators
have not yet been tested and should not
serve as substitutes for other analyses
that, for example, might suggest changes
in the Export-Import Bank, or more
liberal policies relating to allowable
charges against military contracts.
Actions suggested elsewhere in this
report, designed to improve the domestic
market, should find equal acceptance in
foreign markets and will help maintain
and enhance our position of worldwide
leadership.
The demonstrated importance of civil
aviation in world affairs (e.g., interna-
tional prestige, balance of trade, and
maintenance of defense superiority) sug-
gests the desirability of pursuing U.S.
leadership in aviation matters in a more
active manner.
If the United States is to consciously
pursue a course of strengthening the
U.S. position in civil aviation in the
world community, it is necessary to
develop a set of leadership indicators to
quantitatively assess its progress and to
measure the reaction to specific courses
the Government elects to take. It is
therefore recommended that the Depart-
ment of Commerce accept the charter to
measure, test, and refine these suggested
indicators on a continuous basis, so that
this complex issue may be better
understood.
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DEMONSTRATIONPROGRAMS
.Issue
To what extent should the U. S. Government
conduct or support demonstration programs in
the field of civil aviation?
Definition
Demonstration programs are needed to prove
out new systems and technologies, to assess mar-
ket potentials, or to remove major institutional
constraints temporarily. Demonstration programs
are experiments designed to embrace new con-
cepts, procedures, regulations, or the blending of
new technologies into existing systems. These
programs should collect information and required
data in a real-world environment involving the
ultimate users of the system. Two types of
demonstrations have been considered. "Opera-
tional demonstrations" would be designed to test
the effects of the introduction of new elements
on the operations of present systems (e.g., testing
the effect ofa STOL vehicle on the ATC system).
"Market demonstrations" would be designed to
test market reaction and examine the effect of
new elements or other changes on such factors as
equipment, fares, routes, and service, in either
case, the demonstrations should be carefully
designed to test key variables and collect required
data so that the information necessary for the
guidance of R&D programs can be obtained. Mar-
ket or regulatory experiments can be as important
to the R&D process as operational demonstra-
tions. With accurate data on price, frequency, and
service elasticities available, the manufacturer is in
a better position to evaluate trade-offs and
requirements for new systems, in addition, a
properly designed demonstration program can
provide the basis for definitive cost/benefit anal-
yses.
Importance of Demonstrations
Significant changes in living patterns and land
use during the past decade have made
re-evaluation of existing transport systems both
an economic and social necessity. Generally, the
evolution of new travel patterns and requirements
have outstripped the systems that originally
stimulated growth. Although, in the past, tech-
nical developments of air vehicles were the prin-
cipal motivation behind this rapid growth,
"systems" improvements will play an increasingly
important role in the future. The uncertainties of
how to proceed to an optimal system, the number
of different groups required to effect change, and
the involvement of Government in many phases
of air transportation suggest the need for some
form of Federal involvement in demonstration
programs if an orderly and responsive develop-
ment of the air transportation system is to be
achieved in the decades ahead.
Some of the present conditions and trends
that support the need for demonstrations are:
• Systems complexity-- no one private
corporation has significant control over
the many diverse elements of the total
system. The complexity of the system
acts as a deterrent to the development of
some system improvements such as pro-
viding adequate service to the short-haul
market.
• Congestion - The FAA estimates that, in
1969, delays due to congestion cost the
airlines $158 million and 22 million
man-hours (ref. 24). Noise, slow airport
processing, inadequate ground trans-
portation to and from the airport, lack of
suitable land acquisition programs for
new airports, airspace management, and
control and regulations all contribute to
the problem, and need to be considered
together when selecting solutions.
• Political processes- opposition to
airport expansion or construction of new
airports will force airports farther from
the areas they serve. This will result in
lessened interest by the city in the air-
port, coupled with an increased burden
on ground transportation systems. With
these realities, experiments are needed to
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analyze optimization of location versus
access versus environment versus
door-to-door travel time.
• Ground access- one airport handling
50-100 million passengers per year
could require as many as 50 lanes of free-
way to handle the crowds. New tech-
niques of handling movement of people
need examining.
• Nature of passengers- A greater
percentage of all travel in the future will
be for pleasure (by 1985, pleasure travel
is expected to represent 70% of the total
travel market). There will thus be
increased interest in reduced fares and
possibly less interest in travel time and
quality and quantity of service. Market
experiments are needed to match capabil-
ity with the changing demand.
• Regulation - Currently, fare changes and
route awards are argued before the CAB
largely on the basis of price elasticity and
market demand. Under these circum-
stances, the proceedings are more
time-consuming and costly than would
be a contingency award or a demonstra-
tion on a limited basis in the market.
With the latter approach, conjecture
would be replaced by facts.
Transportation Demonstration Programs
The Government has not had extensive
experience in air demonstration programs. The
1958 Acts creating NASA and FAA contain pro-
visions (refs. 25, 26) allowing demonstration pro-
grams, but very few have been conducted and
even in those few there usually has been no rela-
tionship to the economics of normal operations.
In some ways, the CAB subsidy programs
represent the best examples of demonstration
programs. Up to 1951, $200 million were given
the domestic trunks; through 1954, $300 million
to international carriers; through 1970,
$1.1 billion to local service carriers (including car-
riers in Hawaii and Alaska) and $51 million to
helicopter carriers between 1954 and 1966
(ref. 27). These investments in both domestic and
international carriers have successfully demon-
strated the attractiveness of air travel to the pub-
lic. To date, the subsidies to local service and heli-
copter carriers have not culminated as successful
demonstrations. Nor have experiments with
all-cargo carriers or nonscheduled charter carriers
proved conclusively successful. Additional value
would have been received from these "experi-
ments" (particularly helicopter and local service)
if there had been more emphasis on the gathering
of data (especially market elasticity data),
through experiments involving orderly variations
in price, frequency, and service choices. Market or
regulatory experiments could be very important
to the R&D process. With accurate data on
elasticity of the market with price, frequency,
and service available, the manufacturer and the
airline would be in much better positions to eval-
uate trade-offs and requirements for new systems.
The airlines themselves have undertaken
demonstrations. Eastern Airlines and American
Airlines STOL demonstrations, using Breguet air-
craft, represented essentially technical demon-
strations, without marketplace effects. Market
effects were considered, however, in the develop-
ment of suburban passenger terminals in New
York by several airlines and in the fostering by
Allegheny Airlines and other local service carriers
of scheduled third-level commuter passenger
service.
While these examples show that there has
been some limited use of demonstrations in the
past, the growing complexity of the market, the
great financial risk associated with the develop-
ment of new aircraft, and the need to select new
systems from balanced systems analyses rather
than from piecemeal technological improvements
all point to an increasing need for demonstrations
in the future.
Government Involvement
Government involvement is already provided
for by the Department of Transportation Act
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(ref.28) that states"...the Departmentof
Transportationshouldassurethe coordinated
effective administration of the transportation pro-
gram of the Federal Government... encourage
cooperation of Federal, state and local govern-
ment carriers, labor and other interested
parties.., provide general leadership in the iden-
tification and solution of transportation prob-
lems .... " The Secretary, then, under existing
legislation, can clearly undertake demonstration
projects in any areas of transportation where they
may be needed. The need for such DOT initiatives
are dependent upon many considerations, includ-
ing the ability of private industry to perform a
required demonstration without Government
participation.
Based on past performance, private industry
can be expected to make evolutionary improve-
ments to the civil aviation system, and both the
airlines and aircraft manufacturers may be
expected to work together towards this end when
the proper economic incentives are present.
Under certain conditions, however, private indus-
try may not be able to take the necessary action,
in which case, if any progress is to be made,
Government involvement will be needed. Some of
these conditions are:
• No element of private industry can per-
form the task because it lacks sufficient
jurisdiction and because of institutional
barriers or other factors. In these cases,
industry cannot control enough of the
environment to proceed.
• Industry is not the prime mover as is the
case in most airport development pro-
grams.
• Private industry will not proceed for
financial reasons- either the initial
investment is too great or the profits lie
too far in the future. In addition, a pri-
vate firm will be reluctant to engage in an
expensive demonstration when the bene-
fits cannot be restricted to itself, but
would accrue equally to its competitors.
In these cases, Government involvement is
justified if the following conditions are met:
• The service being demonstrated is in the
public interest.
• The service potentially has broad
application.
• The demonstration is designed to
produce results pertinent to a total
transport system.
• The service has the potential of operating
profitably (or with a reasonable initial
subsidy, if it is in the public interest).
• The demonstration is responsive to both
market and political processes.
• All parties involved accept their
appropriate share of responsibilities for
financing and for operations.
If these conditions are met, the Federal
Government may assume any number of roles -
planner, coordinator, regulator, funder, impartial
evaluator, or operator. Table 6.10 shows some of
the advantages and disadvantages associated with
the various roles.
The approach selected should be compatible
with the criteria being used to assess the advisabil-
ity of Government-assisted demonstration pro-
grams in other industries. These more general cri-
teria include:
• Industry must share the risk.
• No industry member may be placed in a
favored position.
• The forces of the marketplace must be
recognized.
• Competition must be maintained.
These criteria can be satisfied by civil aviation
demonstrations if:
• Demonstrations are jointly funded by
Government and industry.
• Industry forms joint ventures to work
with Government.
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Whereappropriate,both manufacturers
andairlinesparticipatein joint ventures.
If possible,more than one industry
participates and competesin the
program.
Eachdemonstrationproposalwill require a
different mix of participation, but emphasis
should be given to increasing the responsibility of
the private sector. The most likely Government
role, however, is leadership and economic partic-
ipation on a limited basis, where private indus-
try, in recognition of potential gains, shares the
economic risks. In addition, Government control
of demonstration programs without the stimulus
of a competitive environment could easily
produce results of limited economic and social
value.
GOVERNMENT ROLE
FULL AND SOLE PARTICIPANT
TABLE 6.10. VARIOUS ROLES THE GOVERNMENT MAY PLAY IN DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS
LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMIC PARTICIPA-
TION ON LIMITED BASIS
ECONOMIC PARTICIPATION (SUBSIDIES)
LEADERSHIP AND DIRECTIONAL PARTICI-
PATION (REGULATORY)
POTENTIAL EFFICIENCIES, DUE TO FULL
GOVERNMENT CONTROL
EFFECTIVE CONCENTRATION ON IMMED-
IATE PROBLEM AREAS
EASE OF COMPREHENSIVE AND COORDIN-
ATED TRANSPO RTATION PLANNING
FLEXIBLE
LOW LONG-TERM COST
ACCOMMODATES EFFECTS OF MARKET
FORCES
CAN WORK TOWARD ECONOMIC SELF-
SUFFICIENCY
PLACES RESPONSIBILITY FOR RISK-SHAR-
ING ON PRIVATE INDUSTRY
ACCOMMODATES POLITICAL FACTORS
COMPLIES WITH DOT ACT
SIMPLICITY AND SPEED
LEAST TAXPAYER COST
COMPLIES WITH DOT ACT
CAN TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF COMPE-
TITION
HIGH COSTTO TAXPAYERS
POTENTIALLY STIFLING OF PRIVATE IN-
DUSTRY
LACK OF REQUIRED SKILLS AND FACILI-
TIES
NOT ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH DOT
ACT
ORGANIZATIONALLY CUMBERSOME
SOMEWHAT UNRESPONSIVE
SHORT-TERM COST
HIGH COST TO TAXPAYER
LACK OF CONTROL
LIMITED VALUE OF RESULTS
DIFFICULTY OF JURISDICTIONAL CO-
ORDINATION
RESTRICTIVE IN TERMS OF PARTIClPA-
TION OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
LIMITED IN APPLICABILITY IN SOME PROB-
LEM AREAS
LIMITED IN SCOPE
RELATIVELY SLOW PROGRESS
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Governmentinteractionin this role would
include:
• Selecting probable demonstration areas,
setting goals, and assessing expected
benefits.
• Requesting proposals from private and
public organizations, outlining concepts
for conducting demonstrations.
• Awarding contracts (with partial
funding) for most promising proposals.
• Remaining in a supervisory capacity,
assessing progress, resolving jurisdictional
problems, resolving legal and procedural
restrictions, and obtaining cooperation of
local and regional governing agencies.
• Modifying operating criteria as necessary.
• Assisting organizations with development
of a testing and analysis plan and per-
forming program reviews as necessary.
• Issuing Government reports summarizing
findings and initiating Government poli-
cies (if successful) to permit implementa-
tion on broadest possible scale.
Benefits
While each specific proposal must be assessed
on the basis of the benefits of time saved, land
use, and dollars saved, the overall gains that can
be realized by making proper use of demonstra-
tion programs may be appreciated from the fact
that, with only four airports at the saturation
point today, capacity limitations are already
costing the nation more than $623 million per
year. It is expected that by 1985 20 to 30 air-
ports will be saturated with a correspondingly
great increase in cost to the Nation. It has been
estimated that the New York area alone will suf-
fer a loss of $600 million per year by 1980 as a
result of insufficient capacity. Subsidies to local
service carriers currently amount to about $34
million per year. These costs should stimulate the
search for new ways of solving the current
problems of air transportation.
Recommendations
Demonstration Airports. It is recommended
that the Federal airports including NAFEC and
Edwards Air Force Base (or suitable alternatives)
be designated demonstration airports. Aircraft
manufacturers have traditionally used a wide
spectrum of demonstrations to validate and test
the utility of new aircraft. Now, demonstration
airports are required so that systems choices and
their alternatives can be clearly understood. It is
believed that this is the most expeditious way to
arrive at a balanced air transport system.
High-Density, Short-Haul System
Demonstration. Just as have previous studies, the
present Study shows the need for a short-haul
system designed to meet the needs of high-density
corridors. Because this market is particularly sen-
sitive to door-to-door travel times, there is also a
particular need to assess the combined effects of
airport location and land costs, vehicle character-
istics, airport access, CAB/FAA regulations, and
air traffic control procedures. At present, an
impasse exists with the manufacturers, airlines,
cities, and Government regulators, each waiting
for the other to take the first big step. Because of
this impasse and the difficulty of optimizing this
complex system, the Federal Government should
take steps to initiate action through demonstra-
tion programs. Cities should be encouraged to
build STOLports; a favorable regulatory environ-
ment should be created; the necessary changes to
the ATC system should be made; and, if needed,
financial support for initial operations should be
provided. Preliminary analyses of a short-haul
system demonstration for the Northeast Corridor
indicate that initial annual income will be
$4 million less than costs, but a well-designed
system shows the promise of doing much to
relieve congestion in that area by utilizing existing
airports more effectively and permitting new air-
ports to be established on significantly smaller
parcels of land.
it is recommended that the Government
assist in the definition of a spectrum of
time/cost/service variations that will be examined
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during the demonstration. This experimentation
may not be self-supporting at the start, but the
information gained should permit a system design
responsive to the public's needs and thus capable
of attracting sufficient patronage to be profitable.
Low-Density, Short-Haul System
Demonstration. Even with the more favorable
economics of jets, the short-haul market as a
whole has continued to lose money. A large per-
centage of the passengers today use this service,
and yet it is necessary for the Government to
provide a $34 million per year subsidy. Ground
costs are an important element, but there is
evidence that a small vehicle (20-40 passengers)
designed especially for this market could sig-
nificantly improve the situation and find broad
application. It also appears that new marketing
techniques are needed. Because the effects these
changes would have on the market are not
known, a demonstration program should be
initiated that would involve:
• The evolution of an improved aircraft to
serve this market
• Removal of the 12,500-poundrestriction
for commuter airlines and air taxi
operations
• Creation of a regulatory environment by
CAB that would encourage carriers to
give greater attention to short-haul
service
• Experimentation with methods
(technical and other) by which
flight-crew labor costs could be reduced
• Experimentation with fare and frequency
of service, to provide data for airlines in
structuring their operations
Airport Capacity Demonstration. Improve-
ments to a number of existing airports are
urgently needed. Experiments are needed to
study runway layouts, high-speed turnoffs,
computer-controlled ground-traffic management,
runway spacing, and wake turbulence dissipation
experiments. Some of these experiments should
take place at a remote and flexible facility such as
Edwards Air Force Base (where runways and
turnoffs can be simply painted on the large dry
lake, and thus can be easily changed in the experi-
ments), and others at NAFEC (where experiments
in air traffic control can take place in a realistic
operating environment). Other experiments are
recommended to assess the effect of charging
lower fares at off-peak hours or of varying landing
fees to encourage operation at other than peak
hours.
Airport Design Demonstration. As passenger
volume increases, the natural tendency is to
increase airport size. It has become more and
more difficult, however, to acquire additional
land at existing airports. It may be desirable,
then, to use airports exclusively for aircraft opera-
tions, moving passenger-handling facilities to
off-airport, and more conveniently located, sites
and providing high-speed ground-transport links
to the airport. Such centralized passenger- and
cargo-processing centers, with rapid access links
to the airport, offer great promise in reducing
congestion at the air terminal. (More than 50% of
the people at terminals today are visitors or
friends and relatives of travelers.) This demonstra-
tion experiment could show the effect of off-site
processing on airport congestion, door-to-door
time savings, relative costs of operation, and
public acceptance. The off-site airport-
operator-owned processing centers could experi-
ment with integrated parking, ticketing,
baggage-handling, and seat-selection techniques.
The traveler would, in effect, have "made his
flight" once he reaches the processing center, thus
eliminating the need for him to allow a time
margin at the airport. The off-airport sites should
be easier to obtain than the large blocks of land
required to provide all the services at the airport.
Market-Sensitivity Demonstration. Rate and
route regulations were originally imposed to
foster and strengthen air transportation while it
was developing. This objective has now been
largely accomplished, and the need for, and the
effects of, further regulation should be examined.
There are, however, not sufficient data to assess
the effects of allowing air carriers to set their own
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ratesandto serverouteswith minimumrestric-
tions.Forthisreason,aregulatorydemonstration
programshouldbe considered.It couldinvolve
designating,for example,25city pairsasopento
freecompetition.Datacouldthenbeobtainedon
thelevel,qualityof service,andprofitsthatresult
fromallowingairlinesto establisht eirownrates,
routes,and promotionalofferings.Theseand
otherexperimentscouldprovidedata for the
evaluationof theneedto makesomeroutescom-
petitive,somenoncompetitive,andsomelimited;
to usefaresvaryingwith the timeof day to
smoothout travelpeaks;to offerminimalpas-
sengerservicesin flight; or to offer serviceat
alternate(lesscongested)airportsat lowerrates.
Suchexperimentationwith regulationson a
controlledbasiswill giveaclearerpictureof pre-
sentmarketconditionsandsensitivities.This,in
turn,canleadto theuseof aircraftincorporating
moreinnovativeR&D.
REMOVALOF REGULATORYAND LEGAL
CONSTRAINTSON INTEGRATED
TRANSPORTSYSTEMS
Issue
Should the Federal Government reconsider
the antitrust and regulatory policies on multi-
modal transportation activities? If so, how should
the policies be modified? The objectives should
be to:
• Remove deterrents to systems integration
in the movement of people and goods.
• Provide an environment more conducive
to intermodal R&D.
Status and Trends
Lcgal and regulatory constraints to inter-
modal integration have had a significant effect on
the development of not only civil aviation but
transportation generally. Justified initially by the
uneven growth of transport modes and the need
for protection against monopoly, these laws and
regulations have accumulated over the past
half-century. Their present validity should be
reexamined in light of current operations and
requirements.
At least four Governmental and advisory
groups have recently studied various aspects of
the question of intermodal constraints. In
January 1971, the report of the President's Advi-
sory Council on Executive Organization (the Ash
Council) advocated a single transportation
regulatory agency (ref. 29). A study group under
the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences
(the National Research Council's Maritime Trans-
portation Research Board) has just completed a
project entitled "Study of Legal Aspects of Inter-
modal Transportation" (ref. 30). The study group
concentrated on through rates, uniform common
liability, and simplified trade documentation, pri-
marily as they relate to the international move-
ment of freight between inland points in the
United States and foreign countries. The Trans-
portation Subcommittee of the Cabinet Com-
mittee on Economic Policy is considering regula-
tory reform. The President's Advisory Council on
Management Improvement (the Schriever
Council) has selected transportation as its first
area of study. The 1971 Economic Report of the
President contains a section on deregulation of
the transportation industry (ref. 31).
Legal and regulatory constraints that
discourage coordination between transportation
modes also discourage intermodal R&D and
innovation. Regulatory and other institutional
constraints (such as different State transportation
laws, and labor unions), tend to blunt the R&D
incentive, and with it, the managerial initiative to
pursue R&D. Consider the area of containeri-
zation. Differing State highway restrictions led
the two pioneers in container ships (Sea-Land and
Matson) to develop different length containers -
35 and 24 feet long, respectively. The absence of
through joint rates and uniform systems of
through liability for intermodal travel has
retarded the growth of containerization and
hence has inhibited improvements in shipping
costs, delivery time, theft, and damage reduction.
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A more sweeping impact with respect to
R&D exists in the area of air cargo. As indicated
in the "Air Cargo" section, air shipment of goods
is revolutionizing traditional means of manufac-
ture, distribution, and inventory storage (the total
distribution cost effect). Innovations to minimize
door-to-door time and costs require coordinated
and compatible activities in aircraft design,
ground-handling equipment, airport location,
facilities, traffic mix, terminal processing and
storage facilities, containerization, documenta-
tion, airport access/egress, shipment consolidation
and scheduling, shipment security and liability
provisions, ground vehicles, and surface distrib-
ution. Technological innovation in any one link
of this chain is inhibited unless complementary
innovations in other links are also assured. It is
clear from an examination of regulatory case
interpretations, however, that strong inhibitions
are placed against intermodal coordination.
The problems arising from legal and regula-
tory constraints are outlined below:
Specific Operational Problems. Of daily con-
cern to shippers and carriers in the air transport
industry are costs associated with documentation,
tariffs, joint rates, and through liability. In each
of these areas a widespread belief is held by
shippers and carriers that present intermodal prac-
tices could be simplified and improved. These
problem areas are closely related; for example,
joint rates and common liability limits would pro-
vide a strong impetus to simplified standard docu-
mentation, including filing tariffs for all modes in
standard formats - with resulting cost decreases.
International documentation for shipments
currently costs all parties involved, including the
U.S. Government, at least $5 billion a year, or
roughly 10% of the gross value of our interna-
tional traffic. The estimated documentation cost
of a typical export shipment in 1968 was $163.
When one considers that approximately 25% of
the shipments exported from the United States
are valued at less than $100, it is clear that
documentation costs are excessive.
Experience has shown that a common form
of contract is greatly beneficial to trade. For
example, the creation by the banking industry of
standards for checks and other documents has
facilitated commerce. In contrast, there does not
exist today a common bill of lading for the
various modes of transportation. If such a form
existed, a shipper could prepare, in cooperation
with the first carrier, a single document, setting
forth the conditions of carriage and limits of
liability for the entire movement, which would be
acceptable from origin to destination. It would
also comprise a waybill, serving as a receipt for
the cargo. Ideally, the single bill of lading would
satisfy banking, insurance, and customs
requirements.
Insistence on preserving tradition may make
it very difficult to arrive at a common bill of
lading. However, much effort is being made to
simplify shipping documentation in general. Both
private and public groups, including the National
Committee on International Trade Documenta-
tion and the office of Facilitation of the Depart-
ment of Transportation - are involved. DOT sup-
ported the "Trade Simplification Act of 1969"
(HR 14489; S 3142) that, had it passed, would
have authorized inland and ocean water carriers
and air carriers to enter into agreements to
establish joint rates and issue a through bill of
lading from origin to overseas destination.
lntermodal transportation is hampered by the
fact that tariffs are not filed before the three
regulatory agencies in a common format, which
would refer to commodities in a standard way.
Today, a commodity may be measured in terms
of volume on one mode and in terms of weight on
another mode. Again, there are groups at work on
the problem, but a much greater effort is
required.
With joint rates agreed to by carriers of dif-
ferent modes, a shipper could determine his ship-
ping costs for an intermodal movement easily and
definitely (x dollars for delivery in y hours,
regardless of modes used). The three transporta-
tion regulatory agencies recognize the possibility
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andeventhedesirabilityof joint ratesmadeby
carriersof the same mode, and recently inter-
modal joint rates have been receiving more atten-
tion. Rail-rail joint rates are recognized, and
indeed are mandatory among domestic rail car-
riers. Joint air-surface rates are permitted but not
mandatory, although joint rates between air
freight forwarders and ICC-regulated carriers are
not yet permitted. The ICC and the Federal Mari-
time Commission have recently agreed to the
filing of joint land-water rates.
Other inconsistencies are aggravated by the
existence of three separate regulatory agencies
and numerous statutes. Although the proposed
Trade Simplification Act sought to widen the use
of intermodal joint rates, it left a number of
important questions to the discretion of the
separate regulatory agencies; for example,
whether the division of the joint rate between the
carriers should be known only to the carriers, as is
the interstate Commerce Commission practice, or
whether the division should be stated in the tariff,
as is the Federal Maritime Commission practice.
Separate transport modes also operate under
many different statutory limits of liability,
including the "Warsaw" convention for interna-
tional air carriers, the Carmack Act for domestic
surface carriers, and the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act of 1936 (known as the "Hague Rules") for
ocean carriers. Under present transportation prac-
tices, it is difficult for the shipper to determine
with which carrier damage occurred and, there-
fore, how to collect for damages. The result is
uncertainty, complexity, and unnecessary
duplication of insurance by both shippers and
carriers.
Administrative and Organizational Problems.
When economic regulation in civil aviation was
established (with the passage of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act in 1938), the air transportation mar-
ket was infinitesimal, with revenues of
$57 million compared with those in 1968 of
$796 billion (ref. 27). At the time economic
regulation was first put into effect, it was
considered essential on the grounds that:
• Transportation could easily become a
monopoly, with monopoly pricing-
thereby restricting the growth of air
transportation.
• Economic regulation would protect the
weaker carriers.
• Economic regulation was desirable since
subsidy was to be paid, and this was
necessarily accompanied by restriction of
entry and control over rates, routes,
mergers, etc.
In the past 30 years, however, air transporta-
tion has been fundamentally transformed by
advances in technology, growth in markets,
massive investments, and strong competition.
Travelers and shippers now usually have a wide
range of choice of routes, services, and even
modes. The number and variety of transportation
alternatives available today has made comprehen-
sive regulation administratively cumbersome (in
1969 there were more than 7,000 formal
proceedings by the ICC and nearly 1,200 dockets
before the CAB) and has led to economic
suboptimization.
The price of regulation is high. Delays
inherent in the regulatory process are costly,
preventing rapid innovation and adjustment to
changing economic conditions- for example,
building up surplus working capital in anticipa-
tion of massive capital investment in new equip-
ment, or quickly covering costs of wage settle-
ments. The regulatory process encourages
protective policies, and industry management
tends to be preoccupied with procedural strategy
rather than with R&D innovation and efficiency.
Air carriers are unable to develop optimal
schedules and route patterns. It is not that the
agencies have been generally unsympathetic to
new development- usually quite the contrary.
But the tendency (and indeed statutory direction)
has been for the agency to wait for the problems
to be presented to it and to deal with them in a
piecemeal fashion.
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Withthematuringof alltransportmodesand
theincreasein intermodaltransportation,prohibi-
tionsin onespecialareaof regulation- thecom-
mon ownershipof more than one transport
mode- areundergoingreviewandchange.
Historically,surfacecarriershavebeenpro-
hibited from acquiringair carriersunlessthey
couldshowthataircraftcouldbeusedto public
advantagein their operationsand wouldnot
restraincompetition.Althoughthelawdoesnot
actuallypreventasurfacecarrierfromenteringair
transportationby meansotherthanacquiringan
air carrier,theCABhasinsistedthatsuchtransac-
tionsmeetboththepublicinterestandconflictof
interesttests,whereair traffic mightbesignif-
icantlydivertedto theothermodes.
Air carriersarenot, however,prohibitedby
law from acquiringother transportmodes,
althoughsuchacquisitionsmustbesubmittedto
the CABfor approval.Thesetransactionsmust
meetpublicinterestandconflictof interestests;
thatis,theprospectsof competitionbetweenthe
modesmustbeslightandthepossibilityof traffic
beingdivertedfrom air transportationmustbe
remote.OverseasNational Airways, a supple-
mental carrier, recently proposed to create a sub-
sidiary that would own and operate a passenger
cruise vessel. The CAB examiner disapproved the
application on the grounds of potential conflict
of interest.
The CAB's concern with preventing possible
diversion of air traffic through an intermodal
acquisition has discouraged intermodal mergers. A
few proposed mergers, however, have overcome
this restrictive obstacle. Transamerica Corpora-
tion, which owns Trans International Airlines (a
supplemental carrier), was recently permitted to
acquire Lyon Van and Storage Co., presumably
because there was little likelihood of a conflict of
interest. In addition, railroads and long-haul
motor carriers have recently been permitted to
enter the field of air freight forwarding, either
through acquisition or original entry.
To further complicate the problem, usually
several agencies have an interest in any carrier
that might be involved in intermodal transporta-
tion. Jurisdictional conflicts have arisen; pickup
and delivery problems and the definition of com-
mercial zones in which air freight forwarders are
authorized to deliver have generated interagency
conflicts.
Examples of the advantages of intermodal
mergers can be found in both cargo and passenger
transportation. The advantage of common owner-
ship, which is of particular interest in this Study,
is the more rapid introduction of new intermodal
technology. Canadian Pacific provides an obvious
example with its ownership of a railroad, airline,
and pipeline, as well as trucking and steamship
operations. The earlier development of large scale
Piggyback service in Canada than in the United
States can be largely explained by Canada's much
less restrictive legislation on multimodal owner-
ship. The vested interests of the separate trans-
port modes and difficulties in agreeing on inter-
modal equipment (including containers) and
facilities tend to retard intermodal technology.
Not only would multimodal ownership provide a
central responsibility for initiating intermodal
R&D, but by enabling the innovator to capture
the full profit of his technological improvement,
the economic incentives for pursuing new tech-
nology would be increased.
In the case of passenger transportation, it
seems clear that legal and regulatory constraints
are inhibiting innovation, research, and develop-
ment aimed at reducing the ground access time to
and from the airport, as well as airport processing
time. Certainly, institutional and policy consider-
ations such as multiple political jurisdictions,
strong funding emphasis on highway versus public
transit, and the importance of parking and con-
cessions to airport revenue strongly affect the
incentive and capability for innovating total
systems processing of passengers.
Government Involvement. The alternatives
open to the Federal Government in modifying
legal and regulatory constraints on integrated
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transportationare:to continuepresentpolicies;
to increasecooperationandcoordination;or to
institutemoresweepingreform.Withthedivers-
ity innature,magnitude,andcomplexityof prob-
lemsassociatedwith legalandregulatorycon-
straints,onealternativemaybeappropriatefor
alleviatingsomeproblemsbut inappropriatefor
others.
Continue Present Policies. Extrapolating
the current trend would help solve some
of the specific operational problems.
Both the DOT and the transportation
regulatory agencies have undertaken to
solve selected aspects of the problems.
The creation of DOT has had a definite
influence on intermodal cooperation. Members of
DOT's Office of Policy Review and Coordination
have testified at hearings before the regulatory
agencies. The office of Facilitation has exerted its
efforts towards simplifying trade documentation,
facilitating container interchange between modes,
and encouraging a uniform system of carrier lia-
bility. The DOT-supported Trade Simplification
Act, as previously mentioned, would have per-
mitted common carriers of one mode to establish
joint rates with common carriers of other modes
for the international transportation of cargo and
would have permitted a carrier to issue a through
bill of lading. The carrier would have assumed
responsibility for the cargo for the entire trip.
The Act would not have solved the problem of
the absence of a simple and uniform system of
carrier liability. The sponsors of the bill realized
that any restructuring of the many conflicting
domestic liability laws and international conven-
tions was unlikely in the short time, but believed
that permitting joint rates and through bills of
lading would provide an impetus for cooperative
private and public attacks on the liability
problem.
Although the CAB has tended to move
toward free entry into air freight forwarding,
questions of common ownership involving the
direct air carriers continue to be interpreted in a
restrictive manner. With other agencies, the cur-
rent approach to common ownership is essentially
passive, each question being answered on a
case-by-case basis. This is normal and correct
quasi-judicial procedure, but with the number of
different agencies involved, it does little toward
assuring a broad and intermodal consideration of
the matter.
There are advantages in continuing the pres-
ent policies. This alternative is the easiest to fol-
low and it is the least costly in terms of additional
effort required. More importantly, under the pres-
ent policies, considerable effort is being exerted
to remove some of the specific operational
impediments to intermodal transportation.
The disadvantages are that the broad aspects
of the issue- common ownership of separate
modes, the status of the three regulatory agencies,
and the questions of deregulation - are not being
treated thoroughly, if at all. This alternative can
be characterized as a piecemeal approach, since
many statutory inconsistencies will remain, leav-
ing today's fragmented systems to continue.
Modal views may be expected to continue to pre-
dominate, and intermodal problems will continue
to be treated on a case-by-case basis by the regula-
tory agencies.
Increased Cooperation and Coordination.
In this alternative, the Government
would accept the existing regulatory
framework and strive to make incre-
mental improvements within this frame-
work. Generally, the three transportation
regulatory agencies would work more
closely with each other as well as with
DOT and with other departments.
The regulatory agencies could adapt their
procedures more to dealing with intermodal
questions by holding joint meetings on important
intermodal questions- even though such meet-
ings are cumbersome - and by encouraging repre-
sentatives of one agency to appear before another
agency.
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Theregulatoryagencieswould work together
and with carrier and shipper representatives to
develop common procedures and forms, such as
the single bill of lading, common tariff formats
(including tariffs for joint rates) and simplified
and standard commodity codes. Where forms
would be used in international transportation,
foreign governments and the Bureau of Customs
would in some cases be involved. Such common
forms would greatly reduce the amount of paper-
work in intermodal transportation, at a saving to
shippers, carriers, and the governments involved.
A spokesman for the National Committee on
International Trade Documentation estimates
that with the cooperation of the Government, the
cost of international trade documentation could
be reduced from $5 billion to half of that within
a 4- to 5-year period. Many procedures and forms
are amenable to joint agency efforts. Although
active interagency cooperation and coordination
are difficult, the effort would be an improvement
over the more passive approach of the preceding
alternative.
Although the statutory inconsistencies and
the numerous international conventions on the
limits of liability for carriage by different modes
create a particularly difficuk and time-consuming
obstacle to rapid improvement, the agencies, in
conjunction with the DOT, could bring some
order to the problem. The agencies could
cooperate in developing and issuing rules concern-
ing from whom and where to collect for damage
or loss to an intermodal shipment. Similarly, pro-
cedures for apportioning liability among carriers
could be recommended. The larger problem of
conflicts in statutory liability limits and interna-
tional conventions can be resolved only through
joint Government-industry cooperation on the
domestic conflicts and international negotiations
on the international conflicts. A uniform system
of liability may be impractical and perhaps even
impossible for all domestic and international
intermodal transportation, but certainly greater
order can be brought to the present situation.
On the subject of common ownership of
carrier by different modes, the three transporta-
tion regulatory agencies, in conjunction with the
Departments of Justice and Transportation,
would study the problems with the purpose of
developing, for presentation to the Congress, a
new policy to assist the establishment of inter-
modal systems in the public interest, with appro-
priate safeguards. The safeguards might include
the following criteria:
• The proposed merger should result in
operational benefit and in financial bene-
fits not otherwise obtainable.
• Competition should not be materially
lessened.
• Internal subsidies should be minimized.
This approach of increased cooperation and
coordination to modify legal and regulatory con-
straints has definite limitations when the broader
aspects of the issue- particularly the status of
the three transportation regulatory agencies and
the question of deregulation - are considered.
More Sweeping Reform. A more
far-reaching alternative would include the
adoption of the single transportation
regulatory agency as proposed by the
Ash Council (ref. 29) and adoption of
degrees of deregulation.
The Ash Council has proposed replacement
of the three transportation regulatory agencies
with a single agency and a single administrator
appointed by the President with no set term of
office. The promotional (subsidy) role of the
CAB would be transferred to the DOT. The
Council has recommended that the common
agency and its single administrator be formed
before the bulk of the transportation regulatory
legislation is rewritten. The following reasons are
offered:
The merger would otherwise be
unnecessarily delayed, since with over
80 years of regulatory statutes, the legis-
lative rewriting would be an extremely
complicated and time-consuming process.
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The administrator could provide strong
help in rewriting the statutes.
Interagency coordination has not been
very successful, judging from past experi-
ence. Under separate agencies, the
process of rewriting would be even more
time-consuming; agencies would be less
willing to compromise, less willing to
consider intermodal aspects, and less will-
ing to give up part of their jurisdiction.
The advantages of a single agency are:
• Inconsistencies in transportation regula-
tory policies - including common owner-
ship of separate modes- would be
removed.
• Regulatory and promotional aspects of
transportation would be completely
separated.
• A more intermodal view would be
adopted.
• Trade simplification- documentation,
joint rates, and through liability - would
be facilitated.
A single administrator would be expected to:
• Develop policies and promulgate rules of
broad applicability.
• Lend more weight to the process of
hearings, since the regulatory bodies now
constituted tend to overjudicialize.
• Coordinate more easily with the
Secretary of Transportation and other
Cabinet-level officials.
Some observers maintain that a single agency
is unnecessary, that the policy inconsistencies can
be removed through legislation and increased
cooperation and coordination, and that, after all,
most of the transportation regulatory problems
are modal rather than intermodal ill nature. The
Congress, however, may not be sympathetic to a
merger, and the transportation companies being
regulated would almost surely oppose such a
reorganization.
Deregulation of air transportation is a
fundamental change that has been considered in
the past and is again receiving serious study
despite the air carriers' current economic regula-
tion: controls on rates, routes, entry, and mergers
would be relaxed over a period of years. The
phasing would provide time to observe the effect
of a gradual deregulation, to change the degree
and speed of the deregulation, and to ensure an
orderly transition to a stronger flee-enterprise
basis of competition. Deregulation would affect
only the economic sphere of operations; safety
regulations would not be affected.
Regulation would not have to be eliminated
entirely. For example, some rate control on fares
may be necessary to protect less competitive parts
of the market from predatory practices. But the
direction toward deregulation has been signaled;
in the current fare-structure investigation by the
CAB, DOT recently proposed that air carrier fares
be permitted to fluctuate by +15% (ref. 32).
In the process of deregulation, both rates and
routes could be freed simultaneously, allowing an
air carrier to vary its fares by as much as, say,
15% the first year, 25% the second year, 40% the
third year, and so on. Routes could be deregu-
lated according to a schedule that permitted an
air carrier to discontinue up to 10% of its route
mileage the first year or expand its route mileage
by as much as 10% the first year, 25% the second
year, and so on. After the phased deregulation
had proceeded for sometime, entry into air trans-
portation would no longer be controlled except
for safety reasons. At the very least, antitrust pro-
visions would apply, with some criteria similar to
those given in the above paragraphs on common
ownership.
Any degree of deregulation would flee indus-
try management to concentrate more on efficient
management of air transportation. Although it
would not remove all institutional constraints,
deregulation would at least remove one important
obstacle to innovation, including the pursuit of
R&D. If deregulatkm is considered for other
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transportationmodes,the need for uniform
deregulationof themodeswouldprovideanother
advantageofasingleregulatoryagency.
Deregulationmayresultin somecertificated
carriersdiscontinuingsomeunprofitableroutes,
particularlyshort-haul.Althougha numberof
theseroutesmaybepickedupbyothercarriers
(probablyatahigherfare)somesmallercommun-
itieswouldloseairservicealtogether.If it werein
the publicinteresto maintaintheseroutes,the
Governmentcouldselectivelysubsidizethem.
Recommendations
The floating fares advocated by DOT
before the CAB's current fare investiga-
tion should be implemented, and further
deregulation should be considered.
Although revision of the regulatory
statutes to resolve the inconsistencies in,
and modal approach to, common owner-
ship of separate modes, will not be easily
accomplished, the issue warrants early
resolution. Without waiting for the
creation of a single transportation regula-
tory agency, the existing agencies, with
the Departments of Transportation and
Justice, should develop a new common
policy toward intermodal systems.
Many of the specific operational
problems - simplification of trade docu-
mentation, joint rates, and aspects of
through liability- would be solved in
the statutory revisions accompanying a
merger of the regulatory agencies. Other
efforts to solve the problem, however,
should be continued in the meantime and
even accelerated. Increased cooperation
and coordination among the agencies and
with the DOT would be useful in simpli-
fying and standardizing intermodal trade
procedures and forms- single bills of
lading, common tariff formats, simplified
and standardized commodity codes, joint
rates, rules on apportioning liability
among carriers, and common rules on
whom and where to sue. The resolution
of statutory inconsistencies, particularly
in the field of through carrier liability,
deserves greater cooperative efforts, legal
research, and international negotiations
toward removing these obstacles to
achieving efficient intermodal
transportation.
AIRPORT LAND ACQUISITION AND
AIRPORT LANDSIDE DEVELOPMENT
Issu e
What role should the Government assume to
assure that airport development programs are
accomplished in a more timely manner? What
methods should be used to achieve a better
integration of the landside of airports
(access/egress, terminal processing, etc.) with the
other parts of the air transport system?
The objective is to:
• Increase the pace of development for
new and improved airports, since airports
have the longest lead time of any element
of the air system.
• Help eliminate congestion.
• Develop a more balanced system, able to
take full economic advantage of
increased aircraft productivity.
Status and Trends
Increasing use of air transportation has pro-
duced congestion in airport access/egress systems
and airport terminals that threatens to limit the
capacity of many major U. S. airports to much
less than their airside capacity. For example, it is
anticipated that 80 million people will use Los
Angeles International Airport in 1975, but the
highway capacity as it is now planned for 1975
will handle only 40 million people. Several of the
modal agencies in DOT, as well as the Department
of Housing and Urban Development and the Eco-
nomic Development Agency, are involved in air-
port landside development, but no one agency has
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responsibilityin allareas.Thisfragmentationmili-
tates againsteffectiveFederalaction.This is
especiallyimportantbecausethereis a strong
dependence on Federal assistance to airports,
which arrives from the long-standing Federal
involvement in:
• Federal Aid to Airports Program
• Airport Development Aid Program
• Airport access, through highway funding
• Air traffic control
• Air vehicles and new airport certification
Active Federal leadership is essential to ade-
quate integration of airport systems into the over-
all air transport system. While such past Federal
activities, as these have been in the past, in this
area have been generally successful, current
efforts appear inadequate because of the rapid
growth of many external factors - for example:
• Environmental problems such as noise
and air pollution
• Extensive airport modifications required
by the introduction of wide-body jets
• Facilities needed to meet projected air
cargo growth
• Rapid urban sprawl resulting in losses of
suitable airport land
The problem is particularly difficult since site
selection and development of a new airport and
its supporting facilities can take from 10 to
15 years. As a result of these delays, demand con-
tinues to outstrip available capacity. The problem
is often made more difficult when actual growth
exceeds forecast growth. In addition, an airport is
difficult to modify if it proves to be inadequate.
A vehicle can be modified relatively easily and the
ATC system can and has evolved, but a mis-
located, undersized airport, hemmed in by urban
sprawl, with inadequate access facilities, is very
expensive to change. Long-range planning is very
important. Early land acquisition and proper bal-
ance between the development of airside and
landside facilities are vital to adequate airport
capacity and, thus, to the future growth of air
transportation.
Land Acquisition. Recent difficulties in
reaching agreement on new sites for major air-
ports in the New York, Miami, Chicago, New
Orleans, and Minneapolis-St. Paul areas make it
clear that the acquisition of land for new airports
will be a major problem in the foreseeable future.
The Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970 (ref. 33) authorizes the Federal Government
to provide up to 50% of the cost of land acquisi-
tion for any airport that the FAA has included in
the National Airport System Plan. Although the
new Act provides for a planning period of at least
10 years - twice as long as did the former Federal
Aid to Airports Program- the difficulties in
obtaining agreement on site locations can be
expected to continue unless further action is
taken. State or local policies have, in the past,
provided little financial incentive for advance land
acquisition. Without some financial aid, local air-
port sponsors will not be able to finance advance
acquisitions. Statutory authorizations of power to
take property for airport use by eminent domain
have traditionally been upheld. However, because
condemnation by eminent domain is politically
unpopular and costly, long-range airport planning
will probably not rely on this procedure.
The recent acquisition of 84,000 acres of
land for airport development in Toronto by the
Canadian Government warrants the attention of
the U.S. Government. By comparison with the
acreage of some of the largest and busiest U. S.
airports, this is a huge tract of land for airport
development. For example:
Size
Airport (acres).
Washington National 860
Kennedy 4,900
O'Hare 6,521
Dulles 10,000
Dallas/Ft. Worth 18,000
Examination of the histories of many of these
airports indicates that the size of the initial pur-
chase of land tends to be the ultimate limit to the
size of the airport- later land acquisition
becomes inordinately expensive.
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Coupledwithlandacquisitionis theneedto
assure zoning compatible to the airport as an
activity center. The power to zone near airpor*.s
has, in some instances, been pre-empted by State
statute but more usually is delegated to a local
political subdivision, pursuant to a State enabling
statute. Zoning has never been thought of as an
appropriate activity for the Federal Government,
but there appears to be no constitutional impedi-
ment to the enactment of Federal legislation on
airport zoning pursuant to the Federal power over
interstate commerce. With the Government now
entering airport certification, it is possible and
even desirable that the Federal Government begin
to exert more leadership regarding zoning around
airports.
Complementary Ground Transportation. The
origin and destination of trips to and from an
airport are distributed throughout the urban area
served by the airport. Airport access/egress must
therefore be taken into consideration as part of
the overall demand on the urban transport sys-
tem. Airport access/egress planning has frequently
been neglected, as in the case of Atlanta and
Minneapolis-St. Paul. This is partly a resuk of
differences in Federal funding policies for various
transportation modes. Federal assistance for con-
struction of transportation facilities currently
favors highway construction by providing up to
90% assistance from the Highway Trust Fund.
For mass (public) transportation the maximum is
67%. Financial problems usually motivate local
authorities to pick an airport access/egress
approach that minimizes costs but may not
minimize door-to-door travel times. As a conse-
quence, the traveler must allow large time allow-
ances (safety factors) for getting to the airport,
parking, ticketing, baggage-handling and
seat-selection. For example, the Official Airline
Guide shows a time of 75 minutes by limousine
from the East Side Terminal in New York City to
JFK; under favorable driving conditions this
schedule provides a 40-minute safety factor
(ref. 34). These necessary time allowances are par-
ticularly annoying and inconvenient for the
short-haul passenger; the ground portion of his
trip may well take longer than the air portion.
Most travelers would welcome more attention to
the ground portion of their trips. New approaches
are needed. Any such system should also provide
for door-to-door package service.
One impediment to progress through apply-
ing the systems approach to airport access/egress
and terminal processing centers around the eco-
nomic aspects of airport management. There is an
incentive to keep transit links out of the airport
because of the importance of parking revenues.
Concessions - an important source of revenue -
are often given more attention in terminal layout
and procedures than is passenger processing. In
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970, Washington
National Airport received more than twice as
much revenue from parking and concessions than
it did from landing fees ($5,069,000 in parking;
$2,334,700 from landing fees). At JFK, approxi-
mately 50% of the arrivals and departures are by
automobile, and at times the demand exceeds
parking lot capacity. Little urgency is being
demonstrated to finding relief for congestion.
Extensions of bus service to JFK have been
opposed and a proposal by American Airlines to
provide a parking garage near its terminal was
refused. For whatever reasons, the user finds that
many of the advantages offered to him by air
transport are being eroded away by difficulties
with the ground portion of his trip.
Processing of Passengers and Cargo at the Air
Terminal. The terminal and the services it offers
need to be considered more carefully as a system.
The analysis of terminal performance is difficult.
A terminal may _ovide good service to a business
traveler with a direct flight and no baggage to
ckeck, but may provide poor service to transfer-
ring between airlines or to originating passengers
with several bags, accompanied by visitors. There
is no single approach to terminal design signifi-
cantly superior to all others. Certain designs serve
some passengers better than others. Design cri-
teria and performance measures for terminals are
not well understood. Research in these areas is
needed.
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Devicesdesignedto manageparking,ticket
andhandlebaggage,andmovepeoplethroughthe
airport terminal,in generalare not developed
with therequirementsof otherpartsof thesys-
teminmind.Cargo-handlingandcargomovement
aroundtheairportcompoundgroundcongestion,
suggestingtheneedto consideroff-airportcargo
processingandevenall-cargoairports.
Remoteprocessingof passengersisalsoworth
study. A recent survey at Cleveland-Hopkins Air-
port showed that of the 213,800 weekly
person-trips to and from the airport, 36% were air
passengers, 46.5% were passenger-related visitors,
13.9% were employees, and 3.3% were casual
visitors (ref. 35). off-airport processing could
relieve much of the load, keeping almost half of
the people - the passenger-related visitors - away
from the airport. With careful planning, remote
terminals could be located near existing or pro-
posed rail links. Bus and limousine transportation
could be used until rapid rail links could be
established. Similarly, cargo-handling facilities
could be located off-airport and linked with the
airport by high-speed rail. These steps would per-
mit using land around the airport more effectively
for operations associated with the airside.
Government Involvement
Rationale. All of the separate elements of the
air transport system come together ("interface")
at the airport. The location, the capacity, and the
other characteristics of airports have an important
influence on the operations and the efficiency of
the entire air transport system. In many areas, the
airports already represent a bottleneck to future
growth of civil aviation. Forecasts suggest more
severe problems in the future. Increased attention
should be given to the relationship between air-
ports and the national transport system. Histori-
cally, the Federal Government has provided finan-
cial assistance in the development of airports.
Continuation or expansion of this role is appro-
priate because of the importance of the airports
to the system and because the benefits that will
accrue as a result of adequate airport develop-
ment will extend beyond the direct user to the
region and to the Nation.
Role. Federal involvement can take the
following forms:
• Leadership and participation in direction.
This role can include such things as elimi-
nation of legal or regulatory barriers (to
stimulate door-to-door travel) and analy-
sis of airport design criteria and opera-
tional requirements. This role is very
appropriate because data are lacking, a
systems perspective needs to be
established, and institutional factors
under the control of Government are
inhibiting action by private industry.
• Economic participation through trust
funds. The Federal Government today
collects user charges, which are used to
improve the overall system. This could
include funding for access/egress roads,
airports land acquisition, and airways.
With this role would go an obligation by
Government to analyze the system suffi-
ciently so funds are allocated where they
will do the most good.
• Economic participation with public
funds through R&D studies on zoning,
mass transit requirements, off-site process-
ing, and terminal design. Results of
these studies would benefit more than
the direct user and thus warrant the use
of public funds.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the Federal Govern-
ment include in its airports program the following
items:
Land Acquisition
Encourage State and local authorities to
plan further ahead for new airport land
acquisition (e.g., by use of "land bank"
systems and economic incentives). The
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Airport and Airway DevelopmentAct
allows50%Federalparticipationin land
acquisition;advanceland acquisition,
however,isof lowpriority.In thecaseof
parks,landis setasidein "landbanks"
beforethisnationalresourceis irretriev-
ably lost. Oncelandis developedfor
other usesit is very expensiveto
"reaccumulate"in theverylargeparcels
requiredfor airports.Lackof landfor
airportscanlimit thedevelopmentof an
optimalair transportnetworkin the
future. Althoughbudgetconsiderations
mayprecludearlylandacquisition,the
advantagesand disadvantagesof such
requisitionsshouldbe morecarefully
analyzed.Theseanalysescouldserveas
thebasisfor adjustingFederalpriorities
underthe Airport andAirwayDevelop-
ment Act regarding early land
acquisition.
Establish better information dissemina-
tion on land control around airports for
State and local planning authorities.
Since compatible land usage around an
airport is important to realization of its
full potential capacity, the Federal
Government should explore its opportun-
ities for leadership in zoning through air-
port certification standards and Airport
and Airway Trust Fund release.
Airport Access Egress
To help foster the integration of
transportation systems, the Federal
Government should use highway, rapid
transit, and airport aid to encourage local
planners to include adequate provision
for airport access and egress. To do this,
it is recommended that the Secretary of
Transportation condition the release of
Highway Trust Funds and UMTA funds
until adequate plans are developed for
access links to airports. In addition, DOT
should encourage the formation of uni-
fied State transportation agencies to pro-
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mote the development of a balanced and
integrated transport system.
• Investigate how the four airports where
demand now exceeds capacity could
receive immediate additional funds for
extensions of mass transit links to the
airports.
Terminal Development and Operation
• The Federal Government should develop
and specify minimum levels of service as
guidelines for terminal development.
• The possibility for providing better
service for interline transfer of passengers
should be investigated. Possible alter-
natives would include giving route struc-
ture incentives and dynamic allocation of
gates at the airport.
• Airport design R&D should be increased.
Studies should be initiated to collect data
and identify the needs of the various pas-
senger types and the optimum methods
of processing them through an airport.
With the information collected, analyzed,
and disseminated, the Government
should leave the development of people-
and baggage-oriented hardware to private
business. The Government role suggested
here is as a supplier of systems informa-
tion so individual developments can be
readily integrated into a total system
framework.
• Air terminal congestion is caused not
only by problems on the airside of the
terminal, but by problems on the land-
side of the airport as well. It is therefore
recommended that legislation be intro-
duced to allow use of the Airport and
Airway Trust Fund for landside problems
(up to and including the airport bound-
ary). Currently, the intent of the user
charge is to provide a better aviation
system, financed by those who use it.
Neglect of the landside problems will pre-
vent full realization of improvements
made on the airside, as well as improved
door-to-door service for those who
contribute to the fund.
Quantitative data are lacking on the
relative merits of various approaches to
solution of the problems on the airport
landside. Demonstration airports are
required to examine different practices
and technology in a systematic way. This
information would assist the airport
operator in making more optimal
choices. It is therefore recommended
that several airports be designated as
demonstration or experimental airports.
Two landside experiments are suggested.
Off-site passenger- and cargo-processing
centers, with rapid access links to the air-
port, offer the promise of reducing up to
50% of the congestion at the air terminal.
This experiment should be carefully
designed to examine the effect on airport
congestion, door-to-door time savings,
relative costs of operation and public
acceptance. Within the processing cen-
ters, a second set of experiments covering
the development, operation, and analysis
of an integrated passenger processing
system is recommended. The patron
would be guaranteed a seat on a flight
once at the processing center. Land
required for these processing centers
should be easier to obtain, resulting in
freeing land at the airport proper for
more efficient use of airside elements.
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Benefits
BACKGROUND
As recently as 1940, civil aviation was a neg-
ligible factor in the Nation's economy and in our
personal lives. In the short span of 30 years its
development has been so widespread that it is
now a significant element in methods of doing
business and patterns of living. An observer in
1940 could not have foreseen the tremendous
growth of civil aviation and its pervasive impact
on today's economic, social, and cukural environ-
ments. The application of the R&D discussed in
this Study to civil aviation systems over the next
15 years may be expected to have an equally
great impact in our pattern of living by 1985.
The industry has made prompt use of new tech-
nology. More than 50% of the aerospace industry
sales in 1973 are expected to come from products
that were not marketed in 1969 (see Table 7.1).
This compares with 37% for other transportation
equipment. As may be seen from the table, an
even greater difference exists between expected
new-technology sales in the aerospace industry
and those expected in other selected industries
fief. 1). The role of R&D in most of these devel-
opments, particularly in the aerospace industry,
has been significant.
TABLE 7.1. ESTIMATED PERCENT OF 1973 SALES
FROM PRODUCTS NOT IN EXISTENCE IN 1969
History shows that aeronautical R&D has
yielded great benefits to the Nation. Continued
development of new concepts and their applica-
tion to economically viable systems will insure a
continuation of this stream of benefits. While it is
possible to hypothesize on the overall magnitude
of these future benefits, it is not possible to quan-
tify them without relating them to specific R&D
proposals. A preferred alternative is to evaluate
the impact of civil aviation on the country in the
past and identify the benefits that have accrued as
a result. The following analysis is not a detailed
cost-benefit study, it focuses instead on the
impact of the aggregate civil aviation system on
society over the past 20 years. In the material
that follows, the many benefits of civil aviation
are assessed but it was not possible to isolate
exclusively the particular benefits resulting from
individual R&D efforts or levels of effort. Rather,
the benefits are treated as the products of the
total system operating in a complex environment
and making use of the capabilities provided by
R&D.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF R&D TO CIVIL
AVIATION
Most of the advances in civil aviation- in
new types of airframes, propulsion units, and air-
craft avionics- can be traced to R&D. These
advances have brought about large increases in the
productivity of the air systems to the benefit of
the users, local regions, and the entire Nation.
INDUSTRY PERCENT
AEROSPACE 52
OTHER TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT 37
INSTR UMENTS 35
AUTOS, TRUCKS, PARTS 30
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 20
CHEMICAL t7
PETROLEUM 6
Source: Ref. 1.
Substantial improvements in the performance
of today's civil aircraft can be related to technical
results from R&D efforts carried out since 1945.
Many of these advancements in performance can
be traced to the introduction of commercial jets
TABLE 7.2. PERFORMANCE OF TRANSPORT
AIRCRAFT, 1945, 1970
..... JU [11 [ I I_111
1945 1970
SPEED, MPH 200 600
RANGE, MILES 2000 6000
CAPACITY, OVERALL AVAILABLE 1.2 a 33.2 b
TON-MILES BILLIONS
ECONOMY, CENTS/AVAILABLE 3.0 0.9
SEAT-MILE
SAFETY, FATALITIES/IO0 MILLION 2.23 0.001
PASSENGER-MILES
aEarliest published data available are for 1946.
bOctober 31, 1969, through October 31, 1970.
Source: Refs. 2-6.
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Figure 7.1. Utilization of technical advances in civil
aviation (517 events). Source: Refs. 3, 7.
in 1958 --jets that were outgrowths of the B 47,
B-52 and KC-135 aircraft, directly attributable
to military R&D. Table 7.2 shows the dramatic
increase in performance of transport aircraft
made possible by R&D in 25 years.
In civil aviation, the acceptance of new devel-
opments follows a remarkably similar pattern. A
study of the application of 517 R&D "events"
(results) (ref. 3) has shown that from 5 to
15 years may elapse between a development event
and its application in production aircraft
(Fig. 7.1). The benefits of R&D performed in the
late 1950's and early 1960's are being realized
today. Thus, it is the R&D funds expended today
and in the next few years that will contribute
many of the advances in the 1970's and 1980's.
Figure 7.2 shows productivity in terms of
awfilable ton-miles offered per dollar of operating
expense for all carriers. It may be seen that, to a
first approxi,nation, the level of effort in R&D in
the 1950's has established the rate of growth of
productivity of transport aircraft ill the 1960's.
The measure of productivity selected eliminates
some of the effects of demand fluctuation, sub-
sidies, and fare variations that would exist if pro-
ductivity were expressed in revenue ton-miles.
(Unless otherwise stated, all dollar figures in this
section are in 1968 constant dollars rather than
._ 7 . : =
aA U services.
b1968 dollars.
Figure 7.2. U.S. commercial transport productivity index
and aeronautical R&D budget. Source: Based on refs. 2,
3, 7.
current dollars, to remove the influence of
inflation.)
The growth rate for 1947 to 1959 was 0.12
ton-mile per dollar per year. The slight dip in the
curve from 1959 to 196l was due to expenditures
for new jet aircraft, training, and changeover to
new maintenance procedures. By 1962, produc+
tivity had reached a level almost three times
greater than in the preceding period. Figure 7.2
shows that total aeronautical R&D funding
increased substantially between 1950 and 1955.
Much of the design data required for the develop-
ment of the jets was generated during this period.
One important result was the evolution of the
turbofan engine from the turbojet. The greatly
increased power of the turbine engine made pos-
sible greater payloads and increased speed in the
1950's; the development of the turbofan engine
led to more economic air carrier operation in the
mid - 1960's. Most of the growth in productivity
of commercial aviation can be attributed to the
vehicle - and it was the introduction of the tur-
bofan engine that accounted for much of this
growth.
It is typical of complex technology systems
that most of the advances in productivity in the
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elementsof thesystem - that is, airports, air traf-
fic control, and complementary ground transpor-
tation. Their influence can be measured only neg-
atively, to the degree that they prevent the
vehicle from attaining its full potential produc-
tivity. These supporting elements today are
affecting advances in vehicle performance to such
an extent that future vehicle achievements may
be largely nullified by reduced performance in the
other parts of the system. It is important that
R&D be applied to all complementary functions
if the civil aviation system is to realize its
potential productivity.
Figure 7.3. Door-to-door travel time for a one-way air
trip, Chicago to Los Angeles (1,746 miles).
first several generations of the system result from
improvements in the primary element of the
system. This has been true with civil aviation as
well. For example, Figure 7.3 shows the signifi-
cant reduction (approximately 33%) in
door-to-door travel time that resulted from the
introduction of jets into the system. It may be
seen from the figure that changes in other system
elements have had little or no impact on this par-
ticular measure of system productivity. (An
exception specific to this example is the slight
reduction in surface travel time attributable to
the opening of the Northwest freeway connecting
downtown Chicago with O'Hare International
Airport.)
The dominance of the vehicle in the growth
of system productivity can be tied to the histor-
ical emphasis on R&D for vehicles. Although the
data do not permit separation of military and civil
R&D by system element, examination of the dis-
tribution of aeronautical R&D dollars from 1945
to 1969 indicates that the air vehicle received
over 90% of the total.
It is difficult to assess the productivity con-
tributions and the benefits derived from the other
These changes in system productivity have
generated the wide range of benefits discussed in
the following sections. The assessments should be
viewed as maximum benefits since vehicle perfor-
mance has been largely unconstrained by the
other systems elements during this period and the
various benefits are not necessarily additive.
BENEFITS TO THE USER
Throughout the past 20 years, both the indi-
vidual user and industry have benefited tangibly
from advances in aviation technology and ser-
vices. It is frequently contended that Government
support of civil aviation is a subsidy to business-
men and those users who "clearly are not in need
of Government support." Yet, it is important to
recognize that these people are by no means the
sole beneficiaries of civil aviation. An analysis of
data from the U. S. Census Bureau revealed that
the median family income of people taking one or
more trips by air in 1967 was $11,922, while it
was $8,021 by car, and $6,759 by train (ref. 8).
Although the median income of air travelers is
higher than that of travelers using either of the
other two modes, it cannot be considered as
representative of a mode utilized principally by
the well-to-do. People who use air transportation
today because of an emergency or because of a
short time allowance (servicemen on leave, stu-
dents or vacationers flying during holidays, or
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individualseekingjobs)representallsegmentsof
society.Thebenefitsarejustasimportanto the
occasionalor one-timeuserastheyare to the
regularuser.
Usersof thesystemhaverealizedatleasthe
followingbenefits:
• Cost savings
• Time savings and increased convenience
• Safer transportation
• Business stimulation
Cost Savi_lgS
Because of improvements in aircraft over the
past two decades, air carrier unit direct operating
costs have dropped from 3 cents per available
seat-mile to 0.9 cents per available seat-mile
(ref. 3). A substantial portion of these savings has
been passed on to the user. If the fare per
passenger-mile had remained at its 1948 level
from 1949 to 1958, passengers would have paid
an additional $4.1 billion in fares (computed in
1968 constant dollars) (ref. 2). Similarly, if the
fare level had not improved in the 1959 to 1968
decade, users would have paid an additional
$4.5 billion. This $8.6 billion savings over the
$55.5 billion the users actually paid occurred
during a period whefl huge capital outlays were
required, first for the postwar piston fleets and
then beginning in 1958 for the jet fleets.
Even though air cargo still generates a rela-
tively small portion of air carrier revenues, reduc-
tions in air freight rates have also been significant.
Had air freight users in the 1949 to 1958 period
continued to pay 1948 rates, an additional
$441 million in cargo expenditures would have
been required over the $1.2 billion actually paid.
Similarly, if the users from 1959 through 1968
had continued to pay 1958 cargo rates, they
would have paid $1.2 billion more than the
$4.6 billion they did pay (ref. 2). It is recognized
that maintaining 1948 and 1958 rates could have
reduced demand. Nonetheless these calculated
figures represent reasonable approximations of
the probable savings even under reduced demand
conditions.
Time Savings
During the past two decades, travel time was
also decreasing dramatically. Using 1948 as the
base year, about 140 million passenger-hours were
saved because of improvements in the air fleet
from 1949 through 1958. With the advent of the
jets, more than 840 million additional hours were
saved between 1959 and 1968 (using 1958 as a
base year) (ref. 2). This has amounted to a total
of 980 million hours saved by businessmen and
pleasure travelers, worth an estimated $5 billion.
Safer Transportation
Advances in safety have brought about a
reduction in the fatality rate from 1.25 deaths per
100million passenger-miles in 1948 to 0.27
deaths per 100 million passenger-miles in 1968
for scheduled service of the U. S. certificated air
carriers (ref. 2). If the 1948 fatality rate had
persisted over the next 20 years, anaddi-
tional 7,705 fatalities would have been expected
over the 3,312 that did occur. These improve-
ments in safety occurred during a period when
the fleet doubled, aircraft departures more than
doubled, and entirely new aircraft came into
service.
Business Stimulation1
The growth of civil aviation has helped shape
the pattern of commercial and industrial activity
in this country over the past 20 years. Fast, effi-
cient air travel and communications have made
possible new techniques of industrial management
and control. Since World War II, a fundamental
change in American business has occurred-
decentralization of economic activity, coupled
with the centralization of management.
Businesses organized in this way would be diffi-
cult to manage without fast personal travel. The
growth of large, diversified corporations, in
particular, would have been impeded without civil
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aviation.Thesuccessof this typeof organization
isdependentupontheabilityofacentralcoreof
high managementtalent to moverapidly to
widely dispersed operations, when they are
needed. For example, the Apollo Program
involved 20,000 contractors, subcontractors, and
suppliers, and almost 400,000 non-Government
workers in all 50 states. Without air transporta-
tion, it would have been necessary to concentrate
all of this activity around a limited number of
scientific and academic communities on the East
and West Coasts.
Civil aviation today is moving many produc-
tion processes away from the traditional ways of
doing business. Increased productivity has been
achieved because geographical separation of the
stages of production is now possible.
U.S.-manufactured electronic parts, for
example, are assembled in Puerto Rico to utilize
lower labor costs. IBM computer systems units
are routinely manufactured in different parts of
the country and assembled into a functioning
system at the customer's facility. All such
processes depend heavily on air transportation.
Air transportation is also reshaping the con-
cepts of moving people and distributing goods.
The productivity of management and of highly
specialized employees has been increased by
reductions in travel time and by more convenient
schedules. Highly skilled, nonduplicable resources
(e.g., heart surgeons, architects, sports and enter-
tainment figures, Government and business exec-
utives) can be more productive with enhanced
mobility. Air travel is an integral part of their
work patterns; this, in turn, has had its effect on
the economy. Many progressive businesses also
use air transport to optimize the distribution of
goods. Although air cargo rates are high, if all the
costs of moving and stocking goods are taken into
consideration (the "total distribution cost" con-
cept), air is often a real bargain. Rapid shipment
may prevent food from perishing, resulting in the
extension of markets. Rapid transport may also
eliminate warehousing and stockpiling of inven-
tory. For example, Venezuela Growers Associa-
tion ships melons by air to New York from
December to May, thus extending their market
boundaries; producers of women's high-fashion
apparel use air cargo extensively to respond to
rapid changes in taste and avoid the need for
maintaining large inventories that may quickly go
out of date. As more companies seek to optimize
inventories, warehousing, shipping time, shipping
costs, packaging, and handling, it is expected that
air shipment will expand, providing new stimula-
tion to business.
The United States is shifting from a
hard-goods society to a service-oriented societv.
Today, employment is split about 50-50
between goods and services, but it is anticipated
that by 1980, seven out of every ten people will
be employed by service industries. Tourism and
Government are two examples of service-oriented
activities. Analysis of Department of Commerce
input/output data on the U. S. economy shows
that air transportation contributes twice as much
to the value of output of the service industries as
it contributes to any other sector (ref. 9). The
service industries are very labor-intensive and
employ a broad cross section of socioeconomic
classes. It is important, therefore, to look not
only at the direct benefits brought by civil avia-
tion to business in terms of increased produc-
tivity, but to recognize that large spinoffs in
terms of additional employment and productivity
are generated by civil aviation.
BENEFITS TO THE REGIONS
The Federal Government has distributed over
$1.2 billion in aid for both commercial and gen-
eral aviation airport development since the incep-
tion of the Federal Aid to Airports Program in
1946 and $2.1 billion for the development and
implementation of the national airways system.
While the allocation of these funds has beenmade
with little understanding of their impact on the
social and economic development of the regions
affected, the few studies that have been made
indicate that significant social and economic
benefits accrue from airport development, both in
metropolitan and rural areas.
7-7
A recent study (ref. 10) considered the eco-
nomic impact to be expected by 1975 from the
addition of new maintenance facilities due to
increased service requirements for both American
and Trans World Airlines at Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport. The following benefit projections
resulted:
• 23,000 additional jobs (direct and
indirect).
• $86.2 million in additional construction.
• A additional $630.2 million per year in
purchases of goods and services.
Based on 1975 projections (ref. 11) for the
Dallas/Fort Worth area, analyses indicate a similar
impact from the airport on the economic health
of North Central Texas:
• 46,612employees.
• $600 million per year economic impact
(direct and indirect) in terms of pur-
chases of goods and services.
A recent study (ref. 12) by the Economic
Development Administration, U.S. Department
of Commerce, on the growth ratio of 34 pairs of
cities showed that airports can significantly affect
the economy of medium-sized communities as
well. The members of each pair were reasonably
close geographically and had approximately the
same socioeconomic characteristics with the
exception that one had scheduled airline service
and the other did not. The differences in the
number of new manufacturing jobs per capita
over the 1958-1963 period were calculated as a
measure of growth for the airline and nonairline
groups. The study concluded that civil aviation
can have a positive influence on the growth of
manufacturing in a city, and that the extent to
which a city can realize the full benefits of air
service depends upon its size, its proximity to the
interstate highway system, its regional location,
the growth of established industry in the region,
and the mileage from center city to the airport.
Although the results of this study support the
hypothesis that civil aviation can have an impact
on a region's economic development, a gap still
exists in relating civil aviation's role to the devel-
opment process and in understanding the support-
ing factors that appear to determine the extent
and nature of its effect on this process.
To the casual observer, evidence of civil
aviation's influence on regional development is
perhaps more readily visible in less-developed
areas than in large metropolitan complexes. A
study (ref. 13) was made of Ohio's County Air-
port Development Program. Under this program
the State granted $100,000 toward the construc-
tion or expansion of airports to each of 50 Ohio
counties. It was anticipated that each new general
aviation airport would serve the travel market
between its county and other destinations, and,
more importantly, that each airport would stimu-
late increased economic activity within its
environs, thus furthering the county's economic
development. Between 1966 and 1970, 62 new
airports were constructed under this program.
The Ohio Department of Development has
traced the following benefits directly to these air-
ports:
• 60,000 new jobs were added.
• An additional $250 million in personal
income was generated.
• Enough new trade was generated to
support 200 additional retail
establishments.
• 1,500 manufacturing firms were added or
expanded.
• An additional $1 billion in capital was
invested.
• Within one year after an airport was com-
pleted, the value of the adjacent land had
doubled.
• Twenty new industrial parks were
established.
The study concluded that "the installation of
airports, capable of accommodating large business
aircraft, is likely to generate an improved eco-
nomic base to the communities which surround
each facility" (ref. 13).
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A study (ref. 14) by the FAA of five general
aviation airports supported by the Federal Aid to
Airports Program also indicated that "accelerated
economic growth" can result from airport devel-
opment if other community conditions are favor-
able. The FAA study credited the airports in its
sample with being the catalysts for substantial
increases in the census index of value added by
manufacture, wholesale and retail trade, and ser-
vices recorded in each community after the
construction of the airport.
A recent Air Transport Association study of
the effect of air transportation on the economic
development of South Dakota (ref. 15) and the
FAA study of general aviation airports cited
above revealed that where new airports were not
built, farm mechanization had been a major fac-
tor contributing to the decline of population,
labor force, and employment in the rural areas
surrounding the communities. Where new air-
ports were added, however, the rural labor force
was retained by the increased business and indus-
trial job opportunities in the community. This has
benefited new industry by providing a source of
skilled and semi-skilled labor in nonurban areas.
The influence of civil aviation on develop-
ment under different political, social, and eco-
nomic conditions needs further investigation. The
Federal Government influences regional develop-
ment through its role in the distribution of air-
port development funds, whether there is such an
intention or not. It therefore has an obligation to
assess this influence and to take it into considera-
tion in the future allocation of funds. The
Economic Development Administration (EDA)
has funded a total of 43 airport-related projects in
economically depressed areas at a cost of over
$25 million, and the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) funds have been
widely used for community planning and develop-
ment, including some airport planning. Both EDA
and HUD have evaluated the effects of their pro-
grams under varying social and economic condi-
tions, and have already devoted some attention to
the role of civil aviation, particularly with refer-
ence to its influence on the development of
regional growth centers.
BENEFITS TO THE NATION
Gross National Product (GNP) contribution
and employment are general benefits in the same
way that any business activity exerts positive
influence on the economy. Balance of trade,
defense preparedness, and cultural understanding
are national benefits to which civil aviation offers
a unique contribution.
Gross National Product
Civil aviation has been a significant contrib-
utor to the Nation's economy. Rising from 0.2%
in 1949 to 1.0%in 1969, civil aviation's contribu-
tion to the GNP is now growing at a rate two to
three times faster than the economy as a whole
(refs. 3, 7). (In 1963 the communications indus-
try contributed 1.6% and the largest industry
group- new construction- contributed 4.6%
(ref. 16).) Over the jet era, the civilian portion of
aerospace (commercial and general aviation
together) has grown at 9.5% per year to a
$3.5 billion contribution, and the air carriers have
grown at 13.3% per year, to $6.3 billion (includ-
ing direct and indirect contributions to GNP)
(refs. 3 and 7).
The contribution of civil aviation to the econ-
omy is significant. Its acceptance by the
American public, as shown by its phenomenal
growth, testifies to its importance.
Employment
Civil aviation (civil aerospace plus air carriers)
is one of the largest employers in the Nation
(ref. 17).
In 1968, direct plus induced employment was
390,000 for civilian aerospace and 440,000 for air
carriers, averaging about a 9% growth rate for
both sectors (refs. 3, 7). The economic turndown
in 1970 has resulted in layoffs in both groups.
Civilian aerospace employment is expected to
drop 20% to 312,000 and that of the air carrier
sector to decline 2% to 431,000 by the first part
of 1971 (ref. 18). The technical talent of civilian
aerospace in particular is an important asset to
the defense of our country. Preservation of this
highly skilled scientific, engineering, production,
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andmanagementtalentisanecessaryelementin
themaintenance of a high technology level.
Balance of Trade
The favorable balance of trade maintained by
the aviation industry over the years is a unique
asset one that probably could not be replaced
by another industry if the aviation dollars were
invested elsewhere. Today, over 76% of the exist-
ing free-world airline fleet is the product of U. S.
manufacturers (ref. 19). In 1969, this accounted
for a net balance of $1.77 billion by civil aero-
space manufacturers, with an historical growth
rate of 9.7% (ref. 20).
Currently, 57% of the free-world air traffic is
carried by U.S. airlines (ref. 21). At the same
time, since foreign airlines carry more U. S. pas-
sengers than U.S. airlines carry foreign passen-
gers, a consistently negative balance-of-payments
position exists for tile U. S. airlines. Historically,
this deficit has grown at 1.4% per year. The
strong positive balance maintained by the aircraft
manufacturers more than offsets this, however,
producing a net $1.5 billion balance by the entire
civil aviation industry (based on refs. 3, 7, 20,
22). This is nearly equal to the total U.S.
favorable trade balance in 1969.
Defense Preparedness
The civil aviation industry has also become an
important element in preparedness for the
national defense. Over the past five years (under
charter operations for the Military Airlift Com-
mand), civil aviation has moved approximately
11.2 million people and 0.7 million tons of cargo
(see Table 7.3). This was over 90% of all military
airlift passengers and 25% of all military air cargo
(ref. 23).
As of December 1970, over 435 civil passen-
ger and cargo aircraft owned by 24 U. S. commer-
cial airlines were committed to the Civil Reserve
Air Fleet (CRAF). They become available to the
Department of Defense for augmentation airlift
during emergencies. It has not yet proved neces-
sary to mobilize this reserve fleet because the
Military Airlift Command's requirements for char-
ter operations have been met by airlines partici-
pating in the CRAF program without mobiliza-
tion. The present reserve fleet of commercial
aircraft can provide, however, on 24hours'
notice, the capability to move over 16 million
ton-miles and 59 million passenger-miles per day.
It has cost the Government only some $246,000
per year (largely for administrative costs) to
ensure this tremendous reserve of capacity and
mobility for the armed forces. If it had been
TABLE 7.3. MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND CHARTER OPERATIONS
FISCAL
YEAR
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
TOTAL
TOTAL,
EXPENDITURES
MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS
394.2
685.0
691.4
617.2
558.0
2,945.8
PASSENGERS,
THOUSANDS
1,446.5
1,929.0
2,482.3
2,718.8
2,627.0
11,203.6
CARGO,
TONS
102,106
201,905
163,073
147,603
103,991
718,678
PERCENT
OF TOTAL
OPERATIONS a
PASSEN G ERS
90
91
91
93
91
CARGO
30
34
24
2O
16
apercentaRe of total Military Airlift Command operations provided by charter.
Source: ReJ[ 23.
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necessaryfor theGovernment to purchase these
aircraft, it would have cost over $ 2 billion.
The availability of a large civil fleet and the
existence of the organized Civil Reserve Air Fleet
greatly augment the national defense capability.
Cultural Exchange
Civil aviation has facilitiated communications
between nations, fostering an unprecedented level
of cultural exchange. State Department's cultural
exchange program and many other educational
exchange programs have promoted visits to the
United States by foreign representatives of the
cultural and academic communities, as well as
reciprocal visits abroad by similar U. S. represen-
tatives. Air travel has been an important element
in this exchange process. Additionally, the low
cost of international travel by air has encouraged
individuals and groups to travel abroad on plea-
sure trips.
In the past eight years, 95.3 million people
have arrived in or departed from the United
States, 82.7 million (87%) by air, with about half
of the total number (43.5 million) arriving or
departing on U.S. carriers (ref. 24) (Fig. 7.4).
During the same period, the number of U. S.
students studying abroad rose from 17,000 to
nearly 26,000, while the number of foreign stu-
dents studying in the United States jumped from
57,000 to 135,000 (ref. 25). This great interac-
tion between members of different cultures con-
stitutes an important benefit to the Nation, made
possible by aviation. Without civil aviation, the
ability of the United States to continue to
develop such ties with other nations of the world
would be limited.
DISBENEFITS
The positive benefits of civil aviation have
not been achieved without some undesirable side
effects, of which noise and air pollution are the
most troublesome.
Noise
The industry has underestimated the impor-
tance of noise abatement in the past. Noise reduc-
tion has been considered as a source of annoying
additional operating costs, to be avoided if pos-
sible. With increasing operations, however, the
noise problem has generated public reaction to
such an extent that:
• New airport location is difficult and in
some cases impossible;
Note: Numbers on bars are arrivals + departures.
aCumula tire to tals in millions of people for 1962-1969.
bCumulative total for people carried on U.S. air carriers.
Figure 7.4. Cumulative arrivals in, and departures from, United States by mode, 1962-1969. Source: Based on ref. 24.
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• Noise suits have been initiated in some
communities;
• The SST was resisted on environmental
issues, noise being a major consideration;
• Air carrier takeoff-and-landing proce-
dures are often altered due to public noise
complaints;
• Citizen groups are already resisting
V/STOL, primarily on the basis of noise
(ref. 26).
Concern over noise began to grow rapidly
with the introduction of the jets. The noise foot-
print of the standard Boeing 707 covers an area
approximately 30 times that of a four-engine pis-
ton aircraft (ref. 27). With the changeover to jets
and the great number of flights, the number of
people subjected to high noise levels has grown
tremendously. In 1958, 100 square miles of land
and 1 million people in the United States were
within areas with a Noise Exposure Forecast
(NEF) of 30 or higher (considered undesirable for
residential use). By 1968, this area had grown to
1,300square miles and contained 15million
people (about 8% of our population) (Fig. 7.5).
Unless substantial improvements are made in the
system, it is projected that by 1978, the affected
land area will grow to 1,800 square miles, encom-
passing almost 24 million people (ref. 28).
Modifying or replacing engines in existing air-
craft ("retrofitting") to reduce noise is costly.
For a large four-engine transport, costs range
from $0.7 million (for nacelle treatment) to
between $6 and $8.6 million (to fit four new
quiet engines) (refs. 26, 29). The costs are
reflected in markedly increased direct operating
costs for the air carriers. Retrofitting must then
be carefully weighed against other alternatives
such as the purchasing of land buffers and hous-
ing noise-insulation programs.
Figure 7.6 shows the first order effects of
trade-offs between land purchases and engine
retrofit, covering the 1,300 square miles of land
presently affected by noise levels of 30 NEF or
greater and for an aircraft fleet of 1,000
four-engine transports. If no reductions are made
in engine noise, it would cost an estimated
$17 billion (at $20,000 per acre) to purchase all
of the land in the high-exposure area. if engine
noise could be reduced by 10 dB, however, the
area of land exposed to noise levels of 30 NEF or
Figure 7.5. Noise-impacted areas and populations (30
noise exposure forecast or higher). Source: Based
on ref. 28.
Figure 7.6. Cost of acquiring land versus retrofitting
fleet (United States).
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greaterwouldbe greatlyreduced.If, through
research and development, engine noise could be
reduced by 20 dB, virtually no land beyond the
airports would be exposed to noise levels of 30
NEF or greater. (Figure 7.6 does not take into
account the additional operating costs incurred
through retrofitting or the fact that noise land
buffers might be put to later profitable use, since
these factors would be significantly different for
each case.) The combined costs shown in
Figure 7.6 suggests, however, that a combination
of land purchase and engine retrofit would pro-
duce the most beneficial results. Any reduction in
the cost of engine retrofit would weight the
choice even more heavily in favor of retrofit.
Since engine retrofitting requires the air carrier to
pay, and land buffering requires the airport opera-
tor to pay, there is a reluctance on the part of
both the air carrier and airport operator to take
the initiative, in the hope that the other will take
the first step.
The social cost of households subjected to
excessive noise is difficult to assess. However, the
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968 (ref. 30) pro-
vides a possible precedent and a clue to evaluating
this cost. The Act provides for relocation services,
allowances, moving and property transfer pay-
ments over and above acquisition payments. This
amounts to $2,500 per household or $625 per
person for a family of four. If the Government
were to apply a similar cost of $625 per person
for "noise rights-of-way," the system-wide social
cost would be $9.4 billion to cover the 15 million
people presently affected by noise levels of
30 NEF and higher.
Air Pollution
The introduction of the turbine engine
lowered air pollution trends for several years, but
the number of new aircraft introduced since has
more than offset the previous gains. Even in areas
of heavy contamination from other sources, the
visible emissions from aircraft today cause com-
munity antagonism. The smoke is in the process
of being eliminated. The invisible emissions, how-
ever, are the more serious pollutants.
Even though aircraft contribute only a very
small percentage to the total, there are "hot spots"
of pollution found around many airports. An esti-
mated 2.3billion pounds of pollutants were
emitted by aircraft in commercial operation in
1970, 0.5 billion pounds of this in the vicinity of
airports (ref. 31). R&D has been successful, never-
theless, in reducing pollutant emission. A
medium-range turbofan aircraft produces
8.6 pounds of pollutant per 1,000 pounds of fuel
on takeoff, while a piston aircraft emits
1,442 pounds per 1,000 pounds of fuel on take-
off (the weight is high because the fuel combines
with air to form oxide compounds) (ref. 31).
Although civil aviation contributes significantly
fewer pounds of pollutants per passenger-mile
than the automobile, aviation must continue to do
its part with all other industries to preserve and
restore the environment.
In 1967, 1,980,000 passengers flew between
Washington, D.C. and New York (ref. 32).
Assuming that medium-range fanjets were used,
each carrying 51 passengers (56% load factor),
3 million pounds of pollutants were emitted by
the airplanes. If these passengers had traveled by
auto (assuming 1.5 passengers per vehicle and
45 miles per hour speed), 36 million pounds of
pollutants would have been emitted. In this
example, the automobiles would have contributed
over 10 times the emissions contributed by the
airplanes.
As auto emissions are decreased and air oper-
ations continue to increase, aircraft pollution
emission may be expected to exceed the urban
background level. Public opposition to aviation,
induced by air pollution, can be expected to grow
unless solutions are aggressively pursued. Minimi-
zation of noise and air pollution will help restore
public confidence in the positive contribution
that civil aviation can make to our Nation's
future.
Other Disbenefits
As with any massive construction program,
new airports can induce other social disbenefits
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that must be considered when assessing any avia-
tion proposals.
Public opposition due to airport siting
will become an increasing problem in
some cases where city-center VTOL or
STOL service is desired.
The airport is a major activity center that
impacts upon roads and services in the
immediate area, which can add to conges-
tion. Its presence stimulates placement of
additional businesses around its periph-
ery, which can contribute even more to
congestion.
PROJECTIONS OF PRODUCTION,
EMPLOYMENT, AND BALANCE
OF TRADE
Turning from an historical look at civil avia-
tion, one can examine the implications which the
forecast growth in air travel has for the produc-
tion and sale of large civil air transports. With the
expected growth in demand, the free-world fleet
of large civil air transports will grow from 5,100
aircraft today to about 8,300 aircraft by 1985
(ref. 19). The increase, along with the replace-
ment of retired aircraft, will provide a large
potential market for U. S. aviation manufacturers.
In the near future, sales will be dominated by
existing technology, embodied in aircraft in or
nearing production. Sales of improved and
"stretched" versions of these aircraft are pro-
jected to continue until 1983. For these existing
technology aircraft- for example, the B-747,
L-1011, and DC-10- the United States may
expect to be the sole source. For new technology
aircraft, the U. S. share of the market is far from
assured. Beginning with the Concorde and stan-
dard wide-body twin-jets, and continuing with
stretched twin-jets, the SST and the advanced
Concorde, STOL or VTOL feeder jets, and
advanced medium-range transports, new technol-
ogy is expected to account for an increasing
proportion of new aircraft sales.
Figure 7.7 shows the projected dollar value of
total production of large civil air transports (Pro-
jection 1), of the estimated U. S. share of both
existing and new technology sales (Projection 2),
and of the U. S. share of existing-technology sales
alone (Projection 3). Projection 2 assumes that
foreign manufacturers will increase their share of
the new technology market. They will increas-
ingly meet the needs of the foreign air carriers,
which, in turn, will increase their share of the air
travel market relative to U. S. air carriers.
At the 1983 peak, U. S. capture of the entire
world market (Projection 1) would triple its out-
put over 1970. U.S. capture of the projected
share (Projection 2) would easily double U.S.
output. But by 1983, the share of U. S. output
(Projection 3) based on existing technology alone
would be only one-fifth of its 1970 value. In the
following year, with the end of sales of stretched
747's and the wide-body tri-jets, the U. S. share
of the market would disappear.
For Projection 2 (a market shared by the
United States and, increasingly by foreign manu-
factures), the 1971-1985 cumulative sales of
new-technology aircraft by the United States
PROJECTION 1 _!,:,(
(TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION)
Figure 7.7. Forecast commercial transport production.
Source: Based on ref. 19.
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would be $34.5 billion. During the same period,
U. S. sales based on existing technology would be
expected to total $35.0 billion (Fig. 7.8).
Employment follows a pattern similar to
production (Table 7.4). With the United States
attaining its share of both new- and
existing-technology sales, primary and indirect
employment generated by new large civil air
transports alone will be 214,000 by 1980.
These projections emphasize once again how
necessary continuing R&D is to the survival and
growth of the U. S. civil aerospace industry.
The need for R&D in sustaining the balance
of trade is even more marked (Figs. 7.9 and 7.10).
For Projection 2 (a U. S.- and foreign-shared mar-
ket), the 1971-1985 total U.S. trade balance
would be $21.8 billion. Should the United States
fail to pursue new technology, then a drop in
sales, to the extreme of Projection 3,would occur
as shown in Figure 7.10, with sales finally falling
to zero by 1984. In such a case, if U. S. carriers
imported new4echnology aircraft, the balance of
trade would fall to zero by 1975-- nine years
earlier. A 1971-1985 cumulative deficit of
$12.7 billion in balance of trade would result.
Figure 7.8. Cumulative commercial transport production, 1971-1985. Source: Based on re fi 19.
TABLE 7.4. PRIMARY AND INDUCED EMPLOYMENT (THOUSANDS)
AIRCRAFT TYPE
EXISTING TECHNOLOGY-
BASE AIRCRAFT
STANDARD WIDE-BODY TWIN
STRETCHED WIDE-BODY TWIN
STOL/VTOL FEEDER JET
SST/CONCORDE I, 11
ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE JET
PEAK I PRODUCTION
YEAR [ YEARS
U.S. PRODUCES A SHARE
AVERAGE PEAK ] CUMULATIVE
1974 I 70-84 150 225 I 2,098
1976 I 73-80 30 44 I 210
1983 I 77-85+ 42 I 86 _ 333
4
1982 I 77-85+ 34 59 I 278
1979 I 78-85+ 102 151 I 813
1983 I 82-85+ 58 61 I 175
U.S. PRODUCES ALL
AVERAGE I PEAK CUMULATIVE
153 I 227 2,142
78 ] 88 553
I0 I 171 719
i8 I 97 462
102 I 151 813
115 ! 119 346
Source: Based on refs. 1 7, 19.
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U.S. PRODUCESALL
U.S. PRODUCESSHARE
U.S. PRODUCESNONE
Figure 7.9. Cumulative balance of trade, new and existing technology, 1971-1985. Source: Based on ref. 19.
\k__/'_
PRODUCTION, $ BILLIONS_
EMPLOYMENT, HUNDRED _-- \THOUSANDS
BALANCEOF TRADE, _m
$ BILLIONS
Figure 7.10. Yearly projections: United States
captures no new commercial transport markets.
Source: Based on ref. 19.
Thus, although the possibility of Projection 3 is
remote, it must be remembered that balance of
trade acts as an early warning indicator of the
health of the civil aviation industry.
If the United States follows a course approxi-
mating Projection 2, aircraft production in dollars
will show a modest 5.7% annual increase, and
employment a 4.7% annual increase, compared
with the recent historical rates of 9.5 and 8.4%,
respectively. The balance of trade will remain
relatively level for the 1971-1985 period.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
• R&D has contributed tangibly to produc-
tivity increases, which, in turn, can be
translated into benefits. Introduction of
jet-powered aircraft succeeded in increas-
ing the productivity of the system by a
factor of three.
• Benefit analyses trace most of the
advances to the vehicle. The majority of
future productivity increases, and hence
benefits, are expected to come primarily
from achieving a better balance among all
the elements that make up the air
transport system.
• Substantial benefits from civil aviation
have been passed on to the user. Approx-
imately $8.5 billion in passenger-fare and
$1.6 billion in cargo-rate savings have
been realized due to advances in the avia-
tion system over 20 years. An estimated
7,700 fatalities have been avoided due to
the high degree of safety built into the
present-day civil aviation system.
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• Many of the benefits extend far beyond
the direct user of the system; they
encompass regional development,
business stimulation, balance of trade,
improved cultural understanding, and
defense preparedness.
• Civil aviation is an essential element
needed to maintain a high-technology
economy. Better distribution of scarce
talent and high-value goods will help the
United States maintain its economic
strength. As the economy moves in a
service-oriented direction, reliance on
civil aviation will increase.
• Airport development has a catalytic
effect on the economy of a region. It is
therefore recommended that HUD and
DOT/FAA engage in a joint program to
gain a better understanding of the role
and impact of civil aviation in regional
development. This can lead to unification
and clarification of objectives between
the two agencies.
• Balance-of-trade data can serve as a
sensitive early-warning indicator that the
domestic civil aerospace industry will
lose its vitality unless new programs are
initiated.
• Noise and air pollution are among the
greatest disbenefits impeding the growth
of civil aviation today. Over 15 million
people in the United States are affected
daily by unacceptable noise levels, with
an estimated social cost of $9.4 billion. A
combination of retrofitting and land
acquisition, as well as better land-use pro-
grams, is required to effectively solve
this problem. Although air pollution out-
put per air passenger is an order of mag-
nitude less than auto pollution output
per person, air pollution "hot spots" in
the vicinity of airports are appearing in
certain metropolitan areas. Their appear-
ance should serve as an early indicator
that public opposition to
aviation-induced air pollution can be
expected to grow unless solutions are
aggressively pursued. Solution of these
problems is required not only to help
eliminate congestion in the system, and
help meet projected demand, but also to
allow an uninterrupted stream of benefits
and to improve the quality of life.
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Appendix C: Glossary
AIR CARGO. All revenue air traffic other than
passengers; includes freight, express, mail,
and passenger baggage in excess of free
allowance.
AIR CARGO TRAFFIC. Freight, express, and
mail carried by fixed-wing aircraft or heli-
copters, measured in revenue ton-miles.
AIR CARRIER. Aircraft operators certificated by
the Federal Aviation Administration to
transport persons, property, and mail by air.
AIRCRAFT MILES OR PLANE MILES. The
miles (airport-to-airport distances) for each
inter-airport flight actually completed,
whether or not performed in accordance
with the scheduled pattern. For this pur-
pose, operation to a flag stop (stop only on
request) is a flight completed, even though a
landing is not actually made.
AIRCRAFT OPERATION. An aircraft arrival at
or departure from an airport with FAA air-
port traffic control service. There are two
types of operations- local and itinerant.
Local operations are performed by aircraft
t hat:
1. Operate in the local traffic pattern or
within sight of the tower.
2. Are known to be departing for, or
arriving from flight in local practice areas
located within a 20-mile radius of the
control tower.
3. Execute simulated instrument
approaches or low passes at the airport.
Itinerant operations:
All aircraft arrivals and departures other
than local operations.
AIRCRAFT REVENUE HOURS. The airborne
hours in revenue service, computed from the
moment an aircraft leaves the ground until it
touches the ground again.
AIRCRAFT SPEED. The average speed of an air-
craft in statute miles per hour, while air-
borne, in terms of great circle
airport-to-airport distance.
AIRPORT CAPITAL INVESTMENT. The
estimated replacement value of existing air-
ports; includes land, runways, taxiways,
terminals, roads, and parking facilities. Pro-
jected airport capital investment is the cost
(for the Joint Study, in 1968 constant dol-
lars) of the projected number of airports by
type, including the cost of land, runways,
terminals, parking areas, and the replace-
ment cost of existing airports.
AIRPORT OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(O&M) COSTS. Total costs associated with
the operation and maintenance of an airport
and related facilities. These costs do not
include charges for debt retirement or return
on investment.
AIRPORTS. See NATIONAL SYSTEM OF
AIRPORTS.
AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER. A
facility established to provide air traffic con-
trol service to IFR (Instrument Flight Rules)
flights operating within controlled airspace,
principally during the enroute phase of the
flight.
AIR TAXI OPERATOR. One of a class of air
carriers operating aircraft having a maximum
gross takeoff weight of 12,500 pounds or
less and engaging in a wide variety of non-
scheduled and scheduled passenger and cargo
transportation services (see COMMUTER
AIRLINES).
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM. As used in
this report is synonymous with "airways"
and includes enroute control and services,
terminal area control and services, flight ser-
vices, airspace allocation and rules, enroute
navigation, and landing aids.
AIR VEHICLE CAPITAL INVESTMENT. The
estimated replacement value of the inven-
tory of aircraft, spares and repair parts, and
supporting ground equipment. Projected
capital investment is the total cost (in 1968
constant dollars) of the various types of air-
craft and associated ground-support equip-
ment in a forecast fleet mix.
AIR VEHICLE OPERATION AND MAIN-
TENANCE (O&M) COSTS. Total of direct
and indirect operating costs b'y mission and
type of vehicle, excluding interest expense
and aircraft landing fees.
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AIRWAYS. As used in this report, airways
includes enroute control and services, termi-
nal area control and services, flight services,
airspace allocation and rules, enroute naviga-
tion and landing aids (see also AIR
TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEM).
AIRWAYS CAPITAL INVESTMENT• The
estimated replacement value of the facilities
and equipment used in the National Airspace
System. Projected capital investment is the
estimated cost (in 1968 dollars) to acquire
and install the facilities and equipment envi-
sioned in the FAA National Airways System
Plan- Ten Year Plan 1971-1980, plus its
expansion recommended by the ATCAC.
AIRWAYS OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE
(O&M) COSTS. Total costs required to oper-
ate and maintain the National Airspace
System as envisioned in the FAA National
Aviation System Plan- Ten Year Plan
1971-1980, plus the expansion recom-
mended by the Air Traffic Control Advisory
Committee ATCAC.
ALL-CARGO AIRCRAFT. An aircraft designed
or converted to carry freight, express, etc.,
not passengers.
ALL SERVICES. The total of scheduled and
nonscheduled services.
ATA. Air Transport Association of America.
ATC. Air Traffic Control.
ATCAC. Air Traffic Control Advisory Com-
mittee, Department of Transportation (the
Committee's report was issued December
1969). Sometimes referred to as the
Alexander Committee.
AVAILABLE SEAT-MILES. The aggregate of
the products of the aircraft miles flown on
each inter-airport flight multiplied by the
number of seats available on that flight,
representing the total passenger-carrying
capacity offered.
AVAILABLE SEATS. The number of seats
installed in an aircraft (including seats in the
lounges) exclusive of any seats not offered
• for sale to the public by the carrier_ and
inclusive of any seat sold.
AVAILABLE SEATS PER AIRCRAFT. The
average number of seats available per aircraft
for sale to passengers, derived by dividing
the total available seat-miles by the total air-
craft revenue miles in passenger services.
AVAILABLE TON-MILES. The aggregate of the
products of the aircraft miles flown on each
inter-airport flight multiplied by the avail-
able aircraft capacity (tons) for that flight,
representing the traffic-carrying capacity
offered.
AVERAGE PASSENGER TRIP LENGTH. Calcu-
lated by dividing the number of revenue
passenger-miles by the number of revenue
passenger originations. Hence, it gives
one-way trip length.
BREAK-EVEN LOAD FACTOR. That load fac-
tor required for revenue to equal expenses.
CAB. Civil Aeronautics Board.
CARGO. See AIR CARGO.
CARGO ORIGINATIONS (TONS). Revenue tons
of mail, express, and freight placed in transit
in scheduled service at the airport from
which originally dispatched in the carrier's
operations. Shipments of this traffic moving
on interline routings are counted as originat-
ing tons on each of the carriers participating
in the shipment.
CARGO TON MILES. The ton-miles of freight,
express, mail, and excess baggage (see
TON-MILES).
CBD. Central Business District.
CATEGORY I WEATHER. Weather allowing a
forward visibility of 1/2mile. The pilot
should be able to see the runway from an
altitude not in excess of 200 feet.
CATEGORY II WEATHER. Weather allowing a
forward visibility of 1/4 mile. The pilot
should be able to see the runway from an
altitude not in excess of 100 feet.
CATEGORY Ill WEATHER. Runway effectively
not visible from any altitude and all landing
decisions are left to the pilot. Category Ill
breaks down into three subcategories, IliA,
lllB, and IIIC, as follows:
IliA. Forward visibility is 700 feet, a dis-
tance sufficient for a landing abort.
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IIIB. Forwardvisibility is 50 feet, a dis-
tance sufficient to permit taxiing.
IIIC. Zero forward visibility.
CERTIFICATED ROUTE AIR CARRIER. One
of a class of air carriers holding certificates
of public convenience and necessity, issued
by the CAB, authorizing the performance of
scheduled air transportation over specified
routes and a limited amount of nonsched-
uled operations. This general carrier group-
ing includes the all-purpose carriers, the
all-cargo carriers, and comprises all of the
airlines certificated by the CAB, except the
supplemental air carriers.
COMMERCIAL OPERATOR. One of a class of
air carriers operating on a private for-hire
basis, as distinguished from public or
common air carrier, holding a commercial
operator certificate issued by the Adminis-
trator of the FAA authorizing the operation
of aircraft in air commerce for the transpor-
tation of goods or passengers for
compensation or hire.
COMMON CARRIER. A transportation business
that offers its services for public hire.
Includes airlines, railroads, buslines,
trucklines, and watercarriers. Excludes con-
tract carriers and nontransportation com-
panies and the public at large who provide
transportation for themselves.
COMMUTER AIRLINES. Air taxi operators who
perform, pursuant to published schedules, at
least five round trips a week between two or
more points.
CONTROLLED AIRSPACE. Airspace containing
aircraft flying under either VFR or IFR. It
starts at some altitude above the ground and
extends up to Positive Controlled Airspace.
In terminal area control zones, it extends to
the ground.
CONTROLLED VISUAL FLIGHT RULES
(CVFR). Visual flights in which avoidance of
collision with all other aircraft is assured by
the ATC system. To enable the ATC system
to carry this out, CVFR flight is restricted to
Positive Control Airspace.
CTOL. Conventional TakeOff and Landing.
DIRECT OPERATING COSTS. Expenses that
apply directly to the operation of an airline's
aircraft. The main categories are flying oper-
ations, maintenance of flight equipment, and
depreciation of flight equipment.
DISBENEFIT. Anything that is disadvantageous
or not for the good of a person or thing; a
negative benefit.
DOC. Direct Operating Costs.
DOD. Department of Defense.
DOMESTIC SCHEDULED SERVICE. Transport
service operated over an air carrier's certif-
icated routes, within the territory of the
United States (see SCHEDULED SERVICE).
DOT. Department of Transportation.
EFFECTIVE PERCEIVED NOISE LEVEL, IN
DECIBELS (EPNdB). The effective per-
ceived noise level (EPNL) is a modification
of the perceived noise level (PNL) to
account for the effect of the pure tones of
high-bypass-ratio engines and the effect of
the flyover period of an aircraft.
ELIGIBLE AIRCRAFT. An aircraft with a cur-
rent airworthiness certificate that, through a
periodic or progressive aircraft inspection, has
been renewed within the past 12 months.
ENPLANED PASSENGERS. Passengers boarding
an aircraft, including originating, stopover,
and transfer passengers, for both scheduled
and nonscheduled service.
FAA. Federal Aviation Administration.
FEEDER SYSTEM (of Airports). See
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF AIRPORTS.
FLIGHT. The operation of an aircraft from take-
off to landing (see OVERALL FLIGHT
STAGE LENGTH).
FTL. Fast Transit Link.
GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT. All civil air-
craft except those classified as air carriers.
GNP. Gross National Product.
HELICOPTER CARRIERS. Domestic certificated
route air carriers employing helicopter air-
craft for their primary operations.
ICC. Interstate Commerce Commission.
IFR. Instrument Flight Rules.
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ILS.InstrumentLandingSystem.
INDIRECTOPERATINGCOSTS(IOC's).All air-
line operating costs, other than direct
operating costs.
INTERMITTENT POSITIVE CONTROL (IPC). A
system that can reliably and accurately pro-
vide an air traffic control center with iden-
tity, position, and altitude information on
all suitably equipped aircraft within desig-
nated portions of the airspace. The ATC
computer, through a data link, can automati-
cally advise aircraft of threats because of
other aircraft, weather, airspace boundaries,
and surface obstacles.
IR&D. Independent Research and Development
performed by private companies. In certain
cases 1R&D costs are allowable overhead
charges on Government procurement
contracts and are thus reimbursed by the
Government.
ITINERANT AIRCRAFT OPERATION. See
AIRCRAFT OPERATION.
L/D. Lift-Drag ratio.
LOAD FACTOR (PASSENGER). The percentage
of saleable seat-miles actually sold in sched-
uled service (passenger-miles + saleable
seat-miles X 100).
LOCAL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS. See
AIRCRAFT OPERATION.
LOCAL SERVICE CARRIERS. Certificated
domestic route air carriers operating routes
of lesser density between the smaller traffic
centers and between these centers and
principal centers.
LONG-TERM DEBT. The face value or principal
amount of debt securities issued or assumed
by the air carrier and held by other than
associated companies, which has not been
retired or cancelled and is not payable
within 12 months of balance sheet date.
M. Mach number.
NACA. National Advisory Committee for Aero-
nautics (Federal aeronautical research
agency that was the predecessor of the
National Aeronautics and Space
Administration).
NASA. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF AIRPORTS. All air-
ports except those of local interest (airports
designed to attract industry, enhance pres-
tige, etc.) and military airports except those
in joint use. The National System of Air-
ports is broken down into the following
major subdivisions based on the number of
annual enplaned passengers:
Primary System. More than one million
enplaned passengers.
Secondary System. 50,000 to one million
enplaned passengers.
Feeder System. Less than 50,000
enplaned passengers.
Each of the above subdivisions is further
subdivided into high-, medium-, and
low-density airports based on the annual
number of aircraft operations. For example,
a high-density airport in the primary system
has more than 350,000 aircraft operations
annually, while a high-density airport in the
feeder system has more than 100,000 annual
operations.
NECTP. Northeast Corridor Transportation
Project.
NOISE EXPOSURE FORECAST (NEF/. A factor
used to measure the effect of aircraft noise
on residential or other communities. NEF
takes into account the effective perceived
noise level (EPNL) and- with different
weightings- the average number of take-
offs, or landings, by day and by night.
NONSCHEDULED SERVICE. Revenue flights
that are not operated on regular scheduled
service, such as charter flights and all non-
revenue flights incident to such flights.
OHSGT. Office of High-Speed Ground Transpor-
tation of DOT.
OPERATING EXPENSES (COSTS). Expenses
incurred in the performance of air transpor-
tation. Includes direct aircraft operating
expenses and ground and indirect operating
expenses.
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OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE (O&M)
COSTS. See AIR VEHICLE, AIRPORT,
AIRWAYS O&M COSTS.
ORIGINATING TONS. See CARGO
ORIGINATIONS (TONS).
OVERALL FLIGHT STAGE LENGTH. The
average distance covered per aircraft flight in
revenue service, from takeoff to landing,
including both passenger/cargo and all-cargo
aircraft. Derived by dividing the overall air-
craft miles flown in revenue services by the
number of overall revenue departures
performed.
PASSENGER-MILE. One passenger transported
one mile. Passenger-miles are the summation
of the products of the aircraft-miles flown
on each interairport flight multiplied by the
number of passengers carried on that flight.
PERSON-TRIP. One person on one round trip
from home to a place at least 100 miles
away or staying overnight and returning (as
used in this report).
PNdB. Perceived Noise in Decibels.
POSITIVE CONTROLLED AIRSPACE (PCA).
Exists above 18,000 feet in the northeastern
portion of the United States and above
24,000 feet in the remainder of the country.
In PCA, all aircraft are under IFR control
and the ATC system provides separation
service between all aircraft.
PRICE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND. The extent
to which changes in air fares and rates will
produce changes in traffic volume.
PROXIMITY (PILOT) WARNING INDICATOR
(PWI). An airborne device whose function is
to warn a pilot of the proximity of other
aircraft. It may also provide other informa-
tion to assist the pilot in evaluating the situa-
tion, such as relative bearing and bearing rate
of other aircraft, relative altitude, range, or
combinations of these parameters.
R&D. Research and development; includes R&T
(see below) and development. Development
is the application of technology to the
design and fabrication of specific compo-
nents subsystems, systems, or processes, and
to the testing and evaluation of these articles
or processes with the intent to go into pro-
duction of operational articles. This part of
the R&D process is sometimes referred to as
prototype development.
R&T. Research and Technology- basic and
applied research. Research (sometimes
referred to as basic research) is a
discipline-oriented activity directed toward
an increase in knowledge in the physical,
biological, or social science. Technology
(sometimes referred to as applied research) is
the application of knowledge to arrive at
techniques, design data, or design criteria, or
to demonstrate the feasibility of a concept
with no intent to go into quantity produc-
tion of operational articles.
RETURN ON EQUITY. The ratio (expressed as a
percentage) of (a)net income after special
items to (b) stock holder equity.
RETURN ON INVESTMENT (ROI). The ratio
(expressed as the percentage of (a)net
income after special items, but before
interest expense, to (b) total investment (see
TOTAL INVESTMENT).
REVENUE PASSENGER-MILE (RPM). One
revenue passenger transported one mile (see
PASSENGER-MI LE).
REVENUE PASSENGER ORIGINATIONS. The
number of revenue passengers boarding air-
craft at the points of initial enplanement
with the return portion of a round trip
counted separately as an initial operation.
Passengers traveline on an interairline ticket
are counted as an initial origination on each
of the carriers in the journey.
REVENUE TON-MILES (RTM). One ton of
revenue traffic transported one mile.
SCHEDULED FLIGHT TIME. Elapsed time
between departure and arrival as published
in Official Airline Guide for best service at
peak hours.
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SCHEDULEDPASSENGER-MILES.Summation
of the productsof the airport-to-airport
distancesof all flightsscheduled,multiplied
by the number of passengers carried (or fore-
cast to be carried) on each scheduled flight.
SCHEDULED SERVICE. Transport service
operated over an air carrier's certificated
routes, based on published flight schedules,
including extra sections and related
nonrevenue flights.
STOL. Short Takeoff and Landing.
SERVICES, ALL. Scheduled and nonscheduled
transport services.
SST. Supersonic Transport.
STAGE (FLIGHT STAGE LENGTH). The opera-
tion of an aircraft from takeoff to landing.
Overall flight stage length is the average dis-
tance covered per aircraft flight from takeoff
to landing. Derived by dividing the over-
all aircraft miles flown in revenue services,
by the number of overall revenue departures
performed.
SUPPLEMENTAL AIR CARRIER. One of a class
of air carriers holding temporary certificates
of public convenience and necessity issued
by the CAB, authorizing them to perform
passenger and cargo charter services, supple-
menting the scheduled service of the
certificated route air carriers.
TON-MILE. One short ton transported one
statute mile. Ton-miles are computed by
summation of the products of the aircraft
miles flown on each interairport flight muhi-
plied by the number of tons carried on that
flight.
TOTAL CAPITAL. Net worth (capital stock,
earned, surplus, capital surplus, and contin-
gency reserves) plus long-term debt.
TOTAL INVESTMENTS. Average of five quar-
terly balances of stockholder equity,
long-term debt, and advances from
associated companies representing
investment.
TRUNK CARRIERS (DOMESTIC TRUNK CAR-
RIERS). This group of carriers operates vri-
marily within the limits of the 48 contiguous
states of the United States and the District
of Columbia over routes serving primarily
the larger communities. Most of the domes-
tic trunks also have international and
territorial operations.
UMTA. Urban Mass Transit Administration of
DOT.
VFR. Visual Flight Rules.
V/STOL. Vertical/Short TakeOff and Landing.
VTOL. Vertical TakeOff and Landing.
YIELD PER PASSENGER-MILE. Passenger
revenues divided by total passenger-miles,
expressed in cents per passenger-mile.
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